Brown v. Cook County Sheriff's Office

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

WILLIAM C. BROWN, III )

(#20230112155), )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 23 C 2710

)

COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, )

COOK COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF )

CORRECTIONS, CERMAK HEALTH )

SERVICES, NURSE STEWART, TOM )

DART, SHERIFF, and COOK COUNTY )

JAIL ADMINISTRATION, )

)

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff William C. Brown III, proceeding pro se, has filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, alleging that defendant Cook County Sheriff Tom Dart, the only remaining

defendant in this case,1 violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Dart has

moved to dismiss Brown's amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. The Court denies the motion for the reasons discussed below.

Background

Brown alleges that on the morning of January 19, 2023, while he was housed as

1 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint does not assert any claims against Nurse Stewart, and

the Court has already dismissed all other defendants.

2 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint does not explicitly allege violations of any particular

constitutional provision, but as explained below, the Court construes the claims as asserted

under the Fourteenth Amendment.

a pretrial detainee in the Cook County Jail and was preparing for a court appearance

later that morning, he was assaulted by several inmates as he left the showers. While

heading toward a staircase that led to his cell, Brown was confronted by a member of a

street gang who spat on him and repeatedly punched him in the face and head. Brown

broke his right ring finger trying to defend himself, and his assailant seized on that injury

to throw Brown to the ground and get on top of him. While the two scuffled, eight other

gang members "swarmed" Brown, pretending to break up the fight but instead punching

and kicking Brown.

The assault left Brown "writhing in pain," with the knuckles of his right hand

bloodied where the primary assailant had bitten him. As they left, several other

assailants warned him not to "say sh*t" or they would "f**k [him] up." Eventually, a

correctional officer appeared and called a sergeant. Brown was taken to the dispensary,

where he was given some bandages and discharged. After returning from court later

that evening, Brown found himself in "tremendous" pain, with his "right ring finger . . .

swelled to an obscene size." For two weeks, Brown says, he received no further

medical treatment from Cermak Health Services, so he acquired pain medication from

fellow inmates. On February 1, 2023, he was given an x-ray, which revealed that his

finger was broken, a diagnosis that was confirmed at Stroger Hospital. Stroger

discharged Brown "with instructions for the jail/Cermak to splint [the] finger" and gave

him an appointment to see a hand specialist, but the finger was never splinted, and the

appointment with a specialist never materialized. By July 2023, Brown says, his finger

had "healed improperly," costing him dexterity in that finger and leaving him unable to

"make a tight fist."

None of this would have happened, Brown alleges, if the Cook County Jail had

correctional officers supervising areas that "they are suppose[d] to be watching." To

manage overcrowding and understaffing, the Jail staggers the release of decks of

inmates into common areas like the dayroom. Though these staggered releases are

designed to ensure that there are enough deputies to supervise the released inmates,

deputies are also required to engage in "cross-watching," temporarily leaving their posts

supervising the released inmates to check o" other inmates who have been left

unsupervised. Because Brown had a court appointment that morning, he was allowed

out of his cell for a "court shower" even though he was among those inmates who

should have remained on their deck. As Brown began his shower, the deputy who "was

supposed to be watching [him] left" to cross-watch another area, leaving Brown and his

assailants unsupervised and exposing Brown to harm.

Brown alleges that Dart is responsible for Brown's exposure to harm "because he

is the Sheriff, and he has not ensured" that there are enough deputies working and

present to protect those in custody from harm. Although Brown does not identify a

particular constitutional provision defendant is alleged to have violated, that failure does

not impose any impediment to his suit, for a complaint need not "identify any particular

legal theory" or "allege all legal elements" of a claim. Brown v. Meisner, 81 F.4th 706,

708 (7th Cir. 2023). Based on the factual allegations, the Court construes the amended

complaint as alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, the constitutional

provision that protects pretrial detainees.

Discussion

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at

678. In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in

the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Taha v.

Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 781, 947 F.3d 464, 469 (7th Cir. 2020). Where, as in this

case, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court construes the complaint "'liberally,'

holding it to a 'less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Perez

v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742,

751 (7th Cir. 2011)).

Discussion

Dart makes a single argument for dismissal: he contends that the amended

complaint does not allege facts sufficient to support an official capacity claim against

him. Such a claim, he argues, is effectively one against the Cook County Sheriff's

Department as an entity and therefore requires plaintiff to establish municipal liability as

defined in Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

This requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege, and eventually prove, that he "(1) suffered a

deprivation of a federal right; (2) as a result of either an express municipal policy,

widespread custom, or deliberate act of a decision-maker with final policy-making

authority; which (3) was the proximate cause of his injury." Scott v. Dart, 99 F.4th 1076,

1088–89 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting King v. Kramer, 763 F.3d 635, 649 (7th Cir. 2014)).

Dart argues for dismissal based only on the second element, which presents three

distinct, though non-exclusive, avenues for establishing a connection between the

municipality and the alleged deprivation. Glisson v. Ind. Dep't of Corrs., 849 F.3d 372,

379 (7th Cir. 2017). Although these three theories of liability involve distinct inquiries,

"[t]he central question is always whether an official policy, however expressed . . .,

caused the constitutional deprivation." Id.

Dart offers arguments to defeat all three of these theories. The Court addresses

each in turn.

I. Express Policy

"The express policy theory applies, as the name suggests, where a policy

explicitly violates a constitutional right when enforced." Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d

375, 379 (7th Cir. 2005). Under this theory, a single "application of the offensive policy

resulting in a constitutional violation is sufficient to establish municipal liability." Id. at

379–80.

Dart argues that Brown does not plausibly to allege an express policy because

the amended complaint "does not point to any specific language that explicitly violates a

constitutional right when enforced as required to pursue a Monell express policy theory."

Brown here has plausibly alleged the existence of a policy. To be sure, his

amended complaint never uses the word "policy," but our system of notice pleading

requires no such "magic words." See Martinez v. Hooper, 148 F.3d 856, 858–59 (7th

Cir. 1998) ("[A] plaintiff is not required to use magic words, nor are civil rights plaintiffs

held to a higher standard of pleading than other litigants."). What matters whether the

complaint supplies a basis for inferring that there is a "policy," a "custom," a "practice,"

or the like. Brown's amended complaint does that, alleging, for example, that cross-

watching was "created and implemented" and that "deputies are required" to cross-

watch. These factual allegations sufficiently support the existence of "an official policy[.]"

See Glisson, 849 F.3d at 379.

II. Custom or Practice

In the absence of an express policy, a plaintiff may establish Monell liability by

plausibly alleging a widespread custom or practice that is "so pervasive that

acquiescence on the part of policymakers [is] apparent and amount[s] to a [municipal]

policy decision." Arquero v. Dart, 587 F. Supp. 3d 721, 728 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (quoting

Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 790 (7th Cir. 2006), overruled on other grounds

by Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016)). "To succeed on that

theory," the plaintiff "must allege facts permitting a reasonable inference 'that the

practice is widespread and that the specific violations complained of were not isolated

incidents.'" Thomas v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 74 F.4th 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2023)

(quoting Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 344 (7th Cir. 2017)). "There is no

bright-line rule defining a widespread custom or practice," Arquero, 587 F. Supp. 3d at

728, but a plaintiff must plausibly allege more than "a few sporadic examples" of

constitutional deprivations resulting from the custom or practice. Thomas, 74 F.4th at

524 (quoting Flores v. City of South Bend, 997 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2021)).

Dart argues that Brown cannot sustain a custom-or-practice claim because he

alleges only a single incident of alleged constitutional deprivation, the assault on him

that took place on January 19, 2023. Plaintiff makes no counterargument on this

dispositive point and has therefore forfeited the point for purposes of the motion to

dismiss. See Bradley v. Vill. of Univ. Park, 59 F.4th 887, 897–98 (7th Cir. 2023)

(counterarguments or issues waived if party fails to respond).

III. Deliberate Act of a Decisionmaker with Final Policy-Making Authority

To succeed on a contention that the governmental entity may be held liable for "a

deliberate act of a decision-maker with final policy-making authority," Scott, 99 F.4th at

1088–89, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the "particular course of action"

challenged "is directed by those who set municipal policy[.]" Valentino v. Village of

South Chicago Heights, 575 F.3d 664, 675 (7th Cir. 2009). In other words, even if the

plaintiff plausibly alleges that a particular official made the challenged decision, the

"official also must be responsible for establishing final government policy on [the]

particular issue" in question. Id. "The determination of whether a person has

policymaking authority is a question of state law . . . to be decided by the court." Id.

Dart argues that Brown cannot succeed on this theory because he does not

allege that Dart had final decision-making authority or that his injury was caused by an

express decision by Dart. Brown responds that Dart "is responsible" because he is in

charge of the Cook County Jail and "is the administrator with final policy-making

authority" who "deliberately implemented the unwritten, widespread, customary practice

of 'cross-watching'" and "ordered the deputies to 'cross-watch.'" Dkt. 21 at 1–2.

Dart replies that Brown's contention relies on facts not alleged in the amended

complaint. First, Dart contends that Brown has not alleged that cross-watching is so

widespread that it constitutes a custom or practice. He further argues that any such

allegation is conclusory. Second, Dart takes issue with Brown's contention that he

deliberately implemented the practice of cross-watching," arguing that it is outside the

scope of the amended complaint and is in any event conclusory.

The Court cannot endorse such a crabbed reading of a complaint, much less a

pro se prisoner's complaint. See Perez, 792 F.3d at 776. Again, complaints need not

identify legal theories or "allege all legal elements of a particular claim." Brown, 81 F.4th

at 708. Thus, Dart need not have even identified a Monell theory of liability in his

amended complaint. He also need not have alleged, in so many words, that cross-

watching is such a widespread policy that it constitutes a custom or practice or that Dart

deliberately implemented the unwritten, widespread customary practice of cross-

watching.

More to the point, Brown has plausibly alleged that Dart is the decisionmaker

responsible for cross-watching. Specifically, he alleges in the amended complaint that

"deputies are required" to engage in "cross-watching" and that Dart "is responsible . . .

because he is the Sheriff." Am. Compl. 5, 8. As a factual matter, these allegations are

sufficient to plausibly allege that Dart made, or at least approved, the decision to

implement cross-watching.

Whether Dart has final policy-making authority is, as the Court has indicated, "a

question of state law . . . to be decided by the court." Valentino, 575 F.3d at 675–76.

The pertinent inquiry is whether Sheriff Dart "is a policymaker 'in a particular area, or on

a particular issue[.]'" Id. at 676 (quoting Kujawski v. Bd. Of Comm'rs of Bartholomew

Cnty., 183 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1999)). Illinois law makes clear that a county sheriff

"has sole control over the policies and practices of the jail." Jones v. Dart, No. 12 C

9272, 2013 WL 4854368, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2013) (quoting Jacoby v. DuPage

County, No. 12 C 6539, 2013 WL 3233339, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 2013)). See also 55

Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-6017 (sheriff has "custody and care" of jail's operations); Ryan v.

County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Illinois sheriffs are

independently elected officials not subject to the control of the county."). This is enough

to permit a finding that Dart had the final policy-making authority to implement cross-

watching.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court denies Dart's motion to dismiss (dkt.

14). Dart is directed to answer the amended complaint by no later than August 5, 2024.

By no later than August 19, 2024, each party is directed to file a status report that

includes the following information: (1) the names of all persons who have information

that the party may need to support its claims or defenses, and a short summary (2-3

sentences) of the topic(s) of the person's possible testimony; (2) a description, by

category, of any documents that the party may need to obtain from the other side or

from third parties to support its claims or defenses; and (3) a description, by category, of

any documents that the party has in its possession or control that it may use to support

its claims or defenses. A party that fails to file a status report by the due date may be

subject to a sanction, up to and including dismissal of the case or entry of default. The

case is set for a telephonic status hearing on September 9, 2024 at 8:45 a.m., using

call-in number 650-479-3207, access code 980-394-33. Defense counsel is directed to

make arrangements for plaintiff to participate by telephone.

Date: July 12, 2024

United States District Judge