Brown v. Gutierrez

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

CATHERINE BROWN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 23-cv-05311

v. )

) Judge Andrea R. Wood

DANIEL GUTIERREZ, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim [16] is granted. The complaint is

dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff shall have until 10/16/2024 to file an amended complaint

that remedies the deficiencies identified in the accompanying Statement. If Plaintiff declines to

file an amended complaint by 10/16/2024, this case will be dismissed with prejudice and final

judgment will be entered. Defendants’ motion to stay discovery pending resolution of their

motion to dismiss [32] is terminated as moot. Telephonic status hearing set for 10/23/2024 at 9:15

AM. To ensure public access to court proceedings, members of the public and media may call in

to listen to telephonic hearings. The call-in number is (888) 557-8511 and the access code is

3547847. Counsel of record will receive an email 30 minutes prior to the start of the telephonic

hearing with instructions to join the call. Persons granted remote access to proceedings are

reminded of the general prohibition against photographing, recording, and rebroadcasting of court

proceedings. Violation of these prohibitions may result in sanctions, including removal of court-

issued media credentials, restricted entry to future hearings, denial of entry to future hearings, or

any other sanctions deemed necessary by the Court.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff Catherine Brown was driving on a residential street in Chicago when she was

struck first by a vehicle being pursued at high speeds by a handful of Illinois State Troopers,

Defendants Daniel Gutierrez, Alexander Giglio, Marcus Soto, Miguel Herrera, and Ryan

McMahon, and then again by one of the trooper’s vehicles. Because of the injuries Brown

suffered in the collisions, she has brought the present action asserting a single claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive

due process. Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss Brown’s complaint pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 16.) For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion

is granted.

I.

For the purposes of the motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts in the

complaint as true and views those facts in the light most favorable to Brown as the non-moving

party. Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 507 F.2d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007). The complaint

alleges as follows.1

On September 2, 2021, Illinois State Police troopers Daniel Gutierrez and Alexander

Giglio received a radio alert concerning a red Dodge Durango. (Compl. ¶¶ 10–11, Dkt. No. 1.)

Kenneth Brown (“Kenneth”) was driving the Durango. (Id. ¶ 13.) After observing the Durango

driving north on Interstate 57 (“I-57”), Gutierrez and Giglio began pursuing it, with Gutierrez at

the wheel of their vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 14, 37.) During the pursuit, the two vehicles wove in and out

of traffic at speeds over 100 miles per hour. (Id. ¶ 15.)

At some point, the Durango exited I-57 and the pursuit continued through residential

streets at speeds over 90 miles per hour, with the vehicles sometimes travelling the wrong way on

one-way streets. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 19–21.) Eventually, troopers Ryan McMahon, Marcus Soto, and

Miguel Herrera joined Gutierrez and Giglio in their high-speed pursuit of the Durango.2 (Id. ¶ 22.)

On at least one occasion, Defendants attempted a precision immobilization maneuver to stop the

Durango. (Id. ¶¶ 25–26.) That maneuver was unsuccessful but did damage the vehicles. (Id. ¶ 26.)

As the chase continued, the vehicle driven by McMahon struck a civilian vehicle and caused an

injury. (Id. ¶ 28.)

Finally, the chase ended when the Durango collided with a vehicle driven by Catherine

Brown.3 (Id. ¶¶ 33, 35.) In quick succession, Gutierrez’s vehicle either struck Brown’s vehicle or

caused another vehicle to strike Brown’s vehicle a second time. (Id. ¶ 37.) Brown was injured as a

result of the two collisions. (Id. ¶ 38.) In her single-count complaint, Brown asserts a claim

pursuant to § 1983 alleging that Defendants’ actions on September 2, 2021, violated her right to

substantive due process.

II.

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This

pleading standard does not necessarily require a complaint to contain detailed factual

allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

1 Although Defendants ask this Court to take judicial notice of certain materials outside the pleadings, the

Court finds that the motion can be resolved on the pleadings alone.

2 It is not clear from the complaint whether McMahon, Soto, and Herrera pursued the Durango in one or

multiple vehicles.

3 Brown is of no relation to Kenneth. For purposes of clarity, the Court refers to Brown by her last name

and Kenneth by his first name.

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir.

2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause has been interpreted to have a

substantive component, “barring certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the

procedures used to implement them.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). Substantive

due process “was not meant to serve as a ‘font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever

systems may already be administered by the states,’” but only to sanction government actions

involving substantial culpability. Bublitz v. Cottey, 327 F.3d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)). To state a substantive due process claim requires

allegations that meet the “high standard” of showing “conduct under the color of state law that

violated a fundamental right or liberty and was so arbitrary and irrational as to shock the

conscience.” Robbin v. City of Berwyn, 108 F.4th 586, 589 (7th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

According to Defendants, the allegations of their conduct in the emergency circumstances

before them do not shock the conscience. Whether actions rise to the level of conscience-shocking

depends on the context. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998). Where officers

are pursuing a fleeing suspect, they are given significant latitude in balancing the “competing

directives” of acting decisively while, at the same time, showing restraint. Flores v. City of South

Bend, 997 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2021). Thus, in that context, the standard for conscience-

shocking behavior requires showing that the relevant “conduct [was] intended to injure in some

way unjustifiable by any government interest.” Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017, 1023 (7th Cir.

2007) (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849); see also Earley v. City of Chicago, No. 23 C 801, 2024

WL 774863, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2024) (“When a police officer faces a decision without an

opportunity to engage in reasoned deliberation, the officer’s conduct cannot be said to shock the

conscience and therefore result in a constitutional deprivation under the 14th Amendment Due

Process Clause unless the decision was made with the intent or purpose to harm or injure.”). And

the Seventh Circuit has explained that “even a minor traffic stop, and pursuit of a fleeing suspect

after an unexplained flight from that stop, is a legitimate government interest.” Steen, 486 F.3d at

1023.

Here, the Court finds that none of Defendants’ actions taken in connection with their

pursuit of the Durango showed an intent to harm. Rather, Defendants were faced with a fleeing

suspect and all of their actions were taken with the intent of apprehending Kenneth. Brown’s

allegations as to Defendants’ conduct—namely, their decision to continue a high-speed pursuit

down residential streets and violate traffic laws—“raise questions of negligence or recklessness

[that do] not rise to the level of conscience-shocking—that is to say, intentional conduct.”

Winston v. City Chicago, 130 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1224 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (finding that the allegations

of police officers maintaining a chase “at a high rate of speed through a residential neighborhood

at 7 p.m.” did not shock the conscience). That Defendants might have abandoned the chase once it

became too dangerous and sought out Kenneth the next day “goes to the question of whether the

pursuit was wise, not whether it violated the Constitution.” Steen, 486 F.3d at 1023.

Brown contends that Defendants’ intent to harm can be inferred from their decision to

continue their pursuit even after one of the officer’s vehicles collided with a bystanding vehicle

and caused injury. But while this earlier collision suggests that Defendants had some awareness

that their continued pursuit could cause another injury to a bystander, it does not further suggest

that they intended to cause such injury. Even in a non-emergency situation, “[m]Jerely showing

that the officer created a recognizable but generic risk to the public at large” is insufficient.” Lisby

v. Henderson, 74 F.4th 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). And, in an

emergency situation like a high-speed pursuit, “police officers often encounter . . . rapidly

changing circumstances that require them to make hasty decisions under pressure.” Earley, 2024

WL 774863, at *6. “Occasionally, police officers make the wrong judgment in these

situations .... But mistakes of judgment, even those that result in tragedy, do not give rise to

liability under § 1983.” Winston, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 1225.

Finally, the Court rejects Brown’s contention that a lesser standard than intent-to-harm

applies here, given that Defendants’ chase lasted long enough for them to have the opportunity to

deliberate as to the appropriateness of their actions. Under Seventh Circuit precedent, a court

“does not scrutinize an officer’s actions down to the second to determine whether a pursuit was

the type of emergency in which the intent-to-harm standard applies” but rather “broadly applies

the standard where there was a pursuit.” Moore v. Town of Merrillville, No. 2:21 CV 317, 2023

WL 5163956, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 11, 2023). Here, there is no question that Defendants were

engaged in a high-speed pursuit of the Durango and therefore, to state a claim, Brown had to

sufficiently plead that Defendants acted with an intent to harm.

At bottom, Brown’s substantive due process claim fails because her complaint is devoid of

any allegations showing that Defendants had “some intent to harm that [went] beyond the traffic

stop, the decision to pursue, and the decision to not terminate the pursuit at some point before the

crash.” Steen, 486 F.3d at 1024. With no allegations of conscience-shocking behavior on the part

of any Defendant, Brown’s § 1983 substantive due process claim must be dismissed.

Hil.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 16) is granted. The

complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

Dated: September 18, 2024 uty

Andrea R. Wood

United States District Judge