ZHANG v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ATHENS DIVISION

MING ZHANG, *

Plaintiff, *

vs. *

CASE NO. 3:23-CV-149 (CDL)

THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE *

UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA,

JOSE CORDERO, and MARSHA DAVIS, *

Defendants. *

O R D E R

Ming Zhang was a tenured faculty member at the University of

Georgia until she was terminated in 2023. Zhang asserts that she

was subjected to discrimination based on her race and national

origin, that she was retaliated against for complaining of

discrimination, that she suffered from a disability but was denied

reasonable accommodations, and that she was terminated after her

accommodation requests were denied. Zhang asserts claims against

the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et

seq. ("Title VII") and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29

U.S.C. § 794(a). She also asserts individual capacity claims

against her former supervisors, Jose Cordero and Marsha Davis, for

race discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, through

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing

that Zhang failed to state a claim. For the reasons set forth

below, the Court denies the motion (ECF No. 22).

MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

More than a dozen years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court explained

that to survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), a "complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). The complaint must include enough factual allegations

"to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555. So, the factual allegations must "raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of" the

plaintiff's claims. Id. at 556. But "Rule 12(b)(6) does not

permit dismissal of a well-pleaded complaint simply because 'it

strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is

improbable.'" Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th

Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

This Court concluded that Twombly and Iqbal did not represent

a sea-change in the legal standard governing a motion to dismiss

because nothing in those opinions abandoned notice pleading or

rewrote Rule 12(b)(6). Since Twombly and Iqbal were decided, the

Court has repeatedly cautioned attorneys to resist the "Twombly-

Iqbal compulsion" to file a motion to dismiss in every case.

Unfortunately, many lawyers still "fail to appreciate the

distinction between determining whether a claim for relief is

'plausibly stated,' the inquiry required by Twombly/ Iqbal, and

divining whether actual proof of that claim is 'improbable,' a

feat impossible for a mere mortal, even a federal judge." Barker

ex rel. U.S. v. Columbus Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 977 F. Supp.

2d 1341, 1346 (M.D. Ga. 2013).

Here, counsel for Defendants did not resist the Twombly/Iqbal

compulsion. In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that

Zhang failed to assert any plausible factual allegations in support

of her claims and that her complaint contains nothing more than

formulaic recitations of the elements of each claim. In making

these arguments, Defendants ignore many of Zhang's factual

allegations, they construe the allegations in the light most

favorable to Defendants, they make arguments based on matters not

alleged in the complaint, and they appear to contend that each

factual allegation should be read in isolation rather than in the

context of the other factual allegations. Contrary to the

suggestions implicit in Defendants' arguments, the Court at this

stage of the litigation must read the operative complaint as a

whole, accept Zhang's factual allegations as true, and construe

the factual allegations in the light most favorable to Zhang. See,

e.g., Speaker v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs. Ctrs. for

Disease Control & Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010)

(explaining that the Court must accept all factual allegations in

the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff).

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Ming Zhang alleges the following facts in her first amended

complaint (ECF No. 20), which, as previously stated, the Court

must accept as true for purposes of the pending motion to dismiss.

Zhang is a United States citizen who identifies her race as Asian

and her national origin as Chinese. She was an associate professor

of epidemiology and biostatistics at the University of Georgia.

Zhang began working at the University in 2010 and ultimately became

an associate professor with tenure. Zhang asserts that her primary

duties to the University were research obligations under federally

funded grants that she obtained. During the timeframe relevant to

this action, Jose Cordero was department head of the epidemiology

and biostatistics department, and Marsha Davis was a dean of the

health promotion and behavior department.

In August and September of 2020, Zhang reported to Cordero

and Davis that a white promotion and tenure candidate's dossier

contained falsehoods. Cordero and Davis did not take action

against the candidate; instead, Cordero issued Zhang a formal

letter of counseling for presenting false allegations. Zhang's

allegations about the candidate were not submitted to the promotion

and tenure committee, and the candidate received tenure. Zhang

and several colleagues, including Xiao Song and Hanwen Huang,

registered a formal complaint with the University regarding

Cordero's actions, and they asserted that he created a

discriminatory work environment based on their race and national

origin (Asian-American/Chinese). According to Zhang, the

University delayed investigating the complaint, and when it did

investigate, the University ignored evidence provided by Zhang,

Song, and Huang; disclosed the identities of Zhang and the others

to Cordero and Davis; and improperly concluded the investigation

in favor of Cordero and Davis. In addition, Zhang alleges that

Cordero prohibited her and Song (the other female Asian faculty

member in the department) from voting on two promotion and tenure

cases even though they were eligible to vote. In 2021, after Zhang

complained about Cordero's actions, she received a low performance

evaluation. Zhang continued to complain that she received biased

treatment based on her race and national origin.

In the spring of 2021, Zhang requested college-approved

course buyouts so that she could focus full-time on her obligations

under grants that she had received and would not have to teach

classes. Cordero approved Zhang's course buyout plan for fall

2021 and spring 2022. But in late 2021, Cordero informed Zhang

that the college had instituted a new policy and that she would

not be allowed to use her course buyouts. Zhang informed Cordero

that she had a heart condition, that she already had a full-time

obligation to her grants, that without the course buyouts she would

have to work many extra hours, and that the resulting sleep-

deprivation and stress presented significant threats to her heart

condition. Zhang was not permitted to use a course buyout for

spring 2022, and she was assigned to teach a large class in

addition to her grant obligations.

After the spring 2022 semester began, Zhang frequently worked

into the night to keep up with her workload. She informed Cordero

and Davis that she could not continue teaching the course on top

of her full-time grant obligations because the stress and lack of

sleep from teaching the course posed a significant threat to her

health due to her heart condition. Zhang offered to teach the

course until a replacement could be found. According to Zhang,

neither Cordero nor Davis helped her after she asked to stop

teaching the course. Instead, in March 2022, Davis sent Zhang a

letter of counseling which notified Zhang of disciplinary actions

against her. The University formed a committee to determine

whether Zhang had violated any policies. The committee found that

there was notable dysfunction within the biostatistics department,

that the college's policy on course hours needed to be clarified,

that no formal disciplinary proceedings should be taken against

Zhang, and that Zhang and her supervisors should seek mediation

and mentoring to resolve their conflicts. Davis and Cordero

refused to participate in mediation.

In the fall of 2022, Zhang was assigned to teach the largest

in-person undergraduate core course offered by her department but

was not provided with a teaching assistant even though she

requested one. According to Zhang, white male instructors and

instructors who had not complained of race discrimination or sought

accommodations for disabilities received teaching assistants for

the same course in the same semester, even though they had far

fewer students. Zhang complained to Cordero and Davis about the

lack of a teaching assistant, and she proposed several solutions

so that she could have teaching assistant support that would

mitigate the work-related stress that exacerbated her heart

condition. Cordero and Davis refused to meet with her about the

teaching assistant situation. Davis removed Zhang from teaching

at the end of October 2022. Based on recommendations from Cordero

and Davis, the University charged Zhang with neglect of duty in

teaching and disruption of teaching, administrative, or other

authorized activities.

In February 2023, Zhang was hospitalized and required surgery

due to a life-threatening heart disease. She was approved for

medical leave under the Family Medical Leave Act, but Cordero and

Davis refused to acknowledge Zhang's medical leave status. Cordero

demanded that Zhang submit a post-tenure review dossier on short

notice. Although a white counterpart who was not on medical leave

had been permitted to submit a late dossier in 2020, Cordero and

Davis denied Zhang's request for an extension.

Zhang returned from medical leave in August 2023. Within

days of her return to the office, the University scheduled a

faculty removal and dismissal hearing. On August 30, 2023, while

Zhang was still wearing an external defibrillator, the University

held a hearing on the revocation of Zhang's tenure and the

termination of her employment. Zhang pointed out that she had an

offer from the University attorney to transfer departments instead

of being terminated. Nevertheless, Zhang was terminated, and her

tenure was revoked. In December 2023, the University asked the

National Institutes of Health to replace Zhang on the federally

funded research Zhang had conceived, designed, and led; the

proposed replacement was a white male faculty member who did not

have the expertise required for the position.

Zhang alleges that between 2020 and the time of her

termination, she continuously and repeatedly objected to poor

treatment that she asserted was based on her race and national

origin. She also alleges that even though she informed Cordero

and Davis that she had a disability related to her heart condition

and that she needed a reasonable accommodation, Defendants failed

to respond to her requests for accommodation even though doing so

would not have caused an undue hardship.

DISCUSSION

Zhang asserts the following claims: (1) race and national

origin discrimination against the Board of Regents under Title

VII, (2) race discrimination against Cordero and Davis under § 1981

(through § 1983), (3) retaliation against Cordero and Davis under

§ 1981 (through § 1983), and (4) disability discrimination against

the Board of Regents under the Rehabilitation Act.1 Defendants

argue that all claims must be dismissed. The Court evaluates each

claim in turn.

I. Zhang's Title VII Claims Against the Board of Regents

Title VII prohibits race and national origin discrimination

against an individual with respect to the terms and conditions of

her employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To establish a Title

VII race or national origin claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate

that her race or national origin was a "motivating factor" for a

challenged employment practice that amounts to an adverse

employment action, which requires "some harm respecting an

1 The operative complaint contains two Title VII counts against the Board

of Regents--one for race discrimination and one for national origin

discrimination. The Title VII counts do not expressly mention

retaliation. The only retaliation count is the § 1981 retaliation count

against Cordero and Davis. In her response brief, Zhang appears to

suggest that she asserted a Title VII retaliation claim. Zhang may be

able to amend her complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15,

but she may not add a new claim in a response brief. Since the operative

complaint does not expressly assert a Title VII retaliation claim, there

is no motion to dismiss such a claim, and the Court does not evaluate

identifiable term or condition of employment." Id. § 2000e-2(m);

Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 355 (2024).

The Board of Regents argues that Zhang only complains about

things that were not identifiable terms or conditions of her

employment and thus did not plausibly allege an adverse employment

action. The Board of Regents is wrong. Zhang alleges that she

was forced to teach a large undergraduate course without a teaching

assistant—an employment condition that was less favorable than

that of white instructors who taught the same course during the

same semester with far fewer students but received teaching

assistants that lightened their workload from the course. Zhang

also alleges facts which, if believed, would support an inference

that she was subjected to disparate discipline because of her race

or national origin, which culminated in University officials

revoking her tenure, terminating her employment, ousting Zhang

from her grant position, and replacing her with an unqualified

white man.2 These allegations certainly concern harm respecting

an identifiable term or condition of employment.

2 Zhang further asserts that after she was charged with several

infractions, her supervisor demanded that she submit a post-tenure review

dossier but refused to give her an extension even though he had given

an extension to a white faculty member. Zhang does not clearly allege

why the dossier was important or if it had anything to do with the

disciplinary proceedings against her, and it is unclear from the present

complaint whether Zhang is pursuing a claim based on an adverse impact

of the extension denial or if she included factual allegations about the

denial to support her contention that her race and national origin

The Board of Regents contends that even if Zhang plausibly

alleged an adverse employment action, she did not allege that her

race or national origin was a motivating factor. The Board of

Regents argues that because no person expressly referenced Zhang's

race or national origin, she cannot establish race or national

origin discrimination. Direct evidence is certainly one way to

establish intentional discrimination, but it is not the only way,

and the failure to allege that direct evidence exists does not

doom Zhang's race and national origin discrimination claims. The

Board of Regents also maintains that Zhang did not plausibly allege

that any adverse employment action was motivated by her race or

national origin because she did not establish the "similarly

situated" element of a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case. But

the McDonnell Douglas framework "is an evidentiary standard, not

a pleading requirement," so "an employment discrimination

plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination" to

survive a motion to dismiss. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534

U.S. 506, 510, 515 (2002) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)).

Zhang alleges that University officials treated her, an

Asian/Chinese person, less favorably than white instructors who

taught the same course during the same semester with fewer

students, and she asserts that she was terminated and replaced

with a white man who was unqualified for the position. These

allegations are enough to support an inference of intentional race

or national origin discrimination.3 For these reasons, the Court

denies the Board of Regents' motion to dismiss the Title VII claim.

II. Zhang's Section 1981 Claims Against Cordero and Davis

In addition to her Title VII claims against the Board of

Regents, Zhang asserts § 1981 claims against Cordero and Davis.4

Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making and

enforcement of contracts, which includes "the making, performance,

modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of

all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual

relationship." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)-(b). Section 1981 also

"encompasses claims of retaliation." CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries,

553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008). To state a claim for discrimination or

retaliation under § 1981, a plaintiff must allege facts to show

that the plaintiff's race or protected activity was the "but-for"

cause of the challenged employment action. Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l

Ass'n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 341 (2020).

Cordero and Davis argue that they are entitled to qualified

immunity on the § 1981 claims. Qualified immunity shields

3 The Court emphasizes that at this stage of the litigation, it must

accept the allegations in Zhang's complaint as true. If discovery does

not reveal evidence to support the allegations, then the Board of Regents

may file a summary judgment motion.

4 Section 1983 provides the exclusive damages remedy for violations of

§ 1981 by a government actor. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491

U.S. 701, 735 (1989). Although § 1981 creates the right to be free of

racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts, it

does not provide an independent damages remedy when a government actor

Id.

government officials acting in their discretionary authority "from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Here, Zhang does not dispute that

Cordero and Davis were acting within their discretionary authority

when they took the challenged employment actions. Thus, the Court

must determine whether Zhang's factual allegations demonstrate

that Cordero and Davis violated her clearly established statutory

rights under § 1981. See, e.g., Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281,

1300 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining "clearly established" prong of

the qualified immunity test).

Defendants do not dispute that it has long been clearly

established that § 1981 prohibits "racial discrimination in public

employment." Bryant, 575 F.3d at 1300 (quoting Smith v. Lomax, 45

F.3d 402, 407 (11th Cir. 1995)). Perplexingly, Defendants argue

that Zhang did not plead a clearly established right to be free

from retaliation. But it has also long been clearly established

that § 1981 prohibits retaliation against public employees who

oppose racial discrimination. See id. at 1301 (citing CBOCS W.,

Inc., 553 U.S. at 457). So, reasonable officials would have known

by the time of the events giving rise to this action that it was

unlawful to discriminate against public employees on account of

their race and retaliate against them for complaining of race

discrimination.

Cordero and Davis argue that even if a general right against

discrimination or retaliation was clearly established, it was not

clearly established that their alleged conduct could be construed

as unlawful discrimination or retaliation. Their first argument

is that Zhang did not allege an actionable adverse employment

action. It was clearly established before 2020 that § 1981

prohibits a supervisor from taking an adverse employment action

against an employee because of her race. At the time of the events

giving rise to this action, a discriminatory § 1981 adverse

employment action required a "'serious and material change in the

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' so that a

'reasonable person in the circumstances' would find 'the

employment action [to] be materially adverse.'"5 Jefferson v. Sewon

Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 921 (11th Cir. 2018) (alteration in

original) (quoting Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1239

(11th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Burlington N. &

Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)). It was also

5 In Muldrow, the Supreme Court abrogated the "serious and material

change" standard and concluded that an employee must show "some harm

respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment," emphasizing

that there is no heightened bar and that discrimination occurs when a

person is treated worse based on a protected trait. Muldrow, 601 U.S.

at 355 (explaining the standard in the Title VII context). But Muldrow

was not decided until after the events giving rise to this action

occurred, so it could not provide clear notice of this standard to

clearly established that § 1981 prohibits a supervisor from taking

a "materially adverse action" against an employee because the

employee opposed racial discrimination. Goldsmith v. Bagby

Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing

Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68). At the time of Defendants' alleged

conduct, a "materially adverse action" was one that likely would

have dissuaded a reasonable person from making a charge of

discrimination. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68.

Cordero and Davis frame their conduct as simply "requiring

Zhang to fulfill her teaching duties per the department's policies"

and "not assigning her a teaching assistant." Defs.' Mot. to

Dismiss 11, ECF No. 22. But at this stage in the litigation, the

Court must accept all the factual allegations in Zhang's complaint

as true and draw reasonable inferences in her favor. As discussed

above, Zhang alleges that she was denied a teaching assistant for

a course that warranted one and that she was ultimately terminated

from her job. The present allegations are enough to show that

Zhang suffered an adverse employment action or a materially adverse

action.

Cordero and Davis also argue that Zhang did not allege enough

facts to show causation for a discrimination claim or a retaliation

claim. To establish a § 1981 discrimination claim, a plaintiff

must establish that race was the but-for cause of her adverse

employment action. As discussed above, Zhang alleges that Cordero

and Davis treated her, an Asian/Chinese person, less favorably

than white instructors and then recommended terminating her and

replacing her with a white man who was unqualified for the

position. She included in her allegations the factual basis for

these assertions. These allegations are enough to support an

inference of intentional race discrimination. As for the § 1981

retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that her protected conduct

of opposing racial discrimination was the but-for cause of a

materially adverse action. Here, Zhang alleges that she began

complaining to University officials of racial discrimination in

2020 and continued complaining about biased treatment until her

termination. She further alleges that after she complained about

biased treatment (including denial of the opportunity to vote on

a tenure candidate, denial of a teaching assistant, and disparate

discipline), Cordero and Davis took adverse actions against her

and ultimately caused her termination. These allegations are

enough to support an inference of intentional retaliation at the

pleading stage.

In summary, Zhang alleges facts which, if accepted as true,

create an inference that Cordero and Davis discriminated against

Zhang because of her race and retaliated against her when she

complained of race discrimination. It was clearly established

before 2020 that § 1981 prohibited such conduct. Cordero and Davis

are not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage in the

litigation. This ruling shall not prevent Cordero and Davis from

seeking summary judgment based on qualified immunity following

discovery.

III. Zhang's Rehabilitation Claim Against the Board of Regents

Zhang's next claim is that the Board of Regents discriminated

against her based on her disability by failing to respond to her

requests for reasonable accommodations and by terminating her

because of her disability. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

prohibits disability discrimination under programs receiving

federal funds. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). "The standards used to

determine whether [§ 504] has been violated in a complaint alleging

employment discrimination [are] the standards applied under title

I of the Americans with Disabilities Act." Id. § 794(d).

To establish discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, an

individual must show that she has a "disability," which is a

"physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or

more major life activities" of the individual. 42 U.S.C.

§ 12102(1)(A).6 An individual must also demonstrate that she is

"otherwise qualified for the position," and she "was subjected to

unlawful discrimination as the result of [her] disability." Owens

v. Governor's Off. of Student Achievement, 52 F.4th 1327, 1334

(11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Sutton v. Lader, 185 F.3d 1203, 1207–08

6 The term "disability" also includes having "a record of" or "being

(11th Cir. 1999)). "Unlawful discrimination under the

Rehabilitation Act includes failing to provide reasonable

accommodations for employees' known disabilities." Id.

The Board of Regents does not dispute for purposes of the

present motion that Zhang's heart condition is a disability within

the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. The Board of Regents

argues, though, that Zhang did not adequately allege facts to

support a claim that she was discriminated against because of her

disability. Zhang alleges that she was a faculty member whose

central duties to the University were research obligations under

federally funded grants that she obtained. She further alleges

that although she requested reasonable accommodations for her

disability, the University refused to engage in the required

interactive process with her and then terminated her within a month

after she returned from medical leave related to her disability.

Her complaint focuses on two proposed accommodations that she

contends would have allowed her to perform the essential functions

of her job: course buyouts and a teaching assistant.

Regarding course buyouts, Zhang alleges that before 2022, she

was allowed to use course buyouts so that she could focus on her

grant-funded research instead of teaching courses.7 She further

7 The Board of Regents contends that course buyouts are not a reasonable

accommodation because Zhang alleges that all professors in her department

were required to teach courses, which suggests that teaching was an

essential function of Zhang's job and that the requested accommodation

alleges that her department approved a course buyout for spring

2022 but later revoked it, that the department's faculty course

hours requirements were so unclear that a University committee

found that they needed to be clarified, and that a University

committee concluded that Zhang should not face formal disciplinary

proceedings for her course-related conduct in spring 2022. Zhang

contends that if she had been permitted to use course buyouts as

she had in the past, that would have been a reasonable

accommodation that enabled her to perform the essential functions

of her job.

Regarding the teaching assistant, Zhang alleges that other

instructors who taught the same course during the same semester

with fewer students received a teaching assistant to help with the

workload associated with teaching. Thus, Zhang asserts, the

University could have accommodated her disability by providing a

teaching assistant as it did for her colleagues who had not

requested an accommodation for a disability. Zhang contends that

having a teaching assistant would have enabled her to perform her

grant-related duties and teach the course.

Accepting Zhang's allegations as true, as the Court must at

this stage in the litigation, the Court finds that Zhang

the cited portion of the complaint contains no such allegation. Rather,

Zhang appears to allege that teaching was not an essential function of

her role. Whether this turns out to be the case upon further development

sufficiently alleged facts to support a claim of disability

discrimination. The Board of Regents nonetheless argues that the

Court should dismiss Zhang's disability discrimination claims,

asserting as though it were seeking summary judgment that it had

a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Zhang: she

"refused to teach courses." Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss 20, ECF No.

22. Zhang, though, does not allege that she refused to teach

courses. Rather, she alleges that she was removed from teaching

after she requested reasonable accommodations for her disability,

that the disciplinary process the University used to terminate her

was improper, and that the University terminated her even though

she had an offer to transfer to another department. Zhang's

complaint states a claim for disability discrimination, and the

motion to dismiss this claim is denied.

CONCLUSION

As discussed above, Defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF No.

22) is denied. The Court previously stayed the Rules 16/26 Order

requirements pending a ruling on the motion to dismiss. Order

(June 18, 2024), ECF No. 24. The stay is lifted. The parties

shall submit a proposed scheduling order within twenty-one days of

the date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 26th day of August, 2024.

S/Clay D. Land

CLAY D. LAND

U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA