Arora v. Miami-Dade County, Florida

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 23-cv-20962-DAMIAN

RISHI ARORA,

Plaintiff,

v.

MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA,

Defendant.

____________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 26]

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant, Miami-Dade County’s (“Defendant”

or the “County”), Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 26] (“Motion”), filed February

2, 2024.

THE COURT has considered the Motion, the Response [ECF No. 34] and Reply

thereto [ECF No. 36], the pertinent portions of the record, including the parties’ respective

Statements of Material Facts [ECF Nos. 25, 33, and 37], and the relevant authorities and is

otherwise fully advised in the premises. The Court also heard argument from the parties who

appeared before the undersigned on July 17, 2024. For the reasons set forth below, this Court

grants the Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Rishi Arora (“Mr. Arora” or “Plaintiff”), filed a Complaint against his

current employer, Miami-Dade County, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (“FCRA”). Mr. Arora

alleges he experienced discrimination and retaliation by his supervisor, Maria Johnson (“Ms.

Johnson”), based on his origin, race, and religion.

Based on the parties’ briefings and the evidence in the record, the following facts are

not genuinely in dispute unless otherwise noted.

A. Mr. Arora’s Employment With The County.

Mr. Arora, an Asian American of Indian origin, has been employed as an Enterprise

Portfolio Manager in the County’s Information Technology Department (“IT Department”)

since 2015. [ECF No. 25 (“County’s SOF”), ¶ 1]. His starting salary was $140,000 annually,

and at the time he filed the Complaint, his base salary was $173,458.88. Id. ¶ 4–5. In his role

as an Enterprise Portfolio Manager in the IT Department, Mr. Arora is involved in improving

the consistency, predictability, and efficiency of the organization’s project delivery capability

by providing leadership in best practices and ensuring that the operational needs of the

Enterprise Program Manager Office (“EPMO”) are managed, focused on the project interface

with project leaders, project teams, technology, sponsors, and stakeholders. Id. ¶ 11.

B. Mr. Arora’s Assignment To The Quality Assurance Initiative.

In December 2021, Ms. Johnson directed Mr. Arora to create a presentation for the IT

Department Director/CIO, Margaret Brisbane (“Ms. Brisbane”), describing the need for a

Quality Assurance function within the IT Department. Id. ¶ 19. On February 4, 2022, Mr.

Arora presented his research to Ms. Brisbane, Assistant Director Mariaelena Salazar, and Ms.

Johnson. Id. ¶ 20. As part of his presentation, Mr. Arora highlighted the need for a quality

assurance plan within the IT Department. Id. On February 15, 2022, after Mr. Arora

presented his research, Ms. Johnson assigned Mr. Arora to the Quality Assurance Office

Design and Implementation Plan (the “Quality Assurance Initiative”). Id. ¶ 21.

According to Ms. Johnson’s Declaration, Mr. Arora was chosen to lead the Quality

Assurance Initiative because he recommended adding this functionality to the IT Department

himself and gathered relevant information on why this functionality would benefit the

Department. Id. ¶ 22; Johnson Decl. [ECF No. 25-3 ¶¶ 13–14]. For this reason, as well as Mr.

Arora’s background and experience, Ms. Johnson deemed Mr. Arora was best suited for the

assignment. Id. Mr. Arora disputes that he was best suited for this assignment because he

lacked a background in quality assurance and the proper director level role. [ECF No. 33

(“Arora’s SOF”) ¶ 22].

As part of the new assignment, Mr. Arora was directed to conduct comprehensive

research to provide a design and implementation plan for the Quality Assurance Office.

County’s SOF ¶ 24. Ms. Johnson advised Mr. Arora that the Quality Assurance Initiative

would be his sole focus and that she would assume the day-to-day management of the EPMO

in order to allow Mr. Arora to focus on the specialized project. Id. ¶ 25. To that end, Ms.

Johnson would be responsible for managing Mr. Arora’s direct reports until his specialized

assignment was completed. Id.; [ECF No. 25-2 at 20 (Ms. Johnson’s February 15, 2022 email

assigning Mr. Arora the Quality Assurance Initiative)].

C. Mr. Arora’s 2020-2021 Performance Evaluation By Ms. Johnson.

Prior to his assignment to the Quality Assurance Initiative, Mr. Arora received an

overall “Satisfactory” performance evaluation for the period November 2, 2020 to October

31, 2021. County’s SOF ¶ 41; [ECF No. 25-2 at 16–19]. According to the County, Mr. Arora

was not entitled to a merit increase for the 2020-2021 performance evaluation period because

he was maxed out in his current classification. County’s SOF ¶ 42; Arocho Decl. [ECF No.

25-1 at ¶ 10]. Mr. Arora disputes this and claims the County’s Human Resources department

has discretionary power to increase an employee’s salary notwithstanding their classification

status. Arora’s SOF ¶ 42.1

D. Mr. Arora’s Record Of Counseling.

On March 30, 2022, after his assignment to the Quality Assurance Initiative, Mr.

Arora received a Record of Counseling for his failure to follow directions and failure to meet

expectations. County’s SOF ¶ 40. Specifically, the Record of Counseling indicates that Mr.

Arora failed to discontinue staff meetings with the EMPO staff after Ms. Johnson advised

him that she would assume the day-to-day management of the EMPO while Mr. Arora

focused on completing the Quality Assurance Initiative. Id.; [ECF No. 25-2 at 23].

Mr. Arora disputes the charges in the Record of Counseling. He claims that although

Ms. Johnson did advise him that she would be assuming Mr. Arora’s role as supervisor of the

EPMO and that he should discontinue his “one on one” meetings with staff, she did not say

he should stop the scheduled group staff meetings. Arora’s SOF ¶ 40. Mr. Arora states that

this misunderstanding was later resolved and that he was surprised by the formal record of

counseling. Id.

E. The Initial Charge of Discrimination.

On April 25, 2022, Mr. Arora filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (the “Initial Charge”). County’s SOF ¶ 12; [ECF No.

25-2 at 26–27]. In the Initial Charge, Mr. Arora identified the “earliest” date of the alleged

1 Mr. Arora cites his own deposition testimony in support of this assertion. He does not

present evidence of the County’s policies regarding employee merit increases and pay

classification. See Raney v. Vinson Guard Service, Inc., 120 F.3d 1192, 1198 (11th Cir. 1997)

(“Summary judgment cannot be avoided . . . based on hunches unsupported with significant

probative evidence.”).

discrimination as “February 15, 2022” and checked the “continuing action” box. [ECF No.

25-2 at 26].

In the Initial Charge, Mr. Arora claims Ms. Johnson treated him differently as

compared to other managers under her supervision because: (1) Mr. Arora was required to

meet with Ms. Johnson weekly; (2) Ms. Johnson removed Mr. Arora from his position as

Leader of EMPO and assigned him to the Quality Assurance Initiative; (3) Ms. Johnson gave

Mr. Arora the “worst performance appraisal ratings” since joining the County; (4) Mr. Arora

was verbally threatened by Ms. Johnson; and (5) Mr. Arora received a record of counseling.

Id. at 27.

F. Mr. Arora’s Assignment To The Call Center Initiative.

Six months after Mr. Arora filed his charge of discrimination, on August 30, 2022, Ms.

Johnson assigned Mr. Arora as the IT Department Program Manager for the Call Center

Modernization program (the “Call Center Initiative”). County’s SOF ¶ 31; Johnson Decl. ¶

19. She states that she assigned Mr. Arora to this project because of the high-profile nature of

the project coupled with Mr. Arora’s certifications and experience. Id. Ms. Johnson also

indicates that she assigned Mr. Arora to the Call Center Initiative due to office needs as an

incumbent Program Manager gave notice of her resignation. Johnson Decl. ¶ 20.

As with the Quality Assurance Initiative, Mr. Arora disputes that he was a good fit to

lead the Call Center Initiative because he did not have the credentials to give directions to his

superiors within the IT Department. Arora’s SOF ¶ 31. According to Mr. Arora, Ms. Johnson

was setting him up “to fail” when she assigned him to the Call Center Initiative. Id. ¶ 35.

Ms. Johnson asserts she was not aware that Mr. Arora had filed a charge of

discrimination with the EEOC when she assigned Mr. Arora to lead the Call Center Initiative.

Johnson Decl. ¶ 24. Ms. Johnson states she also was not aware that Mr. Arora had filed a

complaint with the Human Fair Employment Practices Division when she assigned him to

lead the Call Center Initiative. Id. ¶ 25.

G. The Supplemental Charge of Discrimination.

On October 26, 2022, Mr. Arora submitted a supplement to his Initial Charge (the

“Supplemental Charge”). [ECF No. 25-2 at 28–29]. Again, Mr. Arora marked “February 15,

2022” as the earliest date the alleged discrimination took place. Id.

In the Supplement, Mr. Arora alleges Ms. Johnson retaliated against him since the

filing of his Initial Charge when: (1) Ms. Johnson assigned Mr. Arora as lead on a Department

initiative despite his concern that only an Assistant Director could lead the initiative; (2) Ms.

Johnson failed to restore Mr. Arora to his earlier position once he successfully completed and

presented the Quality Assurance Initiative; (3) Ms. Johnson did not restore the reporting by

Mr. Arora’s direct reports to him; (4) Ms. Johnson barred Mr. Arora from speaking directly

with his direct reports; (5) Ms. Johnson told Mr. Arora’s direct reports to create EMPO

artifacts and he was deliberately kept out of discussions; and (6) Ms. Johnson excluded Mr.

Arora from hiring for positions that reported to him. Id.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. Arora filed the Complaint in this action on March 10, 2023. [ECF No. 1]. The

Complaint asserts eight causes of action: national origin discrimination, in violation of Title

VII and the FCRA (Counts I and II); race discrimination, in violation of Title VII and the

FCRA (Counts III and IV); religious discrimination, in violation of Title VII and the FCRA

(Counts V and VI); and retaliation, in violation of Title VII and the FCRA (Counts VII and

VIII). [ECF No. 1].

On February 2, 2024, the County filed the Motion now before the Court seeking

judgment as a matter of law on Mr. Arora’s discrimination and retaliation claims. [ECF No.

26]. Mr. Arora filed a response arguing that the Motion should be denied [ECF No. 34], and

the County filed a reply in support of the Motion. [ECF No. 36].2

On March 22, 2024, Mr. Arora’s counsel filed a Motion seeking to withdraw from

representing Mr. Arora in this action due to irreconcilable differences. [ECF No. 38]. On

April 24, 2024, following a status conference on the Motion to Withdraw, this Court granted

the Motion and gave Mr. Arora fourteen (14) days in which to either retain new counsel or

file a notice of intent to proceed pro se. See ECF No. 50. Mr. Arora elected to proceed pro se.

[ECF No. 52].

This Court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge to conduct a settlement conference,

see ECF No. 60, which resulted in an impasse. [ECF No. 66]. Thereafter, this Court set a

hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment and removed the case from the Court’s active

trial calendar. See ECF No. 72.

On July 17, 2024, this Court heard argument from Mr. Arora, who appeared pro se,

and from counsel for the County during a two-hour hearing at which Mr. Arora was permitted

to present his arguments in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. [ECF No. 74].

Two days later, on July 19, 2024, Mr. Arora filed a pro se Motion to Recuse the undersigned

from presiding over the instant matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and § 455. [ECF No. 75].

The County filed a response in opposition to the Motion to Recuse [ECF No. 76], and Mr.

2 On March 10, 2024, this case was reassigned to the undersigned for all further proceedings.

[ECF No. 35].

Arora filed a reply. [ECF No. 77]. The undersigned denied the Motion to Recuse by separate

Order. See ECF No. 78.

The Motion for Summary Judgment is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A party may obtain summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is genuine if “a reasonable trier of fact could return judgment

for the non-moving party.” Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 516 F.3d 1235,

1243 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)). A

fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id.

(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48). The Court views the facts in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor.

See Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006). “The mere existence of a scintilla of

evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on

which a jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Further, the

Court does not weigh conflicting evidence. See Skop v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 485 F.3d 1130, 1140

(11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Carlin Comm’n, Inc. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1356

(11th Cir. 1986)).

The moving party shoulders the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact. Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2008). Once this burden

is satisfied, “the nonmoving party ‘must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’” Ray v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 327 F. App’x

819, 825 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). Instead, “the non-moving party ‘must make a sufficient showing on

each essential element of the case for which he has the burden of proof.’” Id. (quoting Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). Accordingly, the non-moving party must produce

evidence, going beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designating specific facts to suggest that a

reasonable jury could find in the non-moving party’s favor. Shiver, 549 F.3d at 1343. Even

“where the parties agree on the basic facts, but disagree about the factual inferences that

should be drawn from those facts,” summary judgment may be inappropriate. Warrior

Tombigbee Transp. Co. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 1983).

IV. APPLICABLE LAW

A. Title VII And The FCRA.

Title VII prohibits employers from intentionally discriminating against their

employees based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Lewis v. City of Union City,

918 F.3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). Title VII also

“prohibits employers from retaliating against an employee ‘because he has opposed any

practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a

charge . . . under [Title VII].’” Tolar v. Bradley Arant Boult Commings, LLP, 997 F.3d 1280, 1289

(11th Cir. 2021) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). “To that end, employers cannot retaliate

against employees who have complained about— that is, opposed—discrimination” based on

sex, age, or other protected characteristics. Martin v. Fin. Asset Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 959 F.3d 1048,

1053 (11th Cir. 2020).

Similarly, under the FCRA, “[i]t is an unlawful employment practice for an employer

. . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions,

or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy,

national origin, age, handicap, or marital status.” Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a). The FCRA also

prohibits retaliation in the same manner as Title VII. Id. § 760.10(7); Mosley v. MeriStar Mgmt.

Co., LLC, 137 F. App’x 248, 252 (11th Cir. 2005).

“[D]ecisions construing Title VII apply to the analysis of FCRA claims.” Johnson v.

Miami-Dade Cnty., 948 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t

Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387, 1389–90 (11th Cir. 1998)); Harper, 139 F.3d at 1387 (“The Florida

courts have held that decisions construing Title VII are applicable when considering claims

under the [FCRA], because the Florida act was patterned after Title VII.”). Indeed, “[n]o

Florida court has interpreted the Florida statute to impose substantive liability where Title

VII does not.” Harper, 139 F.3d at 1387. Therefore, the Court analyzes Mr. Arora’s Title VII

and FCRA claims together.

B. McDonnell Douglas Framework.

When a Title VII or FCRA discrimination claim is based on circumstantial evidence,

the Eleventh Circuit dictates that the three-part McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework

applies. Johnson, 948 F.3d at 1325 (citing Kidd v. Mando Am. Corp., 731 F.3d 1196, 1202 (11th

Cir. 2013)); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The Eleventh

Circuit applies the same burden-shifting framework to Title VII and FCRA retaliation claims.

Tolar, 997 F.3d at 1289 (applying McDonnell Douglas to Title VII and FCRA claims).

Therefore, this Court applies the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to Mr. Arora’s

Title VII and FCRA discrimination and retaliation claims.

Under this framework, the plaintiff has the initial burden to establish a prima facie case

of discrimination or retaliation. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. “Demonstrating a prima

facie case is not onerous; it requires only that the plaintiff establish facts adequate to permit an

inference of discrimination.” Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997). If the

plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence, a presumption of

discrimination arises. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253–54 (1981).

Once the plaintiff has presented a prima facie case and its attendant presumption arises,

the burden “shift[s] to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason”

for its actions. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the employer meets this burden, “the

presumption of discrimination is eliminated and the plaintiff has the opportunity to come

forward with evidence . . . sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the

reasons given by the employer were not the real reasons for the adverse employment

decision.” Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted).

“An employer’s stated reason is not a pretext unless it is shown that both: (1) the reason was

false; and (2) the real reason was unlawful.” Vega v. Invsco Grp., Ltd., 432 F. App’x 867, 871

(11th Cir. 2011) (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993)). “If the plaintiff

does not proffer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether

each of the defendant employer’s articulated reasons is pretextual, the employer is entitled to

summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim.” Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024–25.

However, “establishing the elements of the McDonnell Douglas framework is not . . .

the sine qua non for a plaintiff to survive a summary judgment motion in an employment

discrimination case.” Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011). If,

despite failing to precisely establish the McDonnell Douglas elements, the plaintiff “presents

circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue concerning the employer’s discriminatory

intent”—i.e., “a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer

intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker”—the plaintiff can still survive summary

judgment. Id. (quotation and footnote omitted).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Mr. Arora’s Discrimination Claims.

Mr. Arora alleges claims of discrimination under Title VII (Counts I, III, and V) and

the FCRA (Counts II, IV, and VI) based on his national origin, race, and religion.3 In the

Motion, the County argues that Mr. Arora has not provided direct evidence of discrimination

on the part of the County in the form of actions or remarks, and, therefore, Mr. Arora must

satisfy the burden shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas. See Scott v. Suncoast

Beverage Sales, Ltd., 295 F.3d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 2002).

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas

framework, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2)

plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; (3) the employer treated similarly situated

employees outside of the protected class more favorably; and (4) plaintiff was qualified to do

the job.” Id. at 1228 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). The County does not dispute

that Mr. Arora has satisfied the first element of a prima facie case — that he belongs to a

protected class. Mot. at 8. The record reflects Mr. Arora is of Indian nationality and Asian

race. See Compl. ¶ 4; Resp. at 1. Therefore, the Court turns to the first issue in dispute, whether

3 In his Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, it appears Mr. Arora has abandoned

his discrimination claims based on his religion as there is no mention of such claims. Failure

to respond to arguments relating to a claim constitutes abandonment of the claim or position.

Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v. Indep. Sprinkler Corp., 10 F.3d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.

1994) (plaintiff’s failure to either move for summary judgment on claim raised in complaint

or to respond to defendant’s summary judgment motion on same claim, allowed district court

to properly treat claim as abandoned). Therefore, this Court considers the religious

discrimination claim as abandoned.

Mr. Arora has demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he suffered an

adverse employment action.

1. Adverse Employment Actions.

The County argues Mr. Arora has not demonstrated that he suffered an adverse

employment action. Mr. Arora responds that he suffered from the following acts from his

direct supervisor, Ms. Johnson, that constitute adverse employment actions: (a) Ms. Johnson

micromanaged Mr. Arora during his daily tasks; (b) Ms. Johnson reassigned Mr. Arora to

lead the Quality Assurance Initiative, despite Mr. Arora’s concerns that he did not have the

required experience or certifications and lacked adequate resources to accomplish the

initiative; (c) Ms. Johnson removed Mr. Arora’s supervisory duties and direct reports; and (d)

Ms. Johnson issued Mr. Arora a low rating on his 2020-2021 performance review and a

Record of Counseling after Mr. Arora allegedly failed to follow directions provided by Ms.

Johnson that he should stop his group staff meetings.4

In Doe v. Dekalb County School District, 145 F.3d 1441, 1449 (11th Cir. 1988), the

Eleventh Circuit adopted an objective test for determining whether an employment action is

an actionable adverse action for purposes of discrimination claims:

A plaintiff must prove that a ‘reasonable person in his position would view the

employment action in question as adverse.’ ‘[N]ot everything that makes an

employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action,’ otherwise every trivial

personnel action that an irritable chip-on-the-shoulder employee did not like

would form the basis of a discrimination suit.’

Ramsay v. Broward Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., No. 05-61959-CIV, 2007 WL 6861073, at *9 (S.D. Fla.

May 24, 2007) (Marra, J.) (quoting Dekalb County, 145 F.3d at 1441); see also Graham v. Florida

4 Mr. Arora also claims the County’s failure to promote him constitutes an adverse

employment action. The failure to promote claim is addressed below.

Dep’t of Corr., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1445, 1450 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (“Plaintiff’s unhappiness with the

reassignment does not make the reassignment adverse.”).

To establish an adverse employment action, a plaintiff must show “a serious and

material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Davis v. Town of Lake

Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original), overruled on other grounds by

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). “Although the [McDonnell

Douglas test] does not require any direct economic consequences, the employer’s action must

impact the “terms, conditions, or privileges” of the plaintiff’s job in a “real and demonstrable

way,” and the asserted impact cannot be speculative and must at least have a “tangible adverse

effect” on the plaintiff’s employment. Id. Moreover, “federal courts do not sit as ‘super-

personnel department[s]’ that reexamine an employer’s business decisions.” Medearis v. CVS

Pharmacy, Inc., 646 F. App’x 891, 897 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d at

1244).

Typically, an adverse employment action will “affect continued employment or pay—

things like terminations, demotions, suspensions without pay, and pay raises or cuts—as well

as other things that are similarly significant standing alone.” Monaghan v. Worldpay US, Inc.,

955 F.3d 855, 860 (11th Cir. 2020); see also Henderson v. City of Birmingham, Ala., 826 F. App’x

736, 741 (11th Cir. 2020). Additionally, an adverse employment action extends to actions

which fall short of ultimate decisions. See Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453

(11th Cir. 1998). Therefore, “actions such as undeserved negative job evaluations, demotions,

disadvantageous transfers, or toleration of harassment are actionable . . . .” Graham v. State

Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999).

a. Ms. Johnson’s Alleged Micromanagement of Mr. Arora’s Daily Tasks.

Mr. Arora claims that Ms. Johnson’s increased scrutiny, or micromanagement, of his

performance and daily tasks constitutes an adverse employment action. Specifically, Mr.

Arora asserts Ms. Johnson refused to approve one of his time sheets because Ms. Johnson

claimed he should not receive working credit for any hours during a four-hour time slot Mr.

Arora blocked off for a doctor’s appointment despite an alleged prior understanding between

the two that Mr. Arora was working during part of that time. Resp. at 3. Mr. Arora also argues

that Ms. Johnson required Mr. Arora to meet with her every week, and she would attend all

of his staff meetings. Id. at 4. The County argues that none of these actions constitutes an

adverse employment action.

Mr. Arora cites no authority to support the proposition that increased supervision or

scrutiny, without more, can constitute an adverse employment action. Indeed, there is

substantial authority to the contrary. See Wells v. Miami-Dade County, No. 15-22431-Civ, 2016

WL 7492560, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2016) (Cooke, J.) (citing Harris v. Firstar Bank

Milwaukee, 97 F. App’x 662, 665 (7th Cir. 2004) (intimidating comments, dirty looks, and

increased scrutiny by supervisors not adverse actions by employer); Poppy v. City of Wiloughby

Hills, 96 F. App’x 292, 295 (6th Cir. 2004) (supervisor “reviewing [plaintiff’s] time sheets,

requesting keys to her office to inspect records kept there, or installing a security camera in

the hall outside her office” not adverse employment actions); Kerns v. Capital Graphics, Inc.,

178 F.3d 1011, 1017 (8th Cir. 1999) (stripping of discretionary authority and moving office

closer to supervisor not adverse employment actions).

Additionally, Mr. Arora has not produced any evidence that Ms. Johnson’s increased

supervision or scrutiny of his daily tasks or of his time sheets actually caused him to suffer

any “tangible adverse effect” on his employment. See Raney v. Vinson Guard Service, Inc., 120

F.3d 1192, 1198 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Summary judgment cannot be avoided . . . based on

hunches unsupported with significant probative evidence.”); Merriweather v. Alabama Dep’t of

Pub. Safety, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1275 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (holding that there was no adverse

employment action where plaintiff had produced no evidence that she had been fired,

demoted, or denied any pay increase because of written counseling).

In short, Mr. Arora’s claim that he suffered an adverse employment action with regard

to Ms. Johnson’s increased supervision and scrutiny of his daily tasks falls far short of serious

and material changes in the terms and conditions of employment.

b. Mr. Arora’s Temporary Reassignment and Changes In Duties And

Responsibilities.

Mr. Arora argues that his temporary assignment to the Quality Assurance Initiative

and subsequent changes to his duties and responsibilities constitute adverse employment

actions. Specifically, Mr. Arora asserts he was not qualified to lead the Quality Assurance

Initiative and struggled to get the necessary resources to succeed with the initiative. Resp. at

5. Despite these concerns, Mr. Arora states “the quality assurance initiative was successfully

completed because of [his] efforts and hard work.” Id. at 7. Additionally, Mr. Arora argues

that his loss of supervisory responsibility constitutes an adverse employment action.

Federal courts are reluctant to hold that temporary changes in job duties amount to an

adverse employment action when unaccompanied by any tangible harm. See Town of Lake

Park, 245 F.3d at 1244 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Changes in assignments or work related duties do

not ordinarily constitute adverse employment decisions if unaccompanied by a decrease in

salary or work-hour change.”); McGuire v. Miami-Dade County, 418 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1360

(S.D. Fla. 2006) (Martinez, J.) (“[I]ncreased workloads are not adverse employment actions

but rather an ordinary tribulation of the workplace for which employees should expect to take

responsibility.”); accord Mungin v. Katten Muchin & Zavis, 116 F.3d 1549, 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1997)

(agreeing with “other circuits [which] have held that changes in assignments or work-related

duties do not ordinarily constitute adverse employment decisions if unaccompanied by a

decrease in salary or work hour changes”).

Similarly, courts in the Eleventh Circuit consistently hold that loss of supervisory

responsibility does not constitute an adverse employment action without a material change

in the terms or conditions of employment. See Rorie v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cnty., Fla., No.

21-CV-81865, 2024 WL 51008, at *11 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 4, 2024) (Reinhart, J.) (granting

summary judgment after plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden to show by an objective standard

that the changes to his duties and responsibilities constitute an adverse employment action);

Kidd v. Mando Am. Corp., 731 F.3d 1196, 1203 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding no adverse

employment action where plaintiff suffered neither a decrease in pay nor a loss of title—but

only a loss of supervisory responsibilities); see also Hamilton v. Boys & Girls Club of Metro.

Atlanta, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-3609-TWT, 2014 WL 4100750, at *9 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 18, 2014)

(holding plaintiff’s reassignment was not an adverse employment action after she failed to

demonstrate that she not only lost direct reports but also that any loss of supervisory authority

altered the terms and conditions of her employment); Byrne v. Alabama Alcoholic Beverage

Control Bd., 635 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (removal of employee’s supervisory

responsibilities and shifting of her post-reorganization duties to those more clerical did not

constitute adverse employment actions).

The County argues that Mr. Arora did not experience any material change in the terms

or conditions of his employment due to his temporary assignment to a specialized project and

loss of supervisory responsibility. Mot. at 14. Mr. Arora claims the loss of his supervisory

responsibility “combined with removal of job duties within his skill set, and subsequent

reassignment to a project completely outside of his knowledge base, significantly and

negatively impacted [his] employment.” Resp. at 12. Mr. Arora asserts that the County’s

actions “combined with a lack of support, constant nitpicking, and circular directions,

ultimately converged into a poor performance review,” which, in turn, prevented him from

receiving a pay increase. Id. Mr. Arora also claims his psychological well-being was impacted

by these changes. Id. In support of his discrimination claims, Mr. Arora relies on cases

involving hostile or abusive work environment and racial harassment claims. However, Mr.

Arora alleges neither hostile work environment nor harassment claims in his Complaint.

Aside from his own testimony,5 Mr. Arora does not point to any evidence in the record

regarding his duties and responsibilities before these alleged changes. He likewise fails to

provide evidence or otherwise explain why any alleged changes to his duties and

responsibilities had a material effect on his employment or were otherwise sufficiently

significant that a reasonable person in his position would view the changes as adverse.

Without evidence regarding Mr. Arora’s original responsibilities or how his duties

have changed and why the alleged changes resulted in some material effect on his

employment, it is impossible for the Court to determine whether the alleged changes

5 In the Eleventh Circuit, a party may not avoid summary judgment with conclusory and

unsubstantiated assertions. See Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir.

2000). The plaintiff, as the non-movant, must point to specific evidence or come forward with

additional evidence in the record to avoid summary judgment. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta,

2 F.3d 1112, 1116-17 (11th Cir. 1993). Mr. Arora’s self-serving, uncorroborated testimony is

insufficient to create a material issue of fact to avoid summary judgment. See Cleveland v. Policy

Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999); see also Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 953-

54 (11th Cir. 1986).

constitute adverse employment actions. See Rorie, 2024 WL 51008, at *11 (granting summary

judgment after plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden to show by an objective standard that the

changes to his duties and responsibilities constitutes adverse employment action); see also Long

v. Potter, No. 04-CV-2888, 2006 WL, 8432674, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 2006) (finding that

Title VII plaintiff failed to point to “sufficient evidence in the record that the reassignment of

duties was so undesirable that it constituted a material and significant change in duties or

responsibilities”), report and recommendation adopted, 2007 WL 9701254 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 26,

2007); Diaz v. AIG Mktg., Inc., 396 F. App’x 664, 667 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Town of Lake

Park, 245 F.3d at 1244) (“[C]hanges to an employee’s work assignments are rarely sufficiently

‘adverse’ to warrant scrutiny under the anti-discrimination laws.”).

Moreover, “[w]ork assignment claims strike at the very heart of an employer’s business

judgment and expertise because they challenge an employer’s ability to allocate its assets in

response to shifting and competing market priorities.” Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d at 1244.

As the Eleventh Circuit has made clear, “it is by now axiomatic that ‘Title VII is not designed

to make federal courts sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business

decisions.’” Id. at 1245 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,

939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991)).

In sum, Mr. Arora fails to offer any competent evidence demonstrating that the

changes to his workplace duties or assignments caused a sufficiently material adverse effect

on his employment to constitute a qualifying adverse employment action.

c. Mr. Arora’s Performance Appraisal And Record of Counseling.

Mr. Arora claims his 2020-2021 performance appraisal and formal record of

counseling constitute adverse employment actions. Mr. Arora asserts Ms. Johnson gave him

“the worst” performance appraisal that he had ever received during his employment at the

County and that it was the first time he did not receive a merit increase. Resp. at 4. According

to Mr. Arora, Ms. Johnson failed to acknowledge his major accomplishments, including that

a major organization had published Mr. Arora’s work. Id. Additionally, Mr. Arora claims the

County humiliated him by issuing his first ever record of counseling. Id. at 7.

The County responds that a performance evaluation – even a negative evaluation –

does not constitute an adverse employment action. Reply at 4. The County also argues that a

written record of counseling is not an adverse employment action if it does not result in a

serious and material change in the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. Id. at 7.

In support of this argument, the County points out that Mr. Arora’s salary and benefits

remained the same and that he was neither fired nor demoted as a result of the record of

counseling.

The performance appraisal at issue indicates a “Satisfactory” overall rating for Mr.

Arora for the period November 2, 2020 to October 31, 2021. [ECF No. 25-2 at 16–19].

Specifically, Ms. Johnson rated Mr. Arora as “Above Satisfactory” in the categories of

“Achievement of Objectives” and “Decision Making and Judgment.” Id. at 16. For the

category regarding “Communications”, Ms. Johnson rated Mr. Arora as “Satisfactory” and

noted Mr. Arora’s “communication style maybe improved by engaging in active listening and

being aware of the non-verbal cues from his audience.” Id. at 17. Although Mr. Arora

contends that Ms. Johnson gave him “the worst [performance appraisal] he had received up

to that point,” Mr. Arora has not produced any evidence that his performance review actually

caused him to suffer any tangible loss. See Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir.

2001) (“[T]o prove adverse employment action in a case under Title VII’s anti-discrimination

clause, an employee must show a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment. Moreover, the employee’s subjective view of the significance and

adversity of the employer’s action is not controlling; the employment action must be

materially adverse as viewed by a reasonable person in the circumstances.”).

With regard to Mr. Arora’s assertion that Ms. Johnson did not give him a merit

increase with the evaluation, the County points to an affidavit provided by the Department’s

Administrative Services Manager asserting that Mr. Arora was not entitled to a merit increase

because Mr. Arora was – and continues to be – maxed out in his current classification. Reply

at 5 (citing Declaration of Lylliam Arocho [ECF No. 25-1 ¶ 10 (“Mr. Rishi Arora was not

entitled to a merit increase for the performance evaluation period of November 02, 2020 to

October 31, 2021. Mr. Arora was – and is – maxed out in his current classification.”). Mr.

Arora does not present any evidence to dispute this. Thus, it is not clear how he could have

been harmed by not getting something he was not entitled to in the first place.

It is well-settled in this Circuit that negative performance reviews and a written record

of counseling do not constitute adverse employment actions if they are not used as the basis

for any negative action. See Dixon v. Palm Beach Cnty. Parks & Recreation Dep’t, 343 F. App’x

500, 502 (11th Cir. 2009) (written record of counseling and transfer from bicycle patrol unit

did not constitute serious and material change in employment conditions); McGuire v. Miami-

Dade County, 418 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (Martinez, J.) (issuance of a record

of counseling without any type of suspension, demotion, or decrease in pay was not an

adverse employment action); Gonzalez v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway Safety, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1338,

1348-49 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd, 45 F. App’x 886 (11th Cir. 2002) (a negative performance evaluation

which is not used as the basis for any action against a plaintiff does not constitute an adverse

action); Kavanaugh v. Miami-Dade County, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2011)

(Turnoff, J.) (finding record of counseling is not an adverse employment action absent

evidence of how it adversely affected the plaintiff). As the County points out, Mr. Arora did

not receive a suspension or demotion in connection with the record of counseling, nor was

his pay decreased because of it. And, as discussed above, he was not eligible for the merit

increase he complains he did not receive.

Because there was no termination of employment, no demotion as evidenced by a

decrease in wage or salary, no less distinguished title, no material loss of benefits, no

significant diminishing of material responsibilities, and no other indices of materially changed

employment terms and conditions, this Court concludes that Mr. Arora has not shown that

an adverse employment action occurred based on his record of counseling. See Spencer v. City

of Hollywood, Fla., No. 098–60028–CIV, 2009 WL 980274, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2009)

(Cooke, J.) (finding that a written reprimand did not rise to the level of an adverse

employment action because there was no indication that it would dissuade a reasonable

worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination). Notably, none of the actions

alleged constrained Mr. Arora’s career. See Dekalb County, 145 F.3d at 1451 n.18 (“Under an

objective standard, an employer can expect that it will not be liable for employment

discrimination if it does not constrain its employees’ careers.”).

Therefore, Mr. Arora’s claims relating to his performance appraisal and record of

counseling are not adverse employment actions.

d. The Alleged Adverse Employment Actions Collectively.

To the extent Mr. Arora argues that the above actions collectively constitute an adverse

employment action, that argument fails for the same reason the majority of his individual

allegations fail—that is, there is no evidence that any of the alleged actions had a material

impact on his employment such that a reasonable person in his position would view the

actions collectively as adverse. See Dekalb County, 146 F.3d at 1449 (discussing reasonable

person standard in determining whether a plaintiff has suffered an adverse employment

action); Boan v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 23-13116, 2024 WL 3084388, at *3 (11th Cir. June 21,

2024) (“[T]he employment action must be materially adverse as viewed by a reasonable

person in the circumstances.”) (quoting Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d at 1239)).

e. Conclusion Regarding The Failure To Allege Adverse Employment

Action.

Viewing all of the record evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable

to Mr. Arora, this Court concludes that Mr. Arora has not come forward with evidence

sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he suffered an adverse

employment action. To the contrary, the undisputed facts demonstrate that he did not. While

he may not be happy with his assignments or reassignments, with the changes in duties, with

his one record of counseling, or his less than perfect performance appraisal, under well-

established law in this Circuit, such dissatisfaction, without more, does not constitute the

serious and material change in the conditions of his employment necessary to rise to the level

of an adverse employment action.

Because Mr. Arora has failed to demonstrate that he suffered an adverse employment

action, he has not established a necessary element for his discrimination claims. Therefore,

the County is entitled to summary judgment as to Counts I–VI of the Complaint. See Sloan v.

Miami Dade Fire Rescue, No. 18-21517-Civ, 2019 WL 2869067, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 3, 2019)

(Scola, J.) (citing Martin v. Eli Lilly & Co., 702 F. App’x 952, 956–59 (11th Cir. 2017) (granting

summary judgment on ADA discrimination claim where plaintiff failed to demonstrate that

she suffered an adverse employment action)).

In sum, Mr. Arora has not shown he suffered an adverse employment action to prove

a violation of Title VII’s or the FCRA’s discrimination clause. Therefore, this Court need not

consider whether Mr. Arora has satisfied the remaining elements necessary to establish a

prima facie case of discrimination because Mr. Arora’s failure to demonstrate that he suffered

an adverse employment action is dispositive. See Cogar v. Citrus Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 847 F. App’x

549, 555 (11th Cir. 2021) (“A plaintiff’s failure to prove she suffered an adverse employment

action is dispositive of an employment discrimination claim.”) (citing Hipp v. Liberty Nat’l Life

Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1233 n.39 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Accordingly, the County’s Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be granted as to

Counts I–VI of the Complaint.

B. Mr. Arora’s Failure To Promote Claim Is Time Barred.

Although he did not assert it in the Complaint as a basis for his discrimination claims,

in his Response to the County’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Arora claims the

County’s decision to promote Ms. Johnson to be Division Director of the EPMO rather than

promoting him was also an adverse employment action. Resp. at 2. According to Mr. Arora,

Ms. Johnson had only been employed with the County since December 2018 and only had

one Bachelor’s degree, one MBA degree, and one certification, whereas, Mr. Arora had been

with the County since 2015 and had a Bachelor’s degree, two MBA degrees, and a total of

seven certifications. Id.

While the Complaint briefly mentions that Mr. Arora and others applied and were

passed over for a promotion to Division Director in March of 2021 (see Complaint ¶ 16),

Counts I through VI of the Complaint do not specifically allege the County’s failure to

promote Mr. Arora as a basis for his discrimination claims.

Even assuming that Mr. Arora intended to set forth a claim of discrimination based

on the failure to promote him, any such claim would be time-barred. The only allegation that

Mr. Arora makes about being denied a promotion refers to the County allegedly passing him

over for the position of Division Director and promoting Ms. Johnson on April 19, 2021.

Compl. ¶ 16; Reply at 3. Mr. Arora did not file his charge of discrimination with the EEOC

until April 22, 2022. And, as the County points out, Mr. Arora makes no mention of a failure

to promote claim in either his Initial or Supplemental Charge filed with the EEOC. Reply at

2.

To timely pursue a Title VII claim, the aggrieved party must file a charge with the

EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1). The filing

period is extended to 300 days if the aggrieved party first files a complaint with a state agency.

§ 2000e–5(e)(1). “For a charge to be timely in a deferral state such as Florida, it must be filed

within 300 days of the last discriminatory act.” EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265,

1271 (11th Cir. 2002). Only those discriminatory practices that occur within the 300–day

period prior to the EEOC filing are actionable. Id. If a charge is not filed with the EEOC

within the time limits prescribed by the statute, the claim is barred. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.

v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 (2002). Similarly, an employment discrimination claim filed

under the Florida Civil Rights Act must be filed within 365 days of the discriminatory act to

be actionable. Fla. Stat. § 760.11(1).

Here, Mr. Arora’s claim of discrimination based on the failure to promote is time-

barred as his charges of discrimination were filed well past the outside limit of 300 days from

the date of the allegedly discriminatory act. Even if Mr. Arora’s failure to promote claim was

not time barred, his bare allegations of discriminatory failure to promote, without more, are

not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact to survive summary judgment. See Sun

v. Girardot, 237 F. App’x 415, 417 (11th Cir. 2007) (“This court has consistently held that

conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value, and are

legally insufficient to defeat summary judgment.”). Accordingly, to the extent Mr. Arora

intended to assert such a claim, the claim fails as time-barred and unsubstantiated. See Fuller

v. Edward B. Stimpson Co., 971 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1162 (S.D. Fla. 2013), on reconsideration in

part (Dec. 23, 2013), aff’d sub nom. Fuller v. Edwin B. Stimpson Co. Inc., 598 F. App’x 652 (11th

Cir. 2015) (granting summary judgment on plaintiff’s failure to promote claim as time-barred).

In sum, Mr. Arora’s failure to promote claim is not properly before the Court; and, as

noted above, this Court is compelled to find that none of Mr. Arora’s other alleged adverse

employment actions rise to the level of an adverse employment action covered by Title VII or

the FCRA.

C. Mr. Arora’s Retaliation Claims.

Mr. Arora also alleges claims for retaliation under Title VII (Count VII) and the FCRA

(Count VIII). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII or the FCRA, a

plaintiff must show that: (1) he engaged in a statutorily protected expression; (2) he suffered

an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between the first two elements.

Johnson, 948 F.3d at 1325 (listing the elements for a Title VII retaliation claim).

As to the first element, statutorily protected expression that may give rise to a Title VII

retaliation claim includes filing a discrimination charge with the EEOC, Thompson v. North

America Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 173 (2011), and reporting or complaining about alleged

discriminatory practices to superiors. See Olmsted v. Taco Bell Corp., 141 F.3d 1457, 1460 (11th

Cir. 1998); Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1021 (11th Cir. 1994).

Mr. Arora alleges in the Complaint that on October 27, 2021, he told one of his

superiors, Mr. Brisbane, “that Ms. Johnson was treating him unfairly and that he felt

discriminated against.” Compl. ¶ 28. He further alleges that on December 24, 2021, he met

with Ms. Brisbane, Ms. Johnson, and an HR manager and “voiced his concerns of

discrimination, a toxic work environment, and an unfair review.” Id. ¶ 33. Mr. Arora then

filed his initial EEOC charge on April 25, 2022, and submitted a supplemental charge on

October 26, 2022. These allegations are sufficient to satisfy the first element for a retaliation

claim under Title VII and the FCRA.

However, although Mr. Arora satisfies the first element, he fails to satisfy the second

and third elements. As discussed above, clearly absent from the record available to this Court

is any indication of an adverse employment action that Mr. Arora allegedly suffered as a result

of his involvement in protected activity. As previously noted, to prove an adverse employment

action, “an employee must show a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or

privilege of employment.” Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d at 1239–40 (emphasis in original).

Mr. Arora argues that the County’s refusal to return him to his original EPMO

position with supervisory authority constitutes a material change in the terms and conditions

of his employment that he suffered as the result of the alleged retaliation. Resp. at 17.

However, as discussed above, reassignment of job duties without more does not constitute an

adverse employment action. See Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d at 1244 (11th Cir. 2001)

(“Changes in assignments or work related duties do not ordinarily constitute adverse

employment decisions if unaccompanied by a decrease in salary or work-hour change.”);

Greene v. Loewenstein, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1382 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (a “purely lateral transfer

. . . if not accompanied by any change in position, title, or salary, and that does not require

significant retraining or result in loss of prestige or opportunities for promotion is not an

adverse employment action”).

Mr. Arora has not alleged that he was terminated, demoted, refused a promotion, or

reprimanded. Nor does he claim that he suffered any economic loss as the result of the

County’s or Ms. Johnson’s actions. A plaintiff who engages in activity protected by Title VII

and suffers an adverse employment action because of it can clearly bring a Title VII retaliation

claim—regardless of whether that employee was the target of the discrimination about which

he complained. But Mr. Arora has not established that he suffered an adverse employment

action on this record, and, as such, his retaliation claim fails. See Chavarria v. CJA Innovation,

LLC, No. 1:16-cv-20397-UU, 2016 WL 9461328, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2016) (Ungaro, J.)

(granting summary judgment on Title VII retaliation claim because there was insufficient

evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to any adverse employment action taken by

defendant employer).

Because there is no evidence to show an adverse employment action causally related

to Mr. Arora’s protected expression, his claim of retaliation fails as a matter of law, and the

County is entitled to summary judgment as to the retaliation claims asserted in Counts VII

and VIII of the Complaint.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons laid out above, this Court finds, based upon a thorough review of the

evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Arora and construed liberally, as he is proceeding

pro se, that Mr. Arora has not alleged facts sufficient to create a genuine issue regarding

whether he suffered an adverse employment action. As such, his discrimination and

retaliation claims fail as a matter of law.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 26] is GRANTED.

2. The Court will enter final judgment for the Defendant by separate order.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in the Southern District of Florida, this 25th

day of September, 2024.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: Rishi Arora, Pro Se

Counsel of record

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