Shadmani v. Barnes

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

AMIR SHADMANI,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:22-cv-1008-MMH-SJH

OFFICER J.M. BARNES, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant Sheriff T.K. Waters’

Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support

(Doc. 46; Sheriff’s Motion), filed March 18, 2024, and Defendants Barnes and

Scott’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Accompanying Memorandum of

Law (Doc. 47; Officers’ Motion), filed March 18, 2024. Plaintiff Amir Shadmani

timely filed responses to both motions. See Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to

Defendant T.K. Waters’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of

Law in Support (Doc. 52; Response to Sherriff’s Motion), filed April 8,

2024; Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendant Barnes and Scott’s

Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support

(Doc. 51; Response to Officers’ Motion), filed April 8, 2024. Defendants then filed

replies. See Defendant Sheriff T.K. Waters’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 53; Sheriff’s Reply), filed April 22,

2024; Defendant Barnes and Scott’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’

Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 54; Officers’ Reply), filed April

22, 2024. Accordingly, this matter is ripe for review.

I. Background1

Officers J.M. Barnes and A.G. Scott (collectively “the Officers”) are police

officers employed by the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office (JSO). See Declaration of

Officer J.M. Barnes at 1 (Doc. 48-14; Barnes Declaration); Declaration of Officer

A.G. Scott at 1 (Doc. 48-15; Scott Declaration). On September 17, 2019, the

Officers were patrolling Southside Boulevard and Baymeadows Road due to a

rise in business and auto burglaries in the area. See Barnes Declaration at 2.

While on patrol, at approximately 2:55 A.M., Officer Barnes noticed a vehicle

parked in front of a closed Panda Express. Id. The vehicle was running, had its

lights on, and appeared to be illegally parked as it was “straddling the parking

stripe between two spaces.” Id. Officer Barnes, believing the vehicle to be

suspicious, drove into the parking lot to investigate. Id. Officer Scott, who was

1 Unless otherwise noted, the facts recited herein are undisputed. For the purpose of

summary judgment, the Court views all disputed facts and reasonable inferences in the light

most favorable to Shadmani; however, the Court notes that these facts may differ from those

ultimately proved at trial. See Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995)

(describing the summary judgment standard).

following behind Officer Barnes in a separate patrol car, drove into the parking

lot to assist with the investigation. See Scott Declaration at 2.

Once in the parking lot, Officer Barnes exited his patrol car, turned on

his body worn camera (BWC), and approached the vehicle’s driver side door.

See Barnes Declaration at 2; Officer Barnes’ Body Worn Camera

(Doc. 48-14; BWC Footage).2 Upon approaching the vehicle, Officer Barnes saw

an individual sitting in the driver’s side seat, and asked him “what he was doing

sitting in his car in the middle of the night.” Barnes Declaration at 3. The

individual told Officer Barnes that he was “talking to his wife on the phone,”

and Officer Barnes asked to see his driver’s license. Id. The individual complied,

handed his driver’s license to Officer Barnes, and identified himself as Amir

Shadmani. Id. As Officer Barnes continued talking with Shadmani, he observed

Shadmani to be “sweating, disheveled and sniffling” and that he had “bloodshot,

watery eyes.” Id. Officer Barnes then used his flashlight to look inside of

Shadmani’s vehicle and noticed “a white powdery substance” on a “black folder

in the passenger’s seat[.]” Id. Believing the substance to be “powdered cocaine,”

Officer Barnes asked Shadmani to exit his vehicle. Id. Shadmani complied, got

out of the vehicle, and Officer Barnes asked Shadmani if he could search him.

2 Officer Barnes’ BWC captures the entirety of the events alleged to have occurred.

However, the first thirty-seconds of Officer Barnes’ interaction with Shadmani does not have

audio, as the BWC has a thirty-second delay between when it is activated and when audio

begins to record. See Barnes Declaration at 3.

See BWC Footage at 00:50. Shadmani consented to being searched, and Officer

Barnes completed a pat down. Id. at 00:50–01:50. Officer Barnes did not find

any weapons on Shadmani, but did find “used tissue[s],” which from his

experience as a law enforcement officer is “indicative of drug use because

snorting cocaine causes one’s nose to run.” Barnes Declaration at 3–4. While

being searched, the Officers asked Shadmani why he was parked outside of the

Panda Express. See BWC Footage at 01:15. Shadmani told the Officers that he

just got off work an hour ago, and that he was on his way back from a friend’s

house when he decided to stop in the Panda Express parking lot to talk to his

wife. See Barnes Declaration at 4.

After completing his search, Officer Barnes walked Shadmani to his

patrol car. Id. Officer Barnes advised Shadmani that he was not under arrest,

but placed him in the patrol car’s backseat. Id. Officer Barnes then asked

Shadmani, “what am I seeing in the passenger seat?” See BWC Footage at

02:15. Shadmani responded, “it’s a folder.” Id. at 02:18. Officer Barnes then

asked Shadmani to “put [his] feet in the car.” Id. at 02:23. But Shadmani did

not comply, instead saying, “what do you mean, it’s a folder, I was just at a

friend’s house.” Id. at 02:24–02:30. Officer Barnes told Shadmani that “to [him]

it looks like cocaine,” and that he was going to have to investigate further. Id.

at 02:30–02:36. Officer Barnes then instructed Shadmani to again place his feet

inside the patrol car. Id. at 02:37. But Shadmani still did not comply, and Officer

Barnes told Shadmani that he was “on the verge of resisting and [did not] want

to have to yank [Shadmani] into the car[.]” Id. at 02:40–02:45. Shadmani

eventually complied, and Officer Barnes secured him in the back seat of the

patrol car. Id. at 02:52.

With Shadmani secured, Officer Barnes asked Officer Scott whether she

also saw a white powdery substance in Shadmani’s vehicle. See Barnes

Declaration at 4. Officer Scott confirmed that she saw the substance, and stated

that she believed it to be cocaine. See Scott Declaration at 3. Officer Scott then

obtained a drug test kit from her patrol car and tested the white powdery

substance. Id.3 The field test yielded a presumptive positive result for cocaine.

3 In his Response to the Officers’ Motion, Shadmani “contest[s] the notion that any

substance was field tested at this time by Officer Scott.” Response to Officers’ Motion at 5.

However, Shadmani fails to cite to any evidence in the record to dispute that this occurred. As

the “non-moving party [Shadmani] must go beyond the pleadings and ‘identify affirmative

evidence’ that creates a genuine factual dispute.” Lexmark Int’l Inc. v. Universal Imaging

Indus., LLC, 699 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1276 (M.D. Fla. 2023) (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 523

U.S. 574, 600 (1998)). Because Shadmani has failed to provide any evidence to dispute that

Officer Scott field tested the white powdery substance, the Court will not view this

unsupported argument as a fact weighing in his favor. Indeed, it is difficult to see how

Shadmani could actually dispute that the field test occurred, as the BWC Footage

affirmatively shows Officer Scott conducting what appears to be a field test of the white

powdery substance, and Shadmani, who was seated in the backseat of one of the police

cruisers, was not in a position to observe her actions. See BWC Footage at 03:13; Brooks v.

Miller, 78 F.4th 1267, 1278 (11th Cir. 2023) (“[I]f a valid recording completely and clearly

contradicts a party’s testimony, that testimony is not credible, and the court should disregard

it.”). Thus, for the purposes of summary judgment, the Court will not view this unsupported

assertion in Shadmani’s favor.

In citing to Lexmark, the Court notes that although decisions of other district courts

are not binding, they may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union Corp.,

371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court would not be

bound to follow any other district court’s determination, the decision would have significant

persuasive effects”).

Id. Officer Barnes then began to search the front seat of Shadmani’s vehicle.

See Barnes Declaration at 4. During this search, Officer Barnes found a “folded

business card in the driver’s side door that had the same powder [on it] as the

folder.” Id. at 5. And he also found what appeared to be “counterfeit money

underneath the driver’s seat.” Id. Believing that he had probable cause to arrest

Shadmani for possession of cocaine and drug paraphernalia, Officer Barnes

decided to place Shadmani under arrest. Id.

The First Use of Force. With the intention of arresting Shadmani, Officer

Barnes walked back to his patrol car, advised Officer Scott that he was going to

“read” Shadmani and place him in handcuffs, and opened the patrol car’s door.

See BWC Footage at 04:10–04:32. As soon as Officer Barnes opened the door,

Shadmani began to ask him to call a narcotics detective. Id. at 04:33. Shadmani

then exited the backseat of the patrol car and Officer Barnes instructed him to

turn around. Id. at 04:38. Shadmani hesitated, so the Officers forcibly grabbed

both of his hands. Id. at 04:38–04:44. Shadmani then began telling the Officers

that “I’m not doing anything,” and asked the Officers to “let [him] explain” the

situation to them. Id. at 04:42–04:48. The Officers told Shadmani that he

needed to relax, but Shadmani kept insisting that he was “not doing anything,”

and told the Officers that he was an informant. Id. at 04:48–05:07. The Officers

attempted to handcuff Shadmani, but perceived him to be tensing his arms and

body, preventing them from doing so. See Barnes Declaration at 6; Scott

Declaration at 4.4 Officer Scott ordered Shadmani to “stop resisting,” to “stop

tensing [his] arms,” and to stop “pushing off of the car.” BWC Footage at

05:10–05:23. Unable to handcuff Shadmani, and perceiving him to be resisting

arrest, the Officers began to strike Shadmani in his knee and back. See

Deposition of Amir Shadmani at 156–57 (Doc. 48-13; Shadmani Deposition).5

Afraid for his life, Shadmani began struggling with the Officers, broke free from

4 Shadmani contends that he never attempted to tense his arms to resist being placed

under arrest. See Shadmani Deposition at 152 (“Q: So you admit you were tensing your arm?

A: I was not. And, again, I was not. My brain was telling me, your arm is about to break.”).

But, Shadmani concedes that the Officers may have perceived him to be tensing his arms due

to the way his arms were positioned behind his back. See id. (“The reason [the Officers] felt

like I was tensing my arms is because they had my arm pulled up to the back of my neck.”).

Even if the Court were to accept Shadmani’s characterization of his conduct, the Court must

analyze a reasonable officer’s perception of Shadmani’s conduct, not Shadmani’s actual intent.

See Jones v. Michael, 656 F. App’x 923, 929–30 (11th Cir. 2016) (the Court must analyze how

the situation could “have been perceived to be by a reasonable officer, even if the reasonable

perception was mistaken in the ultimate sense”). Because Shadmani admits that a reasonable

officer could have perceived him to be tensing his arms, the Court does not credit Shadmani’s

characterization of his conduct, but instead finds that a reasonable officer could have perceived

Shadmani’s tensing to be an attempt to resist arrest. See Baker v. Clements, 760 F. App’x 954,

958 (11th Cir. 2019) (finding that “it was reasonable for Defendant Officers to perceive

Plaintiff's failure to present his right hand to be handcuffed as a sign of intentional

resistance”).

In citing to Jones and Baker, the Court notes that it does not rely on unpublished

opinions as binding precedent, but that they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds

them persuasive on a particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61

(11th Cir. 2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36–2 (“Unpublished opinions

are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

5 The Officers dispute that they ever kneed or punched Shadmani during the First Use

of Force. See Barnes Declaration at 6; Scott Declaration at 4. However, as the BWC Footage

does not clearly discredit Shadmani’s version of events, the Court views this fact in his favor

for the purposes of summary judgment. See Brooks, 78 F.4th at 1271–72 (“When the action

happens off camera and the audio doesn’t clearly contradict the plaintiff’s story,” the Court

must “accept the nonmoving party’s version of the facts in determining whether to enter

summary judgment”).

their hold, and started running away. See Shadmani Deposition at 161; BWC

Footage at 05:26–05:32.

The Second Use of Force. With Shadmani on the run, Officer Barnes

radioed that “we’re in a fight,” and both Officers took off in pursuit of him. See

BWC Footage at 05:33. Officer Scott attempted to deploy her Taser, but was

unsuccessful. See Scott Declaration at 4. Officer Barnes also deployed his Taser,

and successfully struck Shadmani’s back. See Barnes Declaration at 6. Once hit

by Officer Barnes’ Taser, Shadmani fell to the ground, see BWC Footage at

05:36, and Officer Scott jumped on top of Shadmani and started striking him in

the head with her Taser. Id. at 05:38–05:41.6 However, Shadmani broke free

and ran away. Id. at 05:41. While running away, Shadmani turned around and

swung his fist, leading Officer Barnes to believe that Shadmani was attempting

to punch him. Id. at 05:42; Barnes Declaration at 6.7

6 Officer Scott concedes that she struck Shadmani with her Taser, but contends that it

was unintentional, as she only intended to strike Shadmani with her closed fist. See Scott

Declaration at 6 (“When I looked at my right hand, I realized I was still holding the TASER. I

did not realize that I still had my TASER until that point. But as soon as I realized I was still

holding it, I immediately discarded the TASER. I then continued to strike Mr. Shadmani with

an empty, closed fist[.]”).

7 Shadmani disputes that he attempted to punch Officer Barnes, and contends that he

was merely trying to pull the Taser probes out of his back. See Shadmani Deposition at 171

(“All I could do is turn around trying to get something that’s pulling on my back.”). As noted

earlier, even if the Court were to accept Shadmani’s characterization of his conduct, the Court

must analyze a reasonable officer’s perception of Shadmani’s conduct, not Shadmani’s actual

intent. See Jones, 656 F. App’x at 929–30. Upon review of the BWC Footage, the Court finds

that a reasonable officer could have perceived Shadmani to be attempting to punch Officer

Barnes. See BWC Footage at 05:42.

The Third Use of Force. With Shadmani again on the run, Officer Barnes

deployed his Taser, and Shadmani fell to the ground once more. See BWC

Footage at 05:43–05:45. Officer Scott then jumped on top of Shadmani and

started striking him in the head with her closed fist. Id. at 05:46–05:48.

Shadmani was briefly able to get on his feet, but was tackled back down by the

Officers. Id. at 05:48–05:52. At this point, Shadmani was face down on the

ground, his arms were pinned underneath his stomach, and both Officers were

on top of Shadmani striking him in the side and head. Id. at 05:53. The Officers

yelled at Shadmani to stop resisting and ordered him to place his hands behind

his back. Id. at 05:53–05:58. But Shadmani’s hands remained pinned

underneath his stomach. Id. at 05:59.8 Officer Scott continued to strike

Shadmani, and Officer Barnes continued to “drive stun” and strike Shadmani

with his closed fist. Id. at 05:50–06:07.9

8 Shadmani contends that he was not trying to resist the Officers’ attempts to place

him in handcuffs, but that he failed to place his hands behind his back because he could not

move his arms. See Shadmani Deposition at 173 (“I couldn’t comply the second time. I was

under so much current of the electricity going through my body I was frozen. I could not even

talk to them. I couldn’t move my arm.”). Again, even if the Court were to accept Shadmani’s

explanation, a reasonable officer could have perceived Shadmani’s failure to place his hands

behind his back as a further attempt to resist arrest. See Baker, 760 F. App’x at 958 (finding

that “it was reasonable for Defendant Officers to perceive Plaintiff’s failure to present his right

hand to be handcuffed as a sign of intentional resistance”). This is true even if Shadmani’s

lack of compliance was merely a result of being physically unable to move his arms.

9 Drive-stunning occurs when a Taser is placed on “the skin of a suspect” and is

activated. Barnes Declaration at 8. It “is a technique that causes discomfort to disorient a

suspect to comply with commands,” but unlike the use of Taser probes, it “does not cause

disruption of muscle function.” Id.

Eventually, the Officers were able to get Shadmani’s arms behind his

back, but still were unable to handcuff him, so Officer Barnes continued to drive

stun Shadmani. Id. at 06:07–06:16; Barnes Declaration at 7. Once the Officers

were able to gain control over Shadmani, they ceased all use of force against

him. Id. at 06:17; Barnes Declaration at 8. Officer Barnes then radioed that he

had Shadmani under control. Id. at 06:50. And the Officers were able to secure

Shadmani in handcuffs. Id. at 07:26. Shortly thereafter, additional police

officers arrived at the scene, and Shadmani was placed in the backseat of a

patrol car. Id. at 08:14–08:43.

II. Legal Standard

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), “[t]he

court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Rule 56(a). The record to be considered on a motion for

summary judgment may include “depositions, documents, electronically stored

information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for

purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other

materials.” Rule 56(c)(1)(A).10 An issue is genuine when the evidence is such

10 Rule 56 was revised in 2010 “to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding

summary-judgment motions.” Rule 56 Advisory Committee’s Note 2010 Amends.

The standard for granting summary judgment remains unchanged. The

language of subdivision (a) continues to require that there be no genuine

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmovant. See

Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting

Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). “[A]

mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position is

insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Kesinger ex rel. Est. of

Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of

demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no genuine

issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats & Clark,

Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). “When a moving party has discharged

its burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its

own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593–94 (11th Cir. 1995)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Substantive law determines

dispute as to any material fact and that the movant be entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. The amendments will not affect continuing development

of the decisional law construing and applying these phrases.

Id. “[A]lthough the interpretations in the advisory committee[’s] notes are not binding, they

are highly persuasive.” Campbell v. Shinseki, 546 F. App’x 874, 879 n.3 (11th Cir. 2013). Thus,

case law construing the former Rule 56 standard of review remains viable and is applicable

here.

the materiality of facts, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of

summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also McCormick v. City of

Ft. Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (“The mere existence of

some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless the factual

dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case.”). In

determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court “must view all

evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing

summary judgment.” Haves, 52 F.3d at 921 (citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v.

Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994)).

III. Discussion

Shadmani asserts four claims: (1) excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Officer Barnes, (2) excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

Officer Scott, (3) municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sheriff

Waters in his official capacity, and (4) battery under state law against Sheriff

Waters in his official capacity. See Complaint at 9–14 (Doc. 1).11 The Officers

argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because the force used

against Shadmani did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and that even if it

11 As to the claims brought against Sheriff Waters in his official capacity as the Sheriff

of the City of Jacksonville, “an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be

treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Thus,

references to Sheriff Waters in this Order should be construed as referring to the City of

Jacksonville.

did, this violation had not been clearly established. See Officers’ Motion at 23.

Shadmani contends that the force used by the Officers was in violation of his

Fourth Amendment rights and that this violation was clearly established. See

Response to Officers’ Motion at 20. For his part, Sheriff Waters moves for

summary judgment on Shadmani’s municipal liability claim arguing that there

is no evidence that the City of Jacksonville had a custom or policy of allowing

its officers to use excessive force. See Sheriff’s Motion at 16. Sheriff Waters also

moves for summary judgment on Shadmani’s battery claim arguing that he

cannot be held liable for the Officers’ conduct. Id. at 20. Shadmani contends that

there is sufficient evidence in the record to show that the City of Jacksonville

had a custom or policy of allowing its officers to use excessive force, see

Response to Sheriff’s Motion at 12, and that Sheriff Waters can be held liable

for the Officers’ conduct. Id. at 13. For the reasons discussed below, the Motions

are due to be granted in-part and denied in-part.

A. The Officers’ Motion

In Counts I and II, Shadmani asserts that the Officers used

unconstitutionally excessive force by striking and tasing him during his arrest.

See Complaint at 9–11. The Officers request entry of summary judgment

arguing that they are entitled to qualified immunity because their use of force

was constitutional as a matter of law, and that even if it was excessive, this

conduct was not a clearly established violation of the Constitution at the time

of the incident. See Officers’ Motion at 24.

The doctrine of “[q]ualified immunity protects from civil liability

government officials who perform discretionary functions if the conduct of the

officials does not violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.’” Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253,

1255 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

As a result, this defense protects from suit “‘all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law.’”12 Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)

(quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)); Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d

1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2003). Indeed, as “‘[g]overnment officials are not required

to err on the side of caution,’ qualified immunity is appropriate in close cases

where a reasonable officer could have believed that his actions were lawful[.]”

Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1200 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Marsh v. Butler

Cnty., 268 F.3d 1014, 1031 n.8 (11th Cir. 2001)).

To be entitled to qualified immunity, a defendant bears the initial burden

of showing that his conduct was within the scope of his discretionary authority.

See Webster v. Beary, 228 F. App’x 844, 848 (11th Cir. 2007); Lee, 284 F.3d at

12 In determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, courts view

the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to the extent

supported by the record, and then consider “the legal issue of whether the plaintiff’s ‘facts,’ if

proven, show that the defendant violated clearly established law.” Priester v. City of Riviera

Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 925 n.3 (11th Cir. 2000); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8 (2007).

1194. Here, it is undisputed that, at all times material to this case, the Officers

were acting in their official capacity and within the scope of their discretionary

authority.13 Accordingly, the burden shifts to Shadmani to demonstrate that

qualified immunity is not appropriate using the test established by the

Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

In accordance with Saucier, the Court must ask whether the facts viewed

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff “show the [Officers’] conduct violated

a constitutional right[.]” Id.; see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002);

Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Scott, 550

U.S. at 377). The court must also ask whether the right allegedly violated was

clearly established at the time of the violation. Hope, 536 U.S. at 739; Saucier,

533 U.S. at 201; Scott, 550 U.S. at 377; Underwood v. City of Bessemer, 11 F.4th

1317, 1328 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[W]e ask two questions: (1) whether the facts that

a plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right,

and (2) if so, whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of

the defendant’s alleged misconduct”) (internal quotations omitted). The Court

13 “‘A government official acts within [their] discretionary authority if the actions were

(1) undertaken pursuant to the performance of [their] duties and (2) within the scope of [their]

authority.’” Jones v. City of Atlanta, 192 F. App’x 894, 897 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)

(quoting Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540, 1545 (11th Cir. 1995)). Making an arrest is thus a

discretionary function for a police officer. See Crosby v. Monroe Cnty., 394 F.3d 1328, 1332

(11th Cir. 2004); see also Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194 (finding that “there can be no doubt that [the

officer] was acting in his discretionary capacity when he arrested [the plaintiff],” even though

the plaintiff asserted that the officer used excessive force in the manner in which he was

arrested).

may consider these questions in whichever order it chooses, and qualified

immunity will protect the defendant if the answer to either question is “no.”

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 236 (2009);14 Underwood, 11 F.4th at

1328.

i. Excessive Force

Addressing the first question, the Court must determine whether the

Officers subjected Shadmani to an unlawful use of force on September 17, 2019.

Specifically, the Court must evaluate whether the Officers applied excessive

force when they struck and tased Shadmani during his arrest. In conducting

this analysis, the Court heeds the Supreme Court’s caution that:

Determining whether the force used to effect a

particular seizure is “reasonable” under the Fourth

Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature

and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth

Amendment interests against the countervailing

governmental interests at stake. Our Fourth

Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the

right to make an arrest or investigatory stop

necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree

of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.

Because the test of reasonableness under the Fourth

Amendment is not capable of precise definition or

mechanical application, however, its proper application

requires careful attention to the facts and

circumstances of each particular case, including the

severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect

poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers

14 In Pearson, the Supreme Court modified the procedure mandated in Saucier,

permitting courts the discretion to determine which prong of the qualified immunity analysis

should be resolved first. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.

or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or

attempting to evade arrest by flight.

The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must

be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer

on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of

hindsight . . . . With respect to a claim of excessive force,

the same standard of reasonableness at the moment

applies: Not every push or shove, even if it may later

seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers,

violates the Fourth Amendment. The calculus of

reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact

that police officers are often forced to make split-second

judgments—in circumstances that are tense,

uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of

force that is necessary in a particular situation.

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989) (internal citations and

quotations omitted); see also Croom v. Balkwill, 645 F.3d 1240, 1251–52 (11th

Cir. 2011); Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1277–78 (11th Cir. 2004);

Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1093–94 (11th Cir. 2003). Consistent with

this authority, a court uses the (1) severity of the crime, (2) danger to officer

safety, and (3) risk of flight, referred to as the Graham factors, to analyze the

reasonableness of an officer’s use of force. See Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198. Indeed,

“Graham dictates unambiguously that the force used by a police officer in

carrying out an arrest must be reasonably proportionate to the need for that

force, which is measured by the severity of the crime, the danger to the officer,

and the risk of flight.” Id.; see also Taylor v. Taylor, 649 F. App’x 737, 746 (11th

Cir. 2016). Significantly, “an officer will be entitled to qualified immunity . . . if

an objectively reasonable officer in the same situation could have believed that

the force used was not excessive.” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th

Cir. 2002).

As to the first Graham factor—the severity of the crime at issue—the

parties dispute what crime Shadmani was thought to have committed. The

Officers argue that they had probable cause to arrest Shadmani for possession

of cocaine, see Officers’ Motion at 17, while Shadmani contends that the Officers

lacked any basis for a “legal arrest[.]” Response to Officers’ Motion at 12. Under

Florida Statute section 893.13(6)(a), “an individual is guilty of possession of

cocaine. . . if he is ‘in actual or constructive possession of a controlled substance

unless such controlled substance was lawfully obtained from a practitioner or

pursuant to a valid prescription[.]” Jasmin v. United States, No. 3:07-cr-218-J-

32JBT, 2016 WL 6071663, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2016) (quoting Fla. Stat.

section 893.13(6)(a)). “Probable cause to arrest exists when law enforcement

officials have facts and circumstances within their knowledge sufficient to

warrant a reasonable belief that the suspect had committed or was committing

a crime.” United States v. Floyd, 281 F.3d 1346, 1348 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation

omitted). However, “[t]o receive qualified immunity, an officer need not have

actual probable cause, but only ‘arguable’ probable cause.’” Grider v. City of

Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010). “Arguable probable cause

exists where ‘reasonable officers in the same circumstances and possessing the

same knowledge as the Defendants could have believed that probable cause

existed to arrest Plaintiff.’” Id. (quoting Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d

1220, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004)). “If the arresting officer had arguable probable

cause to arrest for any offense, qualified immunity will apply.” Id. (citing Skop

v. City of Atlanta, GA, 485 F.3d 1130, 1138 (11th Cir. 2007)).

Here, the Officers argue that because they saw “a white powdery

substance on a black portfolio folder” in Shadmani’s vehicle, and because Officer

Scott field tested the white powdery substance and it came back presumptively

positive for cocaine, they had probable cause to believe that Shadmani was

illegally in possession of a controlled substance. Officers’ Motion at 16–17.

Shadmani concedes that there was a “white powdery substance” in his vehicle,

see Shadmani Deposition at 144, but contends that there was no basis for a

“legal arrest” as the white powdery substance never “tested positive for cocaine”

and “was [n]ever logged in evidence.” Response to Officers’ Motion at 12.

Shadmani’s argument is entirely unavailing. From the perspective of a

reasonable officer, Officer Barnes observed Shadmani “sweating, disheveled

and sniffling,” and saw that he “appeared to have bloodshot, watery eyes.”

Barnes Declaration at 3. Officer Barnes was also able to see inside of

Shadmani’s vehicle, and “observed a black folder in the passenger’s seat that

appeared to have a white powdery substance on it.” Id. Based upon these

observations, Officer Barnes placed Shadmani into his patrol car so that he

could investigate. Id. at 4. During this investigation, Officer Scott conducted a

field test on the white powdery substance, and it “tested presumptively positive

for cocaine.” Scott Declaration at 3. Officer Barnes then conducted a search of

Shadmani’s vehicle and found a “folded business card in the driver’s side door

that had the same powder [on it] as the folder,” and also found what appeared

to be “counterfeit money” underneath the driver’s seat. Barnes Declaration at

5. Viewing these facts in their totality, a reasonable officer would have had

probable cause to believe that Shadmani was in possession of cocaine in

violation of Florida Statute section 893.13(6)(a). As to the seriousness of this

offense, because a “conviction for possession of cocaine pursuant to

Fla. Stat. § 893.13(6)(a) constitutes a felony drug offense,” this factor weighs in

favor of the Officers. Thomas v. United States, No. 8:07-cr-203-T-27MAP, 2013

WL 4855067, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2013) (citing United States v. Neal, 520

F. App’x 794, 795 (11th Cir. 2013)).

The second Graham factor—the danger to officers or others—also

supports the reasonableness of the Officers’ conduct. Shadmani argues that “it

is unreasonable to believe that [he] was an immediate threat to [the Officers]

or his own safety.” Response to Officers’ Motion at 12. The Court is not

convinced. Here, Shadmani was thought to be in possession of cocaine. When

the Officers attempted to arrest him, Shadmani resisted their efforts, broke free

from their hold, and ran away twice. As explained by the Supreme Court, “[t]he

attempt to elude capture is a direct challenge to an officer’s authority. It is a

provocative and dangerous act that dares, and in a typical case requires, the

officer to give chase.” Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 9 (2011), overruled on

other grounds, Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 606 (2015). And give

chase is what the Officers did. However, Shadmani did not submit to the

Officers’ attempts to restrain him. Instead, he continued to flee despite being

tased and struck numerous times, and even swung his fist in Officer Barnes’

direction. Based upon these facts, a reasonable officer could believe that

Shadmani’s resistance and flight posed a threat to officer safety. Accordingly,

the Court finds that this factor weighs in the Officers’ favor.

The third Graham factor—whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest

or attempting to evade arrest by flight—also supports the reasonableness of the

Officers’ conduct. Shadmani concedes, and rightly so, that he actively resisted

arrest and fled from the Officers. See Response to Officers’ Motion at 13 (“Any

hesitation or active resistance only occurred following Officer’s Barnes [sic]

initial aggressive and violent contact[.]”). However, Shadmani contends that

this factor still weighs in his favor because he was “cooperative and compliant”

with the Officers’ initial commands. Id. at 12–13. This argument is unavailing.

Shadmani resisted the Officers’ initial attempts to arrest him when he failed to

submit to handcuffing. During this initial encounter, Shadmani struggled with

the Officers, broke free from their hold, and started to run away. The Officers

chased after Shadmani, and Officer Barnes deployed his Taser, bringing

Shadmani to the ground. Once on the ground, Shadmani struggled with Officer

Scott, got back on his feet, and continued to flee. Officer Barnes then reactivated

his Taser, and Shadmani fell to the ground once more. Shadmani attempted to

get off of the ground and continue fleeing, but was forced back down by the

Officers. The Officers, once on top of Shadmani, attempted to place his hands

behind his back, but Shadmani’s hands remained pinned underneath his

stomach. Officer Barnes then began to drive stun Shadmani, and after a brief

struggle, the Officers eventually were able to get control of Shadmani’s hands

and secure him in handcuffs. Based on these facts, a reasonable officer could

believe that Shadmani was both actively resisting arrest and attempting to

evade arrest by flight. Therefore, this factor weighs in the Officers’ favor.

Accordingly, all three Graham factors—the severity of the crime at issue,

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of officers or

others, and whether the suspect is attempting to resist arrest or evade capture

by flight—weigh in favor of finding the Officers’ use of force to be reasonable.

The Court does not end its inquiry there, however. The Eleventh Circuit also

instructs district courts to consider three other factors: “(1) the need for the

application of force, (2) the relationship between the need and amount of force

used, and (3) the extent of the injury inflicted[.]” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1197–98. The

Court refers to these as “the Lee factors.”

The first Lee factor—the need for the application of force—is answered by

the Graham factors themselves. Shadmani’s resistance to being placed under

arrest, his multiple attempts to flee, and his perceived attempt to punch Officer

Barnes shows that some level of force was needed to gain control of the

situation. Additional force was then required when the Officers were unable to

gain control over Shadmani’s hands, and were unable to place him in handcuffs.

Accordingly, this factor weighs in the Officers’ favor.

The second Lee factor—the relationship between the need and amount of

force used—weighs in the Officers’ favor as well. As a threshold matter, “Fourth

Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest

or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of

physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Id. at 1197 (quoting Graham,

490 U.S. at 396). Therefore, “the typical arrest involves some force and injury.”

Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Nolin, 207

F.3d at 1257–58)). And a “constitutional violation only occurs when the officer’s

use of force is ‘objectively unreasonable’ in light of the totality of the

circumstances at the time the force is used.” Glover v. Eighth Unknown D.E.A.

Agents/Drug Task Force Agents From Birmingham, Alabama Task Force, 225

F. App’x 781, 785–86 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397)). As

Shadmani was subjected to three separate uses of force, the Court will discuss

each one in turn.

The First Use of Force. During the first use of force, the Officers struck

Shadmani in the knee and side while attempting to place him under arrest. As

explained by the Eleventh Circuit, “[b]ecause a police officer is entitled to use

some force to arrest a suspect, ‘the application of de minimis force, without

more, will not support a claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth

Amendment.’” Myers v. Bowman, 713 F.3d 1319, 1327 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting

Nolin, 207 F.3d at 1257)). Here, while attempting to execute a lawful arrest, the

Officers perceived Shadmani to be tensing his arms and resisting their efforts

to place him in handcuffs. In response to Shadmani’s perceived resistance, the

Officers began struggling with Shadmani, and struck him in his knee and side.

Under the circumstances, this use of force was de minimis. See Nolin, 207 F.3d

at 1255 (finding the force used to be de minimis when the officer “grabbed [the

plaintiff] from behind by the shoulder and wrist, threw him against a van three

or four feet away, [and] kneed him in the back and pushed his head into the

side of the van[.]”); Woodruff v. City of Trussville, 434 F. App’x 852, 855 (11th

Cir. 2011) (“The kind of force alleged by [the plaintiff]—including [the officer]

punching [the plaintiff] in the face, forcefully removing him from his car, and

slamming him on the ground . . . constituted only de minimis force.”). Even if

the force used was not de minimis, the Officers were entitled to use some level

of force to overcome Shadmani’s perceived resistance, and a reasonable officer

could believe that the strikes to Shadmani’s knee and back were proportionate

to this need. See Brown v. City of Huntsville, Ala., 608 F.3d 724, 740 (11th Cir.

2010) (“For even minor offenses, permissible force includes physical restraint,

use of handcuffs, and pushing into walls.”). Thus, the Court finds that the

Officers’ first use of force was objectively reasonable.

The Second Use of Force. During the second use of force, Officer Barnes

tased Shadmani while he was attempting to flee, and Officer Scott tackled

Shadmani and struck him in the head with her Taser. As to Officer Barnes’ use

of his Taser, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “the use of a taser gun to subdue

a suspect who has repeatedly ignored police instructions and continues to act

belligerently toward police is not excessive force.” Zivojinovich v. Barner, 525

F.3d 1059, 1073 (11th Cir. 2008). Indeed, when “a suspect appears ‘hostile,

belligerent, and uncooperative,’ [the] use of a taser might be preferable to a

‘physical struggle [causing] serious harm’ to the suspect or the officer.” Fils v.

City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1290 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Draper, 369

F.3d at 1278)). Here, Shadmani had just attempted to resist a felony drug

arrest, broke free from the Officers while they were attempting to handcuff him,

and started to run away. Under these circumstances, a reasonable officer could

believe that it was necessary to tase Shadmani to ensure that he could be

detained safely. See Draper, 369 F.3d at 1278 (“[The officer’s] use of a taser gun

to effectuate the arrest of [the plaintiff] was reasonably proportionate to the

difficult, tense and uncertain situation that [the officer] faced in this traffic stop,

and did not constitute excessive force.”). As to Officer Scott’s strikes to

Shadmani’s head, despite being tased and falling to the ground, Shadmani did

not submit to the Officers’ authority. Instead, he got back on his feet and

attempted to run away. In response, Officer Scott tackled Shadmani and begun

striking him in the head. Due to Shadmani’s continued resistance, a reasonable

officer could believe that Officer Scott’s strikes were necessary to gain control

of Shadmani, and to ensure that he did not continue to flee. See Baker,

760 F. App’x at 957 (finding the use of force to be reasonable because “[w]hen

Defendant Officers employed the fist strikes, Plaintiff had just attempted to

evade arrest by flight and had refused multiple orders to get on the ground, to

stop resisting, and to give his hands to the officers”). Accordingly, the Court

finds that the Officers’ second use of force was objectively reasonable.

The Third Use of Force. During the third use of force, Officer Barnes tased

Shadmani, drive stunned him, and punched him, and Officer Scott struck

Shadmani with her closed fist. Under the circumstances, a reasonable officer

could believe that this use of force was reasonable. Notably, Shadmani had

broken free from Officer Scott, gotten up from the ground, swung his fist in

Officer Barnes’ direction, and continued to run away. In response to Shadmani’s

continued flight, Officer Barnes reactivated his Taser and Shadmani fell to the

ground. Officer Scott then tackled Shadmani and begun punching him, and

Officer Barnes drive stunned and punched Shadmani. At this point, Shadmani’s

hands were pinned underneath his stomach, and the Officers were still unable

to gain control over him. Indeed, they radioed for assistance. After the Officers

were able to get both of Shadmani’s hands behind his back, they still struggled

to handcuff him, causing Officer Barnes to drive stun Shadmani. Shortly after

the drive stun, the Officers were able to gain control over Shadmani and place

him in handcuffs. No further force was applied once this occurred.

As to Officer Barnes’ tasing of Shadmani, as explained above, a

reasonable officer could believe that it was necessary to tase Shadmani a second

time when he continued to flee from the Officers. See Draper, 369 F.3d at 1278.

Similarly, as to the Officers’ striking of Shadmani, a reasonable officer could

believe that the strikes were necessary to overcome Shadmani’s continued

resistance to being placed under arrest. See Baker, 760 F. App’x at 957. Finally,

as to Officer Barnes’ drive stunning of Shadmani, “the use of a Taser in drive-

stun mode is generally held to be a preferred and lesser use of force than the

potential escalation of physical force and brutality.” Douglas v. Faldoski, No.

CV 22-00079-CG-B, 2024 WL 2150264, at *8 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 16, 2024), report

and recommendation adopted, No. CV 22-00079-CG-B, 2024 WL 2139382 (S.D.

Ala. May 10, 2024) (quotation omitted). Thus, “[Officer Barnes’] decision to use

his taser in this mode signifies an attempt to use a lesser amount of force to

overcome [Shadmani’s] resistance[.]” Id. And, considering that the Officers were

still unable to handcuff Shadmani, a reasonable officer could believe that the

drive stuns were necessary to gain full control over the situation. For these

reasons, the Court finds that the Officers’ third use of force was objectively

reasonable.

In sum, the Court finds that all three uses of force were proportionate to

the need to place Shadmani under arrest. Accordingly, this factor weighs in

favor of the Officers.

The third Lee factor—the extent of the injury inflicted—is likely neutral.

Even if not life threatening, Shadmani appears to have suffered injuries to his

lower back, shoulder, and nose, which have required multiple surgeries to fix.

See Shadmani Deposition at 60. Although the Officers argue that “[t]here is no

evidence in the record that [Shadmani’s] injuries were a direct result of the

[O]fficers’ application of force,” viewing Shadmani’s testimony in the light most

favorable to him, the Court finds that a question of fact exists as to whether the

injuries can be attributed to the Officers’ conduct. Officers’ Motion at 22. That

said, the evidence does not suggest that Shadmani’s injuries are greater than

what was needed for the Officers to ensure Shadmani’s compliance. Thus, on

balance, this factor is likely neutral.

Upon consideration of the record, and construing all disputed facts and

inferences in Shadmani’s favor, Shadmani cannot show that the Officers’ use of

force was objectively unreasonable. Given that Shadmani actively resisted

arrest, fled from the Officers multiple times, and appeared to swing his fist in

Officer Barnes’ direction, the Officers reasonably could have believed that their

use of force was necessary to gain control of Shadmani. The Court thus

determines that Shadmani has failed to show a genuine issue of fact for trial on

his claims against the Officers. Therefore, the Officers are entitled to qualified

immunity and summary judgment is due to be entered in their favor on Counts

I and II of the Complaint. See Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1346 (“An officer will be

entitled to qualified immunity . . . if an objectively reasonable officer in the

same situation could have believed that the force used was not excessive.”).

ii. Clearly Established

Even if the Court were to find that the force used by the Officers was

unconstitutionally excessive, Shadmani fails to point to authority supporting a

conclusion that they violated a clearly established constitutional right. See

Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004), abrogated on

other grounds by Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147 (11th Cir. 2020). As the

Supreme Court has explained:

For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours

“must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to

say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless

the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but

it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness

must be apparent.”

Hope, 536 U.S. at 739 (citation omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483

U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). For purposes of this analysis, the critical question is

whether the state of the law gave the government actor “fair warning” that his

alleged treatment of the plaintiff was unconstitutional. Vinyard, 311 F.3d at

1350 (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 741); see also Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1031 (“[F]air

and clear notice to government officials is the cornerstone of qualified

immunity[.]”). The Eleventh Circuit recognizes three sources of law that would

provide a government official adequate notice of statutory or constitutional

rights: “specific statutory or constitutional provisions; principles of law

enunciated in relevant decisions; and factually similar cases already decided by

state and federal courts in the relevant jurisdiction.” Harper v. Lawrence

County, Ala., 592 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Goebert v. Lee

County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007)). Thus, where the words of the

federal statute or federal constitutional provision are specific enough “to

establish clearly the law applicable to particular conduct and circumstances,”

then the plaintiff can overcome the qualified immunity privilege, even in the

absence of case law. Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1350. In this type of “obvious clarity”

case, “the words of the federal statute or federal constitutional provision may

be so clear and the conduct so bad that case law is not needed to establish that

the conduct cannot be lawful.” Id.

Alternatively, where the conduct alleged is not so egregious as to violate

a statutory or constitutional right on its face, courts look to case law to

determine whether the law is “clearly established.” Id. at 1351. If the case law

contains “some broad statements of principle” which are “not tied to

particularized facts,” then it may be sufficient to clearly establish the law

applicable in the future to different facts. Id. However, to provide officials with

sufficient warning, the case law must establish a principle with such “obvious

clarity” that “every objectively reasonable government official facing the

circumstances would know that the official’s conduct did violate federal law

when the official acted.” Id. Last, in the absence of broad statements of

principle, precedent can clearly establish the applicable law where “the

circumstances facing a government official are not fairly distinguishable, that

is, are materially similar,” to the particularized facts of prior case law. Id. at

1352. Such precedent must be found in decisions from the Supreme Court, the

controlling circuit court of appeals, or the pertinent state supreme court. Id. at

1351. Although such a case “on all fours” with materially identical facts is not

required to establish “fair warning” to government officials, see Holloman ex

rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1277 (11th Cir. 2004) (discussing the

impact of Hope on Eleventh Circuit precedent), “existing precedent must have

placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” See Mullenix,

577 U.S. at 12 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).

In his Response, Shadmani cites to Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272

(11th Cir. 2011), for the proposition that the Officers’ use of force was clearly

excessive. See Response to Officers’ Motion at 18. In Fils, the defendant-officers

responded to an ongoing dispute outside of a club and arrested one of the

partygoers. Fils, 647 F.3d at 1276. The plaintiff, in reference to the officers’

arrest of the partygoer, said that “these motherfuckers are overreacting.” Id. at

1277. Unhappy with the plaintiff’s retort, the defendant-officers drew their

Tasers and tased the plaintiff. Id. When the plaintiff fell to the ground, the

defendant-officers kneed him in the back, “applied a contact tase to the back of

his neck,” and placed him in handcuffs. Id. Because the plaintiff was not violent,

did not disobey any orders, did not resist arrest, and posed no risk to the

defendant-officers’ safety, the Eleventh Circuit held that the “unprovoked force”

used against the plaintiff violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. Id.

at 1289–90. The facts of this case, however, bear little resemblance to those in

Fils. As discussed in detail above, Shadmani was thought to be in possession of

cocaine (a felony); he resisted the Officers’ attempts to arrest him; he fled from

the Officers multiple times; he appeared to swing his fist in Officer Barnes’

direction; and once on the ground, he failed to place his hands behind his back

and allow the Officers to handcuff him. With these differences in mind, it cannot

be said that Fils would have put a reasonable officer on notice that the conduct

of the Officers was unconstitutional. See Priester, 208 F.3d at 926 (“[U]nless a

controlling and materially similar case declares the official’s conduct

unconstitutional, a defendant is usually entitled to qualified immunity.”).

Moreover, this is not the sort of case where it is apparent, with “obvious

clarity,” that the Officers’ conduct was unconstitutional. See Vinyard, 311 F.3d

at 1350. In the face of an individual who has resisted arrest, fled from the police,

and appeared to swing his fist in the direction of an officer, it cannot be said

that the use of force in the manner shown here to apprehend and gain control

of that individual is so clearly excessive as to warrant the denial of qualified

immunity in the absence of any case law. For these reasons, even if Shadmani

could show the violation of a constitutional right, he has not shown that this

right had been clearly established.

B. Sheriff Waters’ Motion

In Counts III and IV, Shadmani asserts claims against Sheriff Waters in

his official capacity as the Sheriff of the City of Jacksonville for (1) municipal

liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and (2) battery under state law. See Complaint

at 12–14. Sheriff Waters moves for the entry of summary judgment on Count

III arguing that Shadmani has failed to show that his constitutional rights were

violated, and that even if his rights were violated, he cannot show that this

violation was due to a policy or custom on the part of the City of Jacksonville.

See Sheriff’s Motion at 14. Sheriff Waters also moves for the entry of summary

judgment on Count IV arguing that Shadmani cannot show that he can be held

liable for the Officers’ use of force. See id. at 22–23. The Court will address each

argument in turn.

i. Municipal Liability (Count III)

In Count III, Shadmani brings a claim against Sheriff Waters in his

official capacity as the Sheriff of the City of Jacksonville, alleging that the

“Sheriff’s Office has a widespread custom and practice of using excessive force”

and “failing to discipline its officers for the use of excessive force[.]”

Complaint ¶ 52. “[T]o impose § 1983 liability on a municipality, a plaintiff must

show: (1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality

had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that

constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.”

McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004); Underwood v. City of

Bessemer, 11 F.4th 1317, 1333 (11th Cir. 2021) (same). As the Court has already

found that Shadmani has failed to show that his constitutional rights were

violated by the Officers, he necessarily has failed to establish that the City of

Jacksonville can be held liable for this purported violation. See Am. Mfrs. Mut.

Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999) (emphasis added) (“To state a

claim for relief in an action brought under § 1983, [a plaintiff] must establish

that they were deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of

state law.”). Accordingly, summary judgment is due to be entered in Sheriff

Waters’ favor as to Count III of the Complaint.15

ii. Battery (Count IV)

Having determined that summary judgment is due to be granted in favor

of Defendants as to Shadmani’s federal claims, the Court next considers

whether to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Shadmani’s

remaining state law battery claim. At the time Shadmani filed the instant case,

the Court had original jurisdiction over the federal claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331,

as well as supplemental jurisdiction over Shadmani’s state law claim, see 28

U.S.C. § 1367(a). See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725

(1966). However, § 1367(c)(3) gives a court discretion to dismiss or remand to

state court claims before it on the basis of supplemental jurisdiction if “the

district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction[.]”

15 Even if Shadmani had established that the Officers violated his constitutional

rights, Sheriff Waters would still be entitled to summary judgment. In the Complaint,

Shadmani alleges that the City of Jacksonville has “a longstanding practice” of using

“excessive force against individuals who are not resisting[.]” Complaint ¶ 27. In support of this

contention, he identifies nine different incidents involving the City of Jacksonville. See id. at

6–9. However, Shadmani has failed to support these allegations with any evidence, and Sheriff

Waters has now come forward with evidence to the contrary. See Declaration of Steve Ijames

at 3 (Doc. 48-11) (explaining how “none of the examples alleged in the

Complaint . . . involve matters similar to the incident involving Amir Shadmani”). At summary

judgment, Shadmani must “go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits” demonstrate

a genuine issue for trial on these points. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).

Because Shadmani has submitted no evidence to show that the City of Jacksonville has a

policy or custom of allowing excessive force, or failing to investigate claims of excessive force,

Sheriff Waters is entitled to summary judgment regardless of whether the Officers did in fact

violate his constitutional rights.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a district court

may properly decline to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental state law claims

when the federal claims over which the Court had original jurisdiction are

dismissed on a motion for summary judgment, as is the case here. See Murphy

v. Fla. Keys Elec. Co-op Ass’n, Inc., 329 F.3d 1311, 1320 (11th Cir. 2003)

(affirming summary judgment on defendant’s contribution claim invoking

admiralty jurisdiction, and affirming dismissal of third-party defendant’s state

law counterclaim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)); Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins.

Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999) (“If no federal claim survives summary

judgment, the court sees no reason why the other claims should not be

dismissed or remanded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).”); Eubanks v.

Gerwen, 40 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that since the “federal

claims [had] been disposed of rather early on at the summary judgment

phase[,] . . . comity suggests that the remaining state law malicious prosecution

claim should be heard in state court”); see also Maschmeier v. Scott, 508 F.

Supp. 2d 1180, 1185–86 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (declining to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s state law claim after granting summary

judgment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiff’s federal claims).

In deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law

claims, district courts consider “the circumstances of the particular case, the

nature of the state law claims, the character of the governing state law, and the

relationship between the state and federal claims[,]” as well as “the values of

judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” City of Chicago v. Int’l

Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (internal quotations omitted) (citing

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). “When the balance

of these factors indicates that a case properly belongs in state court, as when

the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and

only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of

jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice.” Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350

(citing Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726–27) (footnote omitted); Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726

(“Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not

insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as

well.”); see also Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004)

(stating that the Eleventh Circuit has “encouraged district courts to dismiss any

remaining state claims when . . . the federal claims have been dismissed prior

to trial”) (citing L.A. Draper & Son v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414,

428 (11th Cir. 1984)). Notably, the Supreme Court’s directive in Cohill

concerning when a district court should decline to continue to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction “was not intended to ‘establish a mandatory rule to

be applied inflexibly in all cases,’” but “it did establish a general rule to be

applied in all but extraordinary cases.” Carr v. Tatangelo, 156 F. Supp. 2d 1369,

1380 (M.D. Ga. 2001) (citing Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350 n.7), aff'd, 338 F.3d 1259

(11th Cir. 2003). Moreover, because “[s]tate courts, not federal courts, should be

the final arbiters of state law,” dismissal of state law claims is strongly

encouraged when federal claims are dismissed prior to trial. Baggett v. First

Nat’l Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1353 (11th Cir. 1997).

Here, the Court has determined that summary judgment in favor of

Defendants is proper with regard to Shadmani’s federal claims. Because the

federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial, the Court has the authority

under § 1367(c) to decline to retain jurisdiction over the remaining state law

battery claim. See Murphy, 329 F.3d at 1320; Carr, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 1380

(dismissing state law claims without prejudice after finding the defendants to

be entitled to qualified immunity as to the federal claims and noting that it is

preferable for state courts to “make rulings on issues of [state] law”). As such,

the Court will decline to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

claim in Count IV of the Complaint, and this count will be dismissed without

prejudice.

As to the claims against Sheriff Waters, Shadmani has failed to show that

his constitutional rights were violated. Thus, he cannot show that Sheriff

Waters can be held liable for the purported violation of his constitutional rights.

Moreover, as Shadmani’s federal claims have been dismissed, the Court will

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law battery claim.

Accordingly, summary judgment is due to be entered in Sheriff Waters’ favor

on Count III of the Complaint, and Count IV of the Complaint is due to be

dismissed without prejudice.

IV. Conclusion

Upon consideration of the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court

makes the following findings. As to Counts I and II, a reasonable officer in

Officer Barnes and Scott’s position could have believed that the force used

against Shadmani was reasonable, and even if the force used was excessive,

Shadmani has failed to show that the unreasonableness of such force had been

clearly established. Thus, Officer Barnes is entitled to qualified immunity and

summary judgment is due to be entered in his favor as to Count I. And Officer

Scott is entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment is due to be

entered in her favor as to Count II. As to Count III, Sheriff Waters is entitled

to qualified immunity because Shadmani has failed to show that his

constitutional rights were violated. Thus, summary judgment is due to be

entered in Sheriff Waters’ favor as to Count III. Finally, the Court declines to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Shadmani’s state law battery claim,

Count IV, and this count is due to be dismissed without prejudice.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. Defendant Sheriff T.K. Waters’ Motion for Summary Judgment and

Memorandum of Law in Support (Doc. 46) is GRANTED in-part and

DENIED in-part. The Motion is granted with respect to Count III of

the Complaint, and the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter

JUDGMENT in favor of Defendant Sheriff T.K. Waters and against

Plaintiff Amir Shadmani as to this count. The Motion is denied as to

Count IV of the Complaint. In the exercise of its discretion under 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court declines to continue to exercise jurisdiction

over this claim, and Count IV is dismissed without prejudice to

Shadmani refiling this claim in state court if he so chooses.

2. Defendants Barnes and Scott’s Motion for Summary Judgment and

Accompanying Memorandum of Law (Doc. 47) is GRANTED. The

Motion is granted with respect to Counts I and II of the Complaint,

and the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter JUDGMENT in favor

of Defendants Officer J.M. Barnes and Officer A.G. Scott and against

Plaintiff Amir Shadmani as to these counts.

3. The Clerk of the Court is further directed to terminate any pending

motions and deadlines as moot and close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida this 11th day of

October, 2024.

United States District Judge

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