Opinion

Struve v. Brown

Court
District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed
Oct 15, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.3%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

NATHAN S STRUVE and NICOLE

M STRUVE, husband and wife,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No.: 2:24-cv-281-JLB-KCD

ERIK JAMES BROWN and

PROGRESSIVE NORTHERN INS.

CO.,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

This is a maritime case stemming from a collision between Plaintiffs and

Defendant Erik James Brown. Plaintiffs move to compel the deposition of

Brown or impose “other sanctions including incarceration for contempt.” (Doc.

53.)1 No response was filed, and the time to do so has expired.

Brown’s deposition was scheduled for last month, but he failed to appear.

(Docs. 53-1, 54-1 at 2.) And Brown, claiming he has been stranded on his boat

for “the last 50 days,” has suggested he will not appear for a deposition unless

he is paid. (Doc. 53-8.) Because Brown has also shared that he has no assets,

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations have

been omitted in this and other citations.

Plaintiffs say fining him won’t work, so they ask for “incarceration for

contempt” to encourage compliance. (Doc. 53 at 6.)

“[T]he purpose of discovery is to provide a mechanism for making

relevant information available to the litigants.” Lozano v. Maryland Cas. Co.,

850 F.2d 1470, 1473 (11th Cir. 1988). “Mutual knowledge of all the relevant

facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end,

either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his

possession.” Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). This broad discovery

helps “make a trial less a game of blind man’s bluff and more a fair contest

with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.”

United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).

Consistent with this broad approach to discovery, the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure allow parties to depose witnesses, including an opposing party.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a). Depositions can be extremely important to the

discovery of relevant facts and the acquisition of key admissions from parties

or witnesses. In some cases, depositions are “indispensable.” Mill-Run Tours,

Inc. v. Khashoggi, 124 F.R.D. 547, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Indeed, Plaintiffs say

that Brown’s deposition is necessary “for Plaintiffs to be able to carry their

burden on proof on ownership of the vessel at the time of the allision, and the

failure to carry any insurance which would be responsive to Plaintiffs’ claims

for personal injuries arising out of the negligence of the owner of the vessel.”

(Doc. 53 at 4.)

Rule 37(d)(1)(A)(i) authorizes the Court to sanction a party when he

“fails, after being served with proper notice, to appear for [his] deposition.”

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 provides different remedies for discovery

violations depending on whether those violations occur due to a party’s failure

to respond to discovery requests, in the context of an order granting or denying

a discovery motion, or when a party disobeys a discovery order.” Maletta v.

Woodle, No. 2:20-CV-1004-JES-KCD, 2022 WL 3213426, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug.

9, 2022). “Ultimately, Rule 37 sanctions are intended to prevent unfair

prejudice to the litigants and ensure the integrity of the discovery process.” Id.

Rule 37 provides district courts “broad discretion to fashion appropriate

sanctions” for discovery violations and non-compliance Malautea v. Suzuki

Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1542 (11th Cir. 1993).

To start, Plaintiffs’ motion includes no memorandum of law as required

by Local Rule 3.01(a) and could be denied on that basis alone. Plaintiffs

ultimately ask the Court to find that the imposition of fine will not suffice, and

instead impose a contempt finding with incarceration. But Plaintiffs provide

no authority for imposing such an extreme sanction, especially when there has

been no history of failure to comply with court orders. Rule 37(b)(2)(A) says

that the court “may” issue a contempt sanction. In its discretion, the Court

finds that such drastic relief is unwarranted in these circumstances as there is

no pattern of discovery abuse. See, e.g., Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123

F.3d 1353, 1371 (11th Cir. 1997).

Brown has presented no argument that he should be excused from

providing testimony, so the Court will order that he appear for a properly

noticed deposition. The Court acknowledges Plaintiffs’ predicament here. But

Plaintiffs have the Federal Rules at their disposal, which allow for different

methods of recording deposition testimony. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(3)(A)

(providing that a properly noticed deposition “may be recorded by audio,

audiovisual, or stenographic means”). And the Rules allow for other methods

of obtaining the discovery that Plaintiffs seek, including requests for

admission. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36.

Plaintiffs must confer with Brown about a date and time for his

deposition. If Brown fails to cooperate, Plaintiffs may unilaterally set the

deposition. Brown should note that if it becomes clear that he does not

intend to comply with the Court’s Order to attend the deposition, the

Court will consider more severe sanctions.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Order Compelling Defendant Erik James

Brown to Appear for His Deposition or be Subject to Other Sanctions Including

Incarceration for Contempt (Doc. 53) is GRANTED IN PART to the extent

that the Court compels Brown to sit for a deposition.2 The motion is DENIED

as much as it seeks any greater or different relief.

2. Plaintiffs are directed to provide a copy of this Order to Brown and

confer with him about a date for his deposition.

ENTERED in Fort Myers, Florida on October 15, 2024.

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* Kale C. Dudek

United States Magistrate Judge

Copies: All Parties of Record

2 Ifa motion to compel “is granted... the court must... require the party or deponent whose

conduct necessitated the motion ... to pay the movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in

making the motion, including attorney’s fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5). Plaintiffs do not ask

for expenses. Nor have they provided any documentation to issue such an award. So the Court

cannot order expenses at this time. See, e.g., CMR Constr. & Roofing, LLC v. ASI Preferred

Ins., No. 2:19-CV-442-FTM-29-MRM, 2020 WL 9172016, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 1, 2020).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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