Lamar Reed Jr. v. Sheriff, Hendry County

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

TYRONE LAMAR REED JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 2:22-cv-0577-SPC-NPM

MICHAEL LUNA, in his individual

capacity, and the CITY OF FORT

MYERS,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

Before the Court are the Motions for Summary Judgment filed by the

City of Fort Myers and Defendant Michael Luna. (Docs. 90, 91). For the

following reasons, the Court denies summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

The heart of this case involves the accidental shooting of Plaintiff Tyrone

Lamar Reed Jr. by law enforcement officers at a neighborhood block party in

Hendry County. The main claims concerning Reed’s shooting, however, have

all been resolved. The only two remaining claims focus on events that occurred

in the aftermath of the shooting, specifically, the allegation that Fort Myers

police officer Michael Luna detained Reed at the hospital while he received

treatment for his injuries. Reed alleges two counts connected to this conduct:

(1) Count IX, a § 1983 false arrest claim against Officer Luna, and (2) Count

XV, a common law false imprisonment claim brought against the City of Fort

Myers. Both Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the respective

claims brought against them.

Some brief background on the shooting is relevant to the resolution of

these two motions. A little before 2:00 am on May 17, 2020, shots rang out at

the block party near Reed’s house in Hendry County. During their search for

the active shooter, Hendry County law enforcement officers shot at a man

named LaTravis Williams who disobeyed their commands and ran towards the

crowd with a gun. The officers shot Williams, but they also shot Reed, who

was near Williams but was not the intended target. Reed was shot four times,

in his back, buttocks, shoulder, and right knee. Williams was shot in the left

ankle and chest. Williams and Reed were both taken by ambulance to Lee

Memorial Hospital for treatment. After arriving at the hospital, Reed claims

he was handcuffed to his hospital bed by Fort Myers Police Department

(FMPD) Officer Michael Luna. Though he could not specifically identify the

officer who handcuffed him due to the officer’s face being covered by a black

face mask, Reed claims that the officer was wearing a black uniform and was

short and chubby.

Officer Luna was not involved in the shooting, but he was dispatched to

the hospital by FMPD to address two gunshot victims who were being

transported to Lee Memorial. Upon his arrival at the hospital, Officer Luna

asked where the two gunshot victims were located and was directed towards

the trauma room. He claims he was the first member of the FMPD to arrive.

He states that upon his arrival, Reed was in the trauma room with another

patient who was not Williams. He states that Reed was not handcuffed when

he entered the trauma room. At this point, Luna only knew that Reed was

involved in a shooting in Hendry County and understood his orders to be to

stand by with Reed until he received more information. Officer Luna testified

that it was not until his direct supervisor, Sergeant Ramy Moussa, arrived at

the hospital that he began to “guard” Reed on Sergeant Moussa’s orders.

Officer Luna does not recall handcuffing Reed to the bed but does classify

his guarding of Reed as a detention, and states that Reed was not free to leave.

He also testified that the FMPD policy is to handcuff a patient if they are a

known suspect or under arrest, but he says he does not know that he would

have handcuffed someone he was guarding on behalf of Hendry County. He

states that he eventually learned from Sergeant Moussa that Reed sustained

his injuries in an officer-involved shooting, and he claims Reed also told him

that he was shot by the police. He testifies that this is the first point at which

he had reason to suspect Reed of a crime, because he assumed the police would

not have shot Reed without probable cause to use deadly force.

Creating a significant fact dispute on this point, Sergeant Moussa denies

ever giving Officer Luna orders to guard Reed and does not recall telling Luna

any information about Reed’s involvement in the shooting. In fact, Sergeant

Moussa states he was not involved with the call whatsoever and was not at the

hospital that day. Officer Luna testified that he guarded Reed until Hendry

County Sheriff’s Office (HCSO) and Florida Department of Law Enforcement

(FDLE) arrived and took over, at which time he left the hospital.

Officer Luna testified that he had no interaction with Williams, but he

also did not specifically recall that Reed was the individual he guarded at the

hospital. The City uses this to argue that there is no evidence that Officer

Luna in fact was the officer who guarded Reed. However, circumstantial

evidence creates at least a reasonable inference that this role was undertaken

by Officer Luna. Officer Luna testified that the shooting victim he was

guarding had been shot in the right leg (which was elevated) and he would not

have been able to walk given his injuries. This description is consistent with

Reed’s leg injury. Williams’ injuries were more minor than Reed’s, as he was

grazed by a bullet in the left ankle and was discharged from the hospital later

that day. FDLE Special Agent Charles Beatty testified that he arrived at Lee

Memorial at 5:25 am on May 17, 2020 to begin his investigation into the

shooting. Beatty testified that when he arrived, Reed was in surgery and

Williams was in the trauma room being guarded by Officer Luna. However,

Officer Luna had custody of both Williams’ and Reed’s personal items, which

he turned over to Beatty. So, on this record, whether or not Officer Luna

guarded Reed is disputed.

The City also contends that it would have been impossible for Officer

Luna to have handcuffed Reed given the timeline of events. But this too is

disputed. The FMPD computer-assisted dispatch (CAD) notes reflect that

Officer Luna arrived at the hospital at 3:05 am. Reed’s medical records reflect

that he had x-rays taken from 3:06 to 3:40 am. And Reed testified that his

handcuffs were removed right before he was taken for x-rays. However, Reed’s

full testimony on the matter shows that he was likely confusing an x-ray with

a CT scan. (Doc. 94-2 at 22:1-4 (“The X-ray is the little thing you go in? . . . If

it’s the little thing you go in, when your body goes in, and it, like, rotates

around you. Yeah, I had that.”)).1 Reed’s CT scans were not performed until

3:40 am, according to medical records. And Reed’s ER nurse, Jenna Harris,

explained that unlike CT scans, x-rays are normally performed in the trauma

room as soon as a patient arrives, the machine is portable so the images can

be taken while the patient is in bed, and handcuffs wouldn’t have to be removed

to get the images. Viewing these disputed facts in Reed’s favor as the

1 Reed asserts in his response affidavit that the handcuffs were removed prior to a CT scan.

The City argues that this assertion should be disregarded because it is plainly contradicted

by his deposition testimony. The full context of Reed’s deposition testimony reveals a

possibility that he confused the two procedures. Ultimately, resolution of this issue requires

a credibility determination not appropriate for the Court to make on summary judgment.

nonmovant, he was handcuffed to the bed from the time Officer Luna arrived

at around 3:05 am until his CT scan at around 3:40 am.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence

is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Material facts are

those “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id.

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of any

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986). In deciding whether the moving party has met this initial burden,

courts must review the record and draw all reasonable inferences in a light

most favorable to the non-moving party. Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1341-

42 (11th Cir. 2002).

When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party

must then designate specific facts (by its own affidavits, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, or admissions on file) that demonstrate there is a genuine

issue for trial. Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315, 1320-1321 (11th Cir. 2006)

(citation omitted). “If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or

fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact . . . the court may

grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials . . . show that

the movant is entitled to it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

DISCUSSION

A. False Arrest Claim Against Officer Luna

The only claim brought against Officer Luna alleges that he violated

Reed’s Fourth Amendment constitutional rights by arresting him without

probable cause. Officer Luna makes the same two arguments in his summary

judgment motion that he made in his motion to dismiss: (1) that he merely

detained Reed and did not arrest him, and (2) that he is entitled to qualified

immunity. Unfortunately for Officer Luna, little has changed factually since

the Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss when the disputed evidence is

viewed in Reed’s favor.

As was the case at the dismissal stage, Officer Luna’s arguments turn

on a determination that his encounter with Reed was an investigatory

detention, rather than an arrest. “[W]here a police officer observes unusual

conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that

criminal activity may be afoot,” the officer may briefly stop the suspicious

person and make “reasonable inquiries” aimed at confirming or dispelling his

suspicions. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). Therefore, it is well-

established under the Fourth Amendment that an officer may briefly detain

and conduct a limited search of a person if the officer has, based on the totality

of the circumstances, a “reasonable suspicion” that the person has engaged in,

is engaged in or is about to engage in a crime. United States v. Acosta, 363

F.3d 1141, 1145–46 (11th Cir. 2004). This temporary detention is deemed to

be a less intrusive invasion of privacy than a formal arrest and, therefore, may

be constitutionally accomplished merely on articulable or founded suspicion of

criminal activity. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. “When the totality of circumstances

indicate that an encounter has become too intrusive to be classified as a brief

seizure, the encounter is an arrest and probable cause is required.” To

distinguish between a Terry stop and an arrest, the court examines four non-

exclusive factors: (1) the purpose of the stop; (2) the diligence with which the

agents pursued their investigation; (3) the scope and intrusiveness of the stop;

and (4) the duration of the stop. Acosta, 363 F.3d at 1146.

Here, as was the case at the pleading stage, the facts, taken in the light

most favorable to Reed, do not support Officer Luna’s contention that Reed was

merely subjected to an investigatory detention. First, Officer Luna argues that

Reed was seized by the Hendry County police officers when he was shot, and

thus, had already been detained by the time Luna encountered him. Officer

Luna contends that he merely continued the detention initiated by the Hendry

County officers for a short time to allow those officers to complete their

investigation. However, a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs “only when there

is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means

intentionally applied.” Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989). Here,

because Reed was not intentionally shot, no seizure occurred prior to Reed’s

arrival at the hospital.

Moreover, because Reed was not intentionally seized by HCSO or

suspected of any crime, HCSO never asked FMPD to detain Reed for any

investigation. Officer Luna concedes that he did nothing to further an

investigation, because he assumed it was being handled by Hendry County.

And, to the extent that Officer Luna contends that he was just following orders

from Sergeant Moussa, this is disputed by Moussa. So, there was no

investigation being pursued—diligently or otherwise.

The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Reed also shows that

his detention by Officer Luna was excessive in its scope and intrusiveness.

Given that there was no investigation of Reed underway at the time Officer

Luna guarded Reed, no valid law enforcement purpose could have been served

by detaining Reed at all. Officer Luna argues that given the nature of Reed’s

injuries, he would not have been able to leave the hospital bed regardless of

Officer Luna’s presence in the doorway or the handcuffs. However, this

argument goes to damages, not the reasonableness of Reed’s detention. Luke

v. Gulley, 50 F.4th 90, 96 (11th Cir. 2022) (“When constitutional rights are

violated, a plaintiff may recover nominal damages even though he suffers no

compensable injury.”). And, if anything, the fact that Reed was unable to walk

out of the room due to his injuries would make it more unreasonable and

intrusive for Officer Luna to have handcuffed him.

Finally, the length of time that Reed was detained is disputed in this

record. However, after resolving the disputes in Reed’s favor, he was

handcuffed for more than 30 minutes and was guarded by Officer Luna for

nearly four hours. Thus, the totality of the circumstances supports a finding

that Reed was arrested by Officer Luna.

Even if it was undisputed that the detention was merely an investigatory

stop, summary judgment would still be inappropriate because the parties

dispute whether the detention was justified. Officer Luna contends that any

detention of Reed was supported by reasonable suspicion given his knowledge

that Reed had been shot by police officers. But, setting aside the question of

whether this information alone would be sufficient to suspect Reed of a crime,

Officer Luna admits that it was not known to him when he first started

guarding Reed. And Officer Luna claims to have later gained this information

from Sergeant Moussa, but Sergeant Moussa denies ever giving it to him. Reed

attests that he told Officer Luna that he was shot by the police only after being

handcuffed. So, viewing the disputed facts in the light most favorable to Reed,

Officer Luna did not have any reasonable suspicion (or probable cause) at the

time he began guarding Reed and allegedly handcuffed him to the bed. Officer

Luna also briefly argues in a footnote that he would have been justified in

detaining Reed as a witness, but he, again, bases this argument on information

that he does not claim to have known concerning Reed’s involvement with the

shooting at the block party.

The Court rejects Officer Luna’s qualified immunity argument for the

same reasons. “Qualified immunity protects government officials performing

discretionary functions from suits in their individual capacities unless their

conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which

a reasonable person would have known.” Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290,

1298 (11th Cir. 2018). Proper application of the defense of qualified immunity

protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.” Id. In the context of a false arrest claim, “[q]ualified immunity applies

when there was arguable probable cause for an arrest even if actual probable

cause did not exist.” Burnett v. Unified Gov't of Athens-Clarke Cnty., Ga., 395

F. App’x 567, 569 (11th Cir. 2010). Arguable probable cause exists if a

reasonable officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same

information as the defendant could—not necessarily would—have believed

that probable cause was present. Brown v. City of Huntsville, Ala., 608 F.3d

724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010).

As discussed above, when all disputed evidence is resolved in Reed’s

favor, Officer Luna entered the trauma room and handcuffed Reed to the

hospital bed on his own accord, with no reason to suspect him of a crime and

with no investigation being pursued. He then left Reed handcuffed for at least

30 minutes and stood guard in the doorway until Reed was taken for surgery.

While these may not be the actual facts of the case, they are the facts the Court

must accept at the summary judgment stage. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188,

1190 (11th Cir. 2002). And no reasonable officer could have believed probable

cause existed under these circumstances. And the Eleventh Circuit’s binding

precedent clearly establishes that an arrest made without arguable probable

cause violates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches

and seizures. See Skop v. City of Atlanta, GA, 485 F.3d 1130, 1144 (11th Cir.

2007) (holding that where the resolution of disputed critical facts determines

on which side of the arguable probable cause line the officer’s conduct fell,

summary judgment is inappropriate). As such, Officer Luna’s Motion is due to

be denied.

B. False Imprisonment Claim Against the City

The other remaining claim is Reed’s claim of false imprisonment brought

against the City of Fort Myers. The elements of a cause of action for false

imprisonment are: (1) the unlawful detention and deprivation of liberty of a

person (2) against that person's will (3) without legal authority or “color of

authority” and (4) which is unreasonable and unwarranted under the

circumstances. Mathis v. Coats, 24 So. 3d 1284, 1289 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).

While closely related, false imprisonment is broader than false arrest; a false

arrest is just one of several methods of committing false imprisonment. Id.

The City presents three arguments for summary judgment, all of which fail.

First, the City contends that there is no evidence that Officer Luna is the

officer who participated in the false imprisonment of Reed. The City suggests

that it would be impossible for Officer Luna to have handcuffed Reed given the

timeline of Officer Luna’s arrival at the hospital and the timing of Reed’s x-

rays as documented in his medical records. However, as discussed above, when

viewed in the light most favorable to Reed, the record contains sufficient

circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that it

was Officer Luna who guarded and handcuffed Reed. At the very least, there

is a triable issue of fact that precludes summary judgment in the City’s favor

on this point.

Second, the City argues that any detention of Reed by Officer Luna

would have been lawful and warranted under the circumstances given Officer

Luna’s knowledge that Reed was shot by the police. But again, whether Officer

Luna possessed this knowledge at the time he guarded and handcuffed Reed is

disputed. So, this argument for summary judgment fails as well.

Finally, the City requests summary judgment because it argues that

Officer Luna is entitled to qualified immunity. But the City lacks standing to

assert the defense of qualified immunity on Officer Luna’s behalf. Qualified

immunity is a defense available only to individuals sued in their individual

capacity. Owen v. City of Indep., Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980). Nevertheless,

the Court already explained why qualified immunity is not available to Officer

Luna at this stage of the proceedings. Therefore, the City’s Motion is due to be

denied.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. Defendant City of Fort Myers’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

90) is DENIED.

2. Defendant Michael Luna’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 91)

is DENIED.

3. This case is REFERRED to United States Magistrate

Judge Nicholas P. Mizell to conduct a settlement conference and issue

any order deemed appropriate. All parties must attend the

settlement conference as directed by Judge Mizell. On or before July

10, 2024, the parties must contact Judge Mizell’s chambers at 239-

461-2170 to arrange for a mutually agreeable date and time for the

settlement conference.

DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on July 3, 2024.

tite POLSTER otal

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies: Counsel of record

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