McKinnie v. City of San Diego

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 JOHN MCKINNIE, an individual, Case No.: 3:24-cv-00827-H-SBC

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT

13 v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO’S MOTION

TO DISMISS

14 CITY OF SAN DIEGO, a municipality;

OFFICER HOFFSTETTER (Badge

15 [Doc. No. 4.]

No. 5773), an individual; and DOES 1-50,

16 inclusive,

17 Defendants.

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19 On May 29, 2024, Defendant City of San Diego (the “City” or “Defendant”) filed a

20 motion to dismiss Plaintiff John McKinnie’s (“Plaintiff”) first amended complaint pursuant

21 to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 4.) On June 17, 2024, Plaintiff

22 filed a response in opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 5.) On June

23 24, 2024, the City filed a reply. (Doc. No. 6.) On August 15, 2024, the City and Plaintiff

24 filed a joint motion to continue the hearing on Defendant’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. No.

25 15.) On August 19, 2025, the Court, pursuant to its discretion under Local Rule 7.1(d)(1),

26 submitted the motion on the parties’ papers. (Doc. No. 16.) For the reasons below, the

27 Court denies Defendant City of San Diego’s motion to dismiss.

28 / / /

1 BACKGROUND

2 The following factual background is taken from the allegations in Plaintiff’s first

3 amended complaint. Plaintiff is a Black man over the age of fifty. (Doc. No. 3 ¶ 8, First

4 Amended Complaint (“FAC”).) On July 6, 2023, Plaintiff alleges that he was pulled over

5 by San Diego Police Department (“SDPD”) Officer Hoffstetter (Badge No. 5773) because

6 Plaintiff was allegedly on probation. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff, however, claims that he was not

7 on probation. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that there was “never any indication that [he]

8 had violated any traffic laws to necessitate the stop.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he was then

9 ordered to get out of his vehicle. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff complied with this request and was

10 immediately handcuffed and searched. (Id.) Plaintiff was “detained for some time,” but

11 was ultimately let go. (Id. ¶ 11.) “No charges were ever filed, nor any citations issued as

12 a result of this encounter.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that “[b]ut for [his] race, [his] rights

13 would not have been trampled on by the police.” (Id. ¶ 13.) As a result of this encounter,

14 Plaintiff alleges that he suffered economic and non-economic damages including, but not

15 limited to, emotional distress, pain, and suffering. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 42, 56, 60, 71.)

16 On April 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants City of San Diego

17 (the “City”), San Diego Police Department, Officer Hoffstetter (Badge No. 5773), and

18 David Nisleit in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego. (Doc. No. 1-2.)

19 On May 9, 2024, Defendants removed Plaintiff’s action from the Superior Court of

20 California, County of San Diego to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 on the basis of

21 original federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction

22 under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. (Doc. No. 1.) On September 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed a first

23 amended complaint only against the City and Officer Hoffstetter (Badge No. 5773),

24 alleging claims for: (1) false arrest, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) false imprisonment, 42 U.S.C. §

25 1983; (3) failure to properly screen and hire, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) failure to properly train,

26 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (5) failure to properly supervise and discipline, 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (6)

27 maintaining an unconstitutional policy of making illegal traffic contacts without reasonable

28 suspicion or probable cause and “contacting, detaining, searching, and arresting citizens

1 based on unlawful racial profiling,” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (7) intentional infliction of

2 emotional distress; and (8) violations of the Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. (See Doc.

3 No. 3, FAC.) By the present motion, the City moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s third, fourth,

4 fifth, sixth, and eighth causes of action in his first amended complaint pursuant to Federal

5 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1 (Doc. No. 4.)

6 DISCUSSION

7 I. LEGAL STANDARDS

8 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

9 sufficiency of the pleadings and allows a court to dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has

10 failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Conservation Force v.

11 Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732

12 (9th Cir. 2001)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading that states

13 a claim for relief contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

14 is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The function of this pleading requirement is

15 to “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it

16 rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v.

17 Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

18 A complaint will survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if it contains “enough

19 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial

20 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

21 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.

22 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a

23 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting

24 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

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27 1 At the time the City filed its motion to dismiss, the City informed the Court that

Plaintiff had not served Defendant Officer Hoffstetter (Badge No. 5773). (Doc. No. 4-1 at

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1 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “While legal conclusions

2 can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”

3 Id. at 679. Accordingly, dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper where the claim

4 “lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.”

5 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008); see Los

6 Angeles Lakers, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 2017).

7 In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a district court must “‘accept the

8 factual allegations of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable

9 to the plaintiff.’” Los Angeles Lakers, 869 F.3d at 800 (quoting AE ex rel. Hernandez v.

10 Cty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012)). But a court need not accept “legal

11 conclusions” as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Further, it is improper for a court to assume

12 the claimant “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated

13 the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc.

14 v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). In addition, a court may

15 consider documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and items that are proper

16 subjects of judicial notice. See Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th

17 Cir. 2010). If the court dismisses a complaint for failure to state a claim, it must then

18 determine whether to grant leave to amend. See Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497

19 (9th Cir. 1995). “A district court should grant leave to amend . . . unless it determines that

20 the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Id.

21 II. ANALYSIS

22 The City moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss with

23 prejudice Plaintiff’s third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth causes of action in the first

24 amended complaint. (Doc. No. 4.) Specifically, the City argues that Plaintiff’s first

25 amended complaint contains conclusory allegations and insufficient factual information

26 regarding Plaintiff’s claims for failure to properly screen and hire, failure to properly train,

27 failure to properly supervise and discipline, Monell violation for making illegal traffic

28 contacts, and violations of the Bane Act. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 5.)

1 A. Plaintiff’s Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action Under § 1983

2 and Monell

3 In the first amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts four causes of action against the City

4 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for: (1) failure to properly screen and hire (Count III); (2) failure

5 to properly train (Count IV); (3) failure to properly supervise and discipline (Count V); and

6 (4) “maintain[ing] a custom, policy, or practice . . . of making inappropriate and illegal

7 traffic contacts despite lacking reasonable suspicion or probable cause” and “contacting,

8 detaining, searching and arresting citizens based on unlawful racial profiling” (Count VI).

9 (Doc. No. 3, FAC ¶¶ 36–60.)

10 “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured

11 by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged

12 deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins,

13 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under

14 color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or

15 causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,

16 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

17 injured in an action at law . . . .”). Local governments can be sued under § 1983, but not

18 under a respondeat superior liability theory. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S.

19 397, 403 (1997). In other words, the City cannot be liable under § 1983 solely because it

20 employs a tortfeasor employee. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).

21 Rather, Plaintiff must demonstrate the alleged constitutional deprivation was the product

22 of a City policy, practice, or custom. Brown, 520 U.S. at 403; City of Canton v. Harris,

23 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989); Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91.

24 To impose Monell liability on a municipality under Section 1983, “four conditions .

25 . . must be satisfied . . . : (1) that the plaintiff possessed a constitutional right of which he

26 was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to

27 deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the

28 moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Dietrich v. John Ascuaga’s Nugget, 548

1 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835

2 (9th Cir.1996)).

3 “A plaintiff can satisfy Monell’s policy requirement in one of three ways.” Gordon

4 v. Cnty. of Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 973 (9th Cir. 2021). “First, a local government may be

5 held liable when it acts ‘pursuant to an expressly adopted official policy.’” Id. (quoting

6 Thomas v. County of Riverside, 763 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2014)). “Second, a public

7 entity may be held liable for a ‘longstanding practice or custom.’” Gordon,

8 6 F.4th at 973 (quoting Thomas, 763 F.3d at 1170). For example, “[a] policy of inaction

9 or omission may be based on failure to implement procedural safeguards to prevent

10 constitutional violations.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1143–44 (9th Cir.

11 2012) (lack of police safeguards to distinguish between trespassers and invitees in a Las

12 Vegas casino resulting in the wrongful arrest of lawful invitees was a policy of omission).

13 And third, a plaintiff can show that “‘the individual who committed the constitutional tort

14 was an official with final policy-making authority,’” or that “such an official ‘ratified a

15 subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.’”

16 Gordon, 6 F.4th at 974 (quoting Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346–47 (9th Cir.

17 1992)).

18 “‘[D]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a

19 municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Connick v.

20 Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). “[W]hen city policymakers are on actual or

21 constructive notice that a particular omission in their training program causes city

22 employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights, the city may be deemed deliberately

23 indifferent if the policymakers choose to retain that program.” Id. (citing Bd. of Cnty.

24 Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997)). “The city’s policy of

25 inaction in light of notice that its program will cause constitutional violations is the

26 functional equivalent of a decision by the city itself to violate the Constitution.” Id. at 61–

27 62 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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1 1. Failure to Properly Screen and Hire (Claim III)

2 In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges against the City a claim for failure to properly screen

3 and hire police officers, including Officer Hoffstetter, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No.

4 3, FAC ¶¶ 36-42.) A claim for failure to properly screen and hire is assessed under the

5 “deliberate indifference” standard. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown,

6 520 U.S. 397, 398 (1997). “Deliberate indifference” in screening and hiring exists “only

7 where adequate scrutiny of the applicant’s background would lead a reasonable

8 policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of the decision to hire the

9 applicant would be the deprivation of a third party’s federally protected right.” Id.

10 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s failure to properly screen and hire claim fails

11 because Plaintiff does not provide sufficient facts about the City’s hiring practices or

12 Officer Hoffstetter’s background to support an allegation that the City was “deliberately

13 indifferent” in its screening and hiring processes. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 7–8.) Plaintiff responds

14 that “the complete lack of probable cause or reasonable suspicion” to justify Officer

15 Hoffstetter’s alleged stop and search of Plaintiff, as well as Defendants’ alleged “racial

16 profiling,” “can only be the product of poor screening and hiring practices,” so that “it can

17 easily be inferred that the City’s negligent hiring and screening practices were the moving

18 force” behind the alleged illegal stop and search of Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 5 at 9–10.)

19 Drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiff, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to

20 state a claim that the City failed to properly screen and hire. Accordingly, the Court

21 declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s failure to properly screen and hire claim at the pleading stage.

22 See, e.g., Foster v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 11-CV-1953-H (BGS), 2011 WL 13152845, at

23 *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2011) (denying dismissal of failure to properly screen and hire claim

24 where Plaintiff argued the Court could draw an inference that the officers were not properly

25 screened for hiring based on the circumstances of alleged misconduct in complaint).

26 Defendant’s arguments are best suited for a motion for summary judgment when the record

27 is more fully developed.

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1 2. Failure to Properly Train (Claim IV)

2 In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges against the City a claim for failure to properly train

3 police officers “necessary to educate the officers as to the Constitutional rights of

4 arrestees,” and as to “the consistent and systematic use of inappropriate intimidation,

5 discrimination, and racially-profiling tactics.” (Id. ¶¶ 43-49.) “To allege a failure to train,

6 a plaintiff must include sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference (1) of a

7 constitutional violation; (2) of a municipal training policy that amounts to a deliberate

8 indifference to constitutional rights; and (3) that the constitutional injury would not have

9 resulted if the municipality properly trained their employees.” Benavidez v. Cnty. of San

10 Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2021); see also Kirkpatrick v. Cnty. of Washoe,

11 843 F.3d 784, 793 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he government’s omission must amount to a

12 ‘policy’ of deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.”) Because “deliberate

13 indifference” is a “stringent standard,” Connick 563 U.S. at 61, “[a] pattern of similar

14 constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate

15 deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Id. at 62 (quoting Bd. of Cnty.

16 Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)).

17 The City first argues that Plaintiff’s claim for failure to properly train should be

18 dismissed because Plaintiff fails to adequately allege the City’s training policy amounts to

19 deliberate indifference to constitutional rights. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 9.) Here, Plaintiff’s FAC

20 cites four studies detailing alleged discriminatory policing by SDPD. (Doc. No. 3, FAC ¶¶

21 15-22.) Plaintiff argues that these statistics illustrate a “pattern demonstrat[ing] that the

22 municipality has shown a deliberate indifference to the rights of people of color in San

23 Diego,” and at this stage in the litigation, “must be taken as true and all reasonable

24 inferences are to be drawn from them.” (Doc. No. 5 at 11–12 (citing Navarro v. Block,

25 250 F. 3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).) The Court agrees with Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges a

26 pattern of unconstitutional violations beyond the single incident of one officer’s alleged

27 misconduct sufficient to allege deliberate indifference to constitutional rights. (See Doc.

28 No. 3, FAC ¶¶ 15-22.)

1 Next, the City asserts that Plaintiff does not allege that the City had notice regarding

2 alleged deficiencies in its training program. (Id.) But, a plaintiff “does not need to prove

3 notice at this stage[.]” Astorga v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 321CV00463BENKSC, 2022

4 WL 1556164, at *8 (S.D. Cal. May 17, 2022); see also Hendrix v. City of San Diego, 2021

5 WL 3892671, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2021) (“On a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff need

6 not prove that the supervisors had ‘notice that the training on the use of force was

7 inadequate and consciously chose not to implement or improve the training.’”) (quoting

8 Santos Garcia v. San Bernardino Sheriff's Dep’t, 2020 WL 8365260, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Dec.

9 8, 2020)).

10 Drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiff, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to

11 state a claim that the City failed to properly train police officers. Accordingly, the Court

12 declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s failure to properly train claim at the pleading stage. See,

13 e.g., Foster, 2011 WL 13152845, at *2 (denying dismissal of failure to properly train claim

14 where Plaintiff argued the Court could draw an inference that the officers were not properly

15 trained based on the circumstances of alleged misconduct in complaint). Again,

16 Defendant’s arguments are best suited for a motion for summary judgment when the record

17 is more fully developed.

18 3. Failure to Properly Supervise and Discipline (Claim V)

19 In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges against the City a claim for failure to properly supervise

20 and discipline police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “in order to prevent the consistent

21 and systematic use of inappropriate intimidation, discrimination, and racially-profiling

22 tactics.” (Doc. No. 3, FAC ¶¶ 50-56.) “A failure to supervise gives rise to § 1983 liability

23 . . . only in those situations where there is a history of wide-spread abuse. Only then may

24 knowledge be imputed to the supervisory personnel.” Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d

25 932, 936 (4th Cir. 1983) (cited with approval in City of Canton, 489 U.S. at

26 398 (O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., concurring and dissenting in part)).

27 The City argues that Plaintiff’s FAC “only includes . . . conclusory allegations” and

28 “does not allege any specific prior incidents of failing to supervise or discipline police

1 officers for alleged ‘consistent and systematic use of inappropriate intimidation,

2 discrimination, and racially-profiling tactics’ in similar scenarios.” (Doc. No. 4-1 at 12

3 (citing Doc. No. 3, FAC ¶ 51).) Plaintiff’s FAC cites four studies, three of which are from

4 2016-2020, detailing alleged discriminatory policing by SDPD. (See Doc. No. 3, FAC ¶¶

5 15–22.) Drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiff, these allegations of discriminatory

6 policing over a four-year period are sufficient to plead a “history of wide-spread abuse” to

7 state a failure to supervise claim. See e.g., Wellington 717 F.2d at 936; see also Rendon

8 v. Fresno Police Dep’t, 2005 WL 1925859, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2005) (“Plaintiff need

9 not satisfy all of the requirements [of failure to supervise claim] set forth above at the

10 motion to dismiss stage.”).

11 Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s failure to properly supervise

12 and discipline at the pleading stage. See, e.g., Foster, 2011 WL 13152845, at *2 (denying

13 dismissal of failure to properly supervise and discipline claim where Plaintiff argued the

14 Court could draw an inference that the officers were not properly supervised and

15 disciplined based on the circumstances of alleged misconduct in complaint); see also

16 Rendon, 2005 WL 1925859, at *5 (denying motion to dismiss failure to supervise claim

17 where plaintiff alleged that City of Fresno negligently trained, staffed, supervised,

18 controlled, and disciplined defendants, leading to plaintiff’s injuries). Defendant’s

19 arguments are best suited for a motion for summary judgment when the record is more

20 fully developed.

21 4. Conducting Traffic Stops Without Reasonable Suspicion or

22 Probable Cause (Claim VI)

23 In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges the City committed a Monell violation of “making

24 inappropriate and illegal traffic contacts despite lacking reasonable suspicion or probable

25 cause,” resulting in “excessive force, falsely arresting, and otherwise burdening citizens.”

26 (Doc. No. 3, FAC ¶¶ 57–58.) The FAC also alleges that the City “maintained an

27 unconstitutional policy with respect to contacting, detaining, searching and arresting

28 citizens based on unlawful racial profiling” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. ¶ 60.)

1 Defendant argues that Plaintiff “does not and cannot show” that the City had “an

2 actual recorded policy or a persistent and widespread practice” of making illegal traffic

3 stops, using excessive force, or of falsely arresting. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 13.) Defendant further

4 argues that the “Plaintiff’s use of the four studies/reports fails to support their Monell

5 claim” of the City’s alleged deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of the

6 individuals with whom its police officers are likely to come into contact. (Id.) Plaintiff

7 responds that to state a Section 1983 claim, he need not allege an official written policy,

8 but rather that he has fulfilled the required elements by alleging “a widespread practice of

9 constitutional violations that constituted an unspoken policy . . . of targeting Black citizens

10 who are or were on probation.” (Doc. No. 5 at 13.)

11 Plaintiff does not need to allege a recorded policy, but rather can allege a

12 “longstanding practice or custom” to satisfy Monell’s policy requirement. See Gordon, 6

13 F.4th at 973. Here, the four studies cited in the FAC (Doc. No. 3, FAC ¶¶ 15–21) “suggest

14 that SDPD discriminates based on race and color with regard to traffic stops and

15 prosecutions.” Whyte v. City of San Diego, 2022 WL 17491178, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 7,

16 2022). Plaintiff alleges that his “experience proves to be in line with SDPD’s documented

17 patterns and practices” as allegedly reported in the studies. (Doc. No. 3, FAC ¶ 22.)

18 Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to allege a § 1983 Monell violation. Accordingly,

19 dismissal is not warranted. Again, Defendant’s arguments are best suited for a motion for

20 summary judgment when the record is more fully developed.

21 B. Plaintiff’s Cause of Action Under The Bane Act (Claim VIII)

22 Plaintiff also asserts a claim against the City for violations of the Bane Act,

23 California Civil Code § 52.1. (Doc. No. 3, FAC ¶¶ 66–73.) The Bane Act, California Civil

24 Code § 52.1, provides a private cause of action against anyone who “interferes by threats,

25 intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with

26 the exercise or enjoyment by an individual or individuals of rights secured by the

27 Constitution or laws of the United States, or laws and rights secured by the Constitution or

28 laws of California.” Cal. Civil Code § 52.1(a). Section 52.1 requires “an attempted or

1 completed act of interference with a legal right, accompanied by a form of coercion.” Jones

2 v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal. 4th 329, 334 (1998); accord Austin B. v. Escondido Union Sch.

3 Dist., 149 Cal. App. 4th 860, 882 (2007). “The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the

4 defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e., ‘threats, intimidation or coercion’), tried

5 to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the

6 law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not required to do under the

7 law.” Austin B., 149 Cal. App. 4th at 883 (quoting Jones, Cal. 4th at 334).

8 Defendant argues, and Plaintiff concedes, that the Bane Act is subject to the claims

9 presentation requirement under the Government Claims Act. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905,

10 911.2. (See also Doc. Nos. 4-1 at 14; 5 at 14.) Under the Government Claims Act, a claim

11 for money damages against a local public entity must be presented to the entity within six

12 months or a year after the cause of action accrues depending on the cause of action. See

13 Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905, 911.2. “[F]ailure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing

14 compliance with the claim presentation requirement subjects a claim against a public entity

15 to a [motion to dismiss] for failure to state a cause of action.” State v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal.

16 4th 1234, 1239 (2004) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905, 911.2, 945.4).

17 The standard for fulfilling the claims presentation requirement is substantial

18 compliance. Carlino v. Los Angeles Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 10 Cal. App. 4th 1526

19 (1992). “If a claim satisfies the purposes of the claims statutes without prejudice to the

20 government, substantial compliance will be found.” Aquino v. Cnty. of Monterey Sheriff’s

21 Dep’t, No. 5:14-CV-03387-EJD, 2018 WL 3659012, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2018). “If

22 the claim gives adequate information for the public entity to investigate, additional detail

23 and elaboration in the complaint is permitted.” Stockett v. Ass’n of Cal. Water Agencies

24 Joint Powers Ins. Auth., 34 Cal. 4th 441, 449 (2004).

25 Here, the City argues that Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim must be dismissed due to

26 Plaintiff’s failure to present the Bane Act cause of action in a claim to the City, failure to

27 name the officer in the claim form, and failure to allege the officer’s violence or threat of

28 violence in the claim. (Doc. No. 4-1 at 14–17.) The City does not argue that Plaintiff’s

1 |/claim form was untimely submitted. (Doc. Nos. 4-1 at 14-17; 5 at 10.) Plaintiff argues

2 ||that he substantially complied. (Doc. No. 5 at 14.) First, Plaintiff asserts that he listed

3 || Officer Hoffstetter’s badge number (Badge No. 5773) in the claim form given that Plaintiff

4 ||was unaware of Officer Hoffstetter’s name at the time of submission. (Id.) Second,

5 || Plaintiff argues that the claim form, which indicates that the City and its employees violated

6 || Plaintiff's “constitutional rights under the 4th, 5th, 8th, and 14th Amendments” and that

7 || Plaintiff was “harassed, degraded, and subjugated for no reason during a traffic stop,”

8 adequately informed Defendant of the nature of Plaintiff's claims. (Id. at 15-16.)

9 The first amended complaint alleges substantial compliance. Plaintiff's FAC pleads

10 || compliance with the Government Claims Act. (Doc. No. 3, FAC § 7) (“On September 28,

11 || 2023, Plaintiff timely filed a claim for damages with the City, as required by California

12 ||Government Code § 910.”) Plaintiff's claim form provided the badge number of Office

13 || Hoffstetter (Doc. No. 4-3 at 3), and detailed Plaintiff's perceived violations, including that

14 || Plaintiff “was racially profiled, unlawfully detained, unlawfully searched, and handcuffed

15 || without probable cause or even a reasonable suspicion” (id.). This account provided the

16 || City with sufficient information to allow it to make a thorough investigation of the matter,

17 ||including any potential Bane Act violations. See Aquino, 2018 WL 3659012, at *2. In

18 the Court denies Defendant’s request to dismiss Plaintiff's Bane Act claim.

19 CONCLUSION

20 For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Defendant City of San Diego’s motion

21 |/to dismiss. The City must file an answer to Plaintiff's complaint within 30 days from the

22 || date this order is filed.

23 IT IS SO ORDERED.

24 || DATED: September 9, 2024 | | | l | | | . /

29 MARILYN WN. HUFF, Distric e

26 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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