The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MARVIN BOWMAN, )
)
Plaintiff, ) No. 1:21-CV-03015
)
v. )
) Judge Edmond E. Chang
CITY OF CHICAGO BOARD OF )
EDUCATION, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Marvin Bowman, a social studies teacher at a Chicago public high school,
claims that—among other things—he received late payments for paid religious holi-
days, had too many special education students in his classes, and was secretly rec-
orded during class and meetings. R. 1, Compl. at 4–6; R. 5, Am. Compl. at 4–6; R. 82-
2, Bowman Dep. at 14, 16–18, 24, 30–33.1 He says that he faced this treatment be-
cause of his religion and because he filed multiple union grievances. Am. Compl. at
4–6. So Bowman brought this suit, alleging that the Chicago Board of Education, his
school’s principal, and another teacher discriminated, harassed, and retaliated
against him. Id.2 Earlier in the case, the individual defendants were dismissed (as
well as a damages claim on behalf of his students), Bowman v. Jones Coleman, No.
1 Citations to the record are “R.” followed by the docket entry number and, if needed,
a page or paragraph number.
2 The Court has jurisdiction over this Title VII case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
1:21-CV-03015, 2021 WL 6113205, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 25, 2021), and the parties
then eventually finished discovery.
The Board now moves for summary judgment on what remains of the case,
arguing that Bowman fails to provide adequate evidence supporting his claims. R. 80,
Def.’s Mot.; R. 81, Def.’s Br. at 1, 8–9. Because the Court agrees and concludes that
Bowman does not show—even with the record viewed in his favor—that he faced dis-
crimination, retaliation, or harassment because of his religion or union grievances,
the motion is granted.
I. Background
Marvin Bowman has been a social studies teacher at George Corliss High
School (a Chicago public school) since 2004. R. 82, DSOF ¶ 1; Bowman Dep. at 9. As
a “Bible-Christian,” Bowman requests a few schooldays off each year for religious
observances. Bowman Dep. at 28:21–23; DSOF ¶ 20; R. 82-11, Timesheet Records.
Under the Chicago Board of Education’s rules, teachers are allowed “up to three (3)
non-attendance days with pay in a school year for the observance of religious holi-
days, which shall not be considered an absence.” DSOF ¶ 8; R. 82-9, Board Rule 4 at
27. Teachers must request these days off in advance through the district’s payroll
system. DSOF ¶¶ 9–10; R. 82-4, Muhammad Verif. ¶¶ 6–7. The school’s principal or
clerk reviews and approves the request, and then the district’s payroll department
processes payment to the teacher for the days off. DSOF ¶¶ 10–11; Muhammad Verif.
¶ 7.
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But in response to some teachers abusing this benefit, starting in 2018, the
payroll department began auditing all requests for paid time off for religious holidays.
DSOF ¶ 16; R. 82-5, Cunningham Verif. ¶ 9. For each request, the department refers
to a list of major religious holidays, and if the requested day off is not on the list, the
department will not process payment for it. DSOF ¶¶ 15–16; Cunningham Verif.
¶¶ 8–9. Instead, the department sends an email to the employee and asks for more
information. Id. It then works with the Board’s law department to decide whether to
approve the request. Id.; R. 82-10, Sims Dep. at 7–8, 12, 14–15.
For years, Bowman has submitted his requests for days off through the payroll
system. But he says that once Ali Muhammad became the interim principal at Corliss
High School in 2017, “all of a sudden people started blocking [Bowman’s] pay and
eventually questioning things about the faith [he] practice[s].” Bowman Dep. at 24.
So Bowman submitted a grievance to the Chicago Teachers Union, claiming that he
was not paid for two religious holidays that he requested and took off in 2021. DSOF
¶ 64; R. 82-27, 2021 Union Grievance.
In addition to these payroll issues, Bowman also claims that once Muhammad
became principal, Bowman’s classes began filling up with “unusually high numbers
of special needs students.” Compl. at 5. The Chicago Teachers Union’s collective bar-
gaining agreement requires that no more than 30% of the students in a general edu-
cation classroom be special education students. (This is referred to by the parties as
the “70/30 ratio.”) DSOF ¶ 24; R. 82-12, Collective Barg. Agr. at 106. For multiple
years, the number of special education students in Bowman’s classes exceeded 30%.
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R. 82-25, Ernesti Letter. So he filed union grievances and a complaint to the Illinois
State Board of Education about this imbalance. R. 82-24, Jan. 2020 Union Grievance;
R. 82-26, Oct. 2020 Union Grievance; R. 82-28, Ill. State Bd. of Educ. Letter.. Bowman
alleges that Muhammad then began retaliating against him for filing these griev-
ances and complaints by further “overpopulating” his classes with special education
students. Bowman Dep. at 14.
Bowman also alleges that he faced several other issues at the school. First, he
says that Muhammad purposely avoided him at the start of the 2017–18 school year.
Bowman Dep. at 11. Second, he asserts that Muhammad turned “the heat up and
down to cause extreme temperatures in [Bowman’s] classroom” and “manipulate[d]”
the temperature based on what Bowman was wearing. R. 82-3, Pl.’s Ans. to Def.’s
Interr. ¶ 9; Bowman Dep. at 16–18. Finally, he claims that another teacher, Sheila
Jones-Coleman, “secretly videotap[ed]” him and posted a “doctored video” of him onto
the school’s shared Google Drive. Bowman Dep. at 30–33.
Based on all of this, Bowman brought this suit against the Chicago Board of
Education (his employer), principal Muhammad, and teacher Jones-Coleman. Compl.
at 1. Because Bowman is a pro se litigant, the Court construes his filings expansively.
Bowman claims that the Defendants have violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Illinois Human Rights Act by discriminating, harassing, and retaliating
against him because of his religion and because he filed grievances about the number
of special needs students in his classes. DSOF ¶ 69; Am. Compl. 4–6. The Defendants
then filed a partial motion to dismiss, requesting that this Court dismiss the claims
4
against the two individual defendants and strike Bowman’s request for damages for
his former special needs students. R. 20, Mot. to Dismiss at 1. The Court granted that
motion, reasoning that Title VII applies only to employers, not to individuals, and
that Bowman does not have standing to sue for damages on behalf of his students.
Bowman, 2021 WL 6113205 at *3–4. So all that remains in this case are Bowman’s
Title VII and IHRA claims against the Board.3
II. Legal Standard
In deciding the Board’s motion for summary judgment, the Court views the
evidence in the light most favorable to Bowman. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Summary judgment must be granted “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In evaluating sum-
mary judgment motions, courts must view the facts and draw reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378
(2007). The Court may not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determi-
nations, Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 704 (7th Cir. 2011),
3Claims under the IHRA are treated the same way as claims under Title VII. So
throughout this opinion, the Court’s analysis of Bowman’s Title VII claims also applies
equally to his IHRA claims. See Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Servs., 840 F.3d 378, 383 (7th
Cir. 2016).
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and must consider only evidence that can “be presented in a form that would be ad-
missible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). The party seeking summary judgment
has the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute and that they are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Carmichael v. Village of Palatine, 605 F.3d
451, 460 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986);
Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008). If this burden is met, the ad-
verse party must then “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
III. Analysis
A. Discrimination
Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1). There are two ways for someone to advance past summary judgment
on a Title VII employment discrimination claim. The first is satisfying the burden-
shifting framework laid out in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). To
establish a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff
must offer evidence to show that: “(1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he met his
employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action;
and (4) another similarly situated employee outside of his protected class received
better treatment from his employer.” Gamble v. Fiat Chrysler Autos. U.S. L.L.C., 993
6
F.3d 534, 537 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).4 Once the plaintiff has satisfied each ele-
ment of a prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the employer to offer a nondiscrimi-
natory motive, and if the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
show that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext.” Id. (cleaned up). The relevant
inquiry is “whether the other employees’ situations were similar enough to the plain-
tiff’s that it is reasonable to infer, in the absence of some other explanation, that the
different treatment was a result of race or some other unlawful basis.” de Lima Silva
v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 917 F.3d 546, 559 (7th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).
The second way to get to trial on a Title VII claim is for the plaintiff to offer
circumstantial evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that he was the
victim of discrimination. Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir.
2017). The ultimate question is “whether the evidence would permit a reasonable
factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other pro-
scribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse employment action.” Id.
The Board argues that under either method, Bowman’s discrimination claim
fails. The Court agrees. For starters, Bowman does not offer evidence to show that he
suffered an adverse employment action. A “cognizable adverse employment action is
a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
4 This Opinion uses (cleaned up) to indicate that internal quotation marks, alterations,
and citations have been omitted from quotations. See Jack Metzler, Cleaning Up Quotations,
18 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 143 (2017).
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significant change in benefits.” Chaudhry v. Nucor Steel-Ind., 546 F.3d 832, 838 (7th
Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). Though Bowman experienced some inconveniences, none of
them caused a significant change in his employment status.
To start, Bowman was not fired, demoted, or disciplined. DSOF ¶ 46; Muham-
mad Verif. ¶¶ 31–33; Bowman Dep. at 92–93. And he neither had his work schedule
changed nor had his pay or benefits decreased. DSOF ¶ 46; Bowman Dep. at 92; Mu-
hammad Verif. ¶¶ 34–35. He claims that after Muhammad became the principal at
Corliss High, Bowman started not getting paid for religious holidays that he re-
quested and took off. DSOF ¶ 17; Bowman Dep. at 24. The evidence conclusively
shows otherwise. Muhammad approved every one of Bowman’s religious holiday re-
quests and never asked him to go unpaid for a requested holiday. DSOF ¶ 19; R. 82-
6, Muhammad Dep. at 37, 44; Muhammad Verif. ¶¶ 8–9. And though some of the
payments were delayed because the payroll department audited Bowman’s requests,
he did end up getting paid for all of the days that he requested off. DSOF ¶ 21; Bow-
man Dep. at 75–76; Cunningham Verif. ¶ 13. So Bowman did not experience an ad-
verse employment action related to his religious holiday pay. See Lewis v. Wilkie, 909
F.3d 858, 868 (7th Cir. 2018).
Next, Bowman notes that too many special education students were placed into
his classes. Am. Compl. at 4. But that does not qualify either. “A materially adverse
employment action is more than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job respon-
sibilities.” Dass v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 675 F.3d 1060, 1069 (7th Cir. 2012). And alt-
hough having classes that exceeded the 70/30 ratio may have been challenging for
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Bowman and may have even increased his workload, it did not “significant[ly] change
[his] employment status.” Chaudhry, 546 F.3d at 838 (cleaned up). In fact, to reduce
the burden on Bowman, Muhammad assigned a co-teacher, a special education class-
room assistant, and a student teacher to Bowman’s class. DSOF ¶ 33; R. 82-16, Mu-
hammad 2020 Parent Email at 1–3. That cements that the deviation from the 70/30
ratio was also not an adverse employment action, even when the facts are viewed in
Bowman’s favor.
As for the rest of Bowman’s complaints: he supplies no evidence to support his
allegations, and the Board’s evidence directly disproves them. Bowman alleges that
Muhammad purposefully avoided and ignored him. But Muhammad did no such
thing. Muhammad Verif. ¶ 36; Muhammad Dep. at 11. For example, when Bowman
reached out to Muhammad about the 70/30 ratio issue, Muhammad engaged with
him and asked for his suggestions on how to better support him. R. 82-15, Muham-
mad 70/30 Ratio Email at 1–2. Bowman also claims that Muhammad manipulated
the temperature in Bowman’s classroom to antagonize him. Bowman Dep. at 16–17.
Again, that speculation is not based on personal knowledge. Muhammad had no con-
trol over the heating and cooling systems at the school; those were managed by the
building engineer and the facilities department. Muhammad Verif. ¶¶ 24, 26; Mu-
hammad Dep. at 56–59. And when Bowman told Muhammad about the temperature
fluctuations, Muhammad asked the facilities department to address it and then even
offered to switch Bowman to a different classroom. Muhammad Verif. ¶¶ 25–26; Mu-
hammad Dep. at 58–59.
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Finally, Bowman contends that another teacher secretly recorded him and
then posted a doctored video of him on the school’s Google Drive. Bowman Dep. at
30–32. But the Board explains, without contradiction, that during the pandemic,
when Corliss High School was conducting classes remotely, the school generally rec-
orded all classes and staff meetings. DSOF ¶ 58; Muhammad Verif. ¶ 29; Muhammad
Dep. at 50. The video platform would notify all attendees verbally and in writing that
it was recording the class or meeting, and then it would automatically send them a
copy of the recording. Id. Bowman simply does not offer evidence to rebut that no
teachers or other Board employees ever secretly recorded Bowman or doctored a video
of him. Muhammad Verif. ¶ 30; Muhammad Dep. at 49. So Bowman did not suffer an
adverse employment action.
But even if the delayed payments and increased number of special education
students did qualify as adverse employment actions, Bowman’s claim would still lose
because he provides no concrete evidence that other employees at Corliss High School
were treated better than him. Plus, the undisputed evidence shows they were not.
Bowman’s delayed pay for religious holidays was not at all unique to him. The
payroll department treated his religious holiday requests the same way it treats all
teachers’ requests. Cunningham Verif. ¶¶ 6–13. Under the school district’s policies, a
teacher must submit a written request for a religious holiday to his school’s principal
at least two days in advance. Cunningham Verif. ¶ 4. Once the principal approves the
request, it is sent to the payroll department. Cunningham Verif. ¶¶ 4–5. The depart-
ment then reviews each request on a case-by-case basis to determine if it qualifies for
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paid time off. Specifically, if the requested day off is not on the payroll department’s
list of major holidays, the department emails the employee and asks for more infor-
mation. DSOF ¶¶ 15–16; Cunningham Verif. ¶¶ 8–9. It then works with the Board’s
law department to decide whether to approve the request. Id.; Sims Dep. at 7, 8, 12,
14–15. Unsurprisingly, this review process results in delayed payments for non-major
religious holiday requests. So the questioning and delayed payments that Bowman
experienced were just standard procedure. All teachers, including those who are not
Bible Christians like Bowman, are subject to the same process for religious holiday
requests.
Similarly, Bowman was (unfortunately) far from the only teacher with exces-
sive numbers of special education students in his class. Corliss High School as a whole
has struggled for years to maintain the 70/30 ratio. Muhammad Verif. ¶ 14; Muham-
mad Dep. at 13, 20, 32. Bowman’s own evidence shows that dozens of classes at
Corliss were comprised of more than 30% special education students and that many
teachers had even higher percentages of those students than Bowman did. R. 89,
Exh. 29, Class Rosters. So again, teachers outside of Bowman’s protected religious
class did not receive better treatment than he did.
That said, even if Bowman had established a prima facia case of employment
discrimination, which would shift the burden to the Board to provide nondiscrimina-
tory motives for its actions, the Board more than carries that burden. It first explains
that it began its policy of auditing all religious holiday requests because some teach-
ers throughout the district were abusing the ability to take these days off. Def.’s Br.
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at 11–12; Cunningham Verif. ¶ 9. That is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
reviewing and delaying payment for Bowman’s religious holiday requests. And the
record supports that explanation. Cunningham Verif. ¶ 9.
The Board then notes that Bowman’s classes exceeded the 70/30 ratio because
Corliss High School is a neighborhood school (that means that any child from the
surrounding area may attend) and the neighborhood that it is in has a high percent-
age of special education children. Def.’s Br. at 12; Muhammad Verif. ¶ 3; R. 82-13,
Lofton Dep. at 31:2–5. Plus, Corliss is a small school, and because the district provides
school budgets based on student population size, Corliss could not hire more teachers
to spread special education students across numerous class sections for a particular
subject. Lofton Dep. at 31:2–17. Given these constraints, Muhammad submitted
waiver applications to the Illinois State Board of Education, asking it to waive the
70/30 ratio requirement for classes that did not comply (including Bowman’s). Mu-
hammad Verif. ¶¶ 15–16, 22; Lofton Dep. at 31:18–23. Again, that is all supported by
the evidence and provides valid, nondiscriminatory reasons for the school placing
more special education students in Bowman’s classes. Moreover, Bowman provides
no evidence that shows that the Board delayed his payments or put more special ed-
ucation students in his classes because of his religious beliefs. So he fails to establish
any connection between his protected class status and the alleged adverse employ-
ment actions. That is yet another reason that Bowman’s discrimination claim fails.
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B. Retaliation
Title VII also bars employers from retaliating against their employees for com-
plaining about discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). For his retaliation claim to
survive summary judgment, Bowman must show that a reasonable jury could find
that (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment ac-
tion; and (3) the adverse action was motivated by the protected activity. Lord v. High
Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2016). But the standard for what
counts as an adverse employment action here is different than it is for discrimination
claims. An adverse action for retaliation purposes “need not be one that affects the
terms and conditions of employment.” Lewis, 909 F.3d at 867 (cleaned up). Instead,
courts simply ask whether the action “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910,
918 (7th Cir. 2016). Having said that, Title VII does not set forth a “general civility
code for the American workplace,” so “petty slights, minor annoyances, and bad man-
ners” do not qualify as materially adverse actions. Id.
Despite this lower standard for adverse actions for retaliation claims, Bow-
man’s retaliation claim still fails because he does not offer evidence showing that the
adverse actions he suffered were motivated by his protected activities. Bowman al-
leges that Muhammad retaliated against him for filing union grievances about hav-
ing too many special education students in his classes. Am. Compl. at 4–6. He sug-
gests that in retaliation, Muhammad blocked or delayed his pay for religious holidays
and “overcrowded” his classes with even more special education students. Id. But
13
again, Bowman offers no evidence that Muhammad or the Board took those actions
because he filed union grievances. And Bowman does not counter the Board’s evidence
that its motives for the actions were legitimate and non-retaliatory.
As discussed above, undisputed evidence shows that Bowman’s payments were
delayed (not blocked or denied) because his requests were audited as per the payroll
department’s standard protocol for all teachers’ religious holiday requests. Cunning-
ham Verif. ¶¶ 6–13.. And the audit policy was instituted because some teachers were
abusing the benefit. Cunningham Verif. ¶¶ 8–9; Sims Dep. at 7, 8, 12, 14–15. Like-
wise, the record establishes that Bowman’s classes had too many special education
students in them because Corliss High School as a whole—due to its size and neigh-
borhood population—struggled to maintain the 70/30 ratio. Muhammad Verif. ¶ 14;
Muhammad Dep. at 13, 20, 32; Lofton Dep. at 31:2–17. So neither the delayed pay-
ments nor the increased number of special education students were retaliatory ac-
tions in response to Bowman filing union grievances. Thus, regardless of whether he
satisfies the first two elements of the test for retaliation claims, Bowman’s claim fails
because he does not tie the alleged adverse actions to his protected activity.
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C. Harassment
The same goes for Bowman’s harassment claim; he fails to connect the harass-
ment he allegedly faced to his religion or any other protected characteristics. A har-
assment or hostile-work-environment claim “requires proof of four elements: (1) the
plaintiff’s workplace was both subjectively and objectively offensive; (2) the plaintiff’s
[protected category] was the cause of the harassment; (3) the harassment was severe
or pervasive; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability.” Lord, 839 F.3d at 561.
Like with retaliation, whether or not Bowman satisfies other prongs of this
test, he does not show that he was harassed because he is a Bible Christian. As pre-
viously discussed, the evidence reveals that all of the Board’s actions that might qual-
ify as harassment were caused not by Bowman’s religious identity, but rather by le-
gitimate, unrelated factors. The closest call is the Board’s delay in paying Bowman
for his requested religious holidays, but that too does not satisfy the causation re-
quirement. Once again, all teachers’ religious holiday requests were audited, and all
payments for non-major religious holidays were delayed and subject to follow-up
questions. Cunningham Verif. ¶¶ 6–13. So Bowman was not targeted or harassed for
being a Bible Christian—he just experienced the same payment delays that plenty of
teachers faced, including many outside of Bowman’s protected category. Cunningham
Verif. ¶¶ 8–9; Sims Dep. at 7, 8, 12, 14–15. And he provides no evidence to the con-
trary. Bowman’s harassment claim—like his others—does not survive summary judg-
ment.
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IV. Conclusion
The Court grants the Board’s motion for summary judgment, R. 80, and the
case is dismissed with prejudice.
ENTERED:
s/Edmond E. Chang
Honorable Edmond E. Chang
United States District Judge
DATE: September 27, 2024
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