Cloutier v. Pesata

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JUSTIN CLOUTIER,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:23-cv-744-MMH-PDB

SERGEANT PESATA, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff Justin Cloutier, a former detainee1 at Flagler County Inmate

Facility, initiated this action by filing a Civil Rights Complaint (Doc. 1).2 He

proceeds on an Amended Complaint (Doc. 5). In the Amended Complaint,

Cloutier asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against seven Defendants:

Sergeant Pesata and Officers Masood, Sullivan, S. Stokes, J. Bocian, D.

Carmona, and Z. Mcminn.3 See Amended Complaint at 2-3; Doc. 20. Cloutier

1 At the time he filed this lawsuit on June 26, 2023, Cloutier was detained at

Flagler County Inmate Facility. Cloutier subsequently advised the Court that he was

released from custody on September 10, 2023. See Doc. 14.

2 For all documents filed in this case, the Court cites to the document and page

numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing System.

3 On July 22, 2024, the Court dismissed Cloutier’s claims against Defendants

Bocian, Carmona, Mcminn and Stokes without prejudice for failure to prosecute. See

Order (Doc. 46); Judgment (Doc. 47).

asserts Defendants violated “Florida State Statute Article 1 § 17 & 2, [his]

PREA rights, 8th Amendment rights, and [his right to] religous [sic] freedom”

when they “[b]rutalized . . . and sexually assaulted” him while he was detained

in a self-harm unit, and further when they subsequently denied him medical

treatment. See Amended Complaint at 3-4. As relief, Cloutier seeks monetary

damages. Id. at 5.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Pesata, Masood, and

Sullivan’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 22; Motion). Cloutier filed a response in

opposition to the Motion. See “Justin Cloutier’s Response in Opposition to

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss” (Doc. 39; Response). The Motion is ripe for

review.

II. Cloutier’s Allegations4

In the Amended Complaint, Cloutier identifies Defendants Pesata,

Masood, and Sullivan as corrections officers employed by the Jacksonville

Sheriff’s Office (JSO) during the relevant time period.5 See Amended

4 In considering the Motion, the Court must accept all factual allegations in

the Amended Complaint as true, consider the allegations in the light most favorable

to Cloutier, and accept all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such

allegations. Holland v. Carnival Corp., 50 F.4th 1088, 1093 (11th Cir. 2022). As such,

the facts recited here are drawn from the Amended Complaint, and may well differ

from those that ultimately can be proved.

5 Cloutier sues Defendants Pesata, Masood, and Sullivan in their individual

and official capacities. See Amended Complaint at 2-3.

Complaint at 2-3. As to the specific facts underlying his claims, Cloutier

alleges:

On October[] 9th, 2023[6] between 8 am and 4 pm

I . . . arrived at Jacksonville County Jail. [A]fter being

booked I was brought to the second floor for

processing. I began to pace the [h]allway and was told

to sit by a corrections officer. I told the officer my

medication was causing me to become restless. [T]he

officer then told me to cuff up and go [t]o a Self-Harm

pod; I complied. I was then brought to 6w2b by the

officer.

[A]fter arriving to 6w2b I witnessed a naked

[A]frican [A]merican man being restrained by the

doorway with a restraint chair[.] He had no clothes or

cover. I was brought to the second level and was placed

in a cell with another inmate. While several unknown

named corrections officers were in the cell they told me

to take my uniform off. I believed this was against

policy and refused since I [h]ad witnessed several

other [i]nmates with uniforms on. The unknown

officers than [sic] brought me out of the cell [and] told

me to lay down and [p]ut my [h]ands behind my back.

[A]s I was compl[y]ing an officer began to knee me and

punch me [i]n the face while I was on the ground being

cuffed. I was given a black eye and brought to the first

level. I was placed in a restraint chair and placed next

to the naked [A]frican [A]merican man who still

remained uncovered. We remained there for several

hours. The naked [A]frican [A]merican man requested

assistance and was denied.

After several [h]ours had passed I was brought

to another cell to be released by the officers from the

6 This date appears to be an error as Cloutier filed this lawsuit in June 2023

and was released from custody in September 2023. The Court notes that Cloutier

states elsewhere in the Amended Complaint that the incident at issue occurred in

October 2022. See Amended Complaint at 4-5.

restraint chair. Sergeant Pesata, Officer Masood,

Officer Sullivan, and an unknown officer were present

while I was being released from a restraint chair. I was

released and brought into a cell by the officers named.

[T]he officers told me to remove my uniform again once

inside the cell. I complied and removed my uniform

standing with my back to the door at the back of my

cell. [A]fter I removed my uniform I was pushed down

by one of the officers and was punched repeatedly in

the face until I was knocked out. Once waking up I was

then punched by another officer repeatedly until I

kicked his leg to attempt to stop the beating. [T]he 3rd

officer then picked me up and slammed my [h]ead on

a bed frame causing me to begin to bleed from my

[h]ead. I was then brought out of the cell complet[e]ly

naked, bleeding from my [h]ead, with my face

deformed and placed back into the restraint chair this

time with no uniform on. I requested a covering and

was denied. I requested emergency medical care and

was denied. I remained in the chair for several hours

until being brought to another cell. I requested a

shower and was denied. [T]hat night I slept covered in

blood. Se[r]geant [P]esata witnessed the beating, and

[r]efused my requests for covering, and for medical

care.

Doc. 5-1 at 1-2. Cloutier also alleges that “several officers and a superior . . .

sexually assaulted [him] while [he] was naked” in self-harm unit 6w2b. See

Amended Complaint at 4. Cloutier asserts that he sustained physical and

mental injuries in the incident. Id. at 5.

III. Summary of the Arguments

In the Motion, Defendants Pesata, Masood, and Sullivan argue that the

Court should dismiss the Amended Complaint because (1) it is a shotgun

pleading, (2) Cloutier fails to state a claim for violation of religious freedom, (3)

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to the individual capacity

claims against them, and (4) Cloutier fails to state a claim for relief against

Defendants in their official capacities. See Motion at 4-12. In response, Cloutier

does not address the specific arguments raised in the Motion; however,

Cloutier provides an alleged video recording of the underlying incident. See

Response at 1.

IV. Analysis

Defendants initially argue that the Court should dismiss the Amended

Complaint because it is an impermissible shotgun pleading. See Motion at 4-

7. Defendants specifically contend that Cloutier improperly asserts “multiple

causes of action against multiple defendants in multiple capacities without

distinct counts.” Id. at 5. As a result, Defendants maintain the Amended

Complaint fails to provide them with adequate notice of the claims against

each Defendant and the grounds upon which each claim rests. Id. at 6.

At the outset, the Court notes that pro se complaints are held to a less

stringent standard than those drafted by an attorney. See Wright v. Newsome,

795 F.2d 964, 967 (11th Cir. 1986). Nevertheless, a pro se litigant is still

required to “‘conform to procedural rules.’” Riley v. Fairbanks Capital Corp.,

222 F. App’x 897, 898 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296,

1304 (11th Cir. 2002)).7 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)) require

that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). “‘A complaint

need not specify in detail the precise theory giving rise to recovery. All that is

required is that the defendant be on notice as to the claim being asserted

against him and the grounds on which it rests.’” Evans v. McClain of Ga., Inc.,

131 F.3d 957, 964 n.2 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Despite Rule 8(a)’s

liberal pleading requirement, “a complaint must still contain either direct or

inferential allegations respecting all material elements of a cause of action.”

Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006) (emphasis

omitted).

Additionally, a complaint may not run afoul of the Eleventh Circuit’s

prohibition against shotgun pleadings. See generally Weiland v. Palm Beach

County Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321-23 (11th Cir. 2015). In Weiland,

the Eleventh Circuit “identified four rough types or categories of shotgun

pleadings.” See Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1324-25 (11th Cir. 2021)

(quoting Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321). As the Barmapov court explained,

7 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;

however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a

particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir. 2022);

see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not

considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

The first [category] is “a complaint containing multiple

counts where each count adopts the allegations of all

preceding counts, causing each successive count to

carry all that came before and the last count to be a

combination of the entire complaint.” The second is a

complaint “replete with conclusory, vague, and

immaterial facts not obviously connected to any

particular cause of action.” The third is a complaint

that does not separate “each cause of action or claim

for relief” into a different count. And the final type of

shotgun pleading is a complaint that “assert[s]

multiple claims against multiple defendants without

specifying which of the defendants are responsible for

which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the

claim is brought against.”

Barmapov, 986 F.3d at 1324-25 (quoting Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321-23).

Notably, “[t]he unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that

they fail to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the

defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon

which each claim rests.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323 (footnote omitted). Thus, a

shotgun pleading is one where “it is virtually impossible to know which

allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief” and the

defendant therefore cannot be “expected to frame a responsive pleading.”

Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trustees of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366

(11th Cir. 1996)). For these reasons, the Eleventh Circuit has unequivocally

instructed that shotgun pleadings of this sort are “altogether unacceptable.”

Cramer v. State of Fla., 117 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Cook v.

Randolph County, 573 F.3d 1143, 1151 (11th Cir. 2009) (“We have had much

to say about shotgun pleadings, none of which is favorable.”) (collecting cases).

Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has engaged in a “thirty-year salvo of criticism

aimed at shotgun pleadings, and there is no ceasefire in sight.” Weiland, 792

F.3d at 1321 n.9 (collecting cases). This is so because “[s]hotgun pleadings,

whether filed by plaintiff or defendant, exact an intolerable toll on the trial

court’s docket, lead to unnecessary and unchanneled discovery, and impose

unwarranted expense on the litigants, the court and the court’s parajudicial

personnel and resources.” Cramer, 117 F.3d at 1263.

Here, upon review of the Amended Complaint, the Court agrees with

Defendants that the Amended Complaint constitutes an impermissible

shotgun pleading. For the reasons outlined below, the Court finds that the

Amended Complaint falls within the second, third, and fourth categories of

impermissible shotgun pleadings, and, ultimately, fails to give Defendants

adequate notice as to the claims being brought against each of them.

First, in the Amended Complaint, Cloutier provides conclusory and

vague assertions of civil rights violations without identifying which alleged

facts are applicable to a particular cause of action. For example, Cloutier

asserts a violation of his right to religious freedom, but fails to identify which,

if any, factual allegations support this claim. Similarly, Cloutier asserts a

sexual assault claim, but does not specify which, if any, of his allegations are

applicable to this cause of action. And although Cloutier generally asserts he

was denied medical treatment, he fails to set forth specific allegations

supporting that claim, especially since he alleges elsewhere in the Amended

Complaint that he received medical treatment—including an MRI, a CAT scan,

stitches, and mental health treatment—following the incident. See Amended

Complaint at 5. In the Amended Complaint, Cloutier also includes immaterial

facts that are not obviously connected to any particular cause of action. For

example, Cloutier raises several allegations concerning an African American

inmate in the same self-harm unit, but he does not explain how these

allegations are connected to any of his claims.

Second, Cloutier’s failure to identify which factual allegations relate to a

particular cause of action is compounded by his failure to separate into

different counts each cause of action he seeks to assert. As such, Cloutier has

left the Court with the onerous task of sifting through the Amended Complaint

to determine which factual allegations relate to each cause of action he is

attempting to bring.

Third, and most critical, Cloutier asserts multiple claims against

Defendants Pesata, Masood, and Sullivan without specifying which of these

Defendants he is seeking to hold liable for which actions or omissions. Indeed,

nearly all of Cloutier’s factual allegations are attributed to an “officer” or

“officers” without specifying by name the Defendant that he asserts committed

each alleged act.8 The Court previously identified this deficiency in Cloutier’s

initial Complaint and ordered Cloutier to amend, see Order (Doc. 4); however,

Cloutier has failed to correct this deficiency in the Amended Complaint.

As presented, the Court is unable to determine whether Cloutier states

a plausible claim against Defendants Pesata, Masood, and Sullivan, much less

which of the various claims he identifies related to which Defendant. And it

would be nearly impossible for these Defendants to file a cogent responsive

pleading. As such, Cloutier’s Amended Complaint will be dismissed without

prejudice with leave to amend.9 If Cloutier chooses to submit a second amended

complaint, he may proceed only on one claim or related claims that properly

may be joined under Rule 20 and that are plausible and cognizable under §

1983. Cloutier may not join multiple, unrelated claims, nor should he include

extraneous or unrelated facts.

In filing his second amended complaint, Cloutier must comply with

federal pleading standards and the instructions in this Order and must present

8 As Cloutier appears to have a video recording of the use-of-force incident, he

may be able to identify the officers involved by name. But the Court cannot review

the video recording and undertake that task for Cloutier. Not only that, at the motion

to dismiss stage, the Court is limited to analyzing the allegations in the Amended

Complaint to determine if Cloutier has properly stated a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

9 Because the Court finds that dismissal on shotgun grounds is appropriate,

the Court declines to consider Defendants’ other arguments in support of dismissal.

Indeed, without a proper pleading, the Court cannot assess whether Cloutier has

stated a claim against Defendants Pesata, Masood, or Sullivan. Nor can the Court

assess whether these Defendants are entitled to the benefit of qualified immunity.

his claims on the Court’s Civil Rights Complaint Form. Specifically, in section

II of the Civil Rights Complaint Form, labeled “Basis for Jurisdiction,” Cloutier

must identify which federal constitutional or statutory right he claims each

Defendant violated, and in the section labeled, “Statement of Claim” (section

IV), he must plainly and clearly describe how each Defendant was involved in

each alleged federal constitutional or statutory violation. In section V, labeled

“Injuries,” Cloutier should clearly state how each Defendant’s action or

omission injured him.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. Defendants Pesata, Masood, and Sullivan’s Motion to Dismiss

(Doc. 22) is GRANTED to the extent Defendants assert the Amended

Complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading. In all other respects, the

Motion is denied without prejudice.

2. Cloutier’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 5) is hereby DISMISSED

without prejudice to his right to refile a second amended complaint.

3. If Cloutier wishes to file a second amended complaint, he must do

so on or before October 11, 2024. This case number should be affixed to the

Civil Rights Complaint Form, and the words “Second Amended Complaint”

should be written at the top of the form. Cloutier’s failure to timely file a second

amended complaint or to correct the deficiencies noted here may result in the

dismissal of this action without further notice.

4, The Clerk shall send Cloutier a blank Civil Rights Complaint

Form.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 11th day of

September, 2024.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD

United States District Judge

Jax-10 9/4

Justin Charles Cloutier

Counsel of record

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