The opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA
EVERARDO RODRIGUEZ et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
FCA US, LLC,
Defendant and Respondent.
S274625
Fourth Appellate District, Division Two
E073766
Riverside County Superior Court
RIC1807727
October 31, 2024
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, Groban,
Jenkins, and Evans concurred.
RODRIGUEZ v. FCA US, LLC
S274625
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act provides
buyers of new motor vehicles with specific remedies when a
vehicle turns out to be defective. (Civ. Code, § 1791 et seq.;
hereafter the Act or the Song-Beverly Act; all undesignated
statutory references are to the Civil Code.) Section 1793.2,
subdivision (d)(2) gives new car buyers what is known as a
refund-or-replace remedy: It requires manufacturers to
“promptly replace” a defective new motor vehicle or “promptly
make restitution” to the buyer when the manufacturer is
“unable to service or repair a new motor vehicle, as that term is
defined in paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 1793.22, to
conform to the applicable express warranties after a reasonable
number of attempts.” These enhanced remedies under the Act
for breach of express warranty are “distinct from” and “in
addition to” remedies otherwise available in contract under the
California Uniform Commercial Code. (Niedermeier v. FCA US,
LLC (2024) 15 Cal.5th 792, 810, 811.)
Section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) defines “new motor
vehicle” to include a new vehicle “bought or used primarily for
personal” purposes as well as “a dealer-owned vehicle and a
‘demonstrator’ or other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s
new car warranty.” Plaintiffs Everardo Rodriguez and Judith
Arellano bought a two-year-old car with over 55,000 miles on it.
The car had an unexpired manufacturer’s new car warranty.
The car repeatedly experienced engine problems despite
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
numerous repair attempts by defendant FCA US, LLC (FCA).
Plaintiffs sued FCA to enforce the refund-or-replace provision
(§ 1793.2, subd. (d)(2)), claiming that their car was a “new motor
vehicle” because it was a “motor vehicle sold with a
manufacturer’s new car warranty” (§ 1793.22, subd. (e)(2)).
FCA argued that the refund-or-replace remedy does not apply
because plaintiffs’ car was not a “new motor vehicle.” The trial
court and Court of Appeal agreed with FCA.
We conclude that a motor vehicle purchased with an
unexpired manufacturer’s new car warranty does not qualify as
a “motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty”
under section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2)’s definition of “new
motor vehicle” unless the new car warranty was issued with the
sale. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
I.
In 2013, plaintiffs bought a 2011 Dodge Ram 2500 from
Pacific Auto Center, a used car dealer in Fontana. At the time
of sale, the vehicle was about two years old with 55,444 miles.
The three-year/36,000-mile bumper-to-bumper warranty on the
truck had expired, but the five-year/100,000-mile powertrain
warranty issued by the vehicle’s manufacturer, FCA, remained
in effect. The powertrain warranty covered the vehicle’s
powertrain (engine, transmission, and drive system), diesel
engine, emissions, and washer bottle, and it also provided a
corrosion warranty.
While the powertrain warranty was still in effect,
plaintiffs repeatedly experienced engine problems. In March
2014, plaintiffs took the vehicle to an authorized FCA facility for
repair, but the engine issues persisted. They took the vehicle
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
for repair five additional times: in June 2014, in January 2015,
twice in April 2015, and in May 2015.
In April 2018, plaintiffs sued FCA for (among other things)
violating the Song-Beverly Act’s refund-or-replace provision.
They alleged that they had afforded FCA a reasonable number
of attempts to repair the vehicle and that because FCA failed to
repair it to conform to the applicable warranty, they were
entitled to restitution of the purchase price or a replacement
vehicle. FCA moved for summary judgment on the ground that
the refund-or-replace remedy applies only to a “new motor
vehicle” (§ 1793.2, subd. (d)(2)) and plaintiffs’ car was not a “new
motor vehicle” within the meaning of section 1793.22,
subd. (e)(2). The trial court held a hearing and granted FCA’s
motion.
The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the phrase
“other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car
warranty” in section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) does not cover
the sale of “previously owned vehicles with some balance
remaining on the manufacturer’s express warranty.”
(Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 209, 215
(Rodriguez).) Based on the text of “the statutory provision, its
place within the Act as a whole, and its legislative history” (id.
at p. 225; see id. at pp. 217–223), the court construed the
disputed phrase as “a catchall for sales of essentially new
vehicles where the applicable warranty was issued with the
sale” (id. at p. 215). The court distinguished the result in Jensen
v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112
(Jensen) while casting doubt on Jensen’s assertion that the
phrase “other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car
warranty” in section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) covers “cars sold
with a balance remaining on the manufacturer’s new motor
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vehicle warranty.” (Jensen, at p. 123; see Rodriguez, at pp. 223–
224.)
We granted review.
II.
The meaning of the phrase “other motor vehicle sold with
a manufacturer’s new car warranty” in section 1793.22,
subdivision (e)(2)’s definition of a “new motor vehicle” is a
matter of statutory construction, which we review de novo.
(Apple, Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 128, 135.)
“ ‘[W]e first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain
and commonsense meaning.’ ” (Kirzhner v. Mercedes-Benz USA,
LLC (2020) 9 Cal.5th 966, 972.) Here, the phrase at issue,
considered as a snippet by itself, is reasonably susceptible to
either plaintiffs’ interpretation (i.e., any vehicle sold with an
unexpired manufacturer’s new car warranty) or FCA’s (i.e., a
vehicle with a manufacturer’s new car warranty that was issued
with the sale). But “[w]e do not consider statutory language in
isolation; instead, we examine the entire statute to construe the
words in context.” (Ibid.) When we examine the full text of the
“new motor vehicle” definition in section 1793.22,
subdivision (e)(2) and consider that definition in the broader
context of the Song-Beverly Act, we are persuaded that FCA’s
reading is the better view.
A.
The full definition of “new motor vehicle” reads: “ ‘New
motor vehicle’ means a new motor vehicle that is bought or used
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. ‘New
motor vehicle’ also means a new motor vehicle with a gross
vehicle weight under 10,000 pounds that is bought or used
primarily for business purposes by a person, including a
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partnership, limited liability company, corporation, association,
or any other legal entity, to which not more than five motor
vehicles are registered in this state. ‘New motor vehicle’
includes the chassis, chassis cab, and that portion of a motor
home devoted to its propulsion, but does not include any portion
designed, used, or maintained primarily for human habitation,
a dealer-owned vehicle and a ‘demonstrator’ or other motor
vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty but does
not include a motorcycle or a motor vehicle which is not
registered under the Vehicle Code because it is to be operated or
used exclusively off the highways. A demonstrator is a vehicle
assigned by a dealer for the purpose of demonstrating qualities
and characteristics common to vehicles of the same or similar
model and type.” (§ 1793.22, subd. (e)(2).)
This text makes clear that certain used cars — “a dealer-
owned vehicle and a ‘demonstrator’ or other motor vehicle sold
with a manufacturer’s new car warranty” — qualify as “new
motor vehicles” for purposes of the statute. (§ 1793.22,
subd. (e)(2).) The meaning of the disputed phrase is informed
by the specific mention of dealer-owned vehicles and
demonstrators as examples of a “motor vehicle sold with a
manufacturer’s new car warranty.” (Ibid.) As the Court of
Appeal explained, “What makes these vehicles unique is that
even though they aren’t technically new, manufacturers (or
their dealer-representatives) treat them as such upon sale by
providing the same type of manufacturer’s warranty that
accompany new cars.” (Rodriguez, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at
p. 220.) In other words, they are vehicles for which a new car
warranty “was issued with the sale.” (Id. at p. 215.)
Plaintiffs take issue with the Court of Appeal’s assertion
that dealer-owned vehicles and demonstrators “come with full
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express warranties.” (Rodriguez, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at
p. 220.) They say those vehicles “don’t necessarily come with a
full manufacturer’s new-car warranty” and instead “usually
come with only a balance remaining” on the warranty after
being driven “sometimes for thousands of miles.” “Because
dealer-owned vehicles and demonstrators are sold with only a
balance of a new-car warranty remaining,” they contend, “the
Act’s use of dealer-owned vehicles and demonstrators as
examples of a vehicle ‘sold with a [manufacturer’s] new car
warranty’ confirms that any other vehicle sold with a balance of
the original manufacturer warranty has been sold, for the Act’s
purposes, ‘with a [manufacturer’s new car] warranty,’ too.”
In response, FCA says dealer-owned vehicles and
demonstrators are sold with warranties that are “typically
coextensive with full warranties issued to new cars that were
not demonstrators.”
But we need not resolve whether such vehicles are or are
not typically sold with “full” new car warranties. The key point,
as FCA further explains, is that “demonstrators are not
warranted prior to sale. In every case, the first customer to
purchase or lease a demonstrator or dealer-owned vehicle
receives a new warranty arising in that transaction, directly
from the manufacturer . . . .” In other words, a warranty in this
context is a guarantee made by the manufacturer to a retail
buyer. Before a sale transaction, there is no such warranty to
speak of; the manufacturer or its dealer representative owns the
car. The sale of a dealer-owned vehicle or demonstrator to a
retail buyer is what gives rise to a new car warranty. “Thus,” as
FCA says, “whether the manufacturer ‘reinstates’ the original
warranty period, ‘extends’ the warranty’s mileage, or simply
sells the vehicle with a warranty arising in that first retail
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transaction, demonstrators — unlike preowned cars — are
always sold to the first retail buyer ‘with a manufacturer’s new
car warranty.’ ”
Even if plaintiffs were correct that dealer-owned vehicles
and demonstrators are typically vehicles with a balance
remaining on a new car warranty, it is unclear why the
Legislature would have singled out those cars, “which comprise
a specific and narrow class of vehicles” (Rodriguez, supra,
77 Cal.App.5th at p. 220), as examples of the general category of
used cars with unexpired warranties. Because dealer-owned
vehicles and demonstrators are but a small fraction of the
universe of used cars with unexpired new car warranties, it
seems unlikely that the mere fact of having been sold with an
unexpired warranty is the salient feature that the Legislature
had in mind.
Like the Court of Appeal, we think that if the Legislature
had intended to define “ ‘new motor vehicle’ to include a
potentially vast category of used cars” with unexpired new car
warranties, “it would have been done so more clearly and
explicitly than tucking it into a reference to demonstrators and
dealer-owned vehicles.” (Rodriguez, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at
p. 221; see People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 715 [no-
elephants-in-mouseholes canon], citing Whitman v. American
Trucking Assns., Inc. (2001) 531 U.S. 457, 468; Ontario
Community Foundations, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization
(1984) 35 Cal.3d 811, 822 [“Such a statutory construction has
the tail wagging the dog”].) Indeed, although demonstrators and
dealer-owned vehicles are not truly “new,” the statutory
definition of “new motor vehicle” makes an exception for them
along with “other motor vehicle[s] sold with a manufacturer’s
new car warranty” (§ 1793.22, subd. (e)(2)), and the general rule
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is that exceptions in a statute are to be narrowly construed. (See
Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club (2008) 45
Cal.4th 309, 319; National City v. Fritz (1949) 33 Cal.2d 635,
636–637.)
By specifically mentioning dealer-owned vehicles and
demonstrators, the Legislature highlighted vehicles for which a
manufacturer’s new car warranty arises upon sale to a retail
buyer. Thus, the phrase “other motor vehicle sold with a
manufacturer’s new car warranty” is most naturally understood
to mean other vehicles for which such a warranty is issued with
the sale. (§ 1793.22, subd. (e)(2).) The phrase serves as “a
catchall to ensure that manufacturers cannot evade liability
under the Act by claiming a vehicle doesn’t qualify as new
because the dealership hadn’t actually used it as a
demonstrator.” (Rodriguez, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 221.)
For example, it would cover a car owned by a manufacturer or
distributor for marketing purposes.
B.
This interpretation is bolstered by the overall framework
of the Song-Beverly Act, which distinguishes between new and
used products and calibrates manufacturers’ and sellers’
obligations accordingly.
Enacted in 1970, “[t]he Song-Beverly Act is a remedial
statute designed to protect consumers who have purchased
products covered by an express warranty.” (Robertson v.
Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006)
144 Cal.App.4th 785, 798.) Under the Act, a manufacturer that
sells “consumer goods” with an express warranty must maintain
nearby repair facilities “to carry out the terms of those
warranties.” (§ 1793.2, subd. (a)(1)(A).) “ ‘Consumer goods’
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means any new product or part thereof that is used, bought, or
leased for use primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes, except for clothing and consumables.” (§ 1791,
subd. (a).) For consumer goods (i.e., new products) that are
defective, “if the manufacturer or its representative in this state
does not service or repair the goods to conform to the applicable
express warranties after a reasonable number of attempts, the
manufacturer shall either replace the goods or reimburse the
buyer in an amount equal to the purchase price paid by the
buyer, less that amount directly attributable to use by the buyer
prior to the discovery of the nonconformity.” (§ 1793.2,
subd. (d)(1).)
The Act also requires consumer goods to be accompanied
by the manufacturer’s and retail seller’s implied warranty of
merchantability (§ 1792) and by the manufacturer’s implied
warranty of fitness where the manufacturer has reason to know
the buyer is relying on its skill or judgment in furnishing a
suitable good for a particular purpose (§ 1792.1). (See § 1791.1.)
A consumer may sue the manufacturer for breach of these
warranties. (§ 1791.1, subd. (d); cf. § 1792 [retail seller has “a
right of indemnity” against the manufacturer for breach of
implied warranty of merchantability].)
Separate from these provisions concerning new products,
the Act includes a distinct section addressing used products.
Section 1795.5 says: “Notwithstanding the provisions of
subdivision (a) of Section 1791 defining consumer goods to mean
‘new’ goods, the obligation of a distributor or retail seller of used
consumer goods in a sale in which an express warranty is given
shall be the same as that imposed on manufacturers under this
chapter,” with certain exceptions. (Italics added.) In other
words, “[s]ection 1795.5 provides express warranty protections
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for used goods only where the entity selling the used product
issues an express warranty at the time of sale.” (Rodriguez,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 218.) In addition, the obligation to
maintain adequate repair facilities lies with “the distributor or
retail seller making express warranties with respect to used
consumer goods (and not the original manufacturer, distributor,
or retail seller making express warranties with respect to such
goods when new).” (§ 1795.5, subd. (a).) Further, subdivision (c)
of section 1795.5 provides for implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness by the distributor or retail seller,
with those warranties having a shorter duration than the
manufacturer’s implied warranties for new products. (See Ruiz
Nunez v. FCA US LLC (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 385, 399 (Ruiz
Nunez) [under section 1795.5, “only distributors or sellers of
used goods — not manufacturers of new goods — have implied
warranty obligations in the sale of used goods”].)
Thus, the basic framework of the Song-Beverly Act
distinguishes between new and used products and “provides
similar remedies in the context of the sale of used goods, except
that the manufacturer is generally off the hook.” (Kiluk v.
Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 334, 339
(Kiluk).) The Legislature added the motor vehicle provisions to
the Act in 1982 and defined “new motor vehicle” to include any
“new motor vehicle which is used or bought for use primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes,” but not “motorcycles,
motorhomes, or off-road vehicles.” (Stats. 1982, ch. 388, § 1,
p. 1723.) In 1987, the Legislature established a refund-or-
replace remedy specific to new motor vehicles with detailed
requirements (Stats. 1987, ch. 1280, § 2, pp. 4557–4559; see
§ 1793.2, subd. (d)(2)) and amended the definition of “new motor
vehicle” to include certain cars that are not entirely new, i.e., “a
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dealer-owned vehicle and a ‘demonstrator’ or other motor
vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty”
(Stats. 1987, ch. 1280, § 2, p. 4561; see § 1793.22, subd. (e)(2)).
The Legislature has not otherwise adjusted the distinction
between new and used cars in any manner that impacts our
assessment of the question presented. In 1988, the Legislature
amended the “new motor vehicle” definition to extend lemon law
coverage to portions of a motorhome “devoted to its propulsion.”
(Stats. 1988, ch. 697, § 1, p. 2319; see Sen. Com. on Judiciary,
Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 4513 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as
amended April 20, 1988, p. 2.) In 1998, the Legislature further
amended the definition to include vehicles bought and used for
commercial purposes, seeking to afford small businesses
protection under the Act. (Stats. 1998, ch. 352, § 1, pp. 2777–
2778; see Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill
No. 1848 (1997–1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 7, 1998, p. 2.)
Finally, the Legislature in 2000 added a limitation to the second
sentence of the “new motor vehicle” definition, providing that it
only applies to vehicles “with a gross vehicle weight under
10,000 pounds.” (Stats. 2000, ch. 679, § 1, p. 4510.)
From this statutory context and history, we discern two
points. First, in enacting and amending the Song-Beverly Act,
the Legislature has maintained a distinction between “new” and
“used” products and has specified the warranty protections
applicable to each category. The Legislature has shown it knows
how to legislate on “used” products (§ 1795.5), and it has
employed clear language when it wants to make a “used”
product subject to the warranty protections that apply to the
product when new (see § 1791, subd. (a) [“ ‘Consumer goods’
shall include new and used assistive devices sold at retail”]). In
defining “new motor vehicle,” section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2)
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does not mention “used” vehicles; the word “used” nowhere
appears. This bolsters the inference that the phrase “other
motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty” was
not intended to cover any used car with an unexpired new car
warranty.
Second, section 1795.5, which governs used goods, makes
clear that the same warranty protections that consumers of new
products have against manufacturers apply to consumers of
used products against distributors or retail sellers “in a sale in
which an express warranty is given.” In other words, just as
with new products, the Act’s remedies for failure to repair a used
product in conformity with an express warranty have
applicability where the express warranty accompanies the sale
of the product. For new products, liability extends to the
manufacturer; for used products, liability extends to the
distributor or retail seller and not to the manufacturer, at least
where the manufacturer has not issued a new warranty or
played a substantial role in the sale of a used good. (See
Rodriguez, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 218; Ruiz Nunez, supra,
61 Cal.App.5th at p. 399; Kiluk, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 339–340.) In both cases, the Act’s protections are premised
on an express warranty arising from the product’s sale. (See
Rodriguez, at p. 218 [“[A] hallmark of the Act is that its
consumer protections apply against the party who sold the
product to the buyer and issued the express warranty.”].)
Against this backdrop, it would be anomalous to construe “other
motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty”
(§ 1793.22, subd. (e)(2)) to include any used car sold by a
distributor or retailer with a preexisting, unexpired
manufacturer’s warranty. If the Legislature had meant to
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depart from the basic scheme and extend manufacturer liability
in this way, again we think it would have spoken more clearly.
Finally, another relevant piece of statutory context is the
requirement, enacted as part of the Motor Vehicle Warranty
Adjustment Program (§ 1795.90 et seq.), that manufacturers
provide notice of safety- or emissions-related recalls and
establish procedures for reimbursing “the consumer” for
necessary repairs. (§ 1795.92, subds. (d), (e).) Section 1795.90,
subdivision (a) defines “consumer” as “any person to whom the
motor vehicle is transferred during the duration of an express
warranty applicable to that motor vehicle.” As relevant here,
this definition shows the kind of language that the Legislature
has used to refer to transferred warranties as opposed to
warranties arising from a sale. Plaintiffs are correct that
section 1795.90 was enacted six years after the 1987
amendment that added the disputed phrase to the definition of
“new motor vehicle.” (Stats. 1993, ch. 814, § 1.) But the point is
not that the Legislature was aware of section 1795.90 when it
amended the “new motor vehicle” definition in 1987. The point
is that the phrase “other motor vehicle sold with a
manufacturer’s new car warranty” (§ 1793.22, subd. (e)(2))
seems quite different, as a textual matter, from the phrase
“motor vehicle . . . transferred during the duration of an express
warranty applicable to that motor vehicle” (§ 1795.90, subd. (a)).
Given this contrasting language, we find unpersuasive
plaintiffs’ suggestion that the former means the latter.
C.
The legislative history of the 1987 amendment (Assem.
Bill No. 2057 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 2057)) that
added “a dealer-owned vehicle and a ‘demonstrator’ or other
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motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty” to
the definition of “new motor vehicle” offers little insight on the
question before us. (Stats. 1987, ch. 1280, § 2, p. 4561.)
Materials related to Assembly Bill 2057 continuously note that
the bill “amends and clarifies the lemon law” and “[a]mends the
definition of a ‘new motor vehicle’ which is covered by the lemon
law to include dealer-owned vehicles and demonstrator
vehicles.” (Assem. 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2057
(1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 11, 1987, pp. 2, 3; see
also Conc. in Sen. Amends. to Assem. Bill No. 2057 (1987–1988
Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 4, 1987, pp. 1–3.)
Although plaintiffs observe that the legislative history
“shows a consistent effort to expand the ‘new motor vehicle’
definition,” the Legislature’s incremental expansions do not
indicate any intent to cover used vehicles with an unexpired
manufacturer’s new car warranty. Indeed, what we find most
significant about the legislative history is that it makes no
mention of used vehicles. Like the Court of Appeal, “we found
no reference to used vehicles in any of the legislative materials
regarding Assembly Bill Number 2057 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.).
One would assume that if the amendment proposed to expand
manufacturers’ liability under the Act to a large class of used
vehicles, such a change to the status quo would warrant mention
if not discussion.” (Rodriguez, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 223.)
Nor do the views expressed by the Department of
Consumer Affairs — an agency involved in both drafting and
monitoring the impact of the original lemon law and this
amendment — contribute much to resolve the question before
us. (See Dept. Consumer Affairs, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem.
Bill No. 2057 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 25, 1987, p. 2.)
According to the enrolled bill report, the added language was
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necessary because “ ‘[s]ome buyers [were] being denied the
remedies under the lemon law because their vehicle [was] a
“demonstrator” or “dealer-owned” car, even though it was sold
with a new car warranty.’ ” (Id. at p. 3, italics added.) But this
sentence simply restates the disputed phrase, without shedding
further light on its meaning.
Plaintiffs also point to section 1795.8, a 2007 amendment
that extends the Act’s protections to members of the Armed
Forces who were stationed in or residents of California at the
time of purchase. Section 1795.8, subdivision (a) covers
purchases of “a motor vehicle as defined in paragraph (2) of
subdivision (e) of Section 1793.22, with a manufacturer’s
express warranty from a manufacturer who sells motor vehicles
in this state or from an agent or representative of that
manufacturer.” Whatever the Legislature may have understood
section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) to encompass when it enacted
section 1795.8 in 2007, it does not aid our determination of what
the Legislature understood section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) to
encompass when it enacted that very provision 20 years earlier
in 1987. (See Coker v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2016) 62
Cal.4th 667, 689–690; id. at p. 690 [“ ‘[p]ost-enactment
legislative history (a contradiction in terms) is not a legitimate
tool of statutory interpretation’ because ‘by definition [it] “could
have had no effect on the [Legislature’s] vote” ’ ”].)
D.
Further, plaintiffs rely heavily on Jensen’s assertion that
“cars sold with a balance remaining on the manufacturer’s new
motor vehicle warranty are included within [the Song-Beverly
Act’s] definition of ‘new motor vehicle.’ ” (Jensen, supra,
35 Cal.App.4th at p. 123.) We agree with the Court of Appeal in
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this case that Jensen is distinguishable because “Jensen
involved a lease by a manufacturer-affiliated dealer who issued
a full new car warranty along with the lease.” (Rodriguez,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 223.) The plaintiff in Jensen had
entered into a lease with a BMW-authorized dealership for a car
with 7,565 miles on its odometer. (Jensen, at p. 119.) The dealer
told Jensen that the car was a demonstrator, and as part of the
lease agreement, the dealer gave her BMW’s full 36,000-mile
warranty “on top of the miles already on the car.” (Ibid.) As it
turned out, the car was not a demonstrator; it had been
previously owned by the BMW Leasing Corporation. (Id. at
p. 120.) When Jensen encountered repeated problems with the
car’s brakes despite multiple repair attempts, BMW took the
position that the car was not a “new motor vehicle” because it
was not in fact a demonstrator and thus the Song-Beverly Act’s
refund-or-replace remedy did not apply. (Jensen, at p. 122.) The
Court of Appeal rejected BMW’s position, and it was in this
context — where BMW had issued a new car warranty with the
lease — that the court found Jensen’s car to qualify as a “new
motor vehicle” under section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2).
(Jensen, at pp. 121–128.)
As the Court of Appeal in this case observed, “Given that
[Jensen’s] facts included a car leased with a full manufacturer’s
warranty issued by the manufacturer’s representative, the
[Jensen] court was not asked to decide whether a used car with
an unexpired warranty sold by a third party reseller qualifies as
a ‘new motor vehicle.’ ” (Rodriguez, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at
p. 224; see Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th
905, 923 [Jensen “must be read in light of the facts then before
the court, and [is] limited in that respect”].) The Court of Appeal
here found Jensen’s result to be correct but its reasoning infirm
16
RODRIGUEZ v. FCA US, LLC
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
(Rodriguez, at p. 224), and it is not the only court to have
questioned the broad statement in Jensen on which plaintiffs
here rely. (See Kiluk, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 340, fn. 4
[“Would a car accompanied by a 20-year warranty still be a ‘new
motor vehicle’ under the Song-Beverly Act on year 18? That
would seem to follow from the holding in Jensen.”].) We
disapprove Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc., supra,
35 Cal.App.4th 112 to the extent it is inconsistent with this
opinion.
E.
Finally, plaintiffs contend that their reading of the statute
would avoid leaving “buyers of used cars with balances
remaining on manufacturer new-car warranties . . . out to dry
when stuck with lemons.” “[F]rom a public policy standpoint,”
they say, “the onus should be on manufacturers to solicit the
Legislature to strip certain vehicle buyers of the Act’s
protections, rather than force consumers to seek legislative
assistance” to obtain those protections. For its part, FCA says
the Legislature had good reason to distinguish demonstrators
and dealer-own cars, which “are maintained professionally with
a goal of keeping the vehicle in as-new condition in anticipation
of a sale to the first consumer owner,” from preowned cars,
whose “various transfers of ownership” may result in
“difficulties of proving what maintenance or misuse a prior
owner may or may not be responsible for.” Further, FCA argues
that the unavailability of the refund-or-replace remedy for used
cars with unexpired warranties still leaves those car owners
with potential remedies under the California Uniform
Commercial Code and the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act. (See Rodriguez, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 225 [“the
beneficiary of a transferrable express warranty can sue a
17
RODRIGUEZ v. FCA US, LLC
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
manufacturer for breach of an express warranty to repair
defects under the California Uniform Commercial Code”].)
We express no view on the parties’ policy arguments as to
whether the Song-Beverly Act strikes an appropriate balance
between protecting buyers of cars with unexpired new car
warranties and cabining manufacturers’ liability for the refund-
or-replace remedy. Those arguments are best directed to the
Legislature, which remains free to amend the definition of “new
motor vehicle” to include used vehicles with a balance remaining
on the manufacturer’s new car warranty. “Our task is to give
effect to the statute as we find it.” (Haggerty v. Thornton (2024)
15 Cal.5th 729, 741.) For the reasons above, we hold that the
phrase “other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car
warranty” — considered in the context of the surrounding text
of section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) and in the broader context
of the Song-Beverly Act’s provisions distinguishing between new
and used goods — means a vehicle for which a manufacturer’s
new car warranty is issued with the sale.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
LIU, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
JENKINS, J.
EVANS, J.
18
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC
__________________________________________________________
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published) XX 77 Cal.App.5th 209
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S274625
Date Filed: October 31, 2024
__________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Riverside
Judge: Jackson Lucky
__________________________________________________________
Counsel:
Rosner, Barry & Babbitt, Hallen D. Rosner, Arlyn L. Escalante; Knight
Law Group, Steve Mikhov, Roger R. Kirnos; Greines, Martin, Stein &
Richland, Cynthia E. Tobisman, Joseph V. Bui and Alana H. Rotter for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Barnes Law Firm and Stephen G. Barnes for Stephen G. Barnes as
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Seth E. Mermin, David S. Nahmias and Leila Nasrolahi for the UC
Berkeley Center for Consumer Law and Economic Justice, Consumers
for Auto Reliability and Safety, Center for Auto Safety, Community
Legal Services in East Palo Alto, Consumer Federation of America,
National Consumer Law Center, National Consumers League, Open
Door Legal, Public Counsel and Public Law Center as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Anderson Law and Martin W. Anderson for Martin W. Anderson as
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Erik Whitman, Alessandro G. Manno and Lara F. Rogers for Consumer
Law Experts, P.C., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
The Arkin Law Firm and Sharon J. Arkin for Consumer Attorneys of
California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Clark Hill, David L. Brandon, Georges A. Haddad; Horvitz & Levy,
Lisa Perrochet, John A. Taylor, Jr., and Shane H. McKenzie for
Defendant and Respondent.
Shook Hardy & Bacon and Patrick J. Gregory for the Alliance for
Automotive Innovation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and
Respondent.
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, Max Carter-Oberstone, Katherine M.
Kopp and Christopher J. Cariello for the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America and the Civil Justice Association of
California as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):
Cynthia E. Tobisman
Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland LLP
6420 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1100
Los Angeles, CA 90048
(310) 859-7811
Shane H. McKenzie
Horvitz & Levy LLP
3601 West Olive Avenue, 8th Floor
Burbank, CA 91505
(818) 995-0800