Saintcy v. Florida Department of Revenue Child Support Program

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 24-60288-CIV-DAMIAN/STRAUSS

WEBBY SAINTCY,

Plaintiff,

vs.

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT

OF REVENUE CHILD SUPPORT

PROGRAM, et al.,

Defendants.

__________________________________/

ORDER AFFIRMING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [ECF NO. 38]

AND GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 32]

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation by United

States Magistrate Judge Jared M. Strauss, filed August 23, 2024 [ECF No. 38], in which the

Magistrate Judge recommends granting Defendants, Sharleen Rostant’s, Debbie Frank’s,

Margarita Ruiz’s, Ann Coffin’s, and the Florida Department of Revenue Child Support

Program’s (collectively, “Defendants”), Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 32 (the “Motion”)],

and denying all other motions as moot.

THE COURT has considered the Report and Recommendation (“Report”), Plaintiff,

Webby Saintcy’s, Objections [ECF No. 39], Defendants’ Response thereto [ECF No. 40], the

record in this case, and relevant authorities and is otherwise fully advised.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of events involving an order garnishing Plaintiff’s wages based on

the alleged failure to pay child support. On February 20, 2024, Plaintiff, Webby Saintcy

(“Plaintiff” or “Saintcy”), filed a Complaint asserting various claims against members of the

Florida Department of Revenue Child Support Program. [ECF No. 1]. Saintcy filed an

Amended Complaint on May 9, 2024. [ECF No. 27]. The Amended Complaint asserts seven

causes of action against Defendants and seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, and

injunctive relief. The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Strauss for a report and

recommendation on dispositive matters. See ECF No. 20.

On June 6, 2024, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint.

[ECF No. 32]. After the Motion was fully briefed, on August 23, 2024, Magistrate Judge

Strauss entered his Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 38 (the “Report”)]

recommending the Court grant the Motion.

On September 3, 2024, Plaintiff timely filed Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s

Report (“Objections”) [ECF No. 39], to which Defendants responded. [ECF No. 40]. The

matter is now ripe for this Court’s consideration.

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD

The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Crim. P.

59(b)(3). The Court “must consider de novo any objection to the magistrate judge’s

recommendation.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3). A de novo review is therefore required if a party

files “a proper, specific objection” to a factual finding contained in the report. Macort v. Prem,

Inc., 208 F. App’x 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006). “It is critical that the objection be sufficiently

specific and not a general objection to the report” to warrant de novo review. Id.

A party’s objections are improper, however, if they expand upon and reframe

arguments already made and considered by the magistrate judge, or simply disagree with the

magistrate judge’s conclusions. See Melillo v. United States, No. 17-CV-80489, 2018 WL

4258355, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2018); see also Marlite, Inc. v. Eckenrod, No. 10-23641-CIV,

2012 WL 3614212, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2012) (“It is improper for an objecting party to .

. . submit [ ] papers to a district court which are nothing more than a rehashing of the same

arguments and positions taken in the original papers submitted to the Magistrate Judge.

Clearly, parties are not to be afforded a ‘second bite at the apple’ when they file objections to

a R & R.”) (quoting Camardo v. Gen. Motors Hourly-Rate Emps. Pension Plan, 806 F. Supp. 380,

382 (W.D.N.Y. 1992)). When the objecting party has not properly objected to the magistrate

judge’s findings, “the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of

the record in order to accept the recommendation.” See Keaton v. United States, No. 14-21230-

CIV, 2015 WL 12780912, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 4, 2015); see also Lopez v. Berryhill, No. 17-CV-

24263, 2019 WL 2254704, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2019) (stating that a district judge

“evaluate[s] portions of the R & R not objected to under a clearly erroneous standard of

review” (citing Davis v. Apfel, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1317 (M.D. Fla. 2000))).

This Court has carefully and de novo reviewed the parties’ written submissions, the

record, and applicable law.

III. THE REPORT AND OBJECTIONS

In a thorough and comprehensive analysis, Magistrate Judge Strauss considered

whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction. The Magistrate Judge determined the Court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any claims brought against Defendants in their official

capacities. To the extent any claims are brought against Defendants in their individual

capacities, the Magistrate Judge determined that Saintcy fails to state a claim upon which the

Court could grant relief.

In his Objections,1 Saintcy contends that: (1) the designation of the Magistrate Judge

is against the law; (2) the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit against a public servant in

their official capacity when the state has no authority to order the acts in question; (3) he has

standing to bring suit; (4) “Plaintiff has jurisdiction for claim under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 [sic] as

alleged in the Complaint[;]” (5) “The domestic relation abstention doctrine does not apply[;]”

(6) the Complaint states a claim under the Iqbal standard; (7) he sued officials of the

Department of Revenue in individual and official capacities; (8) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

does not apply because there was no state court case; (9) “the case should be decided on merits

and only with hearing the Parties[;]” (10) the Report should have addressed his allegation that

he was never duly served with notice regarding administrative child support order

proceedings; and (11) the Report does not address the fact that he has amended his Complaint.

See generally Objections.

This Court addresses each Objection in turn.

IV. ANALYSIS

As to Saintcy’s first objection, the designation of the Magistrate Judge is in fact lawful.

By federal statute, “a judge may designate a magistrate judge to . . . submit to a judge of the

court proposed . . . recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court, of any

motion excepted in subparagraph (A) . . .”2 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Accordingly, this Court

is satisfied that the designation of Judge Strauss to issue a Report and Recommendation is

lawful, and therefore the first objection is overruled.

1 The Court renumbers Saintcy’s objections because the numbering scheme used in his

Objections failed to provide the Court with a coherent mode of organization.

2 In turn, subparagraph (A) excepts a motion “to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).

With regard to Saintcy’s second objection, the undersigned agrees with the Magistrate

Judge that the Ex parte Young doctrine does not apply here to provide an exception to

immunity. That is, Saintcy’s claims do not qualify for application of the Ex parte Young

doctrine because (1) this doctrine cannot be applied to adjudications of past conduct, Puerto

Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993); (2) Saintcy offers

hypothetical rather than imminent future similar acts, Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180

F.3d 1326, 1336 (11th Cir. 1999); and (3) to the extent Saintcy’s claims arguably address

ongoing and continuous conduct, they only address state law, and, as such, do not fall within

the Ex parte Young doctrine, see Brown v. Coffin, No. 8:24-CV-00385-WFJ-NHA, 2024 WL

2304372, at *1, 4–5 (M.D. Fla. May 6, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL

2293039 (M.D. Fla. May 21, 2024). In any event, even if the Ex parte Young doctrine somehow

applied, the claims are also barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983). Plaintiff's second objection is therefore overruled.

As to Saintcy’s third objection, Judge Strauss did not find that Saintcy lacks standing,

and his recommendation to grant the Motion is not based on any finding that Saintcy lacks

standing. Because of this, Saintcy’s third objection is irrelevant and is therefore overruled.

Saintcy’s fourth objection merely restates the basic elements of a § 1983 claim and thus

does not advance any substantive objection. It is therefore overruled.

As for Saintcy’s fifth objection, the undersigned is unable to discern where Judge

Strauss discusses the “domestic relation abstention doctrine.” The only abstention doctrine

discussed by Judge Strauss is the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. To the extent Saintcy’s fifth

objection is meant to identify the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, that doctrine is discussed infra with

respect to Saintcy’s eighth objection. Because, as discussed below, the undersigned agrees

with Judge Strauss’s findings with respect to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Saintcy’s fifth

objection is overruled.

With respect to Saintcy’s sixth objection, the Court finds that it is too general to

address and agrees with Defendants that this particular objection is devoid of any reference

directed to a specific portion of the Report. Saintcy’s sixth objection is therefore improper

and, as such, is overruled.

In his seventh objection, Saintcy is correct that he sued officials of the Department of

Revenue in both their individual and official capacities. Nevertheless, Judge Strauss engaged

in a thorough analysis of both bases for relief, and the Report offers independent reasons for

dismissing claims that fall into either of these two categories. First, Saintcy’s claims against

officials in their official capacities are barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.

See Lewis v. Clarke, 581 U.S. 155, 162 (2017); Cassady v. Hall, 892 F.3d 1150, 1153 (11th Cir.

2018). Saintcy’s claims do not qualify for the Ex parte Young doctrine (as explained in the

discussion regarding the second objection, supra), and are in any event barred by the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine. Second, Saintcy’s claims against officials in their personal capacities fail to

state a claim upon which the Court could grant relief. As to Count 1, the officials in question

are entitled to qualified immunity on the facts as alleged by Saintcy. Jones v. Fransen, 857 F.3d

843, 851 (11th Cir. 2017). Count 2 is merely a restatement of Count 1 and, therefore, fails to

state a claim for the same reasons. Counts 3 and 4 are wholly conclusory and thus due to be

dismissed. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). Count 5 fails to state a § 1983 claim

by failing to plausibly allege any constitutional violation. Count 6 fails to plead any allegations

against Defendants in their individual capacities. And Count 7 is wholly conclusory, merely

reciting the elements of a claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. See id. For all

of these reasons, this Court overrules Saintcy’s seventh objection.

Saintcy’s eighth objection fails to recognize Judge Strauss’s discussion on pages 14-15

of the Report, in which Judge Strauss explains that the Income Deduction Order and the Final

Administrative Paternity and Support Order have the same effect as a state court order, and

thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to bar any claims in which Saintcy seeks an

injunction requiring withdrawal or invalidation of those orders. Saincty’s Affidavit of Non-

Suit, offered to show that there was no state court case, is therefore irrelevant. Finally, a

review of the Report reflects that Judge Strauss’ recommendation does not depend on the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Rather, the doctrine merely buttresses his recommendation. See

Report at 16 (“Therefore, even if a portion of Saintcy’s claims against Defendants in their

official capacities could escape dismissal under the Eleventh Amendment, the Court lacks

jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”). Thus, Saintcy’s eighth objection is

overruled.

To the extent Saintcy’s ninth objection simply asserts, in a conclusory manner, that

the case should survive the Motion, it is overruled without further comment. To the extent

Saintcy intends to argue in his ninth objection that the Court cannot decide the Motion

without first holding a hearing, he is mistaken. District courts have the discretion to resolve

parties’ motions without an evidentiary hearing. Odyssey Marine Expl., Inc. v. Unidentified

Shipwrecked Vessel, 657 F.3d 1159, 1169 (11th Cir. 2011). A court does not abuse its discretion

when it decides a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction without an evidentiary hearing

“when neither party makes a timely and unequivocal request for a [ ] hearing.” Sunseri v. Macro

Cellular Partners, 412 F.3d 1247, 1251 (11th Cir. 2005). Here, neither party made a request for

a hearing in the briefing on the Motion. See ECF Nos. 32, 35, and 36. Saintcy’s ninth objection

is therefore overruled.

Saintcy’s tenth objection, that Judge Strauss failed to consider that Saintcy was never

duly served with notice regarding administrative child support order proceedings, advances

an argument he did not make in his Response to the Motion. See Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v.

Inst. of London Underwriters, 267 F.3d 1303, 1308 n.1 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that a party

waived an argument by failing to raise it in response to a motion). What’s more, Saintcy does

not explain how the result would be different if Judge Strauss had considered this allegation.

See N.L.R.B. v. McClain of Georgia, Inc., 138 F.3d 1418, 1422 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Issues raised

in a perfunctory manner, without supporting arguments and citation to authorities, are

generally deemed to be waived.”). Saintcy’s tenth objection is therefore overruled.

As to Saintcy’s eleventh and final objection, the Report acknowledges that Saintcy

filed his First Amended Complaint on May 9, 2024, see Report at 3, and refers to this

Amended Complaint throughout the Report. Saintcy’s final objection, in which Saintcy avers

that Judge Strauss did not consider the fact that he amended his complaint, is therefore

overruled.

V. CONCLUSION

Having conducted a de novo review of the record in this case and of Magistrate Judge

Strauss’s thorough and astute analysis, and also viewing Saintcy’s filings with the leniency

due pro se filings, the undersigned fully agrees with the analysis and recommendations stated

in Judge Strauss’s Report. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that

1. The Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 38] is AFFIRMED and

ADOPTED.

2. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 32] is GRANTED.

3. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case. Any pending motions are DENIED

AS MOOT.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in the Southern District of Florida, this 23rd

day of September, 2024.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: counsel of record