“Under the test we adopt today, an Eighth Amendment claimant need not show that a prison official acted or failed to act believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.”
How later courts described this case
- “Under the test we adopt today, an Eighth Amendment claimant need not show that a prison official acted or failed to act believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
SHER’MON A. ALLEN,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No.: 2:23-cv-1060-SPC-NPM
TREVOR RATIGAN, GRAIG
BROCK and JEAN ASTREIDE,
Defendants.
/
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants Trevor Ratigan and Graig Brock’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 18) and Defendant Jean
Astreide’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 37).
Background
Sher’mon Allen is a Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) prisoner.
Brock was Allen’s classification officer at Charlotte Correctional Institution,
and Ratigan and Astreide were recreation officers. The events underlying this
action occurred at Charlotte C.I., but Allen was transferred to a different
facility before he filed the Complaint. The Court recounts the factual
background as pled in Allen’s Complaint, which it must take as true to decide
whether the Complaint states a plausible claim. See Chandler v. Sec’y Fla.
Dep’t of Transp., 695 F.3d 1194, 1198-99 (11th Cir. 2012).
Allen claims he is under threat of a long-standing kill order from the
Blood gang. On June 8, 2023, Allen testified in a deposition that a member of
the Blood gang stabbed another inmate. Allen believed the deposition qualified
him for protective management, and he explained the situation to Brock.
Brock did not investigate Allen’s claims and instead denied his request for
protective management based on outdated information.
Six days later, on August 1, 2023, Astreide escorted Allen to the
recreation yard. During the standard body search, Ratigan told Astreide to
place Allen in a locked, single-man recreation cage. During recreation,
Astreide unlocked Allen’s cage and let in two inmates, who stabbed Allen six
times. Astreide told the inmates that was enough, the inmates walked out,
and Astreide locked the cage and sat down to eat his lunch. Allen renewed his
request for protective management later that day. Brock denied the request
on August 2, 2023.
Allen sues the defendants in their official and individual capacities for
deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment and for violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection clause. The defendants assert
sovereign immunity to the official-capacity claims, and they argue Allen fails
to state a plausible Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claim.
Legal Standard
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must
accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and view them in a light
most favorable to the plaintiff. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The preferential standard of review, however, does not let all pleadings
adorned with facts survive to the next stage of litigation. The Supreme Court
has been clear on this point—a district court should dismiss a claim when a
party does not plead facts that make the claim facially plausible. See Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when
a court can draw a reasonable inference, based on facts pled, that the opposing
party is liable for the alleged misconduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. This
plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal quotation
marks omitted)). And a plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions
amounting to a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Allen files his Amended Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a §
1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant deprived him of a
right secured under the Constitution or federal law, and (2) the deprivation
occurred under color of state law. Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175
(11th Cir. 2011) (citing Arrington v. Cobb Cty., 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir.
1998)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege and establish an affirmative causal
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the constitutional
deprivation. Marsh v. Butler Cty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1059 (11th Cir. 2001).
Allen is representing himself in this action. Courts hold the pleadings of
pro se litigants to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by
attorneys. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
But courts do not have a duty to “re-write” a pro se litigant’s complaint to find
a claim. See Washington v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 256 F. App’x 326, 327
(11th Cir. 2007).
Discussion
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The defendants argue Eleventh Amendment immunity bars Allen from
suing them in their official capacities. The Eleventh Amendment states, “The
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S.
Const. amend. XI. Absent an abrogation of immunity by Congress or a waiver
of immunity by the state being sued, the Eleventh Amendment is an absolute
bar to suit by an individual against a state or its agencies in federal court.
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662 (1974).
“When the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the
state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke
its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal
defendants.” Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663. “Thus, the rule has evolved that a
suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from
public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Id.
Congress has not abrogated Florida’s immunity and Florida has not waived its
Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521,
1525 (11th Cir. 1990). Consequently, Allen cannot sue the defendants for
monetary damages in their capacity as state officials.
Allen argues his official-capacity claims should proceed because he seeks
injunctive relief against the defendants. Indeed, the Ex Parte Young doctrine
allows suits “for declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers in their
official capacities.” Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 234 (2023). But Allen does
not request injunctive relief in his Complaint, and any claims for injunctive
relief would be moot because Allen is no longer imprisoned at Charlotte
Correctional Institution. See Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1267 (11th Cir.
2007), overruled and abrogated on other grounds (“The general rule in our
circuit is that a transfer or release of a prisoner from prison will moot that
prisoner’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.”). The Court will thus
dismiss Allen’s official-capacity claims.
B. Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment’s “prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment
requires prison officials to ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety
of the inmates.’” Cox v. Nobles, 15 F.4th 1350, 1358 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). To succeed on a failure to
protect claim, a plaintiff must show (1) he was incarcerated under conditions
posing a substantial risk of serious harm, (2) the prison official was
deliberately indifferent to the risk, and (3) the constitutional violation caused
his injuries. Id. at 1357-58. Deliberate indifference is akin to subjective
recklessness as used in criminal law. To establish deliberate indifference, a
plaintiff “must show that the defendant was actually, subjectively aware that
his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff.”
Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024). A defendant was not
deliberately indifferent if he responded reasonably to the risk. Id.
Each defendant argues Allen fails to allege facts that establish a
plausible Eighth Amendment claim.
i. Brock
Allen alleges Brock rejected his request for protective management
without investigating the reasons for Allen’s request. Allen does not allege
precisely what he reported to Brock, but the Court can reasonably infer that
Allen told Brock the Blood gang had a kill order out on Allen and that Allen
recently testified that a Blood gang member stabbed another inmate. Six days
later, two inmates stabbed Allen six times. Even then, Brock denied Allen’s
renewed request for protective management.
The Court finds these allegations and reasonable inferences sufficient to
establish that Brock had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk to Allen’s
safety and that he responded recklessly by denying Allen’s request for
protective management without investigating Allen’s claims. See Farmer, 511
U.S. at 842 (“Under the test we adopt today, an Eighth Amendment claimant
need not show that a prison official acted or failed to act believing that harm
actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the official acted or failed to
act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.”). Allen has
stated a plausible Eighth Amendment claim against Brock.
ii. Ratigan
Allen alleges Ratigan searched him before he attended recreation on
August 1, 2023, and told Astreide to put Allen in a particular recreation cage.
The Court cannot infer from those facts that Ratigan knew Allen would be
attacked and stabbed while in the cage. Allen has not plausibly alleged that
Ratigan had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk to Allen’s safety, or that
he unreasonably disregarded such a risk. The Court will dismiss Allen’s
Eighth Amendment claim against Ratigan.
iii. Astreide
Allen alleges Astreide unlocked his recreation cage and let in two
unrestrained prisoners with homemade knives. Astreide watched the
prisoners stab Allen six times before telling them that was enough. Then he
let the prisoners out of the cage and sat down to eat lunch. These allegations
are clearly enough to state an Eighth Amendment claim.
C. Fourteenth Amendment
Allen also asserts an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment. To establish an equal protection claim, Allen must demonstrate
that (1) he is similarly situated with prisoners who received more favorable
treatment, and (2) the discriminatory treatment was based on a
constitutionally protected interest, like race or gender. Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d
944, 946-47 (11th Cir. 2001). Allen does not allege the defendants treated him
differently than a similar situated inmate based on any protected interest. He
has not stated an equal protection claim.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
Defendants Ratigan and Brock’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
(Doc. 18) and Defendant Astreide’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
(Doc. 37) are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
1. Allen’s official-capacity claims, Fourteenth Amendment claims, and
Eighth Amendment claim against Ratigan are DISMISSED
without prejudice.
2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate Ratigan as a party to this case.
3. Brock and Astreide must answer the Complaint within 14 days of this
Order.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on October 24, 2024.
, Lh platralh< 3
UNITED STATES DISTRICTJUDGE
SA: FTMP-1
Copies: All Parties of Record