Wisham v. United States

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ANTHONY C. WISHAM,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 23-CV-00027-SPM

THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

McGLYNN, District Judge:

Petitioner Anthony C. Wisham, an inmate incarcerated at the Federal

Correctional Institution in Oakdale, Louisiana, filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside,

or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. 1). Within the motion,

Wisham raises various ineffective assistance of counsel arguments. (See id.). The

Government filed a Response (Doc. 29) to which Wisham replied (Doc. 30). For the

following reasons set forth, the Petition is DENIED.

RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 17, 2021, absent a plea agreement, Wisham pleaded guilty to

distribution of fentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C) (Counts

1 and 2); possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

922(g)(1) (Count 3); and being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 §

U.S.C. 924(a)(2) (Count 4). See United States v. Anthony C. Wisham, No. 21-cr-30027

(S.D. Ill. 2022), (Doc. 29, p. 3) [hereinafter Criminal Case]. This Court sentenced

Wisham to 135 months each for Counts 1–3 and 120 months as to Count 4, with all

counts to run concurrently. Criminal Case, (Doc. 39, p. 3).

Wisham filed the instant § 2255 Petition attacking his sentence on December

27, 2022. (See Doc. 1). In his Petition, Wisham raises various claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel—specifically, he argues that his counsel (Attorney Paul Sims)

was ineffective because counsel failed to object to Wisham’s criminal history falling

within Category III (Claim One), counsel failed to object to the dangerous weapon

enhancement application (Claim Two), counsel failed to pursue a two-point level

reduction pursuant to the safety valve provision (Claim Three), and counsel failed to

consult with Wisham about his right to appeal (Claim Four). (See Doc. 1). The

Government filed a Response to Wisham’s Petition. (Doc. 29). Wisham also filed a

Reply. (Doc. 30).

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is limited. Unlike a direct appeal, in which a

defendant may complain of nearly any error, § 2255 may be used only to correct errors

that litigate the sentencing court’s jurisdiction or are otherwise of constitutional

magnitude. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has

emphasized that relief under § 2255 is “available only in extraordinary situations,

such as an error of constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude or where a fundamental

defect has occurred which results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Blake v.

United States, 723 F.3d 870, 878 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Prewitt v. United States, 83

F.3d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 1996)); see Harris v. United States, 366 F.3d 593, 594 (7th Cir.

2004); Borre v. United States, 940 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir. 1991). Section 2255 cannot

be used as a substitute for a direct appeal or to relitigate issues decided on direct

appeal. See Sandoval v. United States, 574 F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 2009); White v.

United States, 371 F.3d 900, 902 (7th Cir. 2004); Coleman v. United States, 318 F.3d

754, 760 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 926 (2003).

Section 2255 requires a court to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence of a

prisoner in custody if it finds that “the sentence was imposed in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction

to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum

authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

“[R]elief under § 2255 is an extraordinary remedy because it asks the district court

to essentially reopen the criminal process to a person who already has had an

opportunity for full process.” Almonacid v. United States, 476 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir.

2007).

ANALYSIS

Wisham raises claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which may be

brought for the first time under a § 2255 motion. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S.

500, 504 (2003); United States v. James, 635 F.3d 909, 916 (7th Cir. 2011). Ineffective

assistance of counsel claims are evaluated under the two-prong test first enumerated

in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 690, 694 (1984). See McDowell v. Kingston,

497 F.3d 757, 761 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 694). “The Sixth

Amendment right of effective assistance of counsel applies to a criminal defendant’s

trial, sentencing, and the first appeal of right.” Jones v. Welborn, 877 F. Supp. 1214,

1219 (S.D. Ill. 1994).

Under Strickland, the defendant “must demonstrate: (1) ‘that counsel's

performance was deficient,’ and (2) ‘that the deficient performance prejudiced the

defense.’” Thompson v. Vanihel, 998 F.3d 762, 767 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687). To satisfy the performance prong, the defendant must overcome “a

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. To prove prejudice, the

defendant must establish that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Id. at 694. The Court is not required to analyze both the performance and

prejudice prong, because the failure to satisfy either prong will be fatal to the claim.

See Ebbole v. United States, 8 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v.

Slaughter, 900 F.2d 1119, 1124 (7th Cir. 1990).

I. Failure of Counsel to Object to Application of Criminal History

Category III

Wisham’s first claim is that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to

the application of Criminal History Category III. (See Doc. 1, pp. 1–2). Wisham

received two criminal history points for possession of a controlled substance from an

arrest on March 22, 2009, for which he was later sentenced to one year of

imprisonment. Criminal Case, (Doc. 29., ¶ 56). Wisham received an additional two

criminal history points for possession of a controlled substance from an arrest on

September 30, 2011, for which he was later sentenced to one year of imprisonment.

Id., (Doc. 29., ¶ 57). Wisham received a total of four criminal history points from his

previous sentences, which resulted in the application of a Criminal History Category

III in accordance with the United States Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S. Sent’g

Guidelines Manual § 5A (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2023) [hereinafter Sentencing

Guidelines].

Wisham argues that his counsel should have objected to the two points from

his arrest on March 22, 2009 because offenses that result in more than sixty (60) days

but less than thirteen (13) months of imprisonment are not counted towards the

criminal history category if the sentence was imposed more than ten (10) years prior

to the “commencement of the instant offense.” See Sentencing Guidelines § 4A1.1 cmt.

n.2, (Doc. 1, pp. 1–2). The Government argues that Wisham’s “claim is factually and

legally incorrect and Attorney Sims was not deficient for not objecting to Petitioner’s

Wisham’s receiving two criminal history points” because “the date for this conviction

is incorrect as stated in the PSR” and his prior conviction was within ten (10) years

of the criminal conduct at issue here. (Doc. 29, pp. 6–7).

While Wisham was arrested from the previous offense on March 22, 2009, he

was not sentenced until July 28, 2011.1 The distinction between Wisham’s previous

arrest and the resulting sentencing from that arrest is critical; the applicable time

period used to compute a criminal history category includes any other prior sentence

1 See State of Illinois v. Anthony C. Wisham, No. 2009-CF-000236 (2009),

http://records.sangamoncountycircuitclerk.org/sccc/DisplayDocket.sc (last visited June 25, 2024)

(navigate to “Case Search,” then search for “Anthony Wisham,” and select case “2009-CF-000236”).

The date of Wisham’s sentencing was erroneously listed as March 25, 2009 in his Presentence

Investigation Report. See Criminal Case, (Doc. 29, ¶ 56).

that was imposed within ten (10) years of the defendant’s commencement of the

current offense. See Sentencing Guidelines § 4A1.2(e)(2). Wisham’s current offense

and any relevant conduct began in September 2020. Criminal Case, (Doc. 29, ¶ 21).

Therefore, Wisham correctly received two criminal history points from his first

possession of a controlled substance conviction because his sentence (imposed on July

28, 2011) was within ten (10) years of the commencement of the current offense in

September 2020. For these reasons, Wisham’s counsel was not constitutionally

ineffective for failing to make what would have been a frivolous argument. Therefore,

Wisham’s first claim fails.

II. Failure of Counsel to Object to Dangerous Weapon Enhancement

Wisham next claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a

dangerous weapon enhancement application based on a finding that Wisham

possessed a firearm in connection with his drug offense. (See Doc. 1, pp. 2–5). This

finding subsequently disqualified Wisham from safety-valve relief. See infra Section

III.

After Wisham was arrested, DEA agents conducted a search of his apartment

and recovered a .38 caliber Derringer pistol from underneath a pillow in his bedroom

and a 9-millimeter Taurus pistol loaded with a high-capacity magazine from inside a

jacket in his bedroom closet. Criminal Case, (Doc. 29, ¶ 17). Furthermore, Wisham

had previously used his bedroom to retrieve fentanyl for distribution. Id., (Doc. 29, ¶

12). While Wisham argues that these weapons were present for self-defense (see Doc.

1, pp. 16–17, 20, 22), the Government argues that “there is nothing to support

Petitioner Wisham’s self-serving claim that these firearms were present strictly for

self-defense” and that “argument is made too late and is unsupported by the record,”

meaning that “his sentencing enhancement was properly applied, Attorney Sims, who

researched this issue prior to sentencing, was not deficient for not objecting to its

application to Petitioner Wisham’s Base Offense Level, and Petitioner Wisham was

not prejudiced.” (Doc. 29, p. 9 (citations omitted)).

Wisham also argues in his Reply (Doc. 30) that “any weapons enhancement

that is incurred in addition to the gun charge is double counting and/or double

jeopardy in a sense.” (Id., p. 2). He seems to argue that his conviction for being a felon

in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a) already

addressed the possession a weapon and that his sentence should not be enhanced in

accordance with § 2D1.2(b)(1). (See Doc. 30, p. 2). Wisham states that the

“enhancement applies only ‘if a weapon was possessed during the offense,’” which he

claims is not applicable here. (Id.). He also argues that he did not have the gun during

the drug transactions in question, that the informant did not see a gun on Wisham,

and that this is a “stretch” of § 2D1.2(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines.

The Sentencing Guidelines indicate that the dangerous weapon enhancement

associated with a drug charge “should be applied if the weapon was present, unless

it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” Sentencing

Guidelines § 2D1.1 cmt. 11(1). As an example, the Sentencing Guidelines state that

“the enhancement would not be applied if the defendant, arrested at the defendant’s

residence, had an unloaded hunting rifle in the closet.” Id. The government is

required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence “that the defendant possessed

a weapon either actually or constructively, meaning he ‘had the power and the

intention to exercise dominion or control of the firearm.’” United States v. Thurman,

889 F.3d 356, 372 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Morris, 836 F.3d 868, 872

(7th Cir. 2016)). If the Government meets this burden, the burden shifts to the

defendant to prove that it is “clearly improbable [that] he possessed the weapon in

connection with the drug offense.” Id.

The Seventh Circuit has “stated repeatedly that ‘guns found in close proximity

to drug activity are presumptively connected to that activity.’” Id. (quoting United

States v. Bothun, 424 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2005)); see United States v. Fincher, 924

F.3d 501, 505 (7th Cir. 2019). In Fincher, the District Court found that a seized

firearm was connected to the drug offense because the firearm “was kept loaded and

in a readily accessible place,” and in close proximity to the drug stash. 929 F.3d at

506. Comparing the instant facts to Fincher, the Taurus found in Wisham’s bedroom

was loaded, readily accessible, and located near the fentanyl he retrieved on

September 15, 2020 for sale to the confidential informant, who met Wisham at this

same apartment. See Criminal Case, (Doc. 29, ¶¶ 12, 17); Fincher, 929 F.3d at 506.

Moreover, as discussed in the Sentencing Guidelines and in Fincher, the weapon at

issue was a handgun, instead of a “hunting gun,” which would “suggest it had a

purpose unrelated to the offense.” Fincher at 506; see Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1

cmt. 11(1). Thus, the government has met its burden under the preponderance of the

evidence standard to connect the firearms to the charged crime.

The burden thus shifts to Wisham to prove that it is “clearly improbable” that

the firearms in question were connected to drug trafficking. In his Petition, Wisham

includes a Motion to Expand the Record in which he argues that a newspaper clipping

from the Illinois Monitor provides an alternate motive for him to possess a firearm

for self-defense (because his girlfriend’s brother Kein Henderson was kidnapped).

(See Doc. 1, pp. 16–17, 20, 22). However, Kein Henderson was kidnapped in his own

grandmother’s house, not from Wisham’s residence. (See id., pp. 16–17). Moreover,

Wisham’s Petition argues that it was “speculated in the neighborhood” that the

kidnappers would “kill the Eastman family if the Eastmans pursued a police

investigation.” (See id.). He alleges that he purchased the firearms in December of

2020 after the kidnapping in August, but also argues that he was a victim of gun

violence in 1986. (See id., p. 16). While Wisham was romantically involved with Kein’s

sister, his argument that he obtained firearms for protection unrelated to his drug

sales are not convincing, especially since he claims that a prior gun injury from gun

violence from thirty-four years before contributed to him acquiring the weapons at

issue in 2020. (See id.).

Wisham argues in his Reply that it is a “stretch” of § 2D1.1 of the Sentencing

Guidelines to link the weapons in question to the drug transactions at issue here.

(See Doc. 30, p. 2 (citing United States v. Ramirez, 783 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2015))).

However, Ramirez does not help Wisham; in that case, the Seventh Circuit upheld

the district court’s individualized assessment that it was foreseeable for firearms to

be present in stash houses for a drug ring for which the plaintiff worked as a

bookkeeper. See Ramirez at 690–92. Similarly to Ramirez, the defendant in Thurman

unsuccessfully argued that firearms found in a house where he stored drugs “were

not within the immediate vicinity of his drug operations, such that he did not exercise

control over them for purposes of constructive possession.” 889 F.3d at 372. Thurman

claimed that he “procured the guns many years earlier for reasons unrelated to drug

sale.” Id. Wisham does not argue that he obtained the firearms years before—in fact,

he argues the opposite. (See Doc. 1, p. 16). Wisham’s only argument here is that he

did not have the weapons on his person during the drug transactions. However, as

the Government notes, the loaded guns were in his bedroom where he stored drugs,

which is sufficient to link them to Wisham’s drug trafficking enterprise. (See Doc. 29,

pp. 7–9).

In summary, Wisham does not meet his burden to prove that it is “clearly

improbable” that the weapons were associated with drug trafficking. Wisham’s

arguments do not meet the required standard and, thus, his counsel was not

ineffective for not raising them. Therefore, his second claim also fails.

III. Failure of Counsel to Pursue Safety-Valve Relief

Wisham next argues that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing

to pursue relief under the safety-valve provision. (See Doc. 1, pp. 5–6). The

Government argues that Wisham’s arguments are “legally incorrect” and that

Wisham’s counsel was not deficient for failing to object at Wisham’s sentencing. (Doc.

29, p. 8).

The safety-valve provision permits the court to sentence a defendant “without

regard to any statutory minimum sentence” accompanying certain drug-related

offenses if the defendant meets five criteria: (1) his or her criminal history is minimal

(no “more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points

resulting from a 1-point offense” and no three-point offenses or violent two-point

offenses); (2) he or she did not use or threaten violence or possess a firearm in

connection with the offense; (3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily

injury to any person; (4) he or she was not an “organizer, leader, manager, or

supervisor or others in the offense”; and (5) he or she truthfully provided all

information and evidence about the offense to the government before the sentencing

hearing. Sentencing Guidelines § 5C1.2 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)); see United States

v. Stamps, 983 F.3d 945, 949 (7th Cir. 2020).

It is the second factor (whether Wisham possessed a firearm in connection with

his offense) that is at issue in Claims Two and Three. (See Doc. 1, pp. 14–18). Section

2D1.1(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a two-level enhancement if

Wisham possessed a firearm in connection with the offense. Therefore, Wisham’s two-

level enhancement and eligibility for safety-valve relief are interrelated, with both

depending on whether Wisham possessed a firearm in connection with his drug

offense.

The burden of proof for the two-level enhancement and safety-valve relief are

different. United States v. Fincher, 924 F.3d 501, 505 (7th Cir. 2019). To qualify for

safety-valve eligibility, Wisham must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that

he did not possess the firearm in connection with the offense. Id. This is thus a lower

burden than the “clearly improbable” standard associated with the two-level

enhancement discussed above. See supra Section II.

The Seventh Circuit was clear in Stamps that failing to meet the “clearly

improbable” standard does not automatically mean that the petitioner fails under the

preponderance of the evidence standard. See Stamps, 983 F.3d at 950; see also

Fincher, 929 F.2d at 505. That being said, the reverse is true—if a petition fails to

meet the preponderance of the evidence standard, he or she cannot then meet the

higher “clearly improbable standard.” Stamps makes it clear that the possession of

the firearm must be separately evaluated under the preponderance of the evidence

standard. See Stamps at 950.

Wisham argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to assess whether

or not he can establish by the preponderance of the evidence standard that he did not

possess the firearms in relation to the sale of drugs. (See Doc. 1, p. 6). While the

Seventh Circuit has stated that this determination is a “fact-intensive inquiry,” there

is adequate information in the record to address Wisham’s claim. Stamps at 950.

While he cites Stamps as an example of there being “credible reasons for being in

possession of the firearm,” the facts before this Court are much closer to Fincher than

to Stamps. See Fincher at 506; Stamps at 950. In Stamps, the defendant argued that

the weapon in question was for his personal defense, as he had been wrongfully

accused of murder and had received credible threats. See id. at 947 (Even though

“Stamps officially cleared his name[,] . . . others in the community continued to hold

Stamps responsible for the murder and threatened to harm him in retribution. On

one occasion, someone even fired shots into Stamps’s apartment.”). The weapons

found in Wisham’s apartment were in close proximity to where he stored drugs and

were clearly not designed for hunting or for a purpose other than personal defense.

While Wisham also claims that the firearms were for his protection, his Petition does

not describe specific threats to him personally. Rather, the provided newspaper

clipping only describes the kidnapping incident involving his girlfriend’s brother at

his girlfriend’s grandmother’s house and states that Wisham himself was a victim of

firearm violence thirty-four years before acquiring the weapons. (See Doc. 1, pp. 16–

17). Unlike in Stamps, Wisham does not provide a compelling reason for needing a

firearm other than for protecting his drug supply. See Stamps at 947.

Therefore, Wisham has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that

his possession of a firearm was not connected to the offense, and safety-valve relief

was properly denied. Thus, Wisham’s counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for

failing to make a frivolous argument and Wisham’s third claim fails.

IV. Failure of Counsel to Consult with Wisham Regarding His Right to

Appeal

Wisham finally claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to consult

with Wisham regarding his right to appeal. (Doc. 1, pp. 5–6). By pleading guilty

without a plea agreement, Wisham agreed to an unconditional guilty plea, which does

not reserve any issues for purposes of an appeal. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11; Criminal

Case, (Doc. 29, ¶ 6). Additionally, the Government points to the transcript of

Wisham’s sentencing, in which this Court unquestioningly informed Wisham of his

right to an appeal and his right to be represented by counsel. (See Doc. 29, p. 10

(quoting id., Ex. C., pp. 25–26)).

Wisham has provided no evidence—apart from bare assertions—to support his

claim of his counsel’s ineffective performance. The sort of evidence needed to prove

ineffective assistance of counsel in negotiating a plea begins with sworn affidavits

attesting to Wisham’s allegations. Galbraith v. United States, 313 F.3d 1001, 1009

(2002); see Duarte v. United States, 81 F.3d 75, 76 (7th Cir. 1996) (basing § 2255

petition claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on petitioner’s sworn affidavits).

As it is clear that Wisham was apprised of his rights, the Government argues that

the only remaining question is whether or not Wisham’s attorney had a duty to

consult with Wisham about an appeal. (See Doc. 29, p. 10). As the Supreme Court has

stated:

[C]ounsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to consult with the

defendant about an appeal when there is reason to think either (1) that

a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because there

are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular

defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in

appealing.

Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480 (2000). The Supreme Court continued, saying

that “a highly relevant factor in this inquiry will be whether the conviction follows a

trial or a guilty plea, both because a guilty plea reduces the scope of potentially

appealable issues and because such a plea may indicate that the defendant seeks an

end to judicial proceedings.” Id. Additionally, “[e]ven in cases when the defendant

pleads guilty, the court must consider such factors as whether the defendant received

the sentence bargained for as part of the plea and whether the plea expressly reserved

or waived some or all appeal rights.” Id.

Wisham’s counsel has provided an affidavit in which he states that “Defendant

was informed of his rights, including his right to appeal at sentencing, Defendant did

not inform Counsel of a desire to appeal, nor did he ask Counsel any questions in

regards to said rights.” (Doc. 29, Ex. 1, p. 4). Moreover, Wisham’s counsel states that

“I did not think there were non-frivolous grounds to appeal. I did not talk to

Defendant after sentencing nor did I talk to his family and I don’t recall anyone

asking me about appeals. The sentence was within the guidelines and therefore I

thought it was reasonable.” (Id.). Therefore, “tak[ing] into account all the information

counsel knew or should have known,” Flores-Ortega at 480 (citing Strickland at 690),

Attorney Sims did not have a duty to consult with Wisham about an appeal and, thus,

his conduct was neither deficient nor prejudicial. Thus, Wisham’s fourth claims fails,

as well.

V. Evidentiary Hearing

Wisham has requested an evidentiary hearing on his claims, pursuant to §

2255(b). See supra Section III, (Doc. 1., p. 12). The Government opposes an

evidentiary hearing. (See Doc. 29, pp. 11–12).

This Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is not essential. See Almonacid,

476 F.3d at 521 (7th Cir. 2007) (“If it plainly appears from the motion, any attached

exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to

relief the judge must dismiss the motion.”). Wisham failed to provide the Court with

a detailed and specific affidavit that demonstrated the actual proof of the allegations

in his § 2255 petition. See Galbraith, 313 F.3d at 1009 (7th Cir. 2002) (“It is the rule

of the court that in order for a hearing to be granted, the petition must be

accompanied by a detailed and specific affidavit which shows that the petitioner had

actual proof of the allegations that go beyond mere unsupported allegations.”). Thus,

this argument is meritless and Wisham’s counsel will not be found constitutionally

ineffective for failing to consult with Wisham about an appeal.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Anthony C. Wisham’s motion for relief pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 1) is DENIED. This action is DISMISSED with

prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case on the Court’s docket.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings in United States

District Courts instructs the district court to “issue or deny a certificate of

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” 28 U.S.C.

2253(c)(2) provides that a certificate of appealability may be issued “only if the

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”

To meet this standard, the petitioner “must have a constitutional claim (or an

underlying procedural argument on which a constitutional claim depends), and he

must ‘demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment

of his constitutional claims debatable or wrong.’” United States v. Fleming, 676 F.3d

621, 625 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 281 (2004)); see

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

As for his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner Wisham has

not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Having

thoroughly reviewed the record before the Court, the undersigned concludes that

reasonable jurists would not find the disposition of that claim debatable or wrong.

Accordingly, this Court DENIES issuance of a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 26, 2024

s/ Stephen P. McGlynn

STEPHEN P. McGLYNN

U.S. District Judge