Royal Caribbean Cruises LTD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 24-20723-CIV-ALTONAGA/Reid

In re: Petition for Exoneration from or

Limitation of Liability by Royal Caribbean

Cruises Ltd. as owner of the 2022 Sea-Doo

GTX PRO 130 vessels,

Petitioner.

_____________________________________/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Petitioner/Counter-Defendant, Royal Caribbean

Cruises Ltd.’s Amended Motion to Dismiss Statement of Claims of Laureen Pellegrino and Motion

to Strike Claimant’s Affirmative Defenses [ECF No. 30], filed on June 5, 2024. Claimant/Counter-

Claimant, Laureen Pellegrino filed a Response [ECF No. 35], to which Petitioner/Counter-

Defendant filed a Reply [ECF No. 36]. The Court has carefully considered the Statement of Claims

[ECF No. 15], the parties’ written submissions, and applicable law. For the following reasons, the

Motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

In July 2023, Claimant went on a cruise owned and operated by Petitioner.1 (See Statement

of Claims (“SOC”) ¶ 3). On July 21, 2023, the cruise was at port at Petitioner’s private island in

the Bahamas, CocoCay. (See id. ¶¶ 7–8). That day, Claimant went on a “personal watercraft

guided tour” organized, promoted, and run by Petitioner; Claimant signed up for the tour the day

before on the cruise ship. (Id. ¶ 10; see also id. ¶¶ 7–10, 13).

1 For ease of reference, “Claimant” is Claimant/Counter-Claimant, Laureen Pellegrino, and “Petitioner” is

Petitioner/Counter-Defendant, Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.

After watching a 15-minute training video, Claimant, a novice operator of personal

watercrafts, set off on the tour that included nine participants and two tour guides. (See id. ¶¶ 13–

15). The group operated the personal watercrafts individually, then met up as a group at designated

stopping points. (See id. ¶¶ 15, 41). The tour guides told a slower, uncomfortable rider to “go fast

to the next meeting point.” (Id.). The tour was advertised as “no experience . . . necessary” and

“ideal for novice operators[.]” (Id. ¶ 10 (alterations added)).

Not so ideal, the uncomfortable rider crashed into Claimant at the meeting point. (See id.

¶ 15). Claimant was knocked unconscious, thrown into the water, and suffered broken ribs and a

torn lung; she was taken by medivac to Fort Lauderdale, Florida for medical treatment. (See id.

¶ 16).

On February 23, 2024, Petitioner filed a Petition for Exoneration from or Limitation of

Liability [ECF No. 1], under the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. section 30501 et seq., and

Supplemental Admiralty Rule F; Petitioner seeks, as the title suggests, an exoneration from or

limitation of liability for the incident. (See generally id.). After Petitioner published notice (see

Proof of Service by Publication [ECF No. 10]), Claimant filed an Answer and Affirmative

Defenses [ECF No. 14] to the Petition. She raises 13 affirmative defenses to the Petition. (See

Answer 6–10).2

Claimant subsequently filed her Statement of Claims against Petitioner. (See generally

SOC). Claimant brings five claims against Petitioner: negligence (see id. ¶¶ 27–33); vicarious

liability for negligence (see id. ¶¶ 34–43); negligent failure to warn (see id. ¶¶ 44–50); negligent

training of personnel (see id. ¶¶ 51–60); and negligent entrustment (see id. ¶¶ 61–71).

2 The Court uses the pagination generated by the electronic CM/ECF database, which appears in the headers

of all court filings.

Petitioner first argues the Statement of Claims should be dismissed in its entirety because

Claimant fails to allege that Petitioner knew or should have known of any dangerous condition.

(See Mot. 4–9). Petitioner then contends Claimant fails to state a vicarious liability claim, and the

negligent training and negligent entrustment counts should be dismissed as duplicative. (See id.

9–12). Petitioner also asks the Court to strike from the Statement of Claims, references to statutes,

rules, and standards. (See id. 12–14). Petitioner then turns to Claimant’s affirmative defenses,

asking the Court to strike the defenses as denials, legal conclusions, and/or invalid defenses. (See

id. 14–18).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Motion to Dismiss. “To survive a motion to dismiss [under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(alteration added; quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Although this

pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it demands more than an

unadorned, the-[petitioner]-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (alterations added; quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Pleadings must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

(alteration added; citation omitted). “[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief

survives a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (alteration added; citing Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 556).

To meet this “plausibility standard,” the claimant must “plead[] factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the [petitioner] is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Id. at 678 (alteration added; citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The mere possibility the

[petitioner] acted unlawfully is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.” Sinaltrainal v. Coca-

Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009) (alteration added; citation omitted), abrogated on

other grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449 (2012). When considering a motion

to dismiss, a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the claimant and take

its factual allegations as true. See Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364,

1369 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing SEC v. ESM Grp., Inc., 835 F.2d 270, 272 (11th Cir. 1988)).

Motion to Strike. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f):

The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant,

immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. The court may act:

(1) on its own; or

(2) on motion made by a party either before responding to the pleading or, if a

response is not allowed, within 21 days after being served with the pleading.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “A motion to strike is intended to . . . remov[e] irrelevant or otherwise

confusing materials.” Williams v. Delray Auto Mall, Inc., 289 F.R.D. 697, 699 (S.D. Fla. 2013)

(citations omitted). Thus, “[m]otions to strike generally are disfavored and will usually be denied

unless the allegations have no possible relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice to one

of the parties.” Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Performance Mach. Sys. U.S.A., Inc., No.

04-60861-Civ, 2005 WL 975773, at *11 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2005) (quotation marks omitted).

“An affirmative defense must be stricken when the defense is comprised of no more than

bare-bones, conclusory allegations or is insufficient as a matter of law.” Island IP Acquisitions,

LLC v. Antle, No. 22-cv-81293, 2023 WL 7385162, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 2023) (alteration

adopted; citation and quotation marks omitted). “An affirmative defense is insufficient as a matter

of law where: (1) in the face of the pleadings, it is patently frivolous, or (2) it is clearly invalid as

a matter of law.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

As stated, Petitioner requests the Court dismiss all counts, strike part of Claimant’s

Statement of Claims, and strike her affirmative defenses. The Court addresses each issue in turn.

A. Motion to Dismiss

1. All Counts

To properly state a negligence claim under federal maritime law,3 a plaintiff, or as here, a

claimant, must allege four elements: “(1) a legal duty on the [petitioner] to protect the [claimant]

from particular injuries; (2) the [petitioner’s] breach of that duty; (3) the [claimant’s] injury being

actually and proximately caused by the breach; and (4) the [claimant] suffering actual harm from

the injury.” Heller v. Carnival Corp., 191 F. Supp. 3d 1352, 1357 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (alterations

added; citation and quotation marks omitted). Petitioner owes its passengers a duty of “reasonable

care under the circumstances.” Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625,

632 (1959) (holding “the owner of a ship in navigable waters owes to all who are on board . . . the

duty of exercising reasonable care under the circumstances of each case” (alteration added;

footnote call number omitted)). A carrier’s duty of reasonable care includes a “duty to warn of

known dangers beyond the point of debarkation in places where passengers are invited or

reasonably expected to visit.” K.T. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 931 F.3d 1041, 1046 (11th

Cir. 2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Petitioner asserts Claimant’s claims fail to allege sufficient facts to show Petitioner knew

or should have known of a dangerous condition. (See Mot. 4–11). As a prerequisite to liability, a

petitioner must have either actual or constructive notice of the condition that created the risk to the

3 The parties agree admiralty jurisdiction and maritime law apply. (See SOC ¶ 8; Mot. 3–4); see also

Aronson v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 3d 1379, 1392 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (“In a claim based on an

alleged tort occurring at an offshore location during the course of a cruise, federal maritime law applies,

just as it would for torts occurring on ships sailing in navigable waters.” (citations omitted)).

passenger. See Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1989) (per

curiam) (finding the duty of care owed by a shipowner to its passengers is “ordinary reasonable

care under the circumstances . . . which requires, as a prerequisite to imposing liability, that the

carrier have had actual or constructive notice of the risk-creating condition” (alteration added)).

Claimant may show Petitioner had constructive notice in two ways: “she can put forward evidence

that the defective condition existed for a sufficient period of time to invite corrective measures”;

or “she can submit evidence of substantially similar incidents in which conditions substantially

similar to the occurrence in question must have caused the prior incident.” Sutton v. Royal

Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 774 F. App’x 508, 511 (11th Cir. 2019) (citations and quotation marks

omitted).

Claimant properly alleges Petitioner had notice of the risk of collision. (See generally

SOC). Claimant offers the following facts to demonstrate notice: there were prior similar incidents

(see id. ¶ 17); Petitioner took corrective action by removing advertising language that welcomed

beginners on the tour (see id. ¶ 18); crew members were in the vicinity (see id. ¶ 19); the dangerous

condition existed for an extended period (i.e., since the time the excursion was first offered) (see

id. ¶ 20); the risks of the tour were an on-going, repetitive problem (see id. ¶ 21); Petitioner

implemented policies and procedures and trainings to warn guests of dangers and prioritize guest

safety (see id. ¶ 22); Petitioner required tour participants to view a pre-ride safety video (see id.

¶ 23); the personal watercraft owner/operator manual contained warnings and instructions about

the watercraft (see id. ¶ 24); Petitioner failed to comply with industry standards, laws, and rules

(see id. ¶ 25); and passengers previously complained on Petitioner’s website about being rushed

by tour guides to meeting points (see id. ¶ 26).

Four of Claimant’s allegations describe “corrective action” taken by Petitioner, which

stand alone to “establish notice of a dangerous or detective condition.” Carroll v. Carnival Corp.,

955 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020); see also Anders v. Carnival Corp., No. 23-21367-Civ, 2023

WL 4252426, at *6 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2023) (“a plaintiff may establish actual notice with

evidence that a ship owner has taken corrective action” (alteration adopted; emphasis original;

citation and quotation marks omitted)); (see also SOC ¶¶ 18, 22–24). Claimant alleges Petitioner

implemented safety policies and trainings, showed a pre-ride safety video, and provided a personal

watercraft owner/operator manual; after the incident, Petitioner removed the advertising language

welcoming beginners to the excursion. (See id. ¶¶ 18, 22–24). These allegations plausibly assert

notice.

Petitioner does not address the four allegations regarding its precautionary actions, instead

focusing much of its Motion on the purported insufficiency of Claimant’s prior incidents

allegations. (See generally Mot.). But the four unaddressed allegations on their own are plausible

allegations that Petitioner had actual notice of a dangerous condition. See Anders, 2023 WL

4252426 at *6. Because Claimant alleges notice even without the prior incidents from Claimant’s

Statement of Claims, it does not address Petitioner’s critiques (see Mot. 5–7) of the prior incidents

Claimant identifies as establishing notice.

In sum, Claimant’s factual allegations of notice relating to the dangers involved with the

personal watercraft excursion are sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.4 See, e.g., Chaparro v.

Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012). “The facts alleged in the complaint are

4 The Court is unpersuaded by Petitioner’s reliance on Holland v. Carnival Corporation, 50 F.4th 1088,

1095 (11th Cir. 2022), and Patton v. Carnival Corporation, No. 22-21158-Civ, 2022 WL 7536256, at *2

(S.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2022). (See Mot. 7–8). In contrast to those cases, where the notice allegations were few

and bare, Claimant alleges ten different ways Petitioner had notice. (See SOC 17–26). Further, the

numerous allegations are plausible, that is, they “allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

[petitioner] is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Holland, 50 F.4th at 1096 (alteration added; quoting Iqbal

556 U.S. at 678; quotation marks omitted); (see also SOC ¶¶ 17–26).

plausible and raise a reasonable expectation that discovery could supply additional proof of

[Petitioner’s] liability.” Id. (alteration added; citation omitted)).

2. Count II

Petitioner also argues Claimant “attempts to transform a direct liability claim” –– which

has a notice requirement –– “into one for vicarious liability” –– which does not. (Mot. 9). This

argument fails: Claimant sufficiently pleads a vicarious liability claim, so there is no notice

requirement for Count II.

First, Claimant alleges the individual actions of Petitioner’s employees were negligent, and

Petitioner should be held responsible for the employees’ negligent acts. (See, e.g., SOC ¶¶ 40–

42); see also Yusko v. NCL (Bah.), Ltd., 4 F.4th 1164, 1169 (11th Cir. 2021) (“When the tortfeasor

is an employee, the principle of vicarious liability allows an otherwise non-faulty employer to be

held liable for the negligent acts of that employee acting within the scope of employment.”

(alteration adopted; citation and quotation marks omitted)). Although the vicarious liability claim

is similar to the direct negligence claim, Claimant is the “master of [] her complaint” (or, here, her

Statement of Claims) and “may choose to proceed under a theory of direct liability, vicarious

liability, or both.” Yusko, 4 F.4th at 1170.

Second, a claim predicated on vicarious liability need not contain allegations of the

petitioner’s notice. See id. at 1167 (explaining that the “notice requirement does not . . . apply to

maritime negligence claims proceeding under a theory of vicarious liability[]” (alterations added)).

In any event, the Court has already found Claimant adequately pleads notice. The Court thus has

no reason to dismiss Claimant’s vicarious liability count.

3. Counts IV and V

Petitioner further contends Counts IV and V –– negligent training and negligent

entrustment, respectively –– should be dismissed as duplicative of Count I, the general negligence

count. (See Mot. 11–12). The Court is not persuaded.

“Negligent training sounds in negligence but is a separate cause of action with distinct

elements.” Anders, 2023 WL 4252426 at *4 (citation omitted). “To state a claim of negligent

training, [Claimant] must allege [Petitioner] was negligent in the implementation or operation of

the training program and the negligence caused [her] injury.” Id. (alteration adopted; additional

alterations added; citation and quotation marks omitted). “Because negligent training is a discrete

claim, it must be pled separately.” Id. (citation omitted).

Similarly, negligent entrustment is a distinct and separate claim. “The essential thrust of

the tort of negligent entrustment is that a shipowner can be held liable for negligent entrustment

only if he knows or has reason to know that the person being entrusted is incapable of operating

the vessel safely.” In re Bowman, No. 18-cv-71, 2018 WL 3578578, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 25,

2018) (alteration adopted; citation and quotation marks omitted). This plainly entails different

allegations and proofs than a general negligence claim which, as explained, requires a claimant to

show the classic tort elements of duty, breach, causation, and harm. See Heller, 191 F. Supp. 3d

at 1357.

Claimant was correct to separate out the counts. Combining Count IV and V with Count I

could result in a shotgun pleading; “courts have routinely dismissed complaints that combine these

causes of action into a single count as shotgun pleadings.” Finch v. Carnival Corp., No. 23-cv-

21704, 2023 WL 7299780, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2023) (collecting cases; footnote call number

omitted) (discussing negligent hiring, negligent retention, and negligent training).

Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss Claimant’s Statement of Claims is therefore denied.

B. Motion to Strike

1. Statement of Claims’ Allegations

The Court begins with Petitioner’s request to strike all references to statutes, rules, and

industry standards from Claimant’s Statement of Claims. (See Mot. 12–14). Petitioner argues the

statutes, rules, and standards Claimant references in her Statement of Claims “are inapplicable to

the instant matter.” (Id. 13). The Court disagrees.

Courts will strike allegations where “the material has no possible relation to the

controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties.” Williams, 289 F.R.D. at 699–700

(emphasis added; citation omitted). Petitioner is incorrect that all references to the guidelines are

completely irrelevant. Evidence that an allegedly dangerous condition failed to comply with

industry standards can supplement other evidence to establish constructive notice. See Sorrels v.

NCL (Bah.) Ltd., 796 F.3d 1275, 1282 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting that “evidence of custom within a

particular industry, group, or organization is admissible as bearing on the standard of care in

determining negligence.” (alteration adopted; quotation marks omitted; quoting Muncie Aviation

Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet, Inc., 519 F.2d 1178, 1180 (5th Cir. 1975)); see also Andersen v. Royal

Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 543 F. Supp. 3d 1346, 1357 (S.D. Fla. June 14, 2021).

“Compliance or noncompliance with [industry] custom, though not conclusive on the issue

of negligence, is one of the factors the trier of fact may consider in applying the standard of care.”

Sorrels, 796 F.3d at 1282 (alteration added; citation and quotation marks omitted). Claimant’s

references to industry standards, in addition to relevant statutes and rules, supplement her notice

allegations by demonstrating how Petitioner could have “recognized [the] potential danger.”

Patton, 2022 WL 2982699, at *2 (alteration added).

Whether the evidence bears out Claimant’s allegations is not before the Court. For now,

the Court cannot say “the material has no possible relation to the controversy and may cause

prejudice to one of the parties.” Williams, 289 F.R.D. at 699–700 (emphasis added; citations

omitted).5

2. Affirmative Defenses

“An affirmative defense is an assertion raising new facts and arguments that, if proven,

defeat the [petitioner’s] claim even if the allegations in the [petition] are true.” Int’l Sch. Servs.,

Inc. v. AAUG Ins. Co., No. 10-62115-Civ, 2012 WL 5635590, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2012)

(alteration adopted; other alterations added; citation omitted). “In contrast, a defense that points

out a defect in the [petitioner’s] ability to prove a prima facie case is a denial.” Island IP

Acquisitions, LLC, 2023 WL 7385162, at *3 (alteration added; citation omitted).

Claimant raises 13 affirmative defenses. (See Answer 6–10). Petitioner first argued all 13

defenses should be stricken (see Mot. 14–17); but after properly conferring, the parties came to

agree affirmative defenses 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, and 12 should be treated as denials (Resp. 22; Reply 9);

see also Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v. Jackson, 921 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2013)

(“[W]hen a specific denial is labeled as an affirmative defense, a court will generally treat the

defense as a denial and the proper remedy is not to strike the defense but to treat it as a specific

denial.” (alteration added; citation omitted)).

Thus, the affirmative defenses at issue are as follows:

3. The Complaint filed by Limitation Petitioner is insufficient, unsubstantiated and

should be increased pursuant to Supplemental Admiralty Rule F(7).

5 Further, “because the Court finds [Claimant’s] allegations otherwise sufficient to imply [Petitioner’s]

notice, even without her claims about the industry standards, any inadequacies in those allegations are, in

any event, inconsequential.” Fadraga v. Carnival Corp., No. 23-23503-Civ, 2024 WL 1908980, at *4 (S.D.

Fla. Apr. 30, 2024).

4. The Limitation Petitioner’s liability must be increased pursuant to the “Flotilla

Doctrine.” The Flotilla Doctrine provides that the vessel owner’s liability “may be

increased to include his interest in the value of all vessels engaged in a common

enterprise or venture with the vessel aboard which the loss or injury was sustained.”

Complaint of Patton Tully Transp. Co., 715 F.2d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 1993).

Petitioner owns and operates a fleet of over 20 cruise ships. Additionally, Petitioner

operates private properties such as CocoCay where this incident took place.

Limitation Petitioner’s liability must be increased to include the value of all vessels

under the control of Petitioner, as well as any vessels owned by any partners and/or

agents of the Limitation Petitioner engaged in the common enterprise of renting

vessels to the general public.

***

7. Petitioner provided a vessel, that is the personal watercraft, which was not

seaworthy. Under the maritime law, a vessel is not seaworthy when it is manned

or operated by improperly trained or incompetent crew. Petitioner knew, should

have known, and could have discovered upon minimal investigation whether the

requirements of Florida law and the International Navigational Rules were being

met and therefore within the privity or knowledge of the Limitation Petitioner. 46

U.S.C. [section] 30505 provides: “Unless otherwise excluded by law, claims, debts,

and liabilities subject to limitation under subsection (a) are those arising from any

embezzlement, loss, or destruction of any property, goods, or merchandise shipped

or put onboard the vessel, any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or any act,

matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred, without

the privity or knowledge of the owner.” This collision, loss, damage, and matter

were done, occasioned, or incurred with the knowledge or privity of the “owner”

of the vessel and accordingly limitation of liability is not available to these

petitioners.

***

9. The value of Claimant’s claim against the Limitation Petitioner exceeds the

Limitation Petitioner’s value of its vessel.

10. If liability is determined under 46 U.S.C. section 30505, then the Limitation

Petitioner liability must be increased pursuant to 46 U.S.C. section 30506(b).

11. The Limitation Fund is inadequate, and the Complaint should be dismissed

because Petitioners have failed to deposit adequate security for the vessel identified

in its Complaint for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability.

***

13. Petitioner failed to timely file this Limitation Action.

(See Answer 7–10).

Petitioner argues affirmative defenses 3, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 13 should be stricken because

they offer impermissible bare legal conclusions. (See Mot. 15–16). Petitioner contends these

affirmative defenses “all fail to satisfy the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8 and Twombly as they merely state legal conclusions without any factual basis.” (Mot.

15). Certainly, “the undersigned requires affirmative defenses to meet the pleading standard set

out in Twombly and Iqbal.” Jenkins v. Grant Thornton LLP, No. 13-60957-Civ, 2014 WL

12634797, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 22, 2014) (Altonaga, J.) (citation omitted). Petitioner also posits

affirmative defense 4 should be stricken as invalid because “the flotilla doctrine is entirely

inapplicable to the case at hand[.]” (Mot. 16 (alteration added)). Claimant does not refute

Petitioner’s contentions, but rather argues these affirmative defenses are better understood as

specific denials. (See Resp. 22–23).

The Court agrees with Claimant that affirmative defenses 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 13 are

denials, as they all go to show defects in Petitioner’s prima facie case. In this regard, “[c]ourts

conduct a two-step inquiry to determine the effect of a vessel owner’s petition for exoneration

from or limitation of liability.” In re Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 991 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1182

(S.D. Fla. 2013) (alteration added; citations and quotation marks omitted). First, a court

“determines whether the accident was caused by actionable conduct, for if there was no fault or

negligence for the shipowner to be privy to or have knowledge of within the meaning of the statute,

there is no liability to be limited,” and the owner should be exonerated. Id. (citations and quotation

marks omitted). “The claimant bears the burden of proving that the accident was caused by

actionable conduct. Provided that the claimant carries the burden, the owner then must prove that

CASE NO. 24-20723-CIV-ALTONAGA/Reid

the actionable conduct or condition was without his privity or knowledge.” □□□ (citations and

quotation marks omitted).

Each defense relates to Petitioner’s actionable conduct, privity or knowledge, or another

deficiency — such as timeliness — in the Petition. (See Answer 7-10). Thus, these defenses

really “point[] out a defect in the [petitioner’s] ability to prove a prima facie case” and are therefore

better understood as denials. sland IP Acquisitions, LLC, 2023 WL 7385162, at *3 (alteration

added; citation omitted). The Court will not strike these portions of Claimant’s Answer, but rather

treat them as denials instead of affirmative defenses.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED Petitioner/Counter-Defendant, Royal Caribbean Cruises

Ltd.’s Amended Motion to Dismiss Statement of Claims of Laureen Pellegrino and Motion to

Strike Claimant’s Affirmative Defenses [ECF No. 30] is DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 2nd day of July, 2024.

Cocche IM. Athnape

CECILIA M. ALTONAGA

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ce: counsel of record

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