The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
ANTHONY JAMES COKLEY,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No.: 2:23-cv-465-SPC-NPM
RICKY DIXON et al.,
Defendants.
/
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. 44, 47, and
54). Cokley’s only response to the motions is a document titled, “Amended Civil
Action Complaint” (Doc. 53). Cokley clearly did not intend the 2-page
document to supersede his original Complaint, and he did not comply with the
procedural requirements for amended and supplemental pleadings. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15. The Court construes Doc. 53 as a response rather than a
pleading.
Background
Plaintiff Anthony James Cokley is a prisoner of the Florida Department
of Corrections (FDOC). He sues eight officers at Charlotte Correctional
Institution—three identified as John Does—for excessive force. He also sues
FDOC secretary Ricky Dixon and Charlotte C.I. warden Derek Snider for their
role in hiring and training the officers and operating the department and
institution. All defendants move to dismiss Cokley’s official-capacity claims
for monetary damages. Dixon and Snider also move for dismissal of the
individual-capacity claims against them. The Court recounts the factual
background as pled in Cokley’s Complaint, which it must take as true to decide
whether the Complaint states a plausible claim. See Chandler v. Sec’y Fla.
Dep’t of Transp., 695 F.3d 1194, 1198-99 (11th Cir. 2012).
On April 26, 2021, Cokley’s dorm sergeant ordered him to submit to hand
restraints. Cokley refused. A cell extraction team entered Cokley’s cell with
shields and riot gear. Cokley did not resist the team, but John Does 1 and 2
repeatedly punched him in the face and head. After the beating, the team put
Cokley in hand and leg restraints and locked him in a shower. A few minutes
later, John Doe 3 sprayed Cokley with chemical agents. Cokley was escorted
to the nurse’s station, then to a new cell.
While Cokley was sitting quietly in his cell, Defendant Jacob Marshall
told an inmate in a neighboring cell to make noise by banging on his door and
bunk. The inmate complied. Marshall and Defendant Gary Hirschy told
Cokley to cease his disorderly actions. Cokley explained that he was sitting
quietly. Moments later, Marshall sprayed Cokley with chemical agents
through the food slot in his cell door. Cokley was taken to the nurse’s station,
given a shower, and placed on property restriction for three days.
Legal Standard
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must
accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and view them in a light
most favorable to the plaintiff. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The preferential standard of review, however, does not let all pleadings
adorned with facts survive to the next stage of litigation. The Supreme Court
has been clear on this point—a district court should dismiss a claim when a
party does not plead facts that make the claim facially plausible. See Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when
a court can draw a reasonable inference, based on facts pled, that the opposing
party is liable for the alleged misconduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. This
plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal quotation
marks omitted)). And a plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions
amounting to a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Cokley files his Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a § 1983
claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant deprived him of a right
secured under the Constitution or federal law, and (2) the deprivation occurred
under color of state law. Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir.
2011) (citing Arrington v. Cobb Cty., 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998)). In
addition, a plaintiff must allege and establish an affirmative causal connection
between the defendant’s conduct and the constitutional deprivation. Marsh v.
Butler Cty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1059 (11th Cir. 2001).
Cokley is representing himself in this action. Courts hold the pleadings
of pro se litigants to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by
attorneys. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
But courts do not have a duty to “re-write” a pro se litigant’s complaint to find
a claim. See Washington v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 256 F. App’x 326, 327
(11th Cir. 2007).
Discussion
The defendants raise two arguments in their motions to dismiss. First,
they seek dismissal of Cokley’s official-capacity claims for monetary damages
under the Eleventh Amendment. Cokley has not opposed dismissal of these
claims. Second, Snider and Dixon argue Cokley fails to state a claim against
them. Cokley briefly addresses this argument in his construed response.
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The defendants argue Eleventh Amendment immunity bars Allen from
suing them in their official capacities. The Eleventh Amendment states, “The
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S.
Const. amend. XI. Absent an abrogation of immunity by Congress or a waiver
of immunity by the state being sued, the Eleventh Amendment is an absolute
bar to suit by an individual against a state or its agencies in federal court.
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662 (1974).
“When the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the
state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke
its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal
defendants.” Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663. “Thus, the rule has evolved that a
suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from
public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Id.
Congress has not abrogated Florida’s immunity and Florida has not waived its
Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521,
1525 (11th Cir. 1990). Consequently, Cokley cannot sue the defendants for
monetary damages in their capacity as state officials, and the Court will
dismiss those claims.
B. Snider and Dixon
Cokley seeks to hold Snider and Dixon liable because of their
responsibility for hiring and training officers and operating the FDOC and
Charlotte C.I. It is well established in the Eleventh Circuit “that supervisory
officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their
subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Myrick
v. Fulton Cnty., Ga., 69 F.4th 1277, 1297 (11th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). “Instead, supervisory liability under § 1983
occurs either when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged
unconstitutional conduct or when there is a causal connection between the
actions of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id.
A plaintiff can establish the necessary causal connection by showing: (1)
a supervisor failed to correct an alleged deprivation despite notice of a history
of widespread abuse; (2) “a supervisor’s custom or policy results in deliberate
indifference to constitutional rights[;]” or (3) the supervisor directed
subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act
unlawfully and failed to stop them. Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., Ga., 749 F.3d 1034,
1048 (11th Cir. 2014).
Cokley’s allegations against Dixon and Snider are conclusory, and they
do not establish causation between either defendants’ actions and the force
used on Cokley. In Cokley’s construed response, he points to a single instance
of a prison guard being charged with battery in June 2021. Even if Cokley
included this allegation in his Complaint or a properly filed amendment, it
would not be enough. First, a single incident does not demonstrate a
widespread history of abuse that could put Snider and Dixon on notice of a
need to correct a problem. Second, the charges were filed after the use of force
on Cokley, so any action it could have prompted would not have prevented the
incident at issue. The Court will dismiss Cokley’s claims against Dixon and
Snider.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. 44, 47, and 54) are GRANTED.
1. Cokley’s claims against Snider and Dixon are DISMISSED without
prejudice. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate Snider and Dixon
as parties to this case.
2. Cokley’s claims for monetary damages against the defendants in their
official capacity are DISMISSED with prejudice.
3. The remaining defendants must answer the Complaint within 14
days of this Order.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on October 24, 2024.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SA: FTMP-1
Copies: All Parties of Record