Smith v. City of Chicago

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

ANTAWAN SMITH, )

) Case No. 23-cv-05121

Plaintiff, )

) Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman

v. )

)

THE CITY OF CHICAGO, and CHICAGO )

DETECTIVES RICHARD HANRAHAN, TODD )

GILLERAIN, and UNKNOWN CHICAGO )

POLICE PERSONNEL, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Antawan Smith was arrested and tried for murder and other crimes arising out of a

shooting in Chicago. After two years of pretrial custody, Smith was acquitted at trial when the

shooting victim recanted her identification and called him innocent. Smith now sues the City of

Chicago (the “City”), Chicago Detectives Richard Hanrahan and Todd Gillerain, and Unknown

Chicago Police Personnel (with Hanrahan and Gillerain, the “Detectives”; collectively with the City,

“Defendants”) for the following claims: Illegal Seizure against the Detectives under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Count I); Malicious Prosecution against the Detectives under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II);

Malicious Prosecution against the Detectives under Illinois state law (Count III); and

Indemnification against the City under 745 ILCS 10/9-102 (Count IV). Before the Court is

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part

Defendants’ motion [23].

BACKGROUND

The Court accepts the following facts as true for the purposes of deciding Defendants’

motion. On May 14, 2019, Jaylin Ellzey and Emma Clark were shot around 206 W. 113th Street in

Chicago, Illinois. Clark was injured and, tragically, Ellzey was killed. Some combination of Chicago

Police investigated the case, including by interviewing Clark. Clark knew Smith at the time of the

initial interview, yet she did not contemporaneously identify him as the shooter. Instead, she told

the Detectives that “the shooter was a male black in his twenties, with a baby face (no tattoos) and

no facial hair.” That description does not match Smith, as he had visible tattoos on this face.

A few days after the shooting, police interviewed Devontae Bell. Bell did not identify Smith

during his initial interview. Bell was later arrested for selling heroin. Smith’s allegations imply that

Bell later entered into an agreement to provide false information to the Detectives in order to avoid

going to prison on his heroin charge, including by identifying Smith as the May 14 shooter.

After receiving this information from Bell, the Detectives returned to Clark, who was still in

the hospital. According to Smith, the Detectives misled and pressured Clark into identifying Smith

as the shooter to support probable cause for his arrest. A few days after this hospital-room

interview, the Detectives “caused Smith to be arrested and charged with the first-degree murder of

Jaylin Ellzey and charged with aggravated battery with a firearm to Ms. Clark.”

At Smith’s eventual trial,1 no witness identified him as the shooter; in fact, Clark allegedly

testified (referring to Smith) that she “did not want to identify an innocent man as the shooter.” A

jury acquitted Smith on September 29, 2022, and he was released after two years of pretrial custody.

According to Smith, the Detectives failed throughout this time to disclose that Clark previously

could not identify the shooter and “that they had fabricated reports.”

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim tests the sufficiency

of the complaint, not its merits. See Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir.

2014). When considering dismissal of a complaint, the Court accepts well pleaded factual allegations

1 Smith’s charges in state court were continued over a lengthy time period.

as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam); Trujillo v. Rockledge Furniture LLC, 926

F.3d 395, 397 (7th Cir. 2019). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must “state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.

Ed. 2d 929 (2007). A complaint is facially plausible when the plaintiff alleges “factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

DISCUSSION

I. Duplicative Fourth Amendment Claims

Defendants argue that Count I should be dismissed as (1) duplicative of the remaining

federal and state malicious prosecution counts (Counts II and III); (2) inadequately pled; or (3) time

barred. All three of these arguments appear to arise out of confusion about the various labels Smith

used to describe his Fourth Amendment-related claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count I of Smith’s

complaint alleges “Illegal Seizure” against the Detectives under § 1983 and describes the

unreasonable seizure as Smith being “unlawfully detained prior to his criminal trial.” Count II

alleges “Malicious Prosecution” under § 1983 against the same subset of defendants (the Detectives)

based on the same underlying facts (paragraphs 1-35) and the same unreasonable seizure—that is,

that “[Smith] was deprived of liberty until after trial.” Defendants argue that Count I, as alleged, is

duplicative of Smith’s malicious prosecution claims under Supreme Court precedent. The Court

agrees that at least Counts I and II are more properly described as a single Fourth Amendment

“malicious prosecution” claim.

Smith does not respond to the substance of Defendants’ argument that his claims are

duplicative, instead arguing only that “the degree to which a claim is duplicative has no place in a

motion to dismiss … [Smith] has the right to choose which viable claims to proceed to trial with.”

But that misses the point of Defendants’ argument. Defendants cite Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36,

43, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 1337–38, 212 L. Ed. 2d 382 (2022), for the proposition that a Fourth

Amendment unreasonable seizure claim is analogous to a common law malicious prosecution tort.

In Thompson, the Supreme Court held that “the gravamen of the Fourth Amendment claim for

malicious prosecution … is the wrongful initiation of charges without probable cause … [which] is

likewise the gravamen of the tort of malicious prosecution.” Id. As the Thompson Court explained,

such Fourth Amendment-based claims are “sometimes referred to as a claim for unreasonable

seizure pursuant to legal process.” Id. at 42. In this context, the terms “illegal seizure,”

“unreasonable seizure,” and “malicious prosecution” all refer to the same violation.

These labels are likewise interchangeable in Smith’s pleadings. He alleges that the “Illegal

Seizure” at issue was his detention pending trial and that the “Malicious Prosecution” deprived him

of his liberty pending trial. The claims seek the same relief based on the same law and facts against

the same parties. Although plaintiffs are allowed to plead alternative avenues for recovery, “[o]ne

count [of a complaint] may be dismissed as duplicative of another where ‘the parties, claims, facts

and requested relief are substantially the same.’” Lansing v. Carroll, No. 11 C 4153, 2012 WL

4759241, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2012) (Lefkow, J.) (citing Van Vliet v. Cole Taylor Bank, No. 10 CV

3221, 2011 WL 148059, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan.18, 2011) (Valdez, J.) (citing Norfleet v. Stroger, 297 Fed.

Appx. 538, 540 (7th Cir. 2008))). The Rules also give the Court power to strike from a pleading

“any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The Court

therefore dismisses Count I as redundant; it is identical to Smith’s federal claim in Count II.

Defendants argue in the alternative, were the Court to read Count I as some unlawful seizure

other than malicious prosecution (which it does not), that Count I is inadequately pled or time

barred. But because the Court dismisses Count I as duplicative of Count II, it need not address

Defendants’ alternative arguments.

II. Probable Cause

Both of Smith’s remaining malicious prosecution claims require that the Detectives did not

have probable cause to arrest him. See Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2006)

(probable cause is an absolute defense to malicious prosecution under § 1983); Martinez v. City of

Chicago, 900 F.3d 838, 849 (7th Cir. 2018) (lack of probable cause is an element of a malicious

prosecution under Illinois law). And as Smith concedes, the City can only be liable for

indemnification if the Detectives are liable for one or more of Smith’s other claims. Defendants

argue that Smith alleges facts supporting probable cause and therefore pleads himself out of court.

Probable cause “exists whenever an officer or a court has enough information to warrant a

prudent person to believe criminal conduct has occurred.” Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 411 (7th

Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Establishing probable cause is “not a high bar,” and the Court must

view the facts from the perspective of “an objectively reasonable police officer.” D.C. v. Wesby, 583

U.S. 48, 57, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586, 199 L. Ed. 2d 453 (2018) (citations omitted).

Defendants argue that the Detectives had probable cause to suspect Smith of the shooting

because two witnesses, Clark and Bell, identified Smith. Defendants are correct that “[t]he

complaint of a single witness or putative victim alone generally is sufficient to establish probable

cause to arrest unless the complaint would lead a reasonable officer to be suspicious, in which case

the officer has a further duty to investigate.” Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, Ind., 320 F.3d 733, 743

(7th Cir. 2003). But Defendants downplay Smith’s allegations. At this stage, Smith’s allegations

must be taken as true, with all reasonable inferences made in his favor. Trujillo, 926 F.3d at 397.

Smith does not dispute that generally an identification can support probable cause. Instead,

Smith alleges that the identifications in his case were false, and that the Detectives intentionally

coerced them and falsified reports. As Smith points out, such facts, if proven, could show that the

Detectives did not have probable cause: “Where police officers manipulate the evidence, present a

one-sided version of events, or turn a blind-eye to the facts that would clarify the basis of a

subjective belief, the record will not necessarily ‘support a conclusion that [the arresting officers]

decided, in an objectively reasonable fashion, that they had probable cause’ to make an arrest.” Craig

v. City of Chicago, No. 08 C 2275, 2011 WL 1196803, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2011) (Hibbler, J.)

(citing Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, Ill., 434 F.3d 1006, 1014–15 (7th Cir. 2006)). Allegations that

officers fabricated evidence can, at this stage, support a conclusion that the officers lacked probable

cause. See Hegwood v. Meijer, Inc., No. 17 C 2887, 2017 WL 5517255, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2017)

(Feinerman, J.) (collecting cases); see also McBride v. Grice, 576 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding

that, although an officer may end his investigation once probable cause is established, the officer

“may not close his eyes to facts that would clarify the situation”).

Defendants attempt to distinguish Craig by arguing that “[Smith] does not allege that any

photo array given to Bell was unduly suggestive or Bell’s actual identification of [Smith] was

unreliable.” That comparison, however, unduly narrows the key reasoning in Craig and understates

Smith’s allegations. First, an “unduly suggestive” photo array is only one type of manipulation of

evidence that could defeat probable cause. Second, Smith alleges more than that Bell’s testimony

was unreliable, he specifically states that “Bell agreed to provide false information” to the police to

avoid prison, even though Bell did not identify Smith in an interview with the police shortly after the

shooting.

Smith’s allegations relating to Clark are similar. Smith says that Clark knew who he was at

the time of the shooting and knew he had visible face tattoos, yet she did not identify him. Instead,

Clark told the Detectives that the shooter had a baby face with no tattoos. Smith alleges that it was

not until the Detectives pressured Clark to identify him as the shooter, including by lying about the

number of people who had identified Smith, that Clark identified Smith—an identification she later

recanted. Moreover, the Detectives allegedly withheld her initial failure to identify Smith. Such

contradictory evidence known to the police, and alleged manipulation of evidence, militates against

finding probable cause as a matter of law. See Sornberger, 434 F.3d at 1014.

For these reasons, Smith has adequately alleged that the Detectives lacked probable cause for

his arrest and pretrial detention. The Court therefore rejects that aspect of Defendants’ motion.

III. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that, even if the Detectives lacked probable cause, they are protected by

qualified immunity. See Sornberger, 434 F.3d at 1014 (“even if probable cause is lacking with respect

to an arrest, the arresting officer is entitled to immunity so long as his belief that he had probable

cause was objectively reasonable”). But qualified immunity is not absolute. “It contemplates

instances in which a public official’s actions are not protected because the official knew or should

have known he was violating an individual’s constitutional rights.” Id. (citing Butz v. Economou, 438

U.S. 478, 506–07, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (“[I]t is not unfair to hold liable the official

who knows or should know he is acting outside the law, and that insisting on an awareness of clearly

established constitutional limits will not unduly interfere with the exercise of official judgment.”)).

The Detectives are not entitled to qualified immunity at this point of the proceedings. If

Smith’s allegations are proven, the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violations

that officers cannot perform arrests based on fabricated evidence. See Washington v. Haupert, 481

F.3d 543, 551 (7th Cir. 2007) (“According to the plaintiffs, the police officers fabricated a police

report in order to justify their arrests. A reasonable officer would have understood that what he was

doing violated their right to be free from unreasonable seizure.”); Garcia v. City of Chicago, 2012 WL

601844, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2012) (Feinerman, J.) (holding that “[i]t was clearly established in

December 2007 that the Fourth Amendment prohibits a law enforcement officer from knowingly

leveling false charges in a case report or criminal complaint’).

Smith adequately alleges that the Detectives did not act with qualified immunity. The Court

thus rejects Defendants’ arguments on those grounds. Counts I and II may proceed.

IV. Indemnification

Defendants’ only argument against Count IV of the complaint is that it is necessarily tted to

the underlying claims for hability. Since the Court allows Counts I and HI to proceed, the Court

rejects Defendants’ argument on indemnification at this time.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss [23]. [he Court dismisses Count I but denies Defendants’ motion as to all other claims.

Counts IT through IV may proceed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 8/12/2024 ALL

Entered:

SHARON JOHNSON COLEMAN

United States District Judge