“the district court is generally free to employ the magistrate judge’ findings to the extent that it sees fit”
How later courts described this case
- “the district court is generally free to employ the magistrate judge’ findings to the extent that it sees fit”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
SHELDON LEE HUTCHINS,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No.: 3:20cv5952/MCR/ZCB
DAVID MICHAEL ROWELL, et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________/
ORDER
The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) on
April 24, 2024, ECF No. 193, recommending that the undersigned deny summary
judgment motions in this excessive force suit filed by Plaintiff Sheldon Lee Hutchins
against the Defendants, who are Santa Rosa County Deputies. The Court furnished
the parties a copy of the R&R and afforded them an opportunity to file objections
pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1). Defendant Deputies
Eric Hays, Patrick Campbell, Aaron Christopher Nowlin, David Rowell, Kurt
Schultz, and John Robert Pendleton, II, objected. See ECF Nos. 194, 195. Hutchins
was given an extended deadline for filing objections but to date, he has not filed an
objection, and the time for doing so has passed.
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When reviewing a magistrate judge’s R&R on a dispositive matter, the Court
reviews de novo all aspects to which a party has specifically objected and “may
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations
made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Amlong & Amlong,
P.A. v. Denny’s, Inc., 500 F.3d 1230, 1245 (11th Cir. 2007) (“the district court is
generally free to employ the magistrate judge’ findings to the extent that it sees fit”).
Having made a de novo determination of all timely filed objections, the objections
are overruled and the R&R is adopted.as
The undisputed facts, briefly restated for purposes of discussion, include that
on April 17, 2019, Hutchins was arrested for driving with a suspended license. He
was booked at the Santa Rosa County Jail, but during the intake process, he had
something in his mouth that he refused to spit out. No force was used in the Intake
Room, as reflected on video, but Hutchins alleges that the Deputies used excessive
force when he was taken to a Change Out Room, where there was no video. He
contends he was punched twice by Deputy Pendleton, suffered multiple taser strikes
by Deputy Hays and Deputy Pendleton while being held down by Deputy Rowell,
that he was pepper sprayed directly into his eye by Hays and Pendleton while Deputy
Nowlin held his eye open, that Sergeant Campbell applied a choke hold and ordered
a taser strike due to Hutchins’s continued refusal to comply with the command to
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spit out what was in his mouth, and that Deputy Rowell and Deputy Shultz observed
the excessive force and failed to intervene. According to Hutchins, he was
restrained, did not resist, and was unable to comply because he was convulsing or
seizing due to an overdose. He finally spit out an empty plastic baggie that had
contained methamphetamine. EMS took Hutchins to the hospital with overdose
symptoms. Hutchins posted a cash bond while in the hospital, was released from the
hospital on April 20, 2019, and was re-booked in the jail on May 1, 2019. Hutchins
never filed a grievance over the incident.
In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge correctly noted that under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”), exhaustion of available administrative
remedies is mandatory before a prisoner is permitted to bring a § 1983 action in a
federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Supreme Court has rejected a “special
circumstances” exception to exhaustion but explained that a prisoner need only
exhaust remedies that are “available.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 635–36 (2016).
The Defendants argued that Hutchins failed to exhaust available
administrative remedies, but the R&R rejected the argument, finding that in fact the
jail’s procedures were not “available” to Hutchins. The Defendants object that this
decision is not supported by the record. The undersigned disagrees. The Inmate
Handbook provides that the grievance procedures apply to “inmates” (which
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includes “detainees”). Inmates have 7 days to file a grievance but up to 14 days to
file “from the date of the incident” in the event of an emergency or “extenuating
circumstance.”1 ECF No. 163–6 at 2. Hutchins was arrested on April 17, 2019, and
immediately sent to the hospital. He bonded out on April 20, 2019, but was re-
booked on May 1, 2019, at 11:37 p.m., approximately 20 minutes shy of the 14-day
window allowed for filing a grievance based on this incident. Hutchins therefore
was not an “inmate” for most of that time, and the Magistrate Judge found it was
undisputed that when he was re-booked, he did not have access to the electronic
kiosk system for filing within those 20 minutes remaining in the 14-day period, nor
was he yet admitted into a pod where he could have requested a hard copy of the
form from a pod deputy. Thus, the grievance procedure therefore was not
“available” to him within the meaning of the PLRA.
The Defendants argue that nothing prevented Hutchins from walking into the
jail while he was out on bond to obtain a grievance form prior to the expiration of
the 14 days, even though he was not an inmate. They further argue that, contrary to
1 The procedure states that a grievance form may be submitted by hard copy or the kiosk
and that “forms may be obtained from any Pod Deputy upon request.” ECF No. 163–6 at 2. An
inmate has 7 days after the incident to file or, “[i]n the event of emergencies, or if extenuating
circumstance[s] arise, the complainant inmate shall have an additional 7 days, for a total of 14
days from the date of the incident, to file a grievance.” Id. (emphasis added).
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the Second Circuit case on which the R&R relies, Hutchins never filed a grievance.2
Consequently, they argue, he failed to exhaust the available procedures, and the
R&R merely speculates that the grievance would have been denied as untimely. This
argument misses the point. Because the policy only applies to “inmates,” and
nothing suggests that a non-inmate would be subject to the grievance procedure as
defined in the Inmate Handbook, the policy was, practically speaking, incapable of
use by a non-inmate and thus unavailable to Hutchins.
The undersigned also rejects the Defendants’ qualified immunity arguments.
Defendants contend that the Magistrate Judge erred by failing to address the conduct
of each individual deputy and argue that each deputy’s conduct was reasonable
because Hutchins continued to resist and refused to obey the command to spit out
what he held in his mouth (which turned out to be a bag that had contained meth).
A review of the R&R, however, shows that the details were considered. The R&R
acknowledges that there is no video of the Change Out Room where the use of force
allegedly occurred and that Hutchins admitted he could not see the officers because
they were behind his back. Nonetheless, the R&R details that Hutchins “recalled
2 The R&R cites Rucker v. Giffen, 997 F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 2021), which held that a
grievance procedure with a 5-day window and no exceptions for medical emergencies was
“unavailable” to a plaintiff who had been hospitalized for over a month; also, when the plaintiff
did file a grievance almost a year later, it was denied as untimely. Id. at 90–94.
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being ‘thrown’ to the ground while handcuffed behind his back, placed in a
‘chokehold,’ having his eyes pried open while pepper spray was applied to his face,
being tasered repeatedly, being physically struck, and being tasered after he was in
the restraint chair.” ECF No. 193 at 22. Defendants would have the Court make
credibility determinations. Hutchins’s sworn complaint puts names together with
actions based on the incident reports and taser logs, attributes specific actions to each
deputy, and asserts he could not respond to commands because he was convulsing
due to an overdose—for which he was sent to the hospital. The R&R discusses how
Hutchins’s version conflicts with the accounts of the Defendants,3 which is
supported by the record, and aptly notes: “Clearly somebody is telling the truth and
somebody is not. But it is the jury’s job to decide which party is Pinocchio.” ECF
No. 193 at 29.
Defendants also argue they are at least entitled to partial summary judgment
given the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that there was no use of force in the Intake
Room. This evidentiary observation, however, does not resolve a claim—the claim
alleges excessive force during the intake process as a whole; it is not tied to a
particular room.
3 For instance, the Magistrate Judge notes that Deputy Hays testified he used the taser only
twice whereas Hutchins recalled multiple taser strikes, which is corroborated by the taser logs
showing seven taser strikes by Deputy Hays.
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Deputy Rowell objects to the R&R on grounds that he cannot be liable for
failing to intervene because he was the arresting deputy, not a detention deputy, and
he was not present in the Change Out Room for the entire period of time during
which the alleged use of force occurred. As the Magistrate Judge noted, however,
the video shows Rowell going in and out of the Change Out Room several times
during the 13-minute period when the use of force incidents occurred. The video
also shows him looking into the room several times, and it is clear from the video as
well as his own admission that he observed Hutchins being punched twice by another
deputy and did nothing, and he saw Hutchins pepper sprayed and tasered. Moreover,
in Hutchins’s sworn complaint, he states that Rowell actively held him down so that
Hays could inflict injuries. Questions of fact remain, and the objection is overruled.
Having fully reviewed the R&R, all of the parties’ arguments, and the record,
the undersigned overrules all objections and adopts the R&R.
Accordingly:
1 The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, ECF No. 193, is
adopted and incorporated by reference in this order, and all objections are overruled.
2. Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, ECF Nos. 164, 165, 166,
are DENIED.
3. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 170, is DENIED.
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4. The case is referred back to United States Magistrate Judge Bolitho for
a pretrial settlement conference to be scheduled within 40 days and for all pretrial
preparations.
DONE AND ORDERED this 15th day of August 2024.
M. Casey Rodgers
M. CASEY RODGERS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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