abstention improper where arrest and issuance of 19 citation were executive acts not judicial in nature, and only potential for future state 20 judicial proceedings existed
How later courts described this case
- abstention improper where arrest and issuance of 19 citation were executive acts not judicial in nature, and only potential for future state 20 judicial proceedings existed
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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Case No. 24-cv-00660 BLF
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DANIEL JOS EPH FELIX,
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST
Plaintiff, AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH
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LEAVE TO AMEND
v.
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15 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, et al.,
16 Defendants.
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18 Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
19 against the County of Santa Clara. Dkt. No. 1. The Court dismissed the complaint with
20 leave to amend for Plaintiff to attempt to state sufficient facts to state a cognizable claim.
21 Dkt. No. 13. Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”). Dkt. No. 14.
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23 DISCUSSION
24 I. Standard of Review
25 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a
26 prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
27 governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any
1 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim
2 upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
3 from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally
4 construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).
5 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential
6 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was
7 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the
8 color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
9 II. Plaintiff’s Claims
10 In the original complaint, Plaintiff named “Unidentified Santa Clara County
11 Authorities” as Defendant in this action. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. The Court found the complaint
12 lacked sufficient factual allegations describing the acts or conduct of any specific state
13 actor to support a cognizable claim for relief. Dkt. No. 13 at 2.
14 In the FAC, Plaintiff claims he is “a kidnapped, falsely arrested, falsely imprisoned,
15 T.I.N. man” who is incarcerated at the Santa Clara County Elmwood Facility. Dkt. No. 14
16 at 4. He names forty-four defendants which include three attorneys from the District
17 Attorney’s office, four superior court judges, an “administrative” officer, a county clerk,
18 four “government” officers, an officer from the Sheriff’s Department, and thirty San Jose
19 police officers (some by name and some by badge number). Id. at 4-25. Plaintiff asserts
20 thirty-six causes of action based on his allegations. Id. at 34-51.
21 Plaintiff alleges that on January 23, 2018, he was “falsely accused of illegal hearsay
22 evidence” by the San Jose Police Department. Id. at 26. On January 24, 2018, officers
23 came to his home to conduct an investigation, including an interview. Id. at 27-28.
24 Plaintiff includes allegations regarding evidence and witnesses during February 2018 and
25 September 2018. Id. at 28-30. Then on April 17, 2023, Plaintiff began to represent
26 himself in court as a “pro se defendant.” Id. at 30. He describes various court
1 proceedings, exchange of documents, and alleges denial of rights. Id. at 31-33. He seeks
2 declaratory judgment and damages. Id. at 53.
3 There are several issues with the amended complaint. First of all, Plaintiff’s
4 allegations indicate that his claims involve criminal charges and proceedings in Santa
5 Clara County. According to the County of Santa Clara’s Superior Court website, there is
6 at least one active felony complaint pending against Plaintiff (criminal case No.
7 C1801767).1 So it may be that Plaintiff is seeking to challenge those criminal proceedings
8 through this action. If so, there are several reasons why this matter may not proceed.
9 A. Younger Abstention
10 Under principles of comity and federalism, a federal court should not interfere with
11 ongoing state criminal proceedings by granting injunctive or declaratory relief absent
12 extraordinary circumstances. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-46 (1971); Samuels
13 v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 68-74 (1971). Younger abstention is required when: (1) state
14 proceedings, judicial in nature, are pending; (2) the state proceedings involve important
15 state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford adequate opportunity to raise the
16 constitutional issue. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457
17 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). All three elements must be present. Agriesti v. MGM Grand Hotels,
18 Inc., 53 F.3d 1000, 1001 (9th Cir. 1995) (abstention improper where arrest and issuance of
19 citation were executive acts not judicial in nature, and only potential for future state
20 judicial proceedings existed). A fourth requirement has also been articulated by the Ninth
21 Circuit: that “the federal court action would enjoin the state proceeding or have the
22 practical effect of doing so, i.e., would interfere with the state proceeding in a way that
23 Younger disapproves.” SJSVCCPAC v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir.
24 2008) (citing cases).
25 It appears that Younger abstention may apply if the allegations in the amended
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1 complaint are challenging the criminal action in Case No. C1801767 or any other pending
2 criminal action. Plaintiff shall be granted leave to file another amended complaint in
3 which he must either allege that criminal proceedings have concluded or show that
4 extraordinary circumstances warrant federal intervention to overcome Younger abstention.
5 B. Habeas Action
6 Even if Plaintiff has already been convicted and is challenging the constitutionality
7 of his conviction and sentence, a § 1983 action is not the appropriate avenue for such a
8 challenge. The constitutionality of state civil commitment proceedings may be challenged
9 in federal habeas corpus once state remedies have been exhausted. See Nelson v.
10 Sandritter, 351 F.2d 284, 285 (9th Cir. 1965). Furthermore, although a district court may
11 construe a habeas petition by a prisoner attacking the conditions of his confinement as a
12 civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251
13 (1971), the opposite is not true: A civil rights complaint seeking habeas relief should be
14 dismissed without prejudice to bringing it as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See
15 Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, if Plaintiff
16 is seeking to challenge his state conviction and sentence, this action should be dismissed
17 without prejudice to his refiling as a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
18 2254. He must clearly allege the status of criminal proceedings in an amended complaint.
19 C. Heck Bar
20 Furthermore, if Plaintiff is seeking damages for the wrongful conviction, he must
21 prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
22 executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination,
23 or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck v.
24 Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487 (1994). A claim for damages bearing that relationship
25 to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
26 Id. at 487. Accordingly, Plaintiff must first succeed in a habeas action before he can
1 pursue a § 1983 action for damages for the unlawful conviction.
2 D. Defendants
3 Another problem with the amended complaint is that Plaintiff may not be able to
4 proceed against the named prosecutors and state court judges.
5 A state prosecuting attorney enjoys absolute immunity from liability under 42
6 U.S.C. § 1983 for his conduct in “pursuing a criminal prosecution” insofar as he acts
7 within his role as an “advocate for the State” and his actions are “intimately associated
8 with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-
9 31 (1976); Cousins v. Locker, 568 F.3d 1063, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2009) (California Attorney
10 General absolutely immune from liability for wrongful imprisonment for failing to notify
11 the court and CDCR of change in law entitling an inmate to release because this involves
12 petitioning the court and is prosecutorial, rather than investigative or administrative, in
13 nature). Unless Plaintiff can overcome prosecutorial immunity, he cannot proceed on a
14 claim against the prosecution in their role as an “advocate for the State.”
15 With regard to state judges, they are absolutely immune from civil liability for
16 damages for acts performed in their judicial capacity. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
17 553-55 (1967) (applying judicial immunity to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Judicial
18 immunity is an immunity from suit for damages, not just from an ultimate assessment of
19 damages. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Whether an act by a judge is
20 a judicial one relates to (1) the nature and function of the act and not the act itself, i.e.,
21 whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to (2) the expectations of the
22 parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. Stump v. Sparkman,
23 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). Ruling on a motion and exercising control over a courtroom are
24 normal judicial functions. Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001)
25 (judge who denied disability accommodation to litigant was absolutely immune).
26 Therefore, Plaintiff cannot proceed on a claim against the state judges for acts performed
1 in their judicial capacity unless he can overcome judicial immunity.
2 E. Second Amended Complaint
3 Even if the amended complaint did not have the above issues, the allegations are
4 deficient to proceed on all the thirty-six causes of actions listed. Specifically, Plaintiff’s
5 thirty-six causes of actions are not individually supported by factual allegations against
6 specific Defendants as he merely “incorporates” the previous paragraphs of the amended
7 complaint for each claim and refers to “Defendants et al.” Dkt. No. 14 at 34-51. For
8 example, his first claim is that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment under the
9 Eighth Amendment. Id. at 34. He asserts that “Defendants et al.” violated his rights “by
10 depriving Plaintiff of proper services entitled to pro se defendants, by committing acts of
11 fraud for personnel [sic] gain and causing mental duress and treating the Plaintiff as
12 chattel.” Id. However, the factual allegations within “paragraphs 1 through 105” do not
13 support such a claim against “Defendants et al.” Nor are the allegations sufficient to
14 establish that the lack of “proper services” to a pro se defendant amounts to “cruel and
15 unusual punishment” under the Eighth Amendment.
16 Plaintiff should keep the following principles in mind in preparing an amended
17 complaint. Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under § 1983 only if
18 Plaintiff can show that the defendant proximately caused the deprivation of a federally
19 protected right. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988); Harris v. City of
20 Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981). A person deprives another of a
21 constitutional right within the meaning of section 1983 if he does an affirmative act,
22 participates in another’s affirmative act or omits to perform an act which he is legally
23 required to do, that causes the deprivation of which the plaintiff complains. See Leer, 844
24 F.2d at 633.
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1 CONCLUSION
2 For the reasons state above, the Court orders as follows:
3 1. The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Within twenty-eight
4 || (28) days from the date this order is filed, Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint
5 || using the court’s form complaint to address the issues and correct the deficiencies
6 || described above. The second amended complaint must include the caption and civil case
7 || number used in this order, i.e., Case No. C 24-cv-00660 BLF (PR), and the words
8 || “SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT” on the first page. Plaintiff must answer all the
g || questions on the form in order for the action to proceed. Plaintiff is reminded that the
10 || second amended complaint supersedes the previous complaints, and Plaintiff may not
11 || make references to the original or first amended complaints. Claims not included in the
2 second amended complaint are no longer claims and defendants not named therein are no
E 13 longer defendants. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir.1992).
S 14 2. Failure to respond in accordance with this order by filing an amended
3 15 || complaint or notice in the time provided will result in the dismissal of this action with
16 || prejudice for failure to state a claim for relief without further notice to Plaintiff.
5 17 3. The Clerk shall include two copies of the court’s complaint with a copy of
5 18 this order to Plaintiff.
19 IT IS SO ORDERED.
20 || Dated: _ October 3,2024 fenfhacncan _
BETH LABSON F REEMAN
United States District Judge
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25 || Srpno SHULEGH 4uosoOrsle dei
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