Coffey v. United States

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ERNEST COFFEY )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 24-cv-1006-SMY

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, )

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, )

CHARLES RETTIG and )

STEVEN MNUCHIN, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YANDLE, District Judge:

Plaintiff Ernest Coffey filed this pro se action against the United States of America, the

Department of Treasury, the IRS, Charles Rettig, and Steven Mnuchin alleging violations of 42

U.S.C. § 1983, the Federal Torts Claim Act, and the CARES Act. Coffey’s Motion for Leave to

Proceed in Forma Pauperis ("IFP") (Doc. 2) is now before the Court. For the following reasons,

the motion is DENIED and Coffey’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, an indigent party may commence a federal court action without

paying required costs and fees upon submission of an affidavit asserting the inability “to pay

such fees or give security therefor” and stating “the nature of the action, defense or appeal and

the affiant’s belief that the person is entitled to redress.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Section 1915

applies to non-prisoner plaintiffs and prisoners alike. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324

(1989). Coffey has sufficiently demonstrated his indigence in this case. He states in his motion

and accompanying affidavit that he is currently incarcerated and unemployed and has no other

income. His prisoner trust account has a balance of approximately $2.09. Based upon this

information, the Court finds that Coffey is unable to pay the costs of commencing his lawsuit.

The Court’s inquiry does not end there, however, because § 1915(e)(2) requires careful threshold

scrutiny of a Complaint filed by a plaintiff seeking to proceed IFP.

The Court may dismiss a case if it determines the action is clearly frivolous or malicious,

fails to state a claim, or is a claim for money damages against an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B); see also Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003) (“District judges

have ample authority to dismiss frivolous or transparently defective suits spontaneously, and thus

save everyone time and legal expense”). Thus, in conducting the § 1915(e)(2) screening, the

Court is required to determine if the Complaint presents any potentially meritorious factual and

legal grounds. The Complaint must contain allegations that go beyond a merely speculative

level. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

The federal government enacted three major laws in response to the COVID-19

pandemic. Each of these stimulus laws authorized direct economic impact payments (“EIPs”) to

American adults with an income below $75,000. The first stimulus statute, the Coronavirus Aid,

Relief, and Economic Security Act (“the CARES Act”), provided for a $1,200 stimulus payment.

26 U.S.C. § 6428(a). The second stimulus statute, the Consolidated Appropriations Act (“the

CAA”), authorized a $600 stimulus payment. 26 U.S.C. § 6428A(a). The third stimulus statute,

the American Rescue Plan Act (“the ARPA”), authorized a $1,400 stimulus payment. 26 U.S.C.

§ 6428B(b).

Coffey received his CAA payment (Doc. 1, pp. 31-32). However, he alleges that he did

not receive either the CARES Act or ARPA payments which he claims were stolen by someone

impersonating him. He further alleges that the IRS violated his constitutional rights by

negligently failing to do its due diligence and failing to investigate prior to disbursing EIP

payments. He seeks reimbursement of the two EIP in the amount of $1,200 and $1,400 that he

claims were stolen.

As an initial matter, Coffey claims against Defendants Retting and Mnuchin in their

official capacities fail to state a claim. “[A]n official capacity suit is tantamount to a claim

against the government entity itself,” and the Court shall construe it as such. Klebanowski v.

Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 2008). Further, to the extent he seeks to sue these

Defendants in their individual capacities, the tax code provides that any suit related to recovering

any internal revenue tax “may be maintained only against the United States and not against any

officer or employee of the United States....” 26 U.S.C. § 7422(f)(1). Therefore, Defendants

Retting, Mnuchin, Department of Treasury, and IRS will be dismissed with prejudice.

Turning to the allegations in the Complaint, “absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields

the federal government and its agencies from suit.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994)

(finding no direct cause of action for damages against federal agency because of sovereign

immunity). As such, to the extent that Coffey is attempting to allege constitutional violations

against the United States, his constitutional claims are barred by sovereign immunity. Likewise,

he cannot maintain a claim against the United States under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the Federal Torts

Claim Act (“FTCA”). Section 1983 applies only to state and local officers, while the FTCA is

inapplicable to “any claim arising in respect to the assessment or collection of any tax”. Clark v.

United States, 326 F.3d 911, 913 (7th Cir. 2003).

Coffey’s attempt to state a claim for tax refund fails as well. The United States consents

to be sued for a tax refund only where the taxpayer has filed an administrative claim with the IRS

pursuant to the conditions set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a), which states:

“No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any

internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or

collected ... until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the

Secretary, according to the provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations of

the Secretary established in pursuance thereof.”

If the administrative claim is denied, the taxpayer may then file a tax refund suit in the district

court, but only within the time constraints provided in 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(1). Compliance with

these requirements is jurisdictionally required of the taxpayer before initiating the lawsuit.

Coffey attached documents to his Complaint including IRS form 3911 and

correspondence from the IRS. In the most recent correspondence dated February 8, 2024, the

IRS states that records show that the checks were mailed to Coffey on July 24, 2020 and July 16,

2021. The IRS also indicates that it is unable to do any additional investigations regarding the

checks because Coffey did not complete the form 3911 and did not sign it, and instructs Coffey

to resubmit a signed form 3911.

Coffey filed this lawsuit one month after his last correspondence from the IRS and it is

unclear from the Complaint if Coffey followed the directive of the IRS. In other words, the

Court cannot determine whether he exhausted his administrative remedies. Therefore, to the

extent that this case can be construed as a refund action, Coffey has not alleged sufficient facts to

establish that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction to decide the claim. To the extent that

Coffey is alleging constitutional violations, those claims are dismissed with prejudice.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice and his motion to

proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED. All pending motions are TERMINATED as MOOT.

Plaintiff may file an amended complaint consistent with this Order and establishing that he

exhausted his administrative remedies within 30 days.

IT ISSO ORDERED.

DATED: July 8, 2024

STACI M. YANDLE

United States District Judge

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