Rodriguez v. Beamer

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 6:24-cv-539-RMN

JOHN D.W. BEAMER,

Defendant.

ORDER

This cause comes before the Court for consideration without oral

argument on Defendant John D.W. Beamer’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 34), filed

May 17, 2024. Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, did not oppose the motion

and the time to do so has passed.1

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

Defendant, who is a Circuit Judge for Florida’s Ninth Judicial Circuit. See

Dkt. 33 (“Am. Compl.”) ¶ 5. The Amended Complaint alleges that on

February 6, 2024, Judge Beamer was presiding over a matter in a public

courtroom. Id. Plaintiff was in the courtroom and attempted to record the

1 With the parties’ consent, this case was assigned to me to conduct all

proceedings and enter judgment. Dkts. 23, 24.

proceedings “for press purposes.” Id. For doing this, Judge Beamer found

Plaintiff in contempt and ordered Plaintiff’s arrest and detention. Id. ¶ 6.

The Amended Complaint also alleges that Judge Beamer issued a bench

warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest. Am. Compl. ¶ 8. Judge Beamer allegedly ordered

Plaintiff’s arrest because Plaintiff did not appear for a hearing in his contempt

proceeding, as required. Id. The Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff did

not appear because he did not receive the court’s notice, which was mailed to

his former residence. Id.

Lastly, the Amended Complaint alleges that Judge Beamer is not

presiding over his contempt proceeding promptly. Am. Compl. ¶ 10. Plaintiff

contends that Judge Beamer has taken no action in his contempt case in more

than 175 days. Id.

Based on these allegations, the Amended Complaint asserts three

claims: a violation of the First Amendment; a violation of the Fourth

Amendment; and a violation of the Sixth Amendment. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11–13.

Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that Judge Beamer’s actions violated

one or more of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights as well as compensatory and

punitive damages. Id. § 5 (Prayer for Relief).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint may be

dismissed if the facts alleged do not state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Factual allegations in a complaint need not

be detailed but “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even

if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564–65 (2007)

(internal citations and emphasis omitted).

Although it must accept well-pled facts as true, the Court need not accept

legal conclusions, threadbare recitals of elements of a cause of action, or

conclusory statements. Id. at 678. In evaluating the sufficiency of a pleading,

the Court must make reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor but is “not

required to draw plaintiff’s inference.” Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce,

N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005). Similarly, “unwarranted

deductions of fact” in a complaint are not admitted as true to test the

sufficiency of plaintiff’s allegations. Id.

Additionally, though a pro se litigant’s allegations are entitled to the

benefit of liberal construction, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972),the

Court does not have “license . . . to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by

a pro se litigant] in order to sustain an action.” GJR Invs. v. Cnty. of Escambia,

Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678–80.

III. DISCUSSION

The Court will first address Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the motion

and then the merits of the motion’s first substantive argument, which is

dispositive.

A. Plaintiff’s Failure to Oppose the Motion

Plaintiff did not file an opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff was cautioned that failure to respond to a motion may result in the

Court considering the motion to be unopposed. Dkt. 26. Local Rule 3.01(c) also

contains this warning. Despite these warnings, Plaintiff did not oppose the

motion. Thus, the Court treats the motion as unopposed and decides the

“motion on the papers before [it].” Woodham v. Am. Cystoscope Co. of Pelham,

N. Y., 335 F.2d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 1964).

B. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint

Plaintiff’s claims center on actions taken by a state court judge while the

judge was presiding in a state courtroom. Defendant contends he is shielded

from Plaintiff’s claims by absolute judicial immunity. Dkt. 34 at 4–5. The

application of the doctrine of absolute immunity is a question of law. See Brown

v. Crawford County, Ga., 960 F.2d 1002, 1012 (11th Cir. 1992).

As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, “[j]udges are entitled to absolute

judicial immunity from damages for those acts taken while they are acting in

their judicial capacity unless they acted in the ‘clear absence of all

jurisdiction.’” Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting

Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000). A judge acts in his judicial

capacity by performing normal judicial functions, either in chambers or in open

court, in cases that are pending before the court. Id. And plaintiffs cannot use

Section 1983 to circumvent this immunity or as a device to seek collateral

review of a state court conviction. Id.

The immunity of judges from liability to damages is “solidly established.”

Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199 (1985). The immunity applies even if

the “judge’s acts are in error, malicious, or were in excess of his or her

jurisdiction.” Sibley, 437 F.3d at 1067. This is so because “judges should be at

liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of

consequences.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). Indeed, as the

Supreme Court noted many years ago, a judge “should not have to fear that

unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or

corruption.” Id.

Courts apply a two-part test. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 &

361–62 (1978). First, did the judge act in his judicial capacity? Id. at 362. If so,

then did the judge act in the “‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Id. at 357, 98

S.Ct. at 1105

As to judicial capacity, immunity “flows not from rank or title or ‘location

within the Government,’ but from the nature of the responsibilities of the

individual official.” Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293, 1301–02 (11th Cir. 2017)

(quoting Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 201). Courts apply a functional approach. Id.

They consider factors such as (a) the need to ensure that the individual can

perform his functions without harassment or intimidation, (b) the presence of

safeguards that reduce the need for private damages actions as a way to control

unconstitutional conduct, (c) insulation from political influence; (d) the

importance of precedent, (e) the adversary nature of the process, and (f) the

correctability of error on appeal. Id.

Judge Beamer’s alleged actions fall well within the core ground covered

by these factors. Judge Beamer’s decision to hold Plaintiff in contempt while

presiding over a matter in court establishes that the action arose directly and

immediately out of his duties as a judicial officer. See McAlester v. Brown, 469

F.2d 1280, 1282 (1972). The alleged acts—holding a person in contempt of

court, the issuance of a bench warrant, and the scheduling of matters for trial—

are acts normally performed by a judge that are judicial in nature. Stump v.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 361 (1978); see also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12–

13 (1991) (concluding a judge was immune from liability for allegedly

authorizing police officers to use excessive force to hale an attorney into

courtroom); King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding magistrate

judge was absolutely immune for directing a police officer to effect warrantless

arrest); Emory v. Peeler, 756 F.2d 1547, 1553 (11th Cir. 1985) (state judge

questioning a juror in open court is a judicial act); McAlester, 469 F.2d at 1280

(state judge who issued contempt citation entitled to judicial immunity). And

allegations that acts occurred in court or in connection with a court proceeding

provide context for the final factor: the parties’ expectations. Being in a public

courtroom during an ongoing proceeding or the defendant in a contempt

proceeding is strong evidence that one expects to encounter a judicial officer

acting in a judicial capacity.

Given this, do the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint suggest Judge

Beamer acted in “clear absence of all jurisdiction”? This phrase has been

interpreted to mean immunity is precluded in only those circumstances “in

which a judge acts purely in a private and non-judicial capacity,” Henzel v.

Gerstein, 608 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1979), in a matter that is “clearly outside

the judge’s subject matter jurisdiction.” Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 948

(11th Cir. 1985).

The facts alleged in the Amended Complaint make clear that Judge

Beamer was not acting in a private or non-judicial capacity. He allegedly

addressed Plaintiff’s behavior while presiding over an ongoing court

proceeding. He issued a warrant for Plaintiff’s failure to appear. And he was

managing his docket and the scheduling of Plaintiff’s trial. Cf. Overcash v.

Shelnutt, 753 F. App’x 741, 743 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding the application of

administrative judicial-assignment rules by Florida state judges is a judicial

act entitle to immunity). Further, as a Circuit Judge in the Ninth Judicial

Circuit of Florida, Judge Beamer had the authority and jurisdiction under

Florida law as the presiding judge to prohibit Plaintiff from videorecording

court proceedings See, e.g., Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 566 (1981)

(under Florida law, the judge presiding over a court proceeding controls

whether a court proceeding may be recorded).2 Judge Beamer also had

jurisdiction over the claims in his court, and had not only the authority, but

also the obligation, to adjudicate those claims and address the conduct of

individuals in his courtroom. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Coleman, 681 F.2d 1302, 1306

(11th Cir. 1982) (noting that, when conduct occurs in the presence of a judge

and obstructs ongoing proceedings, a court may summarily adjudge a

contemptor guilty of criminal contempt); McAdams v. King, No. 1:17-cv-21,

2017 WL 4810622, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 25, 2017) (holding hearings is a

function normally performed by a judge).

As the Eleventh Circuit has said, a “judge is absolutely immune from

suit in performing his judicial responsibilities.” Sun v. Forrester, 939 F.2d 924,

2 Moreover, state laws that place reasonable restrictions on the way members

of the press report on court proceedings, such as those in Florida, are lawful

and do not infringe on the First Amendment. See United States v. Hasting, 695

F.2d 1278 (11th Cir. 1983) (federal rules contain reasonable restrictions on the

recording and broadcast of court proceedings, and such rules do not violate the

news media’s rights under the First Amendment or the defendant’s right under

the Sixth Amendment to a public trial).

925 (11th Cir. 1991). Judge Beamer is therefore entitled to absolute judicial

immunity from all civil liability for the alleged acts. See Drees v. Ferguson, 396

F, App’x 656, 658-59 (11th Cir. 2010).

The Court also finds that it is unnecessary to permit Plaintiff to amend

his complaint again. No amendment will cure the deficiency discussed in this

order. Any amended claims brought against Judge Beamer based on the

alleged judicial acts would be barred. See Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161,

1163 (11th Cir. 2001) (where a pro se party’s amendment would be futile, the

district court may deny leave to amend).

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, itis ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:

1. Defendant John D.W. Beamer’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 34) is

GRANTED;

2. This action is dismissed with prejudice; and

3. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate all pending motions

and close the case.

DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, on June 21, 2024.

yd sry

ROBERT M. NORWAY

United States Magistrate Judge

-9-

Copies to:

Counsel of Record

Christopher Rodriguez, No. 540868

Osceola County Corrections

P.O. Box 9127

Seminole, Florida 33775