Murphy v. Hughes

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

STEVEN MURPHY, # M04196, )

)

Plaintiff, )

vs. ) Case No. 24-cv-00107-RJD

)

LATOYA HUGHES, )

JON LOFTUS, and )

ANTHONY WILLS, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DALY, Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Steven Murphy, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”)

currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center, filed the instant lawsuit pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights. He asserts that Defendants

denied him protective custody, after which he was attacked by another inmate and sustained

injuries. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Id.

This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A,1 which requires the Court to screen prisoner Complaints to filter out nonmeritorious

claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of the Complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious,

fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant must be

dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

The Complaint

Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the Complaint (Doc. 1): Plaintiff made

1 The Court has jurisdiction to screen the Complaint due to Plaintiff’s consent to the full jurisdiction of a

Magistrate Judge (Doc. 5), and the limited consent to the exercise of Magistrate Judge jurisdiction as set

forth in the Memorandum of Understanding between this Court and the IDOC.

requests to be placed in Protective Custody (“PC”) dating back to August 2021, because he

believed his life was in danger. (Doc. 1, pp. 9, 26). Defendants Wills (Menard Warden), Hughes

(Acting IDOC Director) and Loftus (Administrative Review Board) refused to grant the PC

requests, due to “staff retaliation” for Plaintiff’s litigation and grievance activity, and due to

negligence on their parts. (Doc. 1, p. 9).

On or about September 22, 2023, Plaintiff was being moved to the PC “kick-out/denial

yard,” when he was attacked by another inmate who had also been denied PC. (Doc. 1, pp. 9, 35).

Plaintiff sustained a broken thumb that required surgery, as well as a swollen eye and busted lip.

After the fight, Plaintiff was maced and sent to segregation, where he was not given any medical

treatment for four days, despite submitting multiple medical request slips and asking for a crisis

team.

Plaintiff eventually had surgery for the left thumb fracture; he now has a plate and screws

in his thumb, a large scar, some loss of mobility, and “constant aching pain” from the surgery. He

sues each Defendant in their personal and official capacities. (Doc. 1, p. 10).

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following claims in

this pro se action:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Hughes, Loftus,

and Wills, for denying Plaintiff’s request to be housed in Protective

Custody.

Count 2: State law negligence claim against Hughes, Loftus, and Wills, for

denying Plaintiff’s request to be housed in Protective Custody.

Count 3: First Amendment retaliation claim against Hughes, Loftus, and

Wills, for denying Plaintiff’s PC request because he filed lawsuits

and grievances against them and against other IDOC staff members.

Count 4: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Hughes,

Loftus, and Wills, for delaying medical attention for Plaintiff’s

injuries sustained in the September 22, 2023 attack.

Any other claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be

considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading

standard.2

Discussion

Count 1

“[P]rison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other

prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (internal citations omitted); see also

Pinkston v. Madry, 440 F.3d 879, 889 (7th Cir. 2006). To state an Eighth Amendment claim for

failure to protect, a plaintiff must plead facts suggesting he is incarcerated under conditions posing

a substantial risk of serious harm, and that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference” to

that danger. Id.; Pinkston, 440 F.3d at 889. Typically, the plaintiff must show that he complained

to prison officials about a specific and credible danger to his safety. See Santiago v. Walls, 599

F.3d 749, 758-59 (7th Cir. 2010); Pope v. Shafer, 86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th Cir. 1996).

The Complaint does not disclose any details about what reasons Plaintiff gave Defendants

for why he requested PC placement, or whether Plaintiff alerted them that the inmate who

ultimately attacked him posed a danger to his safety. Nonetheless, at this early stage, Plaintiff’s

allegations in Count 1 are sufficient to proceed against Hughes, Loftus, and Wills, each of whom

concurred in the decision to reject his PC request. (Doc. 1, p. 26).

Count 2

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ denial of his PC request amounted to negligence as well

as a constitutional violation. Under Illinois law, a complaint may state a claim for negligence if

2 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face.”).

the plaintiff alleges facts showing that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, breached

that duty, and that the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Thompson v.

Gordon, 948 N.E.2d 39, 45 (Ill. 2011) (citing Iseberg v. Gross, 879 N.E.2d 278 (2007)). Plaintiff’s

negligence claim is based on the same facts that support the Eighth Amendment claim in Count 1.

Therefore, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction to consider the claim of negligence. See 28

U.S.C. § 1367(a); Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921, 936 (7th Cir. 2008) (state claims

must “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact” with the federal claims). Count 2 may also

proceed against Hughes, Loftus, and Wills.

Count 3

Prison officials may not retaliate against inmates for filing grievances, lawsuits, or

otherwise complaining about their conditions of confinement. See, e.g., Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d

859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012); Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2002). The issue in a

retaliation claim is whether the plaintiff experienced an adverse action that would likely deter First

Amendment activity in the future, and if the First Amendment activity was “at least a motivating

factor” in the defendants’ decision to take the retaliatory action. See McKinley v. Schoenbeck, 731

F. App’x 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Surita v. Hyde, 665 F.3d 860, 878-79 (7th Cir. 2011));

Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 551 (7th Cir. 2009). “A complaint states a claim for retaliation

when it sets forth ‘a chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred.’”

Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff makes only a vague allegation that Defendants’ denial of his PC request was

based on “staff retaliation for [Plaintiff] filing grievances and civil suits against defendants and

other [IDOC] staff members[.]” (Doc. 1, p. 9). Plaintiff does not point to any specific lawsuit or

complaint he filed against Hughes, Wills, or Loftus, or any other IDOC staff, that might have

triggered the decision to deny PC placement. The Complaint does not present a chronology of

events to support an inference that Defendants were motivated by retaliation when they denied

Plaintiff’s PC request. Accordingly, Count 3 will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted.

Count 4

Prison officials and medical staff violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel

and unusual punishment when they act with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical

needs. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 475 (7th Cir. 2017). To state such a claim, a prisoner must

plead facts and allegations suggesting that (1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical

condition, and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Id.

“[D]eliberate indifference may be found where an official knows about unconstitutional conduct

and facilitates, approves, condones, or turns a blind eye to it.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768,

781 (7th Cir. 2015).

The four-day delay in providing medical attention for Plaintiff’s broken thumb and other

injuries could amount to deliberate indifference. These injuries appear to qualify as serious medical

conditions. However, Plaintiff fails to set forth any facts indicating that Wills, Hughes, or Loftus

were aware of his injuries or were personally responsible for the delay. “[T]o be liable under

§ 1983, the individual defendant must have caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.”

Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citations

omitted). The doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisory liability) does not apply to actions filed

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, Count 4 will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Official Capacity Claims

Plaintiff raises claims against each defendant in his or her individual and official capacities.

However, claims for monetary damages may only be pursued against state officials in their

individual capacities. Brown v. Budz, 904 F.3d 904, 918 (7th Cir. 2005); Shockley v. Jones, 823

F.2d 1068, 1070 (7th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the official capacity claims against the individual

defendants are dismissed without prejudice.

Pending Motions

Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 3) is DENIED without prejudice.

There is no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in federal civil cases. Romanelli v. Suliene,

615 F.3d 847, 851 (7th Cir. 2010). In determining whether to recruit counsel, the Court considers

whether the pro se party has made reasonable efforts to secure counsel on his own and his ability

to litigate the case on his own. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007).

Here, Plaintiff has not established any efforts made to obtain counsel on his own. He states

he has written to multiple attorneys, but he does not attach any correspondence to his motion.

Moreover, at this early stage of the litigation, it is difficult to accurately evaluate the need for

assistance of counsel, so recruitment of counsel would be premature. See Kadamovas v. Stevens,

706 F.3d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[U]ntil the defendants respond to the complaint, the plaintiff's

need for assistance of counsel...cannot be gauged.”).

Should Plaintiff encounter difficulties in self-representation as this case proceeds, he may

refile his motion seeking recruitment of counsel. If he renews his request, he should submit at least

three rejection letters from attorneys to show that he has made reasonable efforts to obtain counsel

on his own.

Disposition

The Complaint states colorable claims in Counts 1 and 2 against Latoya Hughes, Jon

Loftus, and Anthony Wills. Counts 3 and 4 are DISMISSED without prejudice.

The Clerk shall prepare for Latoya Hughes, Jon Loftus, and Anthony Wills: (1) Form 5

(Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of

Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint,

and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by

Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the

Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to

effect formal service on the Defendant, and the Court will require the Defendant to pay the full

costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer

shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the

Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as

directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be

retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the

Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant to

Administrative Order No. 244 and Local Rule 8.2, Defendants need only respond to the issues

stated in this Merit Review Order.

Plaintiff is ADVISED that if judgment is rendered against him and the judgment includes

the payment of costs under 28 U.S.C. §1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the

costs, even though his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(f)(2)(A).

Plaintiff is further ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of

Court and the opposing parties informed of any change in his address; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 14 days

after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a

delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of

prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

Finally, based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to

ENTER the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 26, 2024

s/ Reona J. Daly _____

REONA J. DALY

United States Magistrate Judge

Notice to Plaintiff

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the Defendants of your lawsuit and serve

them with a copy of your Complaint. After service has been achieved, Defendants will enter an

appearance and file an Answer to your Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from the date

of this Order to receive the Defendants’ Answer, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days

or more. When Defendants have filed their Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order

containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to

wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions, to give the Defendants

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendants’ counsel

has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any

evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically directed to do so.