Torres v. Cermak Tires and Auto Service, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JESUS H. TORRES,

Plaintiff

No. 23 CV 2218

v.

Judge Jeremy C. Daniel

CERMAK TIRES AND AUTO

SERVICE, INC., et al.,

Defendants

ORDER

The defendants’ motion to dismiss [41] is denied. The defendants shall answer the

first amended complaint by August 28, 2024.

STATEMENT

From 2016 through September 2022, Plaintiff Jesus H. Torres worked for Defendant

Cermak Tires and Auto Service, Inc. (“Cermak”), servicing cars at Cermak’s repair

shop. (R. 36 ¶¶ 3, 6–7.) He was employed by Defendants Saul Meza and Rafael Meza,

who were responsible for setting Torres’ work schedule and determining his rate of

pay. (Id. ¶¶ 4–5.) Torres alleges that the defendants failed to pay him overtime wages.

(Id. ¶¶ 7, 9.) He filed suit, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act,

29 U.S.C. § 201, et. seq. (“FLSA”) (Count I), and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law,

820 ILCS 105, et. seq. (“IMWL”) (Count II). (See generally, id.) The defendants move

to dismiss Torres’ first amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). (R. 41.)

A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a claim, not the merits of a case. Gociman

v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., 41 F.4th 873, 885 (7th Cir. 2022). To survive a motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff “must provide enough factual information

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face and raise a right to relief above

the speculative level.” Haywood v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC, 887 F.3d 329,

333 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732,

736 (7th Cir. 2014)). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts as true

all well-pleaded factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in the

plaintiff’s favor. Lax v. Mayorkas, 20 F.4th 1178, 1181 (7th Cir. 2021). Dismissal is

proper where “the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of

entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).

The defendants argue that the first amended complaint should be dismissed because

Torres fails to allege a valid overtime claim under either the FLSA or the IMWL.

(R. 42 at 6–7.) Both statutes require employers to pay non-exempt employees one and

one-half times their regular hourly wage for hours worked beyond forty hours a

week.1 See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1); 820 ILCS 105/4a(1). Thus, to state an overtime claim

under the FLSA or the IMWL, a plaintiff must allege forty hours of work in a

workweek, as well as some uncompensated time worked in excess of forty hours. See

Downey v. Ineos Joliet, LLC, No. 19 C 4119, 2021 WL 4258980, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan.

19, 2021); Snell-Jones v. Hertz Corp., No. 19 C 120, 2020 WL 1233825, at *4 (N.D. Ill.

Mar. 13, 2020).

In this case, Torres alleges that, from 2016 to 2019, he worked at Cermak Monday

through Friday from 9:00 a.m. to 6:30 p.m., and from 2020 to 2022, his hours were

9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. (R. 36 ¶ 7.) Additionally, from 2016 to 2021, Torres worked on

Saturday from 9:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. without a lunch break. (Id.) During this time,

Torres asserts that the defendants did not pay him an overtime rate for any time

worked in excess of forty hours; rather, they paid him only his regular rate for all

hours worked. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 13.)

The defendants argue that these general allegations regarding Torres’ work schedule

and pay rate are insufficient to plausibly state an overtime claim because they fail to

indicate how many hours of overtime Torres worked during any given week and for

how much he was not properly compensated. (R. 42 at 6.) “There is no requirement,

however, that a FLSA plaintiff identify, by date, the specific weeks in which she was

undercompensated; it is enough to allege that there was in fact at least one such

week.” Hancox v. Ulta Salon, Cosmetics & Fragrance, Inc., No. 17 C 1821, 2018 WL

3496086, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 2018); see also Brown v. Club Assist Road Serv. U.S.,

Inc., No. 12 C 5710, 2013 WL 5304100, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2013) (“FLSA claims

. . . are fairly straightforward and do not require plaintiffs to plead infinitesimal

details to render them plausible or to provide defendants with fair notice of the claims

against them.”).

Here, the fair and reasonable inference from Torres’ allegations is that he regularly

worked more than forty hours a week throughout his career at Cermak but was only

paid his regular rate. See, e.g., Snell-Jones, 2020 WL 1233825, at *4 (the plaintiff

“need not point to a particular week in which she worked 66 hours when the clear

import of her allegations is that she did so nearly every week”). Such allegations are

sufficient to plausibly state a claim for relief under the FLSA and IMWL. See, e.g.,

Nava v. Barton Staffing Sols., Inc., No. 15 C 7350, 2016 WL 3708684, at *2 (N.D. Ill.

Jan. 11, 2016) (plaintiff who alleged that he “regularly worked over forty hours per

1 “Because the IMWL parallels the language of the FLSA,” courts generally apply the same standard

and consider the two statutory claims together. See Chagoya v. City of Chi., 992 F.3d 607, 615 n.21

(7th Cir. 2021).

week but continued to be paid his regular pay rate, and not time and a half, for those

additional hours” sufficiently put the defendant “on notice of his FLSA” claim).

Alternatively, the defendants argue that Torres has pleaded himself out of court for

any overtime claims after 2021 because, presuming he had a one-hour lunch break

(which the defendants say Torres admits in his interrogatory answers), he could not

have worked in excess of forty hours per week from 2021 to 2022. (R. 42 at 6.) This

argument calls on the Court to draw an inference against the plaintiff based on

information outside of the four corners of the complaint, which it cannot do. See Lax,

20 F.4th at 1181 (the court draws “all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor”

on a motion to dismiss); Burke v. 401 N. Wabash Venture, LLC, 714 F.3d 501, 505

(7th Cir. 2013) (“In general, a court may only consider the plaintiff's complaint when

ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Moreover, the Court

cannot, as the defendants so request, engage in “piecemeal dismissals of parts of

claims” in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. BBE, Inc. v. City of Angola, 809 F.3d 317,

325 (7th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original). “[T]he question at this stage is simply

whether the complaint includes factual allegations that state a plausible claim for

relief[,]” and, here, it does. Id.

Finally, the defendants argue that any claims for damages that relate to acts

occurring outside the three-year statute of limitations period that applies to

violations of the IMWL and willful violations of the FLSA must be dismissed as time-

barred. (R. 42 at 2-5); see also 29 U.S.C. § 255(a); 820 ILCS 105/12(a). The statute of

limitations is an affirmative defense, which a complaint need not “anticipate and

overcome.” Cancer Found., Inc. v. Cerberus Capital Mgmt., LP, 559 F.3d 671, 674 (7th

Cir. 2009). Dismissing a complaint as untimely at the pleading stage is appropriate

only when the plaintiff alleges “facts sufficient to establish that the suit is indeed

tardy.” Amin Ijbara Equity Corp. v. Vill. of Oak Lawn, 860 F.3d 489, 492 (7th Cir.

2017). “As long as there is a conceivable set of facts, consistent with the complaint,

that would defeat a statute-of-limitations defense, questions of timeliness are left for

summary judgment (or ultimately trial)... .” Sidney Hillman Health Ctr. of Rochester

v. Abbott Lab’ys, Inc., 782 F.3d 922, 928 (7th Cir. 2015).

Here, Torres sufficiently alleges violations of the FLSA and the IMWL occurring

within the three-year limitations period. (R. 36 7—9.) That is sufficient for these

claims to proceed. As explained above, the sort of “winnowing” of Torres’ claims that

the defendants desire is not appropriate on a motion to dismiss; that properly occurs

at summary judgment. See McInerney v. CareerBuilder, LLC, No. 18 C 4073, 2019

WL 6497369, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 2019) (citing BBL, Inc., 809 F.3d at 325). The

defendants’ motion to dismiss Torres’ FLSA and IMWL claims is therefore denied.

AS >

Date: August 7, 2024

JEREMY C. DANIEL

United States District Judge