Sansoni v. Orange County School Board

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

DANIEL SANSONI,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:24-cv-327-JSS-LHP

ORANGE COUNTY SCHOOL

BOARD,

Defendant

ORDER

This cause came on for consideration without oral argument on the following

motion filed herein:

MOTION: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

AGAINST THE DEFENDANT (Doc. No. 41)

FILED: June 19, 2024

THEREON it is ORDERED that the motion is DENIED without

prejudice.

Plaintiff Daniel Sansoni, appearing pro se, has filed the above-styled motion

for sanctions against Defendant Orange County School Board, asserting that

Defendant has committed numerous “bad acts” since inception of this litigation.

Doc. No. 41. Plaintiff relies on Defendant’s alleged failure to timely respond to

Requests for Admission (Doc. No. 41-2), the allegations of the amended complaint

(Doc. No. 35), allegations in a previously-denied motion for preliminary injunction

(Doc. No. 32), and several allegations against Defendant’s employees which appear

to be unrelated to conduct in this litigation specifically (for example, falsely stating

summer school was open on a day it was not, harassing a teacher, and taking away

a chess club). Id. In relief, Plaintiff seeks “all items in the proposed Order in the

Motion for Preliminary Injunction,” which motion for preliminary injunction was

denied without prejudice due to the filing of the amended complaint. Id. at 3. See

Doc. Nos. 32, 37. He also seeks to have financial penalties imposed against

Defendant. Doc. No. 41, at 3–4. Defendant opposes. Doc. No. 45.

Upon consideration, and without addressing the merits of the parties’

respective positions, Plaintiff’s motion is due to be denied without prejudice.

Specifically, although labeled as a motion for sanctions, the motion is in effect a

motion for preliminary injunction, as evidenced by the relief sought. See Doc. No.

41, at 3.1 But Plaintiff’s motion does not comply with the requirements set forth in

1 Plaintiff seeks: (1) “[e]nforcement of the hour per month of Occupational Therapy

which is in the Settlement Agreement”; (2) “[d]uring the length of the time of these

proceedings, the school principal and the ESE Department, other than the staffing

specialist, of the Defendant Board are not allowed to take, or make, any action affecting

the plaintiffs”; (3) “[t]he Defendant Board is precluded from firing KM’s teacher for any

Local Rule 6.02, see also Local Rule 6.01(a), (b), or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

65, or otherwise meet the standards for obtaining a preliminary injunction. See

Dimare Ruskin, Inc. v. Del Campo Fresh, Inc., No. 8:10-cv-1332-SDM-AEP, 2010 WL

2465158, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 15, 2010) (citing Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts, B.V. v.

Consorcio Barr, S.A., 320 F.3d 1205, 1210 (11th Cir. 2003) (to obtain a temporary

restraining order or preliminary injunction, a movant must show: (1) a substantial

likelihood of success on the merits; (2) an irreparable injury in the absence of the

requested injunction; (3) a threatened injury that exceeds any injury to the non-

moving party caused by the injunction; and (4) that public policy favors such an

order)).

action she did in support of KM”; (4) “[t]he second classroom taken away from KM and

his classroom should be returned to KM and his classroom”; (5) “[t]he general counsel of

the Defendant, Amy Envall, is precluded from making legal decisions on behalf of the

Board in this case”; (6) “[t]he Defendant Board is precluded from allowing the ESE

Department to have any financial control over its School Principals”; (7) “[P]laintiff

Sansoni should be eligible for attorney’s fees” and “should be granted Special Admission”;

(8) “[P]laintiffs need protection from this Defendant. As a Sanction, plaintiff seeks

extension of all time limits for 7 years until Plaintiff KM graduates from the Defendant’s

school”; (9) “Defendant should be financially penalized for its acts which the Court deems

fit with the penalty given to the plaintiffs”; (9) “[D]efendant should be required to pay for

all of plaintiff’s discovery”; and (10) “[D]efendant should be ordered to pay a penalty to

KM’s teacher.” Doc. No. 41, at 3–4. The first six requests are identical to those listed in

the denied motion for preliminary injunction, see Doc. No. 32, at 2, and the remaining four

requests are without legal support. Specifically, the only case Plaintiff cites, Chambers v.

Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991), does not support Plaintiff’s position that the majority of

sanctions he seeks are appropriate under the Court’s inherent authority for the type of

“bad faith” conduct Plaintiff alleges in the present motion.

Accordingly, the motion (Doc. No. 41) is DENIED without prejudice. See,

e.g., Benson v. Hernando Cty. Sch. Dist. Bd., No. 8:21-cv-2060-CEH-AAS, 2021 WL

4050952, at *1-2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2021) (denying plaintiff's construed motion for

temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction for failing to abide by Local

Rule 6.01 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, and for being substantively

deficient); see also David Boggs, LLC v. Soltis, No. 6:18-cv-687-Orl-37GJK, 2018 WL

3860176, at *1-2 (M.D. Fla. May 4, 2018) (denying without prejudice motion for

temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction for failure to comply with

substantially similar prior version of Middle District of Florida Local Rules and

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)).

DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on July 12, 2024.

LESLIE HOFFMAN PRICE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Parties

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