Doe v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois

weanesday, 25 september, 2024 □□□□□□□□□

Clerk, U.S. District Court, IL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

URBANA DIVISION

JOHN DOE, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 23-cv-2091

)

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE )

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, et al., )

Defendants. )

OPINION

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is Defendants’! Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and

Failure to State a Claim. (Doc. 19). For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

L PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 18, 2023, Plaintiff John Doe? filed a complaint following a decision by the

University of Illinois to dismiss Plaintiff after he was accused of sexual misconduct. (Doc.

1). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights under Title IX and the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985,

1 The Defendants in this case include: the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois; Danielle Fleenor,

individually, and in her capacity as Title IX Coordinator; Rony Die, individually, and in his capacity as

Assistant Dean of Students; Justin Brown, individually, and in his capacity as Director of the Office for

Student Conflict Resolution; January Boten, individually, and in her capacity as Assistant Dean of Students

and Investigator; Debra Imel, individually, and in her capacity as Assistant Dean of Students and

Investigator; Mariah Young, individually, and in her capacity as Assistant Dean of Students and

Investigator; and John Does 1-5, individually, and in their official capacities.

2 Plaintiff was granted permission to proceed in this action under the pseudonym “John Doe.” See Text

Order 6/29/2023. The University Title IX complainant shall be referred to as “Jane Roe.”

Page 1 of 21

and 1988. (Id. at 59-89). Plaintiff also alleges a breach of contract claim and requests

declaratory judgment. (Id. at 89-95).

On July 14, 2023, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction

and Failure to State a Claim, challenging all but the Title IX and breach of contract claims

against the Board. (Doc. 19). On August 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed his brief in opposition to

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 26) and Defendants filed their Reply on September

22, 2023. (Doc. 29).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In May of 2020, John Doe was a student on medical leave at the University of

Illinois, College of Medicine. (Doc. 1 at 4). He had previously been in a romantic

relationship with Jane Roe, who was a second-year medical student at the school. (Id. at

6). After their relationship ended, Plaintiff and Roe continued to communicate, spend

time together, and engage in consensual sexual activity. (Id.). Between May 6 and May

12, 2020, Plaintiff was hospitalized due to a mental health crisis. (Id.). Roe was among the

individuals present when Plaintiff was discharged from the hospital. (Id.). Plaintiff, his

parents, and Roe spent the afternoon together on May 12, 2020 before Roe returned to

her apartment. (Id. at 6-7). Upon returning to his own home, Plaintiff took his prescribed

Adderall and began studying. (Id.). A few minutes later, Roe texted Plaintiff and asked

him to come over and keep her company. (Id.). After Plaintiff arrived, Roe got up from

her seat and hugged and kissed Plaintiff, and they walked into her bedroom. (Id.).

In the bedroom, Plaintiff alleges he suffered from an episode of psychosis as a side

effect of the combination of Adderall and Lexapro. (Id. at 8). As a result, Plaintiff contends

Page 2 of 21

that his memory of the events in the bedroom is diminished. (Id.). The formal complaint?

that Roe filed with the Office for Student Conduct Resolution against Plaintiff included

assertions that:

e Plaintiff picked Roe up and took her into her bedroom, threw her on the bed,

tried to kiss her while she turned her head away and said “no,” took off her

shorts, and while one of her arms was under her and Plaintiff was holding her

other arm, he put his penis into her vagina while she was crying and saying

“stop” and “no” for approximately 5-10 minutes;

e Plaintiff got off her and asked her to give him oral sex, she said “no”;

e Plaintiff eventually pushed Roe down on the bed and did it again; and after

getting off of her, Plaintiff put his hands on his head and said “oh my god [Roe],

Ijust raped you.”

(Doc. 20-1 at 4; Complaint Interview, Ex. 1). After the alleged sexual intercourse, Roe

noticed Plaintiff's pupils appeared to be abnormal and asked him if he had hit his head.

(Doc. 1 at 8). They continued to spend that night together, and eventually fell asleep with

each other. (/d.). The two spent the next morning together and took a picture depicting

Roe hugging Plaintiff with her arms and legs wrapped around him. (Id. at 9). Eventually,

Roe told Plaintiff she would like to be alone, so he left. (Id.).

Later that day, Roe spoke with Plaintiff on the phone and stated that she believed

he had sexually assaulted her. (Id.). Plaintiff asked if he could come over and discuss the

allegation with Roe, and she agreed. (Id.). Soon thereafter, while Plaintiff and Roe laid in

her bed, Roe grabbed Plaintiff's hand and placed it on her breast. (Id.). When Plaintiff told

“Documents attached to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to

in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to his claim.” Burke v, 401 N. Wabash Venture, LLC, 714 F.3d

501,505 (7th Cir. 2013). Courts may consider those documents in ruling on a motion to dismiss without

converting it to a motion for summary judgment. Id. Because the formal complaint that Doe filed against

Roe is referred to in his Complaint and is central to his claims, the Court considers that exhibit in ruling

on the motion to dismiss.

Page 3 of 21

her he did not want to engage in sexual activity, Roe moved his hand to other parts of

her body, including her genitals. (Id.). She asked Plaintiff to remove her clothing and

perform oral sex on her. (Id.). Plaintiff felt he had no choice but to comply. (Id.). Following

the sexual encounter, Plaintiff complained of dizziness and light-headedness. (Id.). Roe

took Plaintiff's car key and went outside to call her boyfriend. (Id.). After a few minutes,

Plaintiff found Roe outside, requested his key, and left. (Id.).

Upon arriving home, Plaintiff told his parents that Roe had accused him of sexual

assault. (Id. at 10). Plaintiff experienced another mental health crisis, and his parents

called Heather Wright, a staff member of the University, who reported the allegation to

the University’s Title IX Office. (Id.). The University, through its Office for Student

Conflict Resolution, began an investigation into the claims. (Id.). A formal Complaint was

filed against Plaintiff in June 2021. ([d.). During the investigation into Plaintiff in October

2021, the University learned that Roe had engaged in non-consensual sexual activity with

Plaintiff on May 13, 2020, but took no action against Roe at that time. (Id. at 11). In January

2022, a formal complaint was filed against Roe for the non-consensual sexual activity

which allegedly occurred on the May 13, 2020. (Id.).

Pursuant to the OSCR policy, students accused of sexual misconduct at the

University have a right to notice of the proceedings, participation in the administrative

hearings, an investigative process, an ability to review and respond to the evidence, and

the opportunity to bring an advisor with them to each phase of the proceedings. The

policy ensures a measure of objectivity and notes: “All disciplinary decisions will be

based on an objective evaluation of evidence.” (Doc. 1, Ex. D, Student Disciplinary

Page 4 of 21

Procedures, at 7). In the first step of this process, the investigator collects evidence and

interviews relevant witnesses. (Id. at 7-9). If the investigator finds that no reasonable

decision-making panel could find a violation of the Student Code, then the investigator

can close the case. (Id. at 9). But if the investigator does not close the case, then the case

gets sent to a panel composed of at least one student and one faculty member. (Id. at 11).

The accused student and the complainant are given an opportunity to challenge

the objectivity of any panelist. (Id.). Once a panel is selected, a hearing is conducted

wherein the parties are able to submit evidence and call witnesses to appear. (Id. at 11-

14). Although the investigator may participate in questioning and deliberation, they

cannot vote with the panel. (Id. at 12). If formal sanctions are imposed against the student,

the Panel provides the student with a rationale for the decision and any imposed

sanctions. (Id. at 14). Both the accused and the complainant may appeal the decision of

the panel based on procedural irregularity, new evidence, arguments that the

investigator or panel members had a conflict of interest or bias that affected the outcome

of the matter, and the sanctions imposed were not appropriate for the violations. (Id. at

17). If a student is dismissed from the University, that student may also petition for

permission to re-enter the University. (Id. at 15-16).

Plaintiff alleges that he and Roe were treated differently during the investigation

of their respective complaints. (Id. at 34). For instance, Roe was promptly offered

supportive measures, such as counseling services, while Plaintiff was not sent

information on supportive measures until weeks later. (Id. at 36). Plaintiff claims the

investigators ignored relevant witnesses and “badgered Plaintiff during his interview,

Page 5 of 21

criticized his narrative multiple times, and insinuated that his version of events was not

believable.” (Id.). He also alleges that Defendant Imel’s report made it “clear that [she]

doubted Plaintiff's story.” (Id.). In contrast, Imel’s report from Roe’s interview did not

indicate that she questioned Roe about “any discrepancies or her peculiar behavior after

the alleged assault.” (Id.). Additionally, Plaintiff criticizes the fact that investigators

questioned why Plaintiff's allegations against Roe were relevant. (Id.).

On or about October 29, 2021, November 4, 2021, and November 5, 2021, a Panel

of the Subcommittee on Sexual Misconduct conducted a formal hearing to address Roe’s

allegation against Plaintiff. (Id. at 37). Plaintiff alleges that several members of the panel

were biased against men. (Id.). For instance, Defendant Rony Die, advisor to the

committee, had a proclivity of being biased against males. (Id. at 38). Student 1, a student

voting member, raised money on his social media account for RAINN, a national anti-

sexual violence organization. (Id.). Panel member Kristin Wilcox’s personal Twitter

account criticized “masculinity” and “mansplaining.” (Id.).

At the conclusion of the hearings, Plaintiff was found to be responsible for

violations of Section 1-302.b1 of the Student Code—Sexual Assault. (Id. at 41). The panel

found Roe was credible while Plaintiff was not. (Id.). The panel acknowledged that at the

time of the incident, Plaintiff had recently been hospitalized, but found that conversations

he had around that time extended credibility to Roe’s report of sexual assault. (Id.). As a

result of the finding, Plaintiff was dismissed from the University. (Id. at 43). Plaintiff filed

an appeal which was denied on January 6, 2022 (Id.).

Page 6 of 21

On June 23, 2022, Roe was found to be in violation of the policy prohibiting sexual

assault for putting Plaintiff's hand on her breast. (Id.). All the other sexual activity was

found to be consensual. (Id.). The finding was made without a hearing panel. (Id.). Roe

was placed on University probation and ordered to write a research paper, while

remaining as a student at the University’s medical school. (Id.).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. See

Christensen v. Cnty. of Boone, Ill, 483 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2007). When considering a

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court construes the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true, and construing

all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. Christensen, 483 F.3d at 458.

To state a claim for relief, a plaintiff need only provide a short and plain statement

of the claim showing he is entitled to relief and giving defendants fair notice of the

claims. Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2011). However, the complaint must set

forth facts that plausibly demonstrate a claim for relief. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

US. 544, 547 (2007). A plausible claim is one that alleges factual content from which the

court can reasonably infer that defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Page 7 of 21

B. Analysis

Defendants raise several challenges to Plaintiff’s Complaint.4 First, Defendants

assert that all claims against Defendant Fleenor must be dismissed based on the absence

of any allegations against her. Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s due process claim

should be dismissed because Plaintiff did not properly allege a procedural due process

violation and, in any event, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Finally,

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's declaratory judgment claims should be dismissed

because the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, is discretionary and the claims

are duplicative of Plaintiff's substantive claims.

1. Defendant Fleenor

Defendants allege that all claims against Defendant Fleenor must be dismissed

because the Complaint lacks even a single allegation that Fleenor engaged in misconduct.

Section 1983 does not allow actions against individuals merely for their supervisory role

of others. Doe v. Purdue University, 928 F.3d 652, 654 (7th Cir. 2019). To be held liable under

Section 1983, an individual must have caused or participated in the alleged constitutional

deprivation. Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 574 (7th Cir. 2000). Thus, a supervisor

must have known about the unconstitutional conduct and either facilitated, approved, or

condoned it, or turned a blind eye to it. Doe, 928 F.3d at 654. A plaintiff must allege specific

At oral argument, the following claims were dismissed: 1) Title IX claims in Count 1 against individual

defendants; 2) substantive due process claims in Count 2 against the Board of Trustees; 3) breach of contract

claims against individual defendants in Count 3; 4) injunctive relief claims against individual defendants

in their individual capacity; and 5) monetary damages claims against individual defendants in their official

capacities. (Minute Entry 10/20/2023). Therefore, Defendants arguments as to those claims will not be

discussed.

Page 8 of 21

acts or conduct on the part of the defendant. Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir.

1974). It is insufficient to merely include the defendant’s name in the caption of the

complaint. Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998); Potter, 497 F.2d at 1207 (7th

Cir. 1974).

Plaintiff argues that Fleenor, as the Title IX coordinator, had a fundamental role in

“overseeing and implementing policies that stripped Plaintiff of his constitutional rights,

breached the contract between him and the University, and subjected him to sex-based

discrimination.” Because the Title IX and breach of contract claims against the individual

defendants were dismissed, the only relevant question is whether Plaintiff adequately

alleged that Fleenor oversaw and implemented the policies relating to the disciplinary

proceedings. Plaintiff did not do so. Fleenor does not appear by name anywhere in the

Complaint. There are no allegations in the Complaint that Fleenor knew about the alleged

constitutional violations, much less her facilitation or approval of those violations.

Without specific allegations as to her conduct, Defendant Fleenor should be dismissed as

a party. Potter, 497 F.2d at 1207. Therefore, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted

as it relates to Defendant Fleenor.

2. Due Process Claim

In Count I, Plaintiff alleges a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1988 against

the individual defendants for violation of Plaintiff's protected interests without

procedural due process. The Fourteenth Amendment prevents a state from depriving a

person of “property” or “liberty” without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §

1. In order to proceed under a procedural due process claim, the plaintiff must first

Page 9 of 21

identify the protected property or liberty interest at stake. Malhotra v. University of Illinois

at Urbana-Champaign, 77 F Ath 532, 536 (7th Cir. 2023). Next, if the plaintiff was deprived

of one of those interests, the court must determine what process was due under the

circumstances. Id. (citing Charleston v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Illinois at Chicago, 741 F.3d

769, 772 (7th Cir. 2013)).

Defendants argue that: (1) Plaintiff has not properly alleged a property interest; (2)

Plaintiff has not properly alleged a liberty interest; and (3) even if Plaintiff was deprived

of an interest, he received fair process. Alternatively, Defendants argue that they are

entitled to qualified immunity.

a. Property Interest

The Seventh Circuit has explicitly held that attending a university does not

automatically create a constitutional property right because, unlike with grade school

education, the law does not entitle each person the right to receive an education at a

public university. Malhotra v. University of Illinois At Urbana-Champaign, 77 F.4th 532, 537

(7th Cir. 2023). A plaintiff must not only allege the existence of an express or implied

contract, he must also establish that the contract “entitled him to the specific right that

the university allegedly took, ‘such as ... the right not to be suspended without good

cause.” Id. (quoting Doe, 928 F.3d at 660). To be clear, “the student’s complaint must be

specific about the source of this [express or] implied contract, the exact promises the

university made to the student, and the promises the student made in return.” Id.

(quoting Charleston v. Bd. Of Trs. Of Univ. of Ill. At Chi., 741 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2013)).

Contracts between universities and students can come from a variety of sources including

Page 10 of 21

student catalogs, policies, bulletins, and other publications. Gociman v. Loyola University

of Chicago, 41 F.4th 873, 883 (7th Cir. 2022).

For example, in Malhotra, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to

sufficiently allege that the University officials violated a specific contractual right

between the parties. Malhotra, 77 F.4th at 537. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the

University violated his Due Process rights by failing to follow the procedures outlined in

its student code before suspending the plaintiff. Id. at 535. The plaintiff did not provide a

source of any express contract or identify any specific promises made by the University.

Id. at 537. Instead, he “assume[d] on appeal that his act of paying tuition created a return

promise from the University to either suspend him only for good cause or to follow its

own procedures when deciding whether to suspend him.” Id. The Seventh Circuit held

that this assumption was insufficient to establish a property interest. Id. Due to the

plaintiff's failure to plausibly suggest the existence of an express or implied contract, the

threshold requirement of alleging that the individual defendants deprived him of a

constitutionally protected interest was not satisfied. Id. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit did

not review whether the defendants followed the University’s internal process in deciding

whether to suspend him. Id.

Unlike the plaintiff in Malhotra, Plaintiff here has pled more than just the

assumption that his tuition created a promise from the University: he has pointed to

specific documents and promises made by the University. Plaintiff argues that the

Student Handbook contained several policies and procedures that the University was

bound to follow during the investigation. Plaintiff has alleged that his entitlement to a

Page 11 of 21

continued education was formed by documents sent to him upon his acceptance to the

University. Plaintiff refers to numerous passages from the student handbook which he

has included as an exhibit. Plaintiff further supported his claims with specific passages

from the Student Disciplinary Procedures, which establishes guidelines and procedures

for investigations into the allegations against Plaintiff.

When taken together, and in concert with the other documents provided to

Plaintiff by the University, these passages could establish an express or implied contract

guaranteeing Plaintiff a legally protected entitlement to a continued education. Such an

entitlement, if Plaintiff's reading of the documents is to be accepted, could not be

removed without due process. Therefore, at this early stage in the proceedings and based

upon the precedent outlined above, the court concludes that Plaintiff has alleged

sufficient facts to support his contention that he had a property interest in his continued

education. See Charleston, 741 F.3d at 773.

b. Liberty Interest

To succeed on a theory that the University deprived him of a constitutionally

protected liberty interest, Plaintiff must satisfy the “stigma plus” test, which requires him

to allege both that he suffered a reputational harm and an alteration in legal status that

deprived him of a right he previously held. Malhotra, 77 F.4th at 538. “A state actor

infringes on a liberty interest only by ‘cast[ing] doubt on an individual's ... reputation’ to

such a degree that ‘it becomes virtually impossible for the [individual] to find new

employment in his chosen field.’” Id. (quoting Doyle v. Camelot Care Centers, Inc., 305 F.3d

603, 617 (7th Cir. 2002) (alterations in original).

Page 12 of 21

In Malhotra, the plaintiff claimed his suspension made it virtually impossible for

him to pursue a career as a healthcare consultant because his suspension would be

disclosed to graduate schools and prospective employers. Malhotra, 77 F.4th at 538. The

Seventh Circuit stated that after his suspension, he could return to school, graduate, and

apply to graduate schools in the field of his choice. Id. “While we acknowledge that future

schools and employers, might not look favorably on a suspension for violating the

University’s rules, it is far from clear that they would reflexively turn Malhotra away for

this reason.” Id. The court thus found the allegations did not suggest it would be

impossible for Malhotra to become a healthcare consultant. Id.

In contrast, in Doe, the Seventh Circuit held the plaintiff adequately alleged that

Purdue University deprived him of a protected liberty interest in his freedom to pursue

his occupation of choice. Doe, 928 F.3d at 66. The plaintiff was suspended for an academic

year after the University found him guilty of sexual violence under Title IX, and based

on the finding of guilt, “John was expelled from the Navy ROTC program, which

terminated his ROTC scholarship and plan to pursue a career in the Navy.” Id. The

Seventh Circuit held the university's decision to brand the plaintiff as a sex offender

inflicted reputational harm which resulted in his expulsion from the Naval ROTC

program and foreclosed his re-enrollment in the program. Id. at 661. Because of that, the

plaintiff's chances of pursuing naval service were thwarted. Id. at 662-63. The Court

concluded that the University’s decision to suspend Plaintiff for sexual misconduct

stigmatized him and changed his legal status from “full-time student in good standing to

one suspended for an academic year.” Id. at 663.

Page 13 of 21

The instant case is more akin to Malhotra than Doe. Plaintiff was dismissed from

the University, but he maintains the ability to enroll in other medical schools. Plaintiff is

not able to demonstrate that he is foreclosed from an entire field of study based on his

dismissal from the University. Therefore, Plaintiff has not satisfied the “stigma-plus” test

and has not demonstrated that the University deprived him of a protected occupational

liberty interest.

c. Fair Process

Based on Plaintiff establishing a plausible property interest, the Court must next

assess whether Defendant used fundamentally unfair procedures. When a right is

protected by the Due Process Clause, a state actor “may not withdraw [it] on grounds of

misconduct absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct

has occurred.” Doe, 928 F.3d at 663, citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S, 565, 574 (1975) (alterations

in original). The court must consider the nature of the interest and the severity of its

impairment when determining whether a process is fundamentally unfair. Id. “In the

disciplinary context, the required process depends on a number of factors, including the

severity of the consequence and the level of education.” Id. at 663.

For example, in Doe, the Seventh Circuit found that the plaintiff adequately alleged

the process was deficient when he was given notice of the allegations against him, but

the university did not disclose its evidence to him. Doe, 928 F.3d at 663. The Seventh

Circuit emphasized that the hearing must be “a real one, not a sham or pretense.” Of

particular concern to the Court was the fact the committee found the complainant more

credible than the plaintiff in a case that “boiled down to a he said/she said” without ever

Page 14 of 21

receiving a statement written by the complainant herself, much less a sworn statement,

or asking the complainant any questions during the investigation. Id. at 664. The Seventh

Circuit reasonably questioned how the committee could have conducted an evaluation

of credibility under those circumstances.

Further, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a

basic requirement of due process.” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975). Biased

decision-making does violate due process, but the party claiming bias has the heavy

burden of “lay[ing] a specific foundation of prejudice or prejudgment, such that the

probability of actual bias is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Hess v. Bd. of Trs. of

S. Ill. Univ, 839 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 2016). This is because “we presume that

administrators are honest and impartial, and therefore ‘capable of judging a particular

controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.’” Hess, 839 F.3d at 675, quoting

Withrow, 421 U.S. at 55. This presumption can be rebutted, such as by a showing that the

adjudicator had a pecuniary interest in the outcome or had personal animosity towards

the party. Amundsen v. Chicago Park Dist., 218 F.3d 712, 716 (7th Cir. 2000), citing Withrow,

421 U.S. at 47. However, even when there is bias, courts have found that an opportunity

to appeal the decision to an unbiased decision-maker adequately safeguards a plaintiff's

due process rights. Hess, 839 F.3d at 677.

For example, in Hess, the plaintiff argued that his expulsion from his university

violated his procedural due process rights because the adjudicator was biased against

5 Plaintiff argues that Hess is inapposite because the decision was made after a motion for summary

judgment, and therefore the plaintiff in that case had the benefit of discovery to support his case. This Court

is mindful of the different standards at issue. Nevertheless, the principles at issue in Hess regarding the

Page 15 of 21

him. Id. at 673. The Seventh Circuit found there was insufficient evidence to establish

bias. Id. at 677. It also noted that even if there had been bias, the allegations “suffer[ed]

from a fatal flaw” because the plaintiff was able to appeal the adjudicator’s decision to a

three-member panel of university employees, and later to the University Chancellor. Id.

Because plaintiff did not claim that any of those individuals were biased, the Seventh

Circuit found that plaintiff's due process rights were not violated. Id.

In this case, the University Handbook outlines the procedures in place for

investigations such as the one at issue. Pursuant to the OSCR policy, students accused of

sexual misconduct have a right to notice of the proceedings, participation in the

administrative hearings, an investigative process, an ability to review and respond to the

evidence, and the opportunity to bring an advisor with them to each phase of the

proceedings. The policy ensures a measure of objectivity and notes: “All disciplinary

decisions will be based on an objective evaluation of evidence.” There are multiple stages

in the process and opportunities for the accused to present evidence and challenge the

objectivity of panelists. The investigators may participate in questioning and deliberating

but they cannot vote with the panel. If formal sanctions are imposed against the student,

the Panel provides the student with a rationale for the decision and any imposed

sanctions. Both the accused and the complainant may appeal the decision of the panel

based on procedural irregularity, new evidence, arguments that the investigator or panel

members had a conflict of interest or bias that affected the outcome of the matter, and the

impact of bias on claims of procedural due process are relevant to the instant case and can be considered

by this Court. See Doe, 928 F.3d at 664 (applying the principles outlined in Hess when considering a motion

to dismiss).

Page 16 of 21

sanctions imposed were not appropriate for the violations. If a student is dismissed from

the University, that student may also petition for permission to re-enter the University.

Plaintiff does not dispute that he received notice of the allegations against him or

that he was able to participate in the hearing against him. Instead, Plaintiff claims that

the process was deficient because it did not afford him a meaningful opportunity to be

heard as it was not a fair and impartial process. At this stage, the Court's task is not to

determine whether the allegations are true, but instead to determine whether Plaintiff is

entitled to relief if everything he says is true. Doe, 928 F.3d at 656.

As it relates to the investigators, Plaintiff argues that the investigators were biased

against him and treated Roe more favorably. However, the investigators were not

adjudicators in the disciplinary proceedings and could not vote to dismiss Plaintiff from

the University. Further, Plaintiff was able to present evidence to the panel, even if the

investigators had not considered it during the investigation. Therefore, the general

allegations of bias against the investigators have little impact on this Court's analysis as

to whether Plaintiff's procedural due process rights were adequately safeguarded.

Regarding the panel participants, Plaintiff also avers that they were biased against

him. Plaintiff does not allege that any adjudicator had a pecuniary interest in the outcome

or had a personal connection to Plaintiff. Plaintiff supports his claims of bias by alleging

that: 1) Defendant Die, an advisor to the committee, was biased against men based on

allegations from another, unrelated lawsuit; 2) Student 1 was biased because he tweeted

support for survivors of sexual assault and raised funds for RAINN; and 3) Kristen

Page 17 of 21

Wilcox, a panelist, posted tweets which criticized masculinity and mansplaining. Plaintiff

does not allege that Panelist Laurie Andrews was biased against him.

Defendants argue that the allegations against Defendant Die refer to either

Malhotra v. Univ. of Ill. at Urbana-Champaign, 21-cv-2220, 2022 WL 3576242 (C.D. Ill. Aug.

18, 2022), in which the court dismissed the allegations against all defendants, including

Die, or Doe v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill, No. 17-cv-2180, 2018 WL 11269804 (C.D. IIL. July 24,

2018), in which the court granted summary judgment to the University. Plaintiff did not

dispute this argument and did not argue that Die was ever found responsible for gender-

based discrimination. Although this Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true, the

Court is not obligated to accept “sheer speculation, bald assertions, and unsupported

conclusory statements” on a motion to dismiss. Lanahan v. Cnty. of Cook, 41 F4th 854, 862

(7th Cir. 2022). The Court finds Plaintiff's conclusory statement that “Die had a proclivity

of being biased towards males,” is insufficient to demonstrate an actual bias against

Plaintiff.

As to the claims against Student 1 and Wilcox, Defendants argue that individuals

who show support for feminism or against sexual assault are not necessarily incapable of

being a fair and neutral judge as to whether a sexual assault occurred. General allegations

regarding a panelist’s support for victims of sexual assault or criticism over masculinity

does not support the reasonable inference that a person is biased. The Court certainly

hopes every panelist and individual involved in the disciplinary process is against sexual

assault, as opposed to in favor of it. Plaintiff alleges the bias of the panelists impacted the

proceedings against him. For instance, Plaintiff was told that a witness could not serve as

Page 18 of 21

his advisor and that he was not permitted to introduce character evidence, even though

Roe was able to do both. The panel also allowed the introduction of “victim-impact

statements,” criticized Plaintiff's delayed participation in the proceedings, and failed to

explore inconsistencies with Roe’s narrative. Student 1 also criticized Plaintiff for “mixing

his medications.” The crux of Plaintiff's argument is that he believes he was not treated

the same as Roe during the proceedings through procedural discrepancies and general

allegations of bias based on social media posts. Even when taking his allegations of bias

as true, they simply do not rise to a constitutional violation. Plaintiff fails to allege any

specific foundation of prejudice or prejudgment, such that the probability of actual bias

is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. Hess, 839 F.3d at 675.

Unlike the plaintiff in Doe, Plaintiff was given numerous opportunities to present

evidence and witnesses and to challenge the potential members of the panel. Although

he was not able to present every single witness he would have liked, he did not allege

that he was not entitled to present any evidence. Unlike the proceedings in Doe— which

completely omitted any statement from the complainant--the panel in this case heard

from Roe and found her to be more credible because Plaintiff had memory loss during

the alleged incident.

However, even if the panelists were biased against Plaintiff during the

proceedings, Plaintiff was able to, and did, appeal the panel’s decision to another

adjudicative body: Justin Brown. The panel’s decision was considered and upheld after

Brown’s review. While Plaintiff alleges that Brown “refused to acknowledge or correct”

the alleged procedural deficiencies, Plaintiff does not contend that Brown was biased

Page 19 of 21

against him. Because the case was reviewed by an unbiased adjudicator, Plaintiff's claims

that the panel was biased against him “suffer[ ] from a fatal flaw.” Hess, 839 F.3d at 677.

Therefore, the procedural safeguards afforded to Plaintiff were constitutionally adequate,

and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted as to this count.

3. Declaratory Judgment

Under the Act, the Court “may declare the rights and other legal relations of any

interested party seeking such declaration.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (emphasis added). “This

statutory text has long been understood to confer on federal courts unique and

substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the rights of litigants.” Haze v.

Kubicek, 880 F.3d 946, 951 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations omitted). That Act offers no

independent grant of jurisdiction for Plaintiff's federal claims. Manley v. Law, 889 F.3d

885, 893 (7th Cir. 2018). Further, if the Court “determines ... that a declaratory judgment

will serve no useful purpose,” it can deny the requested relief as a matter of “practicality

and wise judicial administration.” Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 288 (1995).

If traditional remedies are sufficient, courts may properly dismiss a declaratory

judgment claim. Layman v. City of Peoria, Illinois, 352 F.Supp.3d 874, 878 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 8,

2018), citing Cunningham Bros., Inc. v. Bail, 407 F.2d 1165, 1168 (7th Cir. 1969). Likewise,

when the declaration sought by the plaintiff must necessarily be determined to resolve

the substantive suit, then the claim “serve[s] no useful purpose” and courts often dismiss

the claim. Amari v. Radio Spirits, Inc., 219 F.Supp.2d 942, 944 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (dismissing a

declaratory judgment action in the interest of judicial economy because “the substantive

suit would resolve the issues raised by the declaratory judgment action”).

Page 20 of 21

Defendants argue that Count IV seeks a declaration on the same substantive issues

raised in Counts I and II of the Complaint. Because Count II has been dismissed on the

merits, the request for declaratory relief based on those rights must also be rejected. See

Manley, 889 F.3d at 893. However, because Count I has not been dismissed, Plaintiff has

sufficiently pled a claim that may justify the issuance of a declaratory judgment at a later

stage of the proceedings. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count IV is denied.

Defendants also argue that Count V seeks a declaration on the same substantive

issue as Count III. The declaration sought in Count V would not serve the goals of the

Declaratory Judgment Act. Determining whether Defendants breached the contract must

necessarily be resolved by Count III. Therefore, the relief sought in Count V serves no

useful purpose. Amari, 219 F.Supp.2d at 944.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 19) is DENIED as to Count

IV and GRANTED as to the following claims and defendants: 1) Counts II and IV; 2)

Defendant Fleenor; 3) Title IX claims in Count I against individual defendants; 4) breach

of contract claims against individual defendants in Count III; 5) injunctive relief claims

against individual defendants in their individual capacity; and 6) monetary damages

claims against individual defendants in their official capacities.

ENTER: September 25, 2024

COJALEEN R. LAWLESS

NITEDSTATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Page 21 of 21