Lela v. Dart

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

IOAN LELA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 18 C 4058

)

THOMAS J. DART, MICHAEL )

MILLER, MICHAEL CARBERRY, )

MARTHA YOKSOULLIAN, and )

KAREN JAMES HAYES, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:

Plaintiff Ioan Lela has filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages for

alleged violations of the United States Constitution and Illinois law. Lela claims he

suffered injuries while housed as a pretrial detainee in the Cook County Department of

Corrections (CCDOC) due to the defendants' failure to provide and maintain an

adequate air-ventilation system. The defendants have moved for summary judgment on

Lela's federal claims.1 The Court grants the motion for the reasons discussed below.

Background

Lela filed this suit pro se. The Court appointed counsel to represent him. With

1 Lela's second amended complaint also references state law, but it does not include

any state law claims in separate counts. The defendants' summary judgment motion

addresses only Lela's federal claims; it makes no mention of state law. The Court has

no idea whether there are any viable state law claims, but it cannot rule on them based

on the defendants' motion because the motion does not address them. The Court

therefore dismisses any remaining state law claims for lack of supplemental jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

the assistance of counsel, Lela filed his second amended complaint, which is the

operative complaint at this point, and proceeded through discovery. At Lela's request,

however, appointed counsel was terminated after a telephonic hearing held on

September 22, 2023. Lela, at his own insistence, has proceeded pro se since that time;

he did not seek appointment of a replacement attorney.

A. Compliance with Local Rule 56.1

The defendants complied with Local Rule 56.1 in connection with their motion for

summary judgment, but Lela did not. Specifically, defendants filed a statement of

undisputed facts along with their motion for summary judgment. See N.D. Ill. L.R.

56.1(a)(2) & (d). Defendants also served on Lela a notice under Local Rule 56.2, which

explains what Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 56.1 require of a pro

se litigant opposing summary judgment. See N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.2.

Despite this, Lela did not comply with Local Rule 56.1, which requires a party

opposing a motion for summary judgment to file a response to the movant's statement

of facts, "consist[ing] of numbered paragraphs corresponding to the numbered

paragraphs" in the movant's statement and either admitting, disputing, or admitting in

part and disputing in part the facts asserted by the movant. N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(b)(2),

(e)(1)–(2). To place an asserted fact in dispute, the responsive statement "must cite

specific evidentiary material that controverts the fact and must concisely explain how

the cited material controverts the asserted fact." N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(e)(3). The Rule also

requires the nonmovant separately to file "a supporting memorandum of law" citing

"directly to specific paragraphs in" either the movant's statement of facts or the

nonmovant's response to that statement. N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(b)(1), (g).

Lela did none of this. Based on his noncompliance, the Court could deem all the

defendants' properly supported facts to be admitted and proceed directly to determining

whether those facts entitle the defendants to summary judgment. Instead, however, the

Court has determined to overlook Lela's noncompliance with Local Rule 56.1 and has

considered all the materials he has referenced in opposing the defendants' motion: his

"pretrial memorandum," dkt. no. 134; his "partial response to defendants' summary

judgment motion," dkt. no. 171; his very-recently-filed "surreply," dkt. no. 182; and the

materials attached to these filings. See Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880, 886–87 (7th Cir.

2011) ("[W]hether to apply the [local] rule strictly or to overlook any transgression is one

left to the district court's discretion.") (quoting Little v. Cox's Supermarkets, 71 F.3d 637,

641 (7th Cir. 1995)).

B. Facts

The facts set out below either are not genuinely disputed by way of any of the

evidentiary materials submitted to the Court by Lela or are taken in the light most

favorable to Lela, at least where his assertions are supported by admissible evidence.

The Court has not, however, considered—and it cannot appropriately consider—

evidence offered by either side that would not be admissible at trial. See, e.g., Aguilar

v. Gaston-Camara, 861 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir. 2017).

Lela entered the CCDOC as a pretrial detainee in March 2016. Defs.' L.R. 56.1

Stmt. ¶ 33. From June 2016 to October 2021—the time frame relevant to this case—

Lela was housed in Division 11. Id. ¶ 34; Pl.'s Pretrial Mem. at 2.

During those five-plus years, Lela was diagnosed with and treated for multiple

ailments that he believes were caused by inadequate air ventilation. Defs.' L.R. 56.1

Stmt. ¶¶ 38–42; Pl.'s Pretrial Mem. at 2–3 & Pl.'s Resp. at 8. These ailments include

"mild sporadic allergic rhinitis," upper respiratory infections, headaches, swollen and

watery eyes, bilateral earaches, and scalp dermatitis. Defs.' L.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 38; Pl.'s

Pretrial Mem. at 2–3, 6 & Pl.'s Resp. at 8; Lela Dep. at 34:6-24, 35:6–36:8, 39:10-14;

Altez Dep. at 28:4-5, 37:7-12, 37:24, 38:9-11, 41:8-11, 48:10-14. The defendants focus

on the absence of corroborating medical records in the evidentiary record and challenge

Lela's evidentiary support for his contention that he experienced any ailments other than

allergic rhinitis and upper respiratory infections. Defs.' Surreply at 13–14. But whether

Lela experienced headaches, swollen and watery eyes, earaches, or scalp dermatitis

falls within his personal knowledge and is therefore properly supported by his own

deposition testimony. See REXA, Inc. v. Chester, 42 F.4th 652, 665 (7th Cir. 2022)

(genuine factual dispute may exist where nonmovant's testimony is "based on his

personal knowledge").

It is at least possible that Lela's ailments may have been caused or contributed

to by poor air ventilation. Pl.'s Pretrial Mem. at 5–7 & Pl.'s Resp. at 9; Lela Dep. at

41:2-6, 57:18-23; Altez Dep. at 44:8-15. On this point, Lela says that CCDOC medical

personnel told him that poor air ventilation may have caused his ailments. Pl.'s Resp. at

9; Lela Dep. at 41:2-6, 57:18-23. The defendants contend that Lela has cited no

admissible evidence to support this assertion. What the medical personnel said to Lela

is inadmissible hearsay, but that is not fatal to Lela's assertion, for the defendants

themselves cite deposition testimony acknowledging that "exposure to dust, molds,

mites, dust mites, pollen, grass, outdoor molds," and humidity, among other factors, can

cause allergic rhinitis. Defs.' L.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 39; Altez Dep. at 44:8-15.

With respect to Lela's allergic rhinitis, undisputed testimony in the record reflects

that medication was effective in preventing acute symptoms and managing Lela's

symptoms overall. Defs.' L.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 39–40; Altez Dep. at 48:19-23, 78:10-13.

But although Lela was eventually transferred out of CCDOC, he continues to experience

symptoms of allergic rhinitis and "breathing problems."2 Lela Dep. at 74:22-24, 75:7-15.

Division 11 uses an air ventilation and filtration system (HVAC system) that was

installed in 1995 when Division 11 was built. Defs.' L.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 11. The system

circulates air through "two sets of air ducts that come into the main air handler." Id. ¶¶

12–13. One duct pulls fresh air in from the outside, and the other "pulls the air out [of]

cells and recirculates it." Id. ¶ 13. Typically, the system completely cycles the air

"through Division 11 with fresh air from outside" at least four times per hour. Id. ¶ 15.

The Minimum Efficiency Rating Value (MERV) of the system is 5, but the system

actually operates at a MERV of between 8 and 12. Id. ¶ 16. By comparison, the typical

HVAC system in a residence has a MERV of between 1 and 4, so the air in Division 11

is "fresher than the air in a [typical] house." Id. ¶ 17. Division 11's HVAC system

reaches this relatively higher MERV by using two filters: a "pre-filter" and a "secondary

2 Lela says that doctors have told him that his allergic rhinitis is "permanent." Pl.'s

Resp. at 8 & Pl.'s Pretrial Mem. at 6; Lela Dep. at 76:22-24. He has not cited any

properly admissible evidence to support this assertion; the doctors' statements are

inadmissible hearsay. On the other hand, the question of whether Lela's condition is

permanent largely concerns the amount of damages to award him if he prevails, as

opposed to whether the defendants are liable in the first place. And in any event, when

Lela testified at deposition that his allergic rhinitis is "permanent," the context suggests

that he used the word not to mean "perennial" but to mean that he continues to

experience symptoms in an "ongoing" fashion even though symptoms may manifest at

"different levels" at different times. Lela Dep. at 74:22-24, 75:7-15, 76:22–77:2. There

is enough evidence in the record to permit a finding that Lela's rhinitis has persisted

since his departure from CCDOC, whether or not it is "permanent."

filter." Id. ¶¶ 16, 18. The pre-filter is placed in front of the secondary filter. Id. ¶ 18.

Lela has offered no evidence that contradicts any of these statements of fact by the

defendants.

From 2016 through 2021—the relevant time period here—multiple "safeguards"

were in place to ensure that problems with Division 11's HVAC system would be

identified. Defs.' L.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 22. The pre-filter "is typically changed every two

months," and the secondary filter "is changed . . . every six months." Id. ¶ 18. If the

filters are dirty and need to be changed, "a building automation system" controlled by

the Department of Facilities Management (Facilities) sounds an alarm. Id. ¶ 19.

Facilities also performs monthly visual inspections "to check the static pressure across

the filter[s] with a Magnehelic pressure gauge,"3 and CCDOC "uses a computer system

that monitors the air handlers" to sound an alarm if the static pressure reaches an

unacceptable differential. Id. ¶¶ 19, 21. In addition, Facilities engineers "inspect the air

flow in Division 11" at eight-hour intervals. Id. ¶ 20. Again, Lela has not offered any

evidence that contradicts any of these statements of fact by the defendants.

Defendants have offered evidence that in addition to the safeguards just

discussed, Facilities "tr[ies]" to clean the vent covers in cells twice a year. It also

frequently cleans the vents in Division 11, as well as the ductwork leading to the

detainees' cells, when it becomes "necessary"—that is, when the Department of

Building Management and Construction (Building Management) receives a work order

from the Sheriff's Work Order Department. Defs.' L.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 24–25; Nolan Dep.

3 A Magnehelic pressure gauge measures the difference between the pressures at the

front and back of a filter. Nolan Dep. at 110:22–111:2.

at 115:17-19, 116:1-6. Between 2016 and 2021, Facilities cleaned or otherwise

addressed problems with vents in Division 11 more than 100 times. Defs.' L.R. 56.1

Stmt. ¶ 26. On some of these occasions, Facilities did so in response to an inmate

grievance; on other occasions, Facilities took action at the request of CCDOC staff.

Defs.' L.R. 56.1 Stmt., Ex. I. Lela has offered no evidence that contradicts any of this.

Lela contends that there has never been any "regularly scheduled maintenance

cleaning of the HVAC vents" in Division 11. Pl.'s Resp. at 7. This contention, however,

is not supported by any evidence other than Lela's own deposition testimony. See id.

(citing Lela Dep. at 63:13-22). And his testimony is not sufficient to create a genuine

factual dispute on this point, because Lela lacks personal knowledge (i.e., personal

observations) regarding whether such regular maintenance occurred throughout

Division 11. See REXA, Inc., 42 F.4th at 665 (no genuine factual dispute where

nonmovant's testimony not "based on his personal knowledge").

On the other hand, neither Building Management, which does not perform "any

tests for sanitation or health," nor Facilities, which contracts for annual air-quality testing

at the CCDOC hospital, has ever done any air-quality testing at Division 11. Pl.'s Resp.

at 6–7 & Pl.'s Pretrial Mem. at 9; Nolan Dep. at 88:2–89:11; Morrison Dep. at 13:12-20,

54:10-15. Defendants concede that Facilities has never done such testing. Defs.'

Surreply at 9-10.

On February 15, 2018, Lela filed a grievance about the HVAC system in Division

11. Defs.' L.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 35. He complained that the HVAC system had not been

adequately cleaned, allowing between one and two inches of "elements of human dead

skin" and "dust mite particles" to accumulate on the system's vents and cover the intake

and outtake air-conditioning covers. Defs.' L.R. 56.1 Stmt., Ex. D at 2. A work order

was created on February 22, and the vents were cleaned on February 27. Defs.' L.R.

56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 36–37 & Ex. E.

Discussion

Summary judgment is appropriate where "the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Lord v. Beahm, 952

F.3d 902, 903 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986)). The Court views all facts and draws all reasonable inferences in the light

most favorable to the nonmovant. Parker v. Four Seasons Hotels, Ltd., 845 F.3d 807,

812 (7th Cir. 2017).

Though a convicted prisoner's constitutional rights regarding the conditions of

confinement are established by the Eighth Amendment, a pretrial detainee's "rights are

derived from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Smith v. Dart,

803 F.3d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 2015). Thus, whereas a convicted prisoner has the right to

be free only "from conditions that constitute cruel and unusual punishment," a pretrial

detainee is "entitled to be free from conditions that amount to punishment" of any kind.

Id. (cleaned up) (emphasis added). To show that the challenged conditions amount to

punishment, a pretrial detainee must establish that (1) the conditions are "objectively

serious enough to amount to … the denial of a basic human need," id., (2) defendants

"possess a purposeful, a knowing, or possibly a reckless state of mind[,]" and (3)

defendants' actions are "objectively unreasonable," Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S.

389, 396–97 (2015). Basic human needs include "reasonably adequate ventilation[.]"

Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 820 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Gray v. Hardy, 826

F.3d 1000, 1005 (7th Cir. 2016)). To avoid summary judgment, Lela must show that

there are genuine disputes of material fact with respect to all three elements.

The defendants offer several bases for summary judgment. First, they argue that

Lela has failed to show that they "were personally involved in the events giving rise to

his claim." Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 7–9. Second, they contend

that Lela cannot sustain a conditions-of-confinement claim because he has failed to

show that (1) the challenged conditions were "objectively serious," (2) the defendants

acted purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly, or (3) their conduct was objectively

unreasonable. Id. at 9–13. Third, the defendants argue that qualified immunity shields

them from liability. Id. at 13–14. Fourth, they contend that Lela's alleged injuries are de

minimis and therefore insufficient to entitle him to compensatory damages. Id. at 14–

15. Finally, they argue that Lela has failed to proffer evidence that would sustain his

"official capacity" claims. Id. at 15–20.

Lela responds to only two of these arguments. First, he argues that the

defendants acted knowingly in "fail[ing] to provide adequate ventilation to pretrial

detainees" because they are subject to "controlling court orders and statutory code

mandates," as well as "controlling correctional safety and health regulation codes," and

"blatant[ly] disregard[ed]" their responsibilities to ensure compliance. Pl.'s Resp. at 5–7.

Second, Lela disputes defendants' "de minimis injuries" argument, contending that he

has suffered "permanent injuries" and "medical problems proximately caused by" the

defendants' conduct.4 Id. at 8.

1. The defendants' state of mind

The Court begins with the state of mind requirement. To succeed on his claim,

Lela must establish that the defendants engaged in the challenged conduct with "a

purposeful, a knowing, or possibly a reckless state of mind." Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396.

Thus, even if Lela could show that the CCDOC's HVAC system exposed him to

conditions that were objectively serious and that the defendants' efforts to maintain the

system were objectively unreasonable, he would still have to show the defendants were

more than negligent in failing to provide adequate ventilation. See id. ("[L]iability for

negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due

process.") (emphasis omitted) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,

849 (1998)).

Lela does not offer any facts supported by evidence that would permit a

reasonable jury to find that defendants possessed the requisite intent. Rather, he asks

the Court to infer that defendants were more than negligent because they were "legally

responsible" for providing adequate ventilation and failed to do so. Pl.'s Resp. at 5–8.

Defendant Carberry, Lela argues, is "legally responsible for full compliance with" a 2010

Department of Justice consent decree that mandates "adequate ventilation throughout

[CCDOC] to ensure that inmates receive an adequate supply of air flow[.]" Id. at 5; Pl.'s

Pretrial Mem., Ex. A at 16. The decree was renewed in 2015 and requires Facilities to

"assess compliance with this requirement on a daily basis for automated systems and

4 As the defendants point out, Lela's failure to respond to their other arguments results

in waiver. See Bradley v. Village of University Park, 59 F.4th 887, 897–98 (7th Cir.

2023) (party waives counterarguments by failing to respond).

on an annual basis for non-automated systems." Id. To show that Defendant Carberry

is "legally responsible," Lela also points to Facilities' official website, which states that

Facilities "[e]nsure[s] life safety code compliance in all [CCDOC] facilities."5 Pl.'s Resp.

at 6; Pl.'s Pretrial Mem., Ex. D at 33. Lela then argues that because there has never

been any air-quality testing in Division 11,6 defendants had to have acted knowingly in

failing to comply with "controlling court orders and statutory code mandates." Pl.'s

Resp. at 6–8.

Even if the Court were to assume that defendants failed to substantially comply

with either the consent decree or any "statutory code mandates," that would not be

enough to permit a reasonable inference that they were anything more than negligent in

doing so. On this point, Lela offers nothing more than speculative and conclusory

contentions. He asserts that the defendants acted "willfully," "outrageous[ly],"

"horrific[ly]," and with "blatant disregard" for their responsibilities, Pl.'s Resp. at 5–8, but

a reasonable inference that defendants acted with the requisite culpability requires more

than Lela's own speculation or conclusions. See MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 994 F.3d 869, 876 (7th Cir. 2021) ("Summary judgment

requires only that all reasonable inferences be drawn in favor of the non-moving party.")

5 Lela also contends that another judge in this district "issued a memorandum

opinion and order against" Facilities and defendant Dart "for willful failure to provide

adequate ventilation to pretrial detainees." Pl.'s Resp. at 6. The cited decision, however,

made no such determination. See Morton v. Dart, No. 16 C 5057, 2017 WL 4785925

(N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2017).

6 Lela also cites defendants' alleged failure to perform regularly scheduled

maintenance of the HVAC system as reason to infer culpability, Pl.'s Resp. at 7, but his

contention about the failure to perform maintenance is not properly supported by any

admissible evidence, and thus it cannot factor into the Court's analysis.

(emphasis in original); Widmar v. Sun Chem. Corp., 772 F.3d 457, 460 (7th Cir. 2014)

("[A] plaintiff seeking to thwart summary judgment must comply with Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 56(e) and Federal Rule of Evidence 602, both of which require that

testimony be based on personal knowledge[,] [which] . . . can include reasonable

inferences, but it does not include speculating as to an [opposing party's] state of mind,

or other intuitions, hunches, or rumors.").

Lela also says that the defendants failed to perform regularly scheduled

maintenance of the HVAC system. He argues that this is a basis to infer the required

culpable state of mind. The problem is that Lela has no evidence that the defendants

failed to perform regularly scheduled maintenance. All he can offer is what he himself

observed, which cannot possibly come close to covering anywhere near the entirety of

what took place in Division 11. Thus Lela's contention is not supported by admissible

evidence.

Because Lela has failed to show a basis for a reasonable inference that any of

the defendants acted with the required level of intent, he cannot prevail on his

conditions-of-confinement claim. For this reason alone, the defendants are entitled to

summary judgment.

2. Objective seriousness of the conditions

Lela likewise has not offered evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to

find that the challenged conditions reached the threshold required to sustain his claim.

It was no doubt quite unpleasant that between one and two inches of "elements of

human dead skin" and "dust mite particles" accumulated on a vent cover (presumably

the one in Lela's cell, though that's not entirely clear). Defs.' L.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 23 & Ex.

D at 3. But that does not by itself indicate that this "pose[d] a significant risk of severe

harm" to Lela or other pretrial detainees. See Anderson v. Morrison, 835 F.3d 681, 683

(7th Cir. 2016) ("Prisons are not required to provide a 'maximally safe environment,' but

they must address easily preventable, observed hazards that pose a significant risk of

severe harm to inmates[.]") (quoting Carroll v. DeTella, 255 F.3d 470, 472 (7th Cir.

2001)). Rather, Lela would need some form of evidentiary support—either expert

testimony or some other evidence—providing a scientific and/or statistical basis to

conclude that the accumulation of dust and debris or the state of the HVAC system as a

whole presented a danger of serious harm. See Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839,

847 (7th Cir. 1999). Lela has offered no evidence along these lines.

3. Objective unreasonableness of the defendants' actions or inaction

Nor has Lela pointed to evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find that

the defendants' actions or inactions in maintaining Division 11's HVAC system were

"objectively unreasonable." Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397. Though it appears to be the

case that neither Building Management nor Facilities has ever performed any air-quality

testing at Division 11, Pl.'s Resp. at 6–7; Pl.'s Pretrial Mem. at 9; Nolan Dep. at 88:2–

89:11; Morrison Dep. at 13:12-20, 54:10-15, the defendants have offered evidence

establishing that they have implemented multiple safeguards to ensure identification of

problems with HVAC system, including monitoring and regularly changing filters,

monitoring and regularly inspecting the system for unacceptable static pressure

changes, inspecting the air flow three times daily, and cleaning the vent covers and

related ductwork at least a hundred times over the relevant period. Defs.' L.R. 56.1

Stmt. ¶¶ 18–22, 24–26; Nolan Dep. at 115:17-19, 116:1-6. Moreover, the record

reflects when Lela filed a grievance, the defendants promptly responded by cleaning the

vents on his tier. Defs.'L.R. 56.1 Stmt. J] 35-37 & Ex. E. In this context, even if the

accumulation that Lela says he observed indicates that the defendants had neglected to

take some precautionary or remedial measures, no reasonable jury could find the

totality of their conduct to be "objectively unreasonable."

In sum, Lela has not offered evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find

in his favor on any of the essential elements of his conditions-of-confinement claim.

This is true even after overlooking his failures to comply with Local Rule 56.1 and

accounting for any additional (and supported) facts he asserts in his pretrial

memorandum and memorandum of law. Thus, whether on the merits or via qualified

immunity, which requires a plaintiff to establish a constitutional violation, see Reed v.

Palmer, 906 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2018) (immunity attaches where there is no

constitutional violation even if right was clearly established), the defendants are entitled

to summary judgment. The Court therefore need not address the defendants’ remaining

arguments for summary judgment.

Conclusion

Plaintiff's motion to file a surreply [181] is granted. For the foregoing reasons, the

Court grants the defendants’ motion for summary judgment [160] and directs the Clerk

to enter judgment stating: Plaintiff loan Lela's claims under federal law are dismissed

with prejudice; any claims by plaintiff under state law are dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §

1367(a)(3) for lack of supplemental jurisdiction.

Date: July 8, 2024

United States District Judge

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