“[A]s we explained in Anderson[v. Creighton, 483 13 U.S. 635 (1987)], the right allegedly violated must be defined at the appropriate level of 14 specificity before a court can determine if it was clearly established”
How later courts described this case
- “[A]s we explained in Anderson[v. Creighton, 483 13 U.S. 635 (1987)], the right allegedly violated must be defined at the appropriate level of 14 specificity before a court can determine if it was clearly established”
- holding that courts “consider a variety of factors 14 including hygiene, medical training, emotional and physical trauma, and the availability of 15 alternative methods for conducting the search”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 ORVAL FLANNERY, No. 2:22-cv-01518 DB P
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
14 HOLSTEIN, et al.,
15 Defendants.
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17 Plaintiff, an inmate proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
18 Plaintiff proceeds on a claim that defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights when plaintiff
19 was subject to an involuntary cavity search. Presently before the court is defendants’ fully
20 briefed motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 13.) For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned will
21 recommend that the motion be denied.
22 BACKGROUND
23 I. Procedural History
24 Plaintiff initiated this action with the filing of the complaint. (ECF No. 1.) The
25 undersigned screened the complaint and determined it stated cognizable claim for an
26 unreasonable search but failed to state cognizable claims for deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s
27 medical needs, due process, or equal protection. (ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff was given the option to
28 proceed with the complaint as screened or to file an amended complaint. (Id.) Plaintiff opted to
1 proceed immediately, voluntarily dismissing all other claims (ECF No. 7) and service was
2 ordered on defendants. (ECF No. 8.) Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss. (ECF No.
3 13.)
4 II. Allegations in the Complaint
5 Plaintiff indicates that, at all relevant times, he was an inmate at the Amador County Jail.
6 (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff names Correctional Sergeant Holstein, Jackson Police Department
7 (“JPD”) Lieutenant Daniel Barb, JPD Investigator Robert Harmon, and Amador Sutter Hospital
8 (“SAH”) Nurse Jane Doe as defendants in this action. (Id. at 5.)
9 The complaint contains the following allegations: while a pretrial detainee at Amador
10 County Jail, plaintiff was transferred to SAH with two other inmates as it was believed the three
11 inmates had overdosed on fentanyl. (Id. at 2.) After plaintiff was “medically cleared,” defendant
12 Holstein asked plaintiff to submit to a digital cavity search. (Id.) Plaintiff refused but stated he
13 would submit to alterative search options. (Id.) Defendant Holstein spoke with defendants Barb
14 and Harmon in the hallway. (Id.) When Holstein returned, he changed the position of the
15 handcuffs on plaintiff and the two other inmates so that they were all laying on their sides. (Id.)
16 Defendant Doe later entered and performed digital cavity searches on all of the inmates. (Id.)
17 Plaintiff was “the last inmate . . . search[ed] and . . . tried to protest both verbally and by shifting
18 [his] body . . . .” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff feared contracting Hepatitis C as one of the other inmates
19 had it and defendant Doe “used the same glove for the other 2 inmates and did not change it when
20 she came to [plaintiff].” (Id.) Defendant Doe eventually succeeded in performing the cavity
21 search “and spent a significantly longer period of time during [plaintiff’s] search as with the other
22 inmates.” (Id.) Plaintiff noted defendant Barb and Harmon “standing by the open door and
23 openly laughing.” (Id.) As a result of this search, his rectum bled due to a tear. (Id.)
24 Plaintiff claims that there was no warrant for the digital cavity search and that it was done
25 against his will. (Id. at 4.) He asserts that he did not knowingly take fentanyl but that he drank
26 from a cup of water and later woke up in an ambulance. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he faced no
27 disciplinary action. (Id.)
28 ////
1 In the complaint, plaintiff argues that defendants Holstein, Barb, Harmon, and Doe
2 violated his rights by “either ordering or failing to intervene in the digital cavity search without a
3 warrant and against [plaintiff’s] will.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that he seeks one million dollars
4 ($1,000,000) in damages but does not include any other details regarding the monetary relief
5 sought. (Id. at 8.)
6 MOTION TO DISMISS
7 Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claim for unreasonable search should be dismissed
8 because defendants have qualified immunity as government officials. (ECF No. 13 at 3.) First,
9 defendants claim that plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts in his complaint to show that his
10 Fourth Amendment rights have been violated by an unreasonable search. (Id. at 4.) Defendants
11 argue that the search was reasonable because it was done by a medical professional and
12 defendants where not actually involved in the search. (Id. at 4-5.) Second, defendants argue that
13 even if plaintiff’s allegations did state a claim, they do not show violation of a clearly established
14 right because a reasonable officer would not think the manner of the search was unreasonable as
15 it was done by a medical professional. (Id. at 6.)
16 Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that it was not normal hospital practice for a nurse
17 to conduct a body cavity search against his will and that the nurse only did the search on the
18 instruction of defendants. (ECF No. 17 at 1-2.) Plaintiff primarily cites California state law to
19 support his argument that the search was unlawful because it was conducted without a warrant.
20 (See id. at 2-4.) Defendants submitted a reply. (ECF No. 18.)
21 LEGAL STANDARDS
22 I. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
23 Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for motions to dismiss for
24 “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A motion to dismiss for failure to
25 state a claim should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
26 set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King &
27 Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The
28 purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the
1 complaint. N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). A dismissal
2 may be warranted where there is “the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient
3 facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696,
4 699 (9th Cir. 1988).
5 A plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
6 its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility
7 when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
8 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
9 (2009).
10 In evaluating whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the court
11 accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most
12 favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 73. Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent
13 standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curium).
14 Nevertheless, a court’s liberal interpretation of a pro se complaint may not supply essential
15 elements that were not pled. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th
16 Cir. 1982). In addition, the court need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form
17 of factual allegations. U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).
18 Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or
19 that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated
20 Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
21 In ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court may consider
22 material that is properly submitted as part of the complaint, matters properly subject to judicial
23 notice, and documents that are not physically attached to the complaint where their authenticity is
24 not contested and the plaintiffs’ complaint relies on them. See Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d
25 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007)); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001).
26 II. Qualified Immunity
27 Qualified immunity is a defense that must be pled by a defendant official. Harlow v.
28 Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982). It is an “entitlement not to stand trial or face the other
1 burdens of litigation.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth,
2 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236
3 (2009)). Even if a constitutional violation occurred, prison officials are entitled to qualified
4 immunity if they acted reasonably under the circumstances. See Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d
5 847, 858 (9th Cir. 2009); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987). When government
6 officials are sued in their individual capacities for civil damages, a court must “begin by taking
7 note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim . . . against officials entitled to assert
8 the defense of qualified immunity.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675.
9 The doctrine of qualified immunity “protects government officials from ‘liability for civil
10 damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
11 rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Tibbetts v. Kulongoski, 567 F.3d 529,
12 535 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818). The qualified immunity analysis involves
13 two parts, determining whether (1) the facts that a plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a
14 violation of a constitutional right; and (2) the right at issue was clearly established at the time of
15 the defendant’s alleged misconduct. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; see Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232, 236;
16 see also Bull v. City & County of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2010). A right is
17 clearly established only if “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful
18 in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 at 202; Norwood v. Vance, 591 F.3d 1062, 1068
19 (9th Cir. 2010). These prongs need not be addressed in any particular order. Pearson, 555 U.S. at
20 236. “Prison officials conducting violative searches are entitled to qualified immunity if ‘the
21 searches are reasonably related to a legitimate penological goal, or [if] the defendants reasonably
22 could have believed that the searches were conducted to further such a purpose.’” Vaughan v.
23 Ricketts (Vaughan II), 950 F.2d 1464, 1468 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Tribble v. Gardner, 860 F.2d
24 321, 328 (9th Cir. 1988)) (alteration in original).
25 ////
26 ////
27 ////
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1 ANALYSIS
2 I. Plaintiff Has Pled Sufficient Facts to State a Claim for Unreasonable Search
3 Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for an
4 unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment because the search was done by a medical
5 professional and was therefore reasonable. (ECF No. 13 at 4-5.)
6 The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const.
7 amend IV. The reasonableness of a search is determined by the context, which “requires a
8 balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that search
9 entails.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979); Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1227 (9th
10 Cir. 2010). “The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to be secure against
11 unreasonable searches, and its protections are not extinguished upon incarceration.” Jordan v.
12 Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1993). However, lawful incarceration necessarily entails
13 limitations upon many of the rights enjoyed by ordinary citizens. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
14 517, 524 (1984); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). “[A]n intrusion into the human
15 body implicates an individual’s ‘most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.’” United
16 States v. Fowlkes, 804 F.3d 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760
17 (1985)). “[P]hysical rectal examinations of prisoners, when carried out by trained medical staff
18 under sanitary conditions, are at times ‘a necessary and reasonable concomitance of . . .
19 imprisonment.’” Lule v. Aguilar, No. ED CV 21-2057-JWH(E), 2023 WL 6813721, at *4 (C.D.
20 Cal. Feb. 8, 2023) (quoting Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 43 (1st Cir. 2009)).
21 In the Ninth Circuit, a digital bodily cavity search only complies with the Fourth
22 Amendment if: (1) prison officials have reasonable cause to search the inmate, Vaughan II, 950
23 F.2d at 1468-69, (2) the search serves a valid penological need, Tribble, 860 F.2d at 325, and
24 (3) the search is conducted in a reasonable manner, Vaughan v. Ricketts (Vaughan I), 859 F.2d
25 736, 741 (9th Cir. 1988), overruled other grounds by Koch v. Rickets, 68 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir.
26 1995). See also Wiley v. Serrano, 37 Fed. Appx. 252, 253 (9th Cir. 2002)1; Nunez, 591 F.3d at
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28 1 This unpublished decision is being cited for persuasive value only. See 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
1 1227 (“Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is
2 conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” (quoting Bell,
3 441 U.S. at 559)).
4 Defendants stated that this court found that reasonable cause and a valid penological
5 interest existed to conduct a cavity search in the court’s order to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF
6 No. 13 at 4 (citing ECF No. 5 at 6).) However, what the court said was “[i]t is possible
7 defendants had reasonable cause and a valid penological interest in conducting a cavity search.”
8 (ECF No. 5 at 6 (emphasis added).) For the purposes of this motion to dismiss, the court will
9 focus on whether the search was conducted in a reasonable manner.
10 A. Was the Search Conducted in a Reasonable Manner?
11 Determining the reasonableness of a digital cavity search requires that the court consider
12 “issues of privacy, hygiene, and the training of those conducting the searches . . . .” Vaughan I,
13 859 F.2d at 741; see Fowlkes, 804 F.3d at 963 (holding that courts “consider a variety of factors
14 including hygiene, medical training, emotional and physical trauma, and the availability of
15 alternative methods for conducting the search”). “[T]he process for removing suspected
16 contraband from a detainee’s body, ‘if it is to comport with the reasonableness standard of the
17 fourth amendment, must be conducted with regard for the subject’s privacy and be designed to
18 minimize emotional and physical trauma.’” Fowlkes, 804 F.3d at 964 (quoting United States v.
19 Cameron, 538 F.2d 254, 258 (1976)).
20 Here, plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to plead that the search was not conducted in a
21 reasonable manner. On a motion to dismiss, the court must take the facts alleged as true and in
22 the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 73. Plaintiff has stated facts to
23 indicate the search was not conducted in a sanitary manner because the nurse used the same glove
24 on three inmates, one of which may have had Hepatitis C. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Additionally, the
25 search was conducted in front of two other inmates while defendants watched from the doorway
26 and laughed (id.), indicating plaintiff’s privacy was not considered and without regard for any
27 emotional trauma plaintiff might experience. See Fowlkes, 804 F.3d at 964. The search was also
28 performed after plaintiff was “medically cleared” and after he offered to consent to other, less
1 invasive, procedures to determine if he was carrying drugs. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Since plaintiff was
2 medically cleared, there was no emergency requiring a quick resolution. See Lule, 2023 WL
3 6813721, at *5.
4 Therefore, plaintiff has plead sufficient facts to state a claim for an unreasonable cavity
5 search.
6 II. Plaintiff has Alleged a Violation of a Clearly Established Right
7 Defendants argue that even if plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to show his Fourth
8 Amendment rights were violated, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and this case
9 should be dismissed because there is no “clearly established” right. (ECF No. 13 at 3-4.)
10 To determine whether a right is clearly established involves considering whether it would
11 be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. See
12 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999) (“[A]s we explained in Anderson[v. Creighton, 483
13 U.S. 635 (1987)], the right allegedly violated must be defined at the appropriate level of
14 specificity before a court can determine if it was clearly established”); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.
15 “The ‘clearly established law’ test requires more than an alleged ‘violation of extremely
16 abstract rights.’” Tribble, 860 F.2d at 324 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639). Rather, “[t]he
17 contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
18 what he is doing violates that right.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640). “In other words,
19 ‘in the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be apparent.’” Id. (citation omitted).
20 “Clearly established” means the statutory or constitutional question was “beyond debate” such
21 that every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is unlawful. See District of
22 Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018); Vos v. City of Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024, 1035
23 (9th Cir. 2018). To be “clearly established,” a rule must be dictated by controlling authority or a
24 robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority. Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63; Vos, 892 F.3d at
25 1035). Courts must define the law with a “high degree of specificity” when applying qualified
26 immunity. Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63 (citation omitted). The key question is “whether the violative
27 nature of particular conduct is clearly established” in the specific context of the case. Vos, 892
28 F.3d at 1035 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
1 Here, the right at issue is plaintiff’s right to have a search conducted in a reasonable
2 manner, considering factors such as “hygiene, medical training, emotional and physical trauma,
3 and the availability of alternative methods for conducting the search.” Fowlkes, 804 F.3d at 963.
4 It is clearly established that rectal searches be conducted in a reasonable manner. See
5 Vaughan II, 950 F.2d at 1468-69 (“By 1984, it was clearly established that the Fourth
6 Amendment requires that rectal searches in prisons be conducted . . . in a reasonable manner.”
7 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 559). “[I]ssues of privacy, hygiene, and the training of those conducting
8 the searches are relevant to determining whether the manner of search was reasonable.”
9 Vaughan I, 859 F.2d at 741. The Ninth Circuit has found that involuntary bodily cavity searches
10 were unreasonable where they were done on a table that was unsanitary, medical personnel did
11 not wash their hands between searches, the area was visible to other inmates and prison
12 personnel, and some personnel made jokes and insulting comments. Id.
13 Therefore, the right to have a digital cavity search done in a reasonable manner that is
14 sanitary, relatively private and performed in a manner that does not cause unnecessary emotional
15 trauma is clearly established. Viewing the complaint’s allegations in a light favorable to plaintiff,
16 as the court must at this stage, defendants violated this clearly established right.
17 III. Defendants Were Involved in the Search
18 Finally, defendants allege that they are entitled to qualified immunity because a nurse
19 actually performed the search and defendants were not involved. (ECF No. 13 at 5-6.)
20 “[O]fficers may not avoid the requirements of the Fourth Amendment by inducing, coercing,
21 promoting, or encouraging private parties to perform searches they would not otherwise
22 perform.” George v. Edholm, 752 F.3d 1206, 1215 (9th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff’s allegations that
23 defendants ordered the search are enough to allege their involvement. Lule, 2023 WL 6813721,
24 at *7.
25 CONCLUSION
26 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’
27 motion to dismiss (ECF No. 13) be denied.
28 ////
1 In addition, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall assign a district
2 | judge to this case.
3 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
4 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days
5 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
6 | objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned
7 | “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the
8 | objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The
9 | parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to
10 | appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
11 | Dated: May 28, 2024
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14 ORAH BARNES
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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