Sojda v. Chicago Board Of Education

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

ILDA SOJDA, on behalf of her daughter,

VICTORIA SOJDA, a minor,

Plaintiffs,

No. 23 CV 4231

v.

Judge Thomas M. Durkin

CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION,

a municipal corporation,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Ilda Sojda (“Plaintiff”) seeks damages against Defendant Chicago

Board of Education for student-on-student harassment on behalf of her daughter

Victoria Sojda (“Sojda”). R. 20. Defendant moves to dismiss the first amended

complaint. R. 25. For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion is denied in part

and granted in part.

Legal Standard

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the “sufficiency of a complaint.” Gunn v.

Cont’l Cas. Co., 968 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2020). A complaint must provide “a short

and plain statement of the claim” to give the defendant “fair notice” of the claim and

its basis. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While “detailed factual

allegations” are not required, “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. The complaint must “contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570). “Facial plausibility exists ‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.’” Thomas v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 74 F.4th 521, 523 (7th Cir.

2023) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In applying this standard, the Court “accept[s]

all well-pleaded facts as true and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiff. Hernandez v. Ill. Inst. of Tech., 63 F.4th 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2023).

Background

Sojda was an eighth-grade student at Abraham Lincoln Elementary, a Chicago

Public School. R. 20 ¶8. Sojda, a Hispanic student, was bullied by a Black student

(“the Student”). Id. ¶¶ 12, 13. Prior to March 31, 2023, on numerous occasions, the

Student made “threats of physical violence” and referred to Sojda using racial slurs

such as “beaner” and “border jumper.” Id. ¶¶ 14–15. The Student also made “threats

of physical violence” and racially offensive comments to Sojda on social media

platforms such as Snapchat. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. This caused Sojda to “fear[] for her physical

safety during school hours.” Id. ¶ 19. Sojda then met with her homeroom teacher to

report the “bullying and violent threats.” Id. ¶ 20. But following this meeting, the

school did not intervene or discipline the Student. Id. ¶ 28.

On March 31, 2023, Sojda reported the “bullying and the violent threats” to the

assistant principal. Id. ¶ 22. Sojda indicated that the bullying was “racially motivated

due to [her] Hispanic background.” Id. ¶ 23. That same day, the assistant principal

met with the Student and disclosed Sojda’s complaint. Id. ¶ 24. Later that day, the

Student physically attacked and severely injured Sojda during school hours on school

property. Id. ¶ 41. Sojda was taken to a hospital to receive emergency medical

treatment, and a physician recommended that Sojda miss “several days to weeks of

school” to allow for “a slow and gradual . . . full recovery.” Id. ¶¶ 64, 71. Following

March 31, the Student was suspended for two days. Id. ¶ 57.

The Court dismissed the original complaint without prejudice. R. 19. Plaintiff

now brings a first amended complaint with two counts. R. 20. First, Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant is liable for student-on-student harassment under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d

(Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Id. ¶¶ 95–108. Second, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant is liable based on a Monell claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. ¶¶ 109–121.

Defendant moves to dismiss. R. 25.

Discussion

I. Student-on-Student Harassment

Title VI states: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,

color, or national origin be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,

or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal

financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. §2000(d). Under Title VI, school boards may be liable

for “student-on-student harassment.” Doe v. Galster, 768 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir.

2014). To state a claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that: (1) the harassment was

discriminatory; (2) the harassment was so “severe, pervasive and objectively offensive

that it” deprived the victims of access to educational opportunities; (3) the school

officials had “actual knowledge” of the harassment; and (4) the school officials were

“deliberately indifferent” to the harassment. Id. (citations omitted).

1. Discriminatory and Objectively Offensive

The racial harassment must be “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive

[that it] undermines and detracts from the victims’ educational experience, [and] that

the victim-students are effectively denied equal access to an institution’s resources

and opportunities.” Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999). In

other words, the harassment must “have a ‘concrete, negative effect’ on the victim’s

education, which may include dropping grades, becoming homebound or hospitalized

due to harassment, physical violence, or physical exclusion from a school resource.”

C.S. v. Couch, 843 F. Supp. 2d 894, 907 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at

654). Unless the “harassment is serious enough to deny its victims equal access to

education,” then “commonplace schoolyard altercations, including name-calling,

teasing, and minor physical scuffles” are not actionable “even [if the] comments target

differences in [race or] gender.” Galster, 768 F.3d at 618 (citations omitted).

Defendant emphasizes that Plaintiff did not allege that “the Student used

racial slurs during the March 31 [attack]” and argues that Sojda thus failed to

plausibly allege that the attack, itself, was “motivated by a racial animus.” R. 25 at

7. But, as alleged, the Student engaged in continued racial harassment that caused

Sojda to fear for her safety and that culminated in a physical attack. Drawing all

reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court can reasonably infer the attack

was motivated by racial animus. And as alleged, the harassment had a concrete,

negative effect in that it caused Sojda to receive hospital treatment and miss class.

Plaintiff has plausibly alleged racial harassment that was objectively offensive.

2. Actual Knowledge and Deliberate Indifference

To hold a school board liable under Title VI, “‘a school official who possessed

the requisite control over the situation [must have] had actual knowledge of, and

[must have been] deliberately indifferent to, the alleged harassment.’” Couch, 843 F.

Supp. 2d at 913 (citing Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, 186 F.3d 1238, 1247 (10th

Cir. 1999)). School administrators such as principals and assistant principals likely

have the requisite control required to hold a school board liable under Title VI. See

Plamp v. Mitchell Sch. Dist. No. 17-2, 565 F.3d 450, 457 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[S]chool

principals are considered ‘appropriate persons’ in the Title IX [or Title VI] analysis.”).

“But whether that requisite is satisfied by a teacher having actual knowledge is less

clear.” M.R. v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 2023 WL 3510642, at *20 (E.D. Wis. May

17, 2023). “Because officials’ roles vary among school districts, deciding who exercises

substantial control for the purposes of Title IX [or Title VI] liability is necessarily a

fact-based inquiry.” Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1247. “Where the victim is complaining

about a fellow student’s action during school hours and on school grounds, teachers

may well possess the requisite control necessary to take corrective action to end the

discrimination.” Id. at 1248 (citations omitted).

Regarding actual knowledge, “[s]chool administrators have actual knowledge

only of the incidents that they witness or that have been reported to them.” Galster,

768 F.3d at 618. Regarding deliberate indifference, a school administrator is

deliberately indifferent when his indifference, “at a minimum, cause[s] students to

undergo harassment or make[s] them liable or vulnerable to it.” Davis, 526 U.S. at

645. That said, the “standard of deliberate indifference sets a high bar for plaintiffs

under Title VI and Title IX.” Galster, 768 F.3d at 619. “To ensure that school

administrators continue to enjoy the flexibility they require in making disciplinary

decisions, the school will not be held liable unless its response to harassment is clearly

unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.” Johnson v. Ne. Sch. Corp., 972

F.3d 905, 911 (7th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). Courts will not “second guess a

school’s disciplinary decisions” and “in appropriate cases, courts can identify a

[disciplinary decision] as not clearly unreasonable as a matter of law. Id. at 912.

Regarding the homeroom teacher, the first amended complaint does not

contain allegations as to whether the homeroom teacher had the requisite control for

Title VI liability. The claim is saved, however, because the assistant principal was a

school administrator who likely had the requisite control.

Focusing on the assistant principal, Defendant emphasizes that Plaintiff did

not allege that Sojda told “the assistant principal about the Student’s use of racial

slurs” and argues that Plaintiff thus failed to plausibly allege actual knowledge that

Sojda was “being harassed because of her race.” R. 25 at 8. But drawing all reasonable

inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court can reasonably infer Sojda informed the

assistant principal as to the nature of the harassment. Plaintiff has thus plausibly

alleged actual knowledge.

Following his conversation with Sojda, the assistant principal spoke with the

Student. As alleged, the Student physically attacked Sojda shortly after speaking

with the assistant principal. Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, it

is certainly plausible that the assistant principal’s conversation with the Student

escalated the situation and somehow prompted the physical attack. As stated above,

deliberate indifference must, at a minimum, cause students to undergo harassment

or make them vulnerable to it. Plaintiff has plausibly alleged such deliberate

indifference.1

Because Plaintiff has plausibly alleged the required elements for student-on-

student harassment, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied on this issue.

II. Monell Claim

A municipal organization like a school board may be liable for damages under

a § 1983 Monell claim if the alleged unconstitutional act is caused by (1) an official

policy; (2) a custom or practice that, though not officially authorized, is widespread

and well settled; or (3) an official with final policy-making authority. Thomas v. Cook

Cnty. Sheriff's Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010). As to the alleged

unconstitutional act, Plaintiff contends that Defendant violated Sojda’s right to equal

protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because Defendant failed to discipline

the Student based on a Chicago Public School (“CPS”) “express policy and a common

practice of favoring [Black] students in disciplinary matters,” thus leading to Sojda’s

injury. R. 27 at 11.

1 Defendant argues that it was not deliberately indifferent because, after the attack,

it suspended the Student for two days, which Defendant contends was not clearly

unreasonable as a matter of law. R. 25 at 8–9. At this stage, however, the Court need

not determine if the suspension was reasonable. The claim survives based on the

alleged deliberate indifference of the assistant principal prior to the attack.

Regarding the express policy, Plaintiff fails to identify any specific, official

policy. Id. at 11–14. Instead, Plaintiff abstractly cites a CPS Discipline Improvement

Plan (“Plan”). R. 20 at 78–83. The Plan is insufficient to support Plaintiff’s position

for the following reasons. First, the Plan does not articulate express, official policies

but rather provides a generalized overview of CPS goals. See, e.g., id. at 82 (“CPS is

in the process of expanding the yearly CPS Student Code of Conduct policy review

process to assess how the district’s discipline policies can be changed to reduce the

use of school exclusion for students of color most impacted by disproportionality.”).

Second, although the Plan sets a general goal to reduce disproportionate impact, it

never states that Black students should be treated more favorably than other

students. To the contrary, it refers to historical data showing that Black students had

been suspended “at much higher rates” than other students. Id. Third, to the extent

the Plan does articulate a specific policy, it provides an example of a policy where

CPS required “network chief approval when using catch-all codes for suspensions.”

Id. This policy imposes a general pre-requisite of “network chief approval” as a

safeguard for the suspension of all students, not just Black students. Finally, Plaintiff

failed to plead any facts connecting the Plan to this case. In other words, Plaintiff

does not allege any facts suggesting that the Plan prevented the school from

disciplining the Student in advance of March 31.

Regarding the common practice, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has a

“widespread practice by [its] agents, employees, and/or representatives under which

[Black] students are not disciplined for their misconduct.” R. 20 ¶ 113. In general, a

“single event is not enough to adequately allege a [widespread] custom or practice.”

Walker v. City of Chicago, 596 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1074 (N.D. Ill. 2022). Rather, to

succeed on a Monell claim of a widespread practice, a plaintiff must demonstrate that

the “specific violations complained of were not isolated incidents” and “must allege

facts that permit the reasonable inference that the practice is so widespread as to

constitute a governmental custom.” Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 344 (7th

Cir. 2017) (dismissing Monell claim where plaintiff failed to “provide examples of

other [officers] taking actions similar to those complained of here.”). Here, Plaintiff

describes only one event in which the failure to discipline took place—the facts

specific to this case. And there are no other allegations in the complaint from which

the Court can infer any wider practice than the circumstances at issue. Plaintiff thus

fails to plausibly allege a widespread practice.

Because Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that an official policy or widespread

practice caused the violation of Sojda’s right to equal protection under the Fourteenth

Amendment, Plaintiff’s Monell claim is dismissed.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss (R. 25) is denied

with respect to Count I of the first amended complaint and Plaintiff may bring a claim

for student-on-student harassment. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted with

respect to Count II and Plaintiff’s Monell claim is dismissed.

ENTERED:

Honorable Thomas M. Durkin

United States District Judge

Dated: September 26, 2024

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