“A settlement following sufficient discovery and genuine arms- 12 length negotiation is presumed fair.”
How later courts described this case
- “A settlement following sufficient discovery and genuine arms- 12 length negotiation is presumed fair.”
- “Indeed, ‘courts have routinely enhanced the lodestar to reflect the risk of 9 non-payment in common fund cases.’”
- “An attorney who has created a common 19 fund for the benefit of the class is entitled to reimbursement of reasonable litigation costs 20 from that fund.”
- explaining that the 22 district court need not ensure all class members receive actual notice, only that “the best 23 practicable notice” is given
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
9
10
ITXAMAR HERNANDEZ, on behalf of Case No.: 22-cv-01910-H-DEB
11
herself and all other similarly situated,
12 ORDER:
Plaintiff,
13
v. (1) CERTIFYING SETTLEMENT
14 CLASS;
ARTHUR J. GALLAGHER SERVICE
15 COMPANY, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company; PRONTO (2) GRANTING FINAL APPROVAL
16
CALIFORNIA AGENCY LLC, a OF CLASS ACTION
17 California limited liability company; SETTLEMENT; AND
PRONTO CALIFORNIA GENERAL
18
AGENCY, LLC, a California limited (3) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
19 liability company; and DOES 1-50, REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS’
FEES, COSTS, AND A CLASS
20 Defendants.
REPRESENTATIVE INCENTIVE
21 AWARD
22
[Doc. No. 58.]
23
On July 29, 2024, Plaintiff Itxamar Hernandez filed an unopposed motion for final
24
approval of class action settlement. (Doc. No. 58.) The Court held a final approval hearing
25
on August 26, 2024. Jonathan Melmed and Laura Supanich appeared for Plaintiff. Joan
26
B. Fife and Emilie C. Woodhead appeared for Defendants Arthur J. Gallagher Service
27
Company (“Arthur J. Gallagher”) and Pronto Auto Insurance Services, Inc., Pronto
28
1 California Agency LLC, and Pronto California General Agency LLC (collectively
2 “Pronto”). No class members filed an objection and no objectors appeared at the final
3 approval hearing. For the reasons below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for final
4 approval of class action settlement, and the Court grants Plaintiff’s requests for attorneys’
5 fees, costs, and a class representative incentive award.
6 Background
7 I. Factual and Procedural Background
8 This is a wage and hour class action. Defendant Arthur J. Gallagher is a global
9 insurance brokerage and risk management services firm operating throughout California,
10 with its headquarters in Illinois. (Doc. No. 49-2, Melmed Decl. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff asserts that
11 Defendant Arthur J. Gallagher is the owner of Defendant Pronto. (Id.)
12 Plaintiff is a citizen of California and at all relevant times worked for Defendants in
13 California as a non-exempt sales agent from around January 2020 through October 2023.
14 (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ non-exempt California employees experienced
15 various violations of California’s wage-and-hour laws due to Defendants’ policies and
16 practices. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 26-38.)
17 On October 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed a class action complaint against Defendants in
18 the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego.1 (Doc. No. 1-2, Compl.) On
19 December 2, 2022, Defendant Arthur J. Gallagher removed the action to the United States
20 District Court for the Southern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and
21 1446 on the basis of jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C.
22 § 1332(d).2 (Doc. No. 1, Notice of Removal.)
23 On April 4, 2023, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint against Defendants.
24
25 1 In the original complaint, Defendant Pronto was initially named as “Pronto Auto
Insurance Services, Inc.” (Doc. No. 1-2, Compl. at 1.)
26
2 On December 29, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand the action back to state
27
court. (Doc. No. 8.) On January 23, 2023, Plaintiff withdrew her motion to remand. (Doc.
28 No. 12.)
1 (Doc. No. 21.) On June 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”)
2 against Defendants, alleging claims for: (1) failure to pay all minimum wages; (2) failure
3 to pay all overtime wages; (3) failure to provide rest periods and pay missed rest period
4 premiums; (4) failure to provide meal periods and pay missed meal period premiums; (5)
5 failure to maintain accurate employment records; (6) failure to pay wages timely during
6 employment; (7) failure to pay all wages earned and unpaid at separation; (8) failure to
7 indemnify all necessary business expenditures; (9) failure to furnish accurate itemized
8 wage statements; (10) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”),
9 California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200-17210; and (11) penalties under
10 California’s Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”), California Labor Code § 2699 et
11 seq.3 (Doc. No. 35, SAC ¶¶ 82-135.) On June 30, 2023, Defendants filed an answer to
12 Plaintiff’s SAC. (Doc. No. 39.)
13 On September 29, 2023, the parties participated in a full-day mediation with a
14 mediator with extensive experience in California wage and hour class action lawsuits.
15 (Doc. No. 49-2, Melmed Decl. ¶ 24.) The mediation negotiations were contentious, but
16 the parties were eventually able to reach the broad terms of a settlement agreement. (Id.)
17 On November 9, 2023, the parties notified the Court that they had reached a
18 settlement in principle. (Doc. No. 45.) On February 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed an unopposed
19 motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement. (Doc. No. 49.) On April 8,
20 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion and: (1) certified the class for settlement
21 purposes; (2) preliminarily approved the class action settlement; (3) appointed a class
22
23
3 On April 4, 2024, pursuant to the parties’ joint motion, the Court granted Plaintiff
24
leave to file a Third Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 51.) Plaintiff’s third amended
25 complaint, including the modifications discussed at the April 8, 2024 hearing, is due by
April 11, 2024. (Id. at 2.) The filing of this third amended complaint is part of the parties’
26
settlement agreement. (See Doc. No. 49-2, Melmed Decl. ¶ 25, Ex. A, Settlement § 12.1.)
27 In addition, at the April 8, 2024 hearing, the parties agreed and represented that Plaintiff’s
filing of her third amended complaint should not affect the Court’s approval of Plaintiff’s
28
1 representative, class counsel, and a settlement administrator; (4) approved the class notice;
2 and (5) scheduled a final approval hearing. (Doc. No. 54 at 18.) The Court appointed
3 Plaintiff as class representative, Melmed Law Group P.C. as class counsel, and ILYM
4 Group Inc. (“ILYM”) as the settlement administrator. (Id.) On April 11, 2024, pursuant
5 to the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement and to encompass the scope of the agreed-
6 upon settlement, Plaintiff filed a third amended complaint. (Doc. No. 56; see also Doc.
7 No. 50.)
8 By the present motion, Plaintiff moves for final approval of the class action
9 settlement. (Doc. No. 58-1.) In addition, Plaintiff requests attorneys’ fees, costs, and a
10 class representative incentive award. (Id.)
11 II. The Settlement Agreement
12 On January 23, 2024, the parties finalized the settlement agreement. (See Doc. No.
13 49-2, Melmed Decl. ¶ 24, Ex. A, Settlement Agreement.) The settlement agreement
14 defines the settlement class as: “all individuals who are or were employed by the Gallagher
15 Entities as non-exempt employees in California during the Class Period.”4 (Doc. No. 49-
16 2, Melmed Decl. Ex. A, Settlement Agreement § 1.5.) “Class Period” is defined as “the
17 period from October 28, 2018 until the date the Court grants Preliminary Approval.” (Id.
18 § 1.12.)
19 Under the settlement agreement, Defendant will pay a gross settlement amount of
20 $4,000,000. (Id. § 3.1.) Each settlement class member will receive an individual class
21
22
4 The parties’ settlement agreement defines “Gallagher Entities” as “any and all
23 entities that are encompassed within the corporate umbrella of Arthur J. Gallagher & Co.,
including but not limited to Arthur J. Gallagher & Co.; Arthur J. Gallagher Service
24
Company, LLC; Arthur J. Gallagher Service Company, Inc.; Pronto California Agency
25 LLC; Pronto California General Agency LLC; Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. Insurance
Brokers of California, Inc.; Arthur J. Gallagher Risk Management Services, Inc.; Gallagher
26
Basset Services, Inc.; Risk Placement Services, Inc.; Gallagher Benefit Services, Inc.;
27 Arthur J. Gallagher Brokerage & Risk Management Services, LLC; Arthur J. Gallagher
(U.S.) LLC; and Premier Insurance Services, Inc.” (Doc. No. 49-2, Melmed Decl. Ex. A,
28
1 payment calculated by “(a) dividing the Net Settlement Amount by the total number of
2 Workweeks worked by all Participating Class Members during the Class Period and (b)
3 multiplying the result by each Participating Class Member’s Workweeks.” (Id. § 3.2.4.)
4 Under the settlement agreement, upon the funding of the gross settlement amount by
5 Defendants, every participating class member will release Defendants from the “Released
6 Class Claims,” which is defined as “any and all claims, known or unknown, that were
7 asserted in any complaint in the Action and/or Plaintiff’s PAGA Notices; as well as any
8 and all claims, known or unknown, that could have been asserted against Defendants and/or
9 any of the Gallagher Entities in any complaint in the Action or Plaintiff’s PAGA Notices
10 based on the facts and allegations alleged in any complaint in the Action and/or Plaintiff’s
11 PAGA Notices.” (Id. §§ 1.42, 5.2.) In addition, Defendants will be released from the
12 Released PAGA Claims, which is defined in the agreement as “any and all claims, known
13 or unknown for civil penalties under California Labor Code section 2698 et seq. (PAGA)
14 that: were asserted in any complaint in the Action and/or Plaintiff’s PAGA Notices; as well
15 as any and all claims, known or unknown, that could have been asserted against Defendants
16 and/or any of the Gallagher Entities in any complaint in the Action or Plaintiff’s PAGA
17 Notices based on the facts and allegations alleged in any complaint in the Action and/or
18 Plaintiff’s PAGA Notices.” (Id. §§ 1.43, 5.3.)
19 In the settlement agreement, Plaintiff indicates that she intends to seek a class
20 representative’s service payment of up to $7,500.00 from the settlement fund. (Id. § 3.2.1.)
21 Class counsel also intends to request an attorneys’ fee award of $1,333,333.33, or one-third
22 of the gross settlement fund, as well as litigation expenses of up to $20,000.00. (Id. §
23 3.2.2.)
24 In the present motion, Plaintiff seeks the following distribution of the $4,000,000.00
25 gross settlement amount: (1) $1,333,333.33 in attorneys’ fees; (2) $14,537.42 in litigation
26 costs; (3) $23,000.00 in settlement administration costs; (4) a $7,500.00 representative
27 incentive award for Plaintiff; (5) a $150,000.00 PAGA payment, apportioned 75%
28 ($112,500.00) to the Labor Workforce and Development Agency (“LWDA”) and 25%
1 ($37,500.00) to aggrieved employees; and (6) a net settlement amount of $2,471,629.25.
2 (Doc. No. 58-1 at 2; Doc. No. 58-4, Snow Decl. ¶ 15.) Class counsel estimates that the
3 average payment to participating class members will be $1,056.70 and the average PAGA
4 payment to aggrieves employees will be $24.59. (Doc. No. 58-1 at 3; Doc. No. 58-4, Snow
5 Decl. ¶ 15.)
6 III. Class Notice
7 The Court appointed ILYM as the settlement administrator for the action. (Doc. No.
8 54 at 18.) On April 8, 2024, ILYM received the Court approved class notice packet from
9 class counsel. (Doc. No. 58-4, Snow Decl. ¶ 4.) ILYM then prepared a draft of the
10 formatted notice packet, which was approved by the parties’ counsel prior to mailing. (Id.)
11 On May 6, 2024, ILYM received the class data file from counsel for Defendants,
12 which contained the name, social security number, last known mailing address, the number
13 of workweeks worked for each settlement class member during the class period and the
14 number of pay periods worked for each aggrieved employee during the PAGA period. (Id.
15 ¶ 5.) The class list contained 2,342 individuals. (Id.) Prior to mailing the notice packets,
16 all 2,342 names and addresses contained in the class list were then processed against the
17 National Change of Address (“NCOA”) database, maintained by the United States Postal
18 Service (“USPS”), for purposes of updating and confirming the mailing addresses of the
19 settlement class members. (Id. ¶ 6.)
20 On May 13, 2024, ILYM mailed the notice packets, via U.S First Class Mail, to all
21 2,342 individuals contained in the class list. (Id. ¶ 7.) As of July 29, 2024, 146 notice
22 packets have been returned to ILYM. (Id. ¶ 8.) Of the 146 returned notice packets, four
23 were returned with a forwarding address and the notice packets were promptly re-mailed
24 to those forwarding address provided. (Id.) ILYM performed a computerized skip trace
25 on the remaining 142 returned notice packets in an effort to obtain updated addresses. (Id.)
26 As a result of this skip trace, 80 updated addresses were obtained and notice packets were
27 promptly re-mailed to those settlement class members, via U.S. First Class Mail. (Id.) In
28 addition, one settlement class member contacted ILYM to request that a notice packet be
1 remailed to them. (Id.) ILYM has deemed 62 notice packets undeliverable as no updated
2 addresses were found notwithstanding the skip tracing. (Id. ¶ 10.)
3 As of July 29, 2024, ILYM has received no objections to the settlement and three
4 requests for exclusion. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) ILYM has received four disputes from settlement
5 class members. (Id. ¶ 13.) Those four disputes were forwarded to defense counsel for
6 review and have been resolved. (Id.) ILYM reports that there is currently 2,339
7 participating class members, which represents a 99.87% participation rate.5 (Id. ¶ 14.)
8 Discussion
9 I. Final Certification of Settlement Class
10 The Court previously found that all the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil
11 Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) had been met in its order preliminarily certifying the class.
12 (Doc. No. 54 at 10.) Given that no substantive issues concerning class certification have
13 been raised since the Court granted preliminary approval of the settlement class, the Court
14 incorporates its prior analysis by reference, (id. at 6–10), and finds that final class
15 certification for settlement is appropriate. The Court certifies the following as the class
16 members: “all individuals who are or were employed by the Gallagher Entities as non-
17 exempt employees in California during the Class Period.”6 (See Doc. No. 58-2, Melmed
18
19
5 In addition to the class notice, on February 29, 2024, class counsel submitted the
20 settlement agreement to the LWDA pursuant to California Labor Code § 2699(l)(2). (Doc.
No. 58-2, Melmed Decl. ¶ 32, Ex. D.) And, on July 29, 2024, Defendant gave notice
21
regarding the settlement to the United States and California Attorney Generals as required
22 by PAGA and CAFA. (Id. ¶¶ 30-31.)
23 6 “Gallagher Entities” is defined as “any and all entities that are encompassed within
the corporate umbrella of Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., including but not limited to Arthur J.
24
Gallagher & Co.; Arthur J. Gallagher Service Company, LLC; Arthur J. Gallagher Service
25 Company, Inc.; Pronto California Agency LLC; Pronto California General Agency LLC;
Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. Insurance Brokers of California, Inc.; Arthur J. Gallagher Risk
26
Management Services, Inc.; Gallagher Basset Services, Inc.; Risk Placement Services, Inc.;
27 Gallagher Benefit Services, Inc.; Arthur J. Gallagher Brokerage & Risk Management
Services, LLC; Arthur J. Gallagher (U.S.) LLC; and Premier Insurance Services, Inc.” (See
28
1 Decl. Ex. A, Settlement Agreement § 1.5.)
2 II. Final Approval of Class Action Settlement
3 Class action settlements must be approved by the district court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
4 Specifically, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(1)–(5) requires a district court
5 to: (1) ensure notice is sent to all class members; (2) hold a hearing and make a finding that
6 the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate; (3) confirm that the parties seeking
7 approval file a statement identifying the settlement agreement; and (4) be shown that class
8 members were given an opportunity to object. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)–(5).
9 Class counsel filed the settlement agreement on February 29, 2024 and an addendum
10 to the settlement agreement on April 8, 2024. (See Doc. No. 49-2, Melmed Decl. Ex. A,
11 Settlement Agreement; Doc. No. 52.) In addition, class members were given an
12 opportunity to object to the settlement by June 27, 2024. (Doc. No. 58-4, Snow Decl. ¶
13 12.) As of July 29, 2024, no objections have been received by the settlement administrator.
14 (See id.) Following the final fairness hearing, the Court evaluates the adequacy of notice
15 and conducts its final review of the settlement.
16 A. Adequacy of Notice
17 Adequate notice of the class settlement must be provided under Federal Rule of Civil
18 Procedure 23(e). “While Rule 23 requires that ‘reasonable effort’ be made to reach all
19 class members, it does not require that each individual actually receive notice.” Winans v.
20 Emeritus Corp., No. 13-cv-03962-HSG, 2016 WL 107574, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2016);
21 see also Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449, 1453–54 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the
22 district court need not ensure all class members receive actual notice, only that “the best
23 practicable notice” is given).
24 The Court previously reviewed the content of the class notice, the method for
25 providing notice, and the procedure for class members to opt out or object at the
26 preliminary approval stage and found each to be satisfactory under Rule 23(c)(2)(B) and
27 Rule 23(c)(3). (See Doc. No. 54 at 15–17.) Following the Court’s grant of preliminary
28 approval, on May 6, 2024, ILYM – the settlement administrator – received the class data
1 file from Defendants, which included mailing addresses for 2,342 unique class members
2 from Defendants. (Doc. No. 58-4, Snow Decl. ¶ 5.) After confirming and updating those
3 addresses against the National Change of Address database maintained by the United States
4 Postal Service, on May 13, 2024, ILYM mailed the notice packets to the 2,342 class
5 members via U.S. First Class Mail. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.) ILYM represents that a total of 62 notice
6 packets have been deemed undeliverable because ILYM found no updated address despite
7 performing skip tracing. (Id. ¶¶ 8-10.) As of July 29, 2024, ILYM has received three
8 requests for exclusion. (Id. ¶ 11.) As such, 99.87% (2,339/2,342) of the class is
9 participating in the settlement. (Id. ¶ 13.) Given the above, the Court finds that ILYM
10 provided adequate notice per the Court’s preliminary approval order, (see Doc. No. 54 at
11 15-17), and satisfied Rule 23(e).
12 B. Final Fairness Determination
13 A proposed class settlement can only be approved if “it is fair, reasonable, and
14 adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). In making this determination, district courts in the
15 Ninth Circuit consider several factors, including: “(1) the strength of the plaintiff’s case;
16 (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of
17 maintaining class action status throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered in settlement;
18 (5) the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience
19 and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental participant; and (8) the reaction
20 of class members to the proposed settlement.” Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 959
21 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotations omitted). A proposed settlement must additionally meet the
22 factors enumerated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2)(A)–(D).
23 “In deciding whether to approve a proposed settlement, the Ninth Circuit has a
24 ‘strong judicial policy that favors settlements, particularly where complex class action
25 litigation is concerned.’” In re Heritage Bond Litigation, No. 2-ML-01475 DT, 2005
26 WL 1594403, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2005) (quoting Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle,
27 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1991)). Further, the Ninth Circuit favors deference “to the
28 private consensual decision of the [settling] parties,” particularly when the parties are
1 represented by experienced counsel. Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 965
2 (9th Cir. 2009). Nevertheless, when “class counsel negotiates a settlement agreement
3 before the class is even certified,” settlement approval “requires a higher standard of
4 fairness and a more probing inquiry than may normally be required under Rule 23(e).”
5 Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citations
6 omitted). As such, courts must also scrutinize proposed settlements for “evidence of
7 collusion or other conflicts of interest.” In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654
8 F.3d 935, 946–47 (9th Cir. 2011).
9 1. The Strength of Plaintiff’s Case and the Risk of Further Litigation
10 Both parties have expended significant time, effort, and resources supporting their
11 positions, and they would continue to do so if the settlement failed to receive final approval.
12 Here, Plaintiff’s primary claim stems from Defendants’ alleged consistent policy of
13 rounding shift start and end times, which Plaintiff contends is unlawful. (Doc. No. 58-1 at
14 9.) Plaintiff alleged that she and the class members worked certain hours for which they
15 were not paid due to Defendants’ unlawful rounding policy. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleged
16 that when Defendants paid overtime to Plaintiff and the class members, Defendants did not
17 pay overtime at the proper rate. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleged that Defendants’ employees
18 were required to work through their meal periods and rest periods, and that they were
19 required to use their personal cell phones and personal devices for work purposes without
20 any corresponding reimbursement. (Id.)
21 In response to Plaintiff’s claims, Defendants maintained (and continues to maintain)
22 that they have complied with California law in all respects, denied all liability of any kind
23 associated with the claims and allegations, and further denied that the employees are
24 entitled to any relief. (Doc. No. 58-2, Melmed Decl. ¶ 12.) Defendants also deny that
25 these allegations are appropriate for class or representative treatment for any purpose other
26 than the settlement. (Id.) Defendants thus argued that their realistic exposure was
27 effectively $0. (Id.)
28 Class counsel represents that continued litigation in this case would be costly, time
1 consuming, and uncertain in outcome. (Id. ¶ 13.) And there is always a risk of the class
2 not being certified and/or being decertified or of losing on the merits on the principal and/or
3 the derivative claims. (Id.) Class counsel represents that the settlement agreement here
4 ensures timely relief and a substantial recovery of the amounts that Plaintiff contends are
5 owed to the class members. (Id.) See Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship, 151 F.3d 1234,
6 1242 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[I]t is the very uncertainty of outcome in litigation and avoidance
7 of wasteful and expensive litigation that induce consensual settlement.” (internal quotation
8 marks and citation omitted)). In light of the above, the Court concludes that the strength
9 of the parties’ positions as well as the risk of further litigation weigh in favor of approving
10 the settlement.
11 2. The Settlement Amount
12 In determining whether a settlement agreement is substantively fair to the class,
13 courts must balance the value of the plaintiffs’ expected recovery against the value of the
14 settlement offer. In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1080 (N.D.
15 Cal. 2007). The Ninth Circuit has cautioned that “the proposed settlement is ‘not to be
16 judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might have been achieved by
17 the negotiators.’” Martinez v. Semi-Tropic Coop. Gin & Almond Huller, Inc., No. 19-cv-
18 01581-JLT-CDB, 2023 WL 3569906, at *14 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2023) (emphasis removed)
19 (quoting Officers for Just. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n of City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 688
20 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted)).
21 Here, the parties agreed to settle all claims for a gross settlement amount of
22 $4,000,000.00. (Doc. No. 58-1 at 2.) After deducting for fees, costs, the incentive award,
23 and PAGA payments, the net settlement amount offered to the class members totals
24 approximately $2,471,629.25. (Id.) The average recovery for each class member will be
25 $1,056.70 and the highest payout will be $3,743.29. (Id. at 3.) This settlement amount is
26 reasonable when compared with other wage and hour settlements approved in recent years
27 by California federal courts. See e.g., Sarabia v. Ricoh USA, Inc., No. 820–CV–00218–
28 JLS–KES, 2023 WL 3432160, at *1, 5 (C.D. Cal. May 1, 2023) (finding wage and hour
1 class action settlement with an average net payout of $1,119 per class member reasonable);
2 Mondrian v. Trius Trucking, Inc., No. 119–CV–00884–ADA–SKO, 2022 WL 6226843, at
3 *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2022) (determining wage and hour class and collective action
4 settlement reasonable where average class member received $1,528.81).
5 This settlement is a good result for the class and eliminates the risks, expenses, and
6 delay associated with continued litigation. Moreover, the gross settlement amount is the
7 result of arm’s-length negotiation conducted by experienced counsel and an experienced
8 mediator. See Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 966 (“We put a good deal of stock in the product of
9 an arms-length, non-collusive, negotiated resolution.”). As such, the Court concludes that
10 the amount offered in settlement weighs in favor of granting final approval of the
11 settlement.
12 3. The Extent of Discovery Completed and the Stage of the Proceedings
13 The parties’ settlement was the result of contentious arms-length negotiations and
14 was reached after the parties participated in a full-day mediation with an experienced
15 mediator who has extensive experience in California wage and hour class action lawsuits.
16 (Doc. No. 49-2, Melmed Decl. ¶¶ 6, 24.) Prior to that mediation, Plaintiff’s counsel
17 conducted significant informal discovery, including:
18 numerous telephonic conferences with Plaintiff; inspection and analysis of
hundreds of pages of documents and other information produced by Plaintiff
19
and Defendant; analysis of work-related data from a sample of Class Members
20 and PAGA Class Members; and an analysis of the legal positions taken by
Defendant; investigation into the viability of class treatment of the claims
21
asserted in the action; analysis of potential class-wide damages, including
22 information sufficient to understand Defendant’s potential defenses to
Plaintiff’s claims; research of the applicable law with respect to the claims
23
asserted in the amended complaint and the potential defenses thereto; and
24 assembling and analyzing of data for calculating damages.
25 (Id. ¶ 23.) Class counsel represents that, based upon the record that was developed through
26 this investigation and informal discovery process, Plaintiff’s counsel was able to
27 realistically estimate class damages and assess the risks of further litigation before reaching
28 the settlement. (Doc. No. 58-2, Melmed Decl. ¶ 14.)
1 Considering this history, the record supports the conclusion that the parties
2 conducted sufficient discovery to allow them to make an informed decision to settle this
3 case. See Yanez v. HL Welding, Inc., No. 20-cv-01789-MDD, 2021 WL 3054986, at *7
4 (S.D. Cal. July 20, 2021) (“The use of an experienced private mediator and presence of
5 discovery supports the conclusion that Plaintiffs were armed with sufficient information
6 about the case to broker a fair settlement.” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Uschold
7 v. NSMG Shared Servs., LLC, 333 F.R.D. 157, 170 (N.D. Cal. 2019))); Ontiveros v.
8 Zamora, 303 F.R.D. 356, 371 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (“[T]he parties’ apparent careful
9 investigation of the claims and their resolution in consideration of the views of a third party
10 mediator weigh in favor of settlement.”); Couser v. Comenity Bank, 125 F. Supp. 3d 1034,
11 1042 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (“A settlement following sufficient discovery and genuine arms-
12 length negotiation is presumed fair.”). As such, this factor also weighs in favor of granting
13 final approval of the settlement.
14 4. The Experience and Views of Counsel
15 Class counsel has extensive experience acting as counsel in wage and hour class
16 actions. (See Doc. No. 58-2, Melmed Decl. ¶¶ 7-12, Ex. B.) Class counsel represents that
17 he believes the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable and in the best interest
18 of the class members. (Id. ¶ 16.) Class counsel’s expertise and sound support of the
19 settlement weighs in favor of granting final approval. See In re Immune Resp. Sec. Litig.,
20 497 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1174 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (The parties’ “negotiation and adoption of
21 the settlement terms, based on their familiarity with the law in this practice area and the
22 strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions, suggests the reasonableness of the
23 settlement. This factor clearly favors settlement.”); see also Blount v. Host Healthcare,
24 Inc., No. 21-cv-00310-MMA, 2022 WL 1094616, at *3 (S.D. Cal. April 12, 2022) (“Great
25 weight is accorded to the recommendation of counsel,” because “parties represented by
26 competent counsel are better positioned than the courts to produce a settlement that fairly
27 reflects each party’s expected outcome in the litigation” (citations and internal quotations
28 omitted)).
1 5. Presence of a Government Participant
2 No government entity participated in this case. However, the proposed settlement
3 will result in $150,00.00 in PAGA penalties, $112,500.00 of which will be paid to the
4 LWDA. (Doc. No. 58-1 at 2; Doc. No. 58-4, Snow Decl. ¶ 15; Doc. No. 58-2, Melmed
5 Decl. Ex. A, Settlement Agreement § 1.37.) Class counsel provided notice and a copy of
6 the settlement to the LWDA prior to filing Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval.
7 (Doc. No. 58-1 at 6-7; Doc. No. 58-2, Melmed Decl. ¶¶ 30-32.) To date, the LWDA has
8 not made any objections to the proposed settlement. Because the class shares civil penalties
9 with the State of California, this factor weighs in favor of final approval of the settlement.
10 See Cordova v. BAE Sys. Tech. Sols. & Servs., Inc., No. 20-CV-2425 JLS (MDD), 2022
11 WL 298365, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2022) (weighing PAGA penalties in favor of
12 settlement approval and collecting cases).
13 6. The Reaction of the Class Members to the Proposed Settlement
14 There are 2,342 class members. (Doc. No. 58-4, Snow. Decl. ¶ 5.) As of July 29,
15 2024, no class members have objected, and only three class members have requested
16 exclusion from the class. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) In addition, ILYM received four disputes from
17 settlement class members, and all four disputes have been resolved. (See id. ¶ 13.) The
18 complete lack of objections and minimal exclusions indicates the adequacy of the
19 settlement. See Benitez v. W. Milling, LLC, No. 1:18-CV-01484-SKO, 2020 WL
20 3412725, at *7 (E.D. Cal. June 22, 2020) (“[I]t is established that the absence of a large
21 number of objections to a proposed class action settlement raises a strong presumption that
22 the terms of a proposed class settlement action are favorable to the class members.”)
23 (citation omitted). As such, the class members’ reaction weighs in favor of granting final
24 approval.
25 7. No Signs of Collusion
26 The collusion inquiry addresses the possibility that the agreement is the result of
27 either overt misconduct by the negotiators or improper incentives of certain class members
28 at the expense of other members of the class. Staton, 327 F.3d at 960. The Ninth Circuit
1 has articulated the following as “subtle signs” of collusion, including: (1) “when counsel
2 receive a disproportionate distribution of the settlement, or when the class receives no
3 monetary distribution but class counsel are amply rewarded”; (2) “when the parties
4 negotiate a ‘clear sailing’ arrangement providing for the payment of attorneys’ fees
5 separate and apart from class funds”; and (3) “when the parties arrange for fees not awarded
6 to revert to defendants rather than be added to the class fund.” In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d
7 at 947 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
8 Here, there is no evidence of overt misconduct nor any indication of collusion.
9 Every class member will receive a monetary distribution, and the requested attorneys’ fees
10 are reasonable considering the record and the time spent by class counsel. See Order infra
11 Section III.A. There is no clear sailing arrangement as part of the parties’ settlement
12 agreement. (See generally Doc. No. 58-2, Melmed Decl. Ex. A, Settlement Agreement.)
13 Additionally, the fund is non-reversionary, meaning that none of the funds will revert to
14 Defendants. (See Doc. No. 58-1 at 3.) Finally, the proposed settlement was the result of
15 significant arms-length negotiations between experienced counsel with a respected
16 mediator after years of litigation. See Mauss v. NuVasive, Inc., Case No. 13cv2005 JM
17 (JLB), 2018 WL 6421623, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2018) (finding no collusion based on
18 extensive litigation, counsel’s experience, and the parties’ participation in mediation).
19 8. Approval Conclusion
20 After considering all applicable factors, the Court concludes the settlement is “fair,
21 reasonable, and adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2); Staton, 327 F.3d at 960. As such, the
22 Court approves the settlement.
23 III. Final Approval of PAGA Penalties
24 The settlement agreement resolves claims brought under PAGA. (Doc. No. 58-2,
25 Melmed Decl. Ex. A, Settlement Agreement §§ 1.37, 1.43, 5.3.) “A PAGA representative
26 action is . . . a type of qui tam action” where a private plaintiff pursues a dispute between
27 an employer and the California LWDA as the proxy or agent of the state. Haralson v. U.S.
28 Aviation Servs. Corp., 383 F. Supp. 3d 959, 971 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Cal. Lab. Code §
1 2699(a). “[B]ecause a settlement of PAGA claims compromises a claim that could
2 otherwise be brought by the state,” courts must “review and approve any [PAGA]
3 settlement.” Ramirez v. Benito Valley Farms, LLC, No. 16-CV-04708-LHK, 2017 WL
4 3670794, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2017); see Cal. Lab. Code § 2699 (l)(2). Proposed
5 settlements must also be submitted to the LWDA.7 See Cal. Lab. Code § 2699 (l)(2). No
6 binding authority sets forth the proper standard of review for PAGA settlements; however,
7 California district courts often apply “a Rule 23-like standard, asking whether the
8 settlement of the PAGA claims is ‘fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable in light of
9 PAGA’s policies and purposes.’” Arredondo v. Sw. & Pac. Specialty Fin., Inc., No.
10 118CV01737DADSKO, 2022 WL 2052681, at *9 (E.D. Cal. June 7, 2022) (quoting
11 Haralson, 383 F. Supp. 3d at 972).
12 Here, the settlement agreement provides for $150,000.00 in civil PAGA penalties.
13 (Doc. No. 58-1 at 2; Doc. No. 58-4, Snow Decl. ¶ 15; Doc. No. 58-2, Melmed Decl. Ex.
14 A, Settlement Agreement § 1.37.) Pursuant to PAGA, 75% of the civil PAGA penalties,
15 or $112,500, will go to the LWDA, and 25%, or $37,500, will be distributed proportionally
16 to all PAGA Members. (Id.) See also Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(i). This amount of PAGA
17 penalties represents 3.75% of the gross settlement amount. In addition, there have been no
18 objections to the settlement from the LWDA or class members. (Doc. No. 58-4, Snow
19 Decl. ¶ 12.) As such, the Court finds that the settlement agreement’s $150,000.00 PAGA
20 penalty is reasonable, fundamentally fair, and adequate. See Alcala v. Meyer Logistics,
21 Inc., No. CV177211PSGAGRX, 2019 WL 4452961, at * 9 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2019)
22 (collecting cases in which courts approved PAGA penalties between 0 and 2% of the gross
23 settlement amount).
24 / / /
25
26
27 7 Class counsel provided notice and a copy of the settlement to the LWDA prior to
filing Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement. (Doc. No. 58-
28
1 IV. Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Incentive Payment to Class Representative
2 Having granted final approval of the settlement, the Court now turns to class
3 counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees, costs, and an incentive payment to the class
4 representative. Here, class counsel requests $1,333,333.33 in attorneys’ fees, $14,537.42
5 in litigation costs, and $7,500 as an incentive award for the class representative. (Doc. No.
6 58-1 at 14, 15, 22.)
7 A. Attorneys’ Fees
8 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h), “[i]n a certified class action, the
9 court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law
10 or by the parties’ agreement.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). However, “courts have an
11 independent obligation to ensure that the award, like the settlement itself, is reasonable,
12 even if the parties have already agreed to an amount.” In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 941.
13 With respect to the attorneys’ fees, “[t]he typical range of acceptable attorneys’ fees
14 in the Ninth Circuit is 20% to 33 1/3% of the total settlement value, with 25% considered
15 the benchmark” in common fund cases. Vasquez v. Coast Valley Roofing, Inc., 266
16 F.R.D. 482, 491 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Stanger v. China Elec. Motor, Inc., 812 F.3d 734, 738
17 (9th Cir. 2016). This “benchmark percentage should be adjusted, or replaced by a lodestar
18 calculation, when special circumstances indicate that the percentage recovery would be
19 either too small or too large in light of the hours devoted to the case or other relevant
20 factors.” Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th
21 Cir. 1990). Regardless of whether courts use the percentage approach or the lodestar
22 method, the main inquiry is whether the end result is reasonable. Powers v. Eichen, 229
23 F.3d 1249, 1258 (9th Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit has identified several factors that may
24 be relevant in determining if the award is reasonable, including: (1) the results achieved;
25 (2) the risks of litigation; (3) the skill required and the quality of work; (4) the contingent
26 nature of the fee; (5) the burdens carried by class counsel; and (6) the awards made in
27 similar cases. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1048–50 (9th Cir. 2002).
28 Here, class counsel requests an award of $133,333,333.33 in attorneys’ fees to be
1 paid from the gross settlement amount. (Doc. No. 58-1 at 15.) The requested amount of
2 attorneys’ fees is one-third (33 1/3%) of the total settlement fund of $4,000,000. (See id.
3 at 2.) This is a higher percentage than the Ninth Circuit’s 25% benchmark for common
4 fund cases. Nevertheless, class counsel achieved an overall award that was quite favorable,
5 and the risks of continuing to litigate this case were real and substantial. See supra Order
6 Section II.B.1. Moreover, class counsel took this case on a contingent fee basis, bearing
7 the entire risk and cost of litigation. (See Doc. No. 58-1 at 18.) Further, class members
8 received notice of the requested attorneys’ fees award, and no class members have
9 objected. (Id. at 16; see Doc. No. 58-4, Snow Decl. ¶ 12.) And the requested fee award is
10 in line with what other district courts in this Circuit have awarded in cases where class
11 counsel took the case on contingency and no class member objected. See, e.g., Taylor v.
12 Populus Grp., LLC, No. 20-CV-0473-BAS-DEB, 2023 WL 139898, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan.
13 9, 2023) (“[C]ourts in this district have approved 33.3% attorneys’ fees in wage and hour
14 class action settlements.”); Anthony Ayala v. U.S Xpress Enterprises, Inc., No. EDCV 16-
15 137-GW-KKX, 2023 WL 6559786, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2023) (approving 33% fee
16 award in wage and hour class action where class counsel took the case on contingency and
17 no class member objected); Ochinero v. Ladera Lending, Inc., No.
18 SACV191136JVSADSX, 2021 WL 4460334, at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 19, 2021) (approving
19 33% fee award from common fund settlement where counsel took the case on contingency
20 and no class member objected); see also Arredondo, 2022 WL 2052681, at *12-15
21 (approving 30% fee award from common fund wage and hour settlement where counsel
22 took the case on contingency and there were no “objections to the settlement or requests
23 for exclusions”).
24 Finally, as a cross-check, class counsel represents that the fees calculated under the
25 lodestar method would be $92,286.00. (Doc. No. 58-1 at 21; Doc. No. 58-2, Melmed Decl.
26 ¶¶ 21-28.) Thus, the amount class counsel requests ($1,333,333.33) is approximately 14.45
27 times what class counsel would receive under the lodestar method ($92,286). See In re
28 Bluetooth., 654 F.3d at 944–45 (encouraging district courts to cross-check their
1 calculations under the percentage-of-recovery method against the lodestar method).
2 Although this is a hefty multiplier, it is within the accepted range for common fund cases
3 where class counsel took the case on a contingency fee arrangement. See Vizcaino, 290
4 F.3d at 1051 n.6 (affirming multiplier of 3.65 in a common fund case and noting that the
5 multiplier range for common fund cases examined was 0.6 to 19.6); Craft v. Cnty. of San
6 Bernardino, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (collecting common fund cases
7 with multipliers over 5.2, including multipliers of 19.6 and 15.6); see also Vizcaino, 290
8 F.3d at 1051 (“Indeed, ‘courts have routinely enhanced the lodestar to reflect the risk of
9 non-payment in common fund cases.’”).
10 B. Costs
11 Class counsel represents to the Court that they incurred litigation expenses in the
12 amount of $14,537.42. (Doc. No. 58-1 at 22; Doc. No. 58-2, Melmed Decl. ¶ 29, Ex. C.)
13 This amount is below the $20,000 upper limit set forth in the parties’ settlement agreement
14 and preliminarily approved by the Court. (See Doc. No. 58-2, Melmed Decl., Ex. A,
15 Settlement Agreement § 3.2.2; Doc. No. 54 at 14-15.) “‘Class Counsel are entitled to
16 reimbursement of the out-of-pocket costs that they reasonably incurred investigating and
17 prosecuting [the] case.’” Taylor, 2023 WL 139898, at *4; see Carlin v. DairyAmerica,
18 Inc., 380 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1023 (E.D. Cal. 2019) (“An attorney who has created a common
19 fund for the benefit of the class is entitled to reimbursement of reasonable litigation costs
20 from that fund.”). “The award ‘should be limited to typical out-of-pocket expenses that
21 are charged to a fee-paying client and should be reasonable and necessary.’” Carlin, 380
22 F. Supp. 3d at 1023 (quoting In re Immune Response Sec. Litig., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1166,
23 1177 (S.D. Cal. 2007)).
24 After reviewing class counsel’s declaration regarding expenses, the Court concludes
25 that the requested litigation expenses are reasonable, and grants class counsel’s request for
26 those fees. As such, the Court grants Plaintiff’s request for $14,537.42 in litigation costs.
27 / / /
28 / / /
1 C. Incentive Award to Class Representative
2 Class counsel requests a $7,500 incentive award for the class representative. (Doc.
3 No. 58-1 at 14.) “The criteria courts may consider in determining whether to make an
4 incentive award include: (1) the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, both
5 financial and otherwise; (2) the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class
6 representative; (3) the amount of time and effort spent by the class representative; (4) the
7 duration of the litigation and; (5) the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class
8 representative as a result of the litigation.” Cox v. Clarus Mktg. Grp., LLC, 291
9 F.R.D. 473, 483 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (citations omitted).
10 After reviewing these factors, the Court concludes that the requested incentive award
11 is fair and reasonable. Throughout the litigation, Plaintiff regularly conferred with class
12 counsel to discuss the status of the case, to offer her input, and to assist the attorneys in
13 gathering the evidence necessary to prosecute her claims. (Doc. No. 58-3, Hernandez Decl.
14 ¶ 4.) In addition, in preparation for mediation, Plaintiff participated in multiple discussions
15 with her attorneys regarding the job duties and daily activities at her job site. (Id. ¶ 5.)
16 Further, Plaintiff’s participation in the case as the named plaintiff required her to assume
17 risks, including but not limited to potential reputational harm of having her name affiliated
18 with an employment lawsuit and the potential resulting stigma from future prospective
19 employers. (Id. ¶ 9.) Finally, the $7,500 incentive award requested is well within the
20 acceptable range awarded in similar cases. See Gutierrez v. Amplify Energy Corp., No.
21 8:21-CV-01628-DOCJDEX, 2023 WL 6370233, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2023) (“Service
22 awards of $7,500 or larger are often awarded in this Circuit.”); see, e.g., Fulford v.
23 Logitech, Inc., No. 08-CV-02041, 2010 WL 807448, at *3 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (collecting
24 cases awarding incentive payments ranging from $5,000 to $40,000). As such, the Court
25 grants Plaintiff’s request for an incentive award of $7,500.
26 / / /
27 / / /
28 / / /
1 Conclusion
2 For the reasons above, the Court grants Plaintiffs motion. The Court has
3 || jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action and all parties to the action, including the
4 ||settlement class members. First, the Court certifies the settlement class and grants final
5 || approval of the settlement, including the PAGA payment. All persons who satisfy the class
6 || definitions and did not opt out of the settlement classes by the deadline are class members
7 ||bound by this Order. The form and method of notice satisfied the requirements of the
8 || Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the United States Constitution. Second, the Court
9 ||grants class counsel $1,333,333.33 in attorneys’ fees and $14,537.42 in documented
10 || out-of-pocket litigation expenses. The Court also grants $23,000.00 in costs to the
11 |/}settlement administrator. Further, the Court grants Plaintiff an incentive award of
12 ||$7,500.00. The attorneys’ fees, costs, and incentive award will be paid out of the settlement
13 || fund.
14 IT IS SO ORDERED.
15 || DATED: August 26, 2024 | | |. | |
16 MARILYN W. HUFF, Distri ge
17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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