Wadelton v. Whiteside County

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

WESTERN DIVISION

CHEROKEE WADELTON, Independent

Administrator of the Estate of CHEVY

R. WADELTON, Deceased,

Plaintiff,

No. 3:23-cv-50104

v.

HON. IAIN D. JOHNSTON

WHITESIDE COUNTY and JOHN BOOKER,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Cherokee Wadelton’s brother, Chevy Wadelton, died by suicide while in

custody at the Whiteside County Jail. As the administrator of Mr. Wadelton’s estate,

Ms. Wadelton brings this action against Defendants Whiteside County and Whiteside

County Sheriff John Booker. Before the Court is Defendants’ motion for judgment on

the pleadings. For the following reasons, the motion is denied.

LEGAL STANDARD

When challenging the sufficiency of a complaint, a motion for judgment on the

pleadings under Rule 12(c) is governed by the same standard for a motion to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6). Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coyle Mech. Supply Inc., 983 F.3d 307,

313 (7th Cir. 2020). The only difference is timing—a Rule 12(c) motion is filed after

the answer and affirmative defenses are filed. Id. The court views the complaint’s

allegations and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant to decide whether

the complaint states a claim that is plausible on its face. Id.; Vinson v. Vermilion

County, 776 F.3d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 2015). The moving party bears the burden of

establishing the insufficiency of the plaintiff's allegations. Marcure v. Lynn, 992 F.3d

625, 631 (7th Cir. 2021).

BACKGROUND1

Mr. Wadelton was taken into protective custody on March 22, 2022, and then ad-

mitted to the Whiteside County Jail. Dkt. 46 at 7. After a medical consultation, he

was placed on suicide watch. Id. at 8. At around 1:28 AM on March 25, he was dis-

covered unresponsive in his cell and pronounced dead. Id. at 9. According to the

Whiteside County coroner’s certification of death, Mr. Wadelton died by hanging him-

self. Id.

ANALYSIS

Defendants move to dismiss Count III of the complaint, which raises a claim under

the Illinois Survival Act based on “willful and wanton conduct.” The Survival Act

doesn’t itself create a cause of action, Moon v. Rhode, 67 N.E.3d 220, 230 (Ill. 2016),

but it need not, as long as the complaint states an underlying claim that Mr. Wadel-

ton could have brought while he was still alive. See Vincent v. Alden-Park Strathmoor,

Inc., 948 N.E.2d 610, 614 (Ill. 2011). Illinois law has “no separate and independent

tort of ‘willful and wanton’ misconduct.” Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R., 641 N.E.2d 402, 406

(Ill. 1994). Instead, it is treated “as an aggravated form of negligence.” Krywin v. Chi.

Transit Auth., 938 N.E.2d 440, 452 (Ill. 2010).

1 The facts remain unchanged from the last motion before the Court in this case. See

Wadelton v. Whiteside County, No. 3:23-cv-50104, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63744, at *1-2 (N.D.

Ill. Apr. 8, 2024).

To state a claim of negligence involving willful and wanton conduct, a plaintiff

must allege “that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, that the defendant

breached the duty, and that the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s

injury.” Id. Defendants contend that the complaint fails to sufficiently allege the last

element, specifically that there was no alleged injury that Mr. Wadelton sustained

before his death.2 Ms. Wadelton counters that common sense would dictate that Mr.

Wadelton experienced pain and suffering as he strangled himself (which ultimately

resulted in his death).

Defendants rely on Ellig v. Delnor Community Hospital, 603 N.E.2d 1203 (Ill. App.

Ct. 1992), which emphasized the need for conscious pain and suffering before death

to support a Survival Act claim. Id. at 1207.3 But the requirement of consciousness is

not a reason to dismiss the claim in this case—it can reasonably be inferred that Mr.

Wadelton was conscious in hanging himself.

In their reply, Defendants zero in on the complaint’s language that Mr. Wadelton’s

“survivors have incurred substantial pecuniary losses, including the loss of his soci-

ety, companionship and support.” Dkt. 46 at 15. Defendants are right that those enu-

merated harms didn’t precede Mr. Wadelton’s death (and thus couldn’t support a

2 Defendants’ opening brief is unclear as to whether the proximate cause issue was in-

tended as simply an extension of the injury argument or as an independent argument. Then,

in their reply, Defendants focus only on the lack of injury. Because the issue of proximate

cause is underdeveloped in the opening brief and absent from the reply brief, the Court con-

strues Defendants’ argument as only about the lack of injury. See United States v. Berkowitz,

927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991) (“We repeatedly have made clear that perfunctory and

underdeveloped arguments . . . are waived . . . .”).

3 Defendants also cite Saucedo v. City of Chicago, No. 11 C 5868, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

75523, at *28-29 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2015). The passage they specifically cite, which discusses

proximate cause, also notes that the pain and suffering must be conscious. Id.

Survival Act claim), but that doesn’t preclude inferring the existence of unenumer-

ated, pre-death harms from the facts pleaded. “[F]ederal pleading standards do not

‘demand that complaints contain all legal elements (or factors) plus facts correspond-

ing to each.” Zimmerman v. Bornick, 25 F.4th 491, 493 (7th Cir. 2022); see also

Brown v. Meisner, 81 F.4th 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2023). Reasonable inferences drawn

from the factual allegations will do.

The complaint’s pleading of the Survival Act claim may leave a little to be desired,

but it’s sufficient to survive Defendants’ challenge. Defendants’ motion for judgment

on the pleadings is denied.

Date: July 29, 2024 NY

Hon. IAIN D. esto

United States District Judge