explaining that a district court has the inherent authority to dismiss a complaint as a shotgun pleading but that the Court must “sua sponte allow a litigant one chance to remedy such deficiencies”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that a district court has the inherent authority to dismiss a complaint as a shotgun pleading but that the Court must “sua sponte allow a litigant one chance to remedy such deficiencies”
- “[O]nce a pro se . . . litigant is in court, he is subject to the relevant law and rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (emphasis omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
MARY ANDREWS,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:24-cv-00257-KKM-SPF
SARASOTA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,
and SARASOTA CLASSIFIED TEACHERS ASSOCIATION,
Defendants.
___________________________________
ORDER
Mary Andrews sues her former employer, the Sarasota County School Board, for
violating Title VII. (Doc. 7). Although Andrews’s amended complaint also names the
Sarasota Classified Teachers Association as a Defendant, she has since voluntarily
dismissed her claims against the Association. (Docs. 14, 19). The Board moves either to
dismiss the amended complaint as an impermissible shotgun pleading or for a more definite
statement. (Doc. 15). Because the amended complaint is a “shotgun pleading,” dismissal is
warranted.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint include “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 10(b) provides that “[a] party must state its claims or defenses in
numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances”
and that “[i]f doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction
or occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate count.” “Complaints that violate either Rule
8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both, are often disparagingly referred to as ‘shotgun pleadings.’ ”
, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015).
Shotgun pleadings “exact an intolerable toll on the trial court’s docket.”
, 117 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 1997); , 878
F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018) (explaining that a district court has the inherent authority
to dismiss a complaint as a shotgun pleading but that the Court must “sua sponte allow a
litigant one chance to remedy such deficiencies”); , 863 F.2d 835, 837
(11th Cir. 1989) (“[O]nce a pro se . . . litigant is in court, he is subject to the relevant law
and rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (emphasis omitted)).
The four basic types of shotgun pleadings are (1) a complaint that contains multiple
counts “where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts; (2) a complaint
that is replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any
particular cause of action; (3) a complaint that fails to separate into different counts each
cause of action or claim for relief; and (4) a complaint that asserts several claims against
several defendants without specifying which defendant is responsible for which act or
omission or against which defendant the plaintiff states a claim. , 792 F.3d at
1321–23. “The unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail to
one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice
of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” , 792
F.3d at 1323 (footnote omitted).
The amended complaint is a prototypical shotgun pleading. Specifically, despite
requesting relief against two defendants, Andrews fails to “specify[] which of the
defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions or which of the defendants the claim
is brought against.” , 792 F.3d at 1323. Although the amended complaint, when
recounting facts, sometimes distinguishes between the Association and the Board,
Andrews’s substantive counts speak in more general terms. , (Doc. 7) ¶ 64. Given
Andrews’s allegation that some of the individuals involved held positions with both the
Board and the Association, , (Doc. 7) ¶ 32, more specificity is required “to give the
[Board] adequate notice of the claims . . . and the grounds upon which each claim rests,”
, 792 F.3d at 1323 (footnote omitted). That Andrews dismissed her claims against
the Association without prejudice before the Board moved to dismiss is irrelevant.
Accordingly, the Board’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 15) is GRANTED and the
amended complaint, a shotgun pleading, is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Andrews is granted leave to file a second amended complaint by September 26, 2024. If
Andrews fails to timely amend or files another shotgun pleading, an order will dismiss this
action without further notice.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on September 6, 2024.
STEVEN D. MERRYDAY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE*
* Signed by Judge Steven D. Merryday to expedite the resolution of this motion. This case remains assigned
to Judge Kathryn Kimball Mizelle.