Glen Love v. Benjamin Sanza

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:24-cv-00462-WDK-PD Date: October 8, 2024

Title Glen Love v. Benjamin Sanza

Present: The Honorable: Patricia Donahue, U.S. Magistrate Judge

Isabel Verduzco N/A

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder

Attorneys Present for Plaintiff: Attorneys Present for Defendant:

N/A N/A

Proceedings: (In Chambers) Order to Show Cause Why First

Amended Complaint Should Not Be Dismissed as

Time-Barred

Plaintiff Glen Love (“Plaintiff”), a federal inmate proceeding pro se,

filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Defendant Benjamin Sanza (“Defendant”), an Inglewood police

officer, in his individual capacity. [Dkt. No. 8 at 3.]

Plaintiff alleges that on July 30, 2017, Defendant knowingly presented

false information to a California state judge to obtain a search warrant for

Plaintiff’s store, the “Stop & Shop.” [Id. at 5-6, 24-36.] Plaintiff alleges that

the state warrant was premised on a “fictitious allegation that Raythel

Brown and Wiley Ivory were involved in a shooting.” [Id. at 5.] Plaintiff

alleges that the state warrant is unrelated to his federal conviction. Plaintiff

further alleges that he is not contesting his federal conviction, and his case is

therefore not barred by Heck.1 [Id.]

1 The Court previously issued an Order to Show Cause why the Complaint should

not be dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), as it appeared

that Plaintiff was contesting his federal criminal conviction. [See Dkt. No. 5.]

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:24-cv-00462-WDK-PD Date: October 8, 2024

Title Glen Love v. Benjamin Sanza

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated his Fourth Amendment right

against unreasonable search and seizure and his Fourteenth Amendment

right to due process. [Id. at 5-6.] Plaintiff further alleges that his personal

property was destroyed, and Defendant had no legal justification to leave his

property unsecured to allow thieves to rob it afterwards. [Id. at 6.] Plaintiff

seeks $57,220.00 in actual losses and $500,000 in punitive damages. [Id. at

7.]

Plaintiff attached as Exhibit One to the FAC correspondence from the

City of Inglewood dated October 24, 2017, notifying him that his claim has

been forwarded to the Office of the City Attorney [Id. at 9, 10], as well as

correspondence dated January 10, 2018, notifying him that the Inglewood

City Council had denied his claim for damages (date of loss September 20,

2017) and advising him that he has six months from the denial to file a court

action under California Government Code section 945.6 [Id. at 11]. Plaintiff

also attached a letter dated October 15, 2019, to an attorney regarding his

federal criminal matter [Id. at 12] and two claims for damages to the City of

Inglewood dated October 8, 2017, and October 16, 2017 [Id. at 13-20].

Attached as Exhibit Two is a report from the Inglewood Police Department

along with a copy of the search warrant. [Id. at 22-36.]

I. Standard of Review

The Court is required to screen pro se complaints brought by prisoners

and dismiss claims that, among other things, are frivolous, malicious, or fail

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-

(b)(1). Even when a plaintiff is not proceeding in forma pauperis, Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a claim sua sponte

and without notice “where the claimant cannot possibly win relief.” See

Omar v. Sea–Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987). In

determining whether a complaint should be dismissed at screening, the

Court applies the same standard as that in a motion to dismiss pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037,

1039 (9th Cir. 2015). Under that standard, “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true” and viewed in the light most

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:24-cv-00462-WDK-PD Date: October 8, 2024

Title Glen Love v. Benjamin Sanza

favorable to the nonmoving party, “to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This does not require “detailed

factual allegations,” but it does require “more than an unadorned, the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. The Court does not,

however, “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory,

unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v.

Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). Because Plaintiff

is proceeding pro se, the Court construes the First Amended Complaint

liberally. Barrett v. Belleque, 544 F.3d 1060, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2008) (per

curiam).

II. Discussion

A. Plaintiff’s Claims Appear Barred by the Two-Year Statute

of Limitations

The FAC appears on its face to be time barred. A complaint may be

dismissed sua sponte at the screening stage for failure to state a claim when

“the running of the statute of limitations is apparent on the face of the

complaint.” Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592

F.3d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465

F.3d 992, 997 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). Belanus v. Clark,

796 F.3d 1021, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of pro se

complaint upon screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, in part, because

prisoner's complaint, on its face, appeared to be untimely and barred by the

applicable statute of limitations).

The applicable statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 is the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury

actions. Bird v. Dep't of Human Servs., 935 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 2019) (per

curiam) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 899 (2020); Mills v. City of

Covina, 921 F.3d 1161, 1166 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 388 (2019). “In

California, personal injury claims that accrued after January 1, 2003, are

subject to a two-year statute of limitations.” Colony Cove Props., LLC v. City

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:24-cv-00462-WDK-PD Date: October 8, 2024

Title Glen Love v. Benjamin Sanza

of Carson, 640 F.3d 948, 956 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 971 (2011); Cal.

Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1; Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 761 (9th Cir. 2014),

cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1077 (2015). Federal law determines when a cause of

action accrues and the limitations period begins to run. McDonough v.

Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 2155 (2019); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387

(2007). Under federal law, “a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has

reason to know of the injury that forms the basis of his cause of action.” Soto

v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 870 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 480 (2018);

Bird, 935 F.3d at 743.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that on September 20, 2017, his business was

illegally searched, surveillance cameras at his business were destroyed, and

his property was stolen. [Dkt. No. 8 at 13-14.] Plaintiff's claim therefore

accrued on September 20, 2017, when he was aware of Defendant’s actions

and his damages. Without tolling, the two-year statute of limitations would

have expired on September 20, 2019. Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint on

January 11, 2024. [Dkt. No. 1.] The FAC is untimely unless Plaintiff is

entitled to tolling.

The Court borrows California’s statutory and equitable tolling rules to

the extent they are not inconsistent with federal law. See Jones v. Blanas,

393 F.3d 918, 927-28 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 820 (2005). Among

other statutory provisions, California applies up to two years of tolling for

plaintiffs imprisoned for less than a life term. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a)

(“If a person entitled to bring an action ... is, at the time the cause of action

accrued, imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence

of a criminal court for a term less than for life, the time of that disability is

not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action, not to

exceed two years.”); Brown v. County of Los Angeles, 830 F. App’x 231, 232

(9th Cir. 2020) (only prisoners serving sentences less than life without the

possibility of parole are entitled to tolling under section 352.1).

It does not appear that Plaintiff was imprisoned at the time his claim

accrued. Further, even if Plaintiff qualified for the two years of

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:24-cv-00462-WDK-PD Date: October 8, 2024

Title Glen Love v. Benjamin Sanza

imprisonment tolling under section 352.1, his claim still would be untimely

by about two years.

California also provides for equitable tolling in limited circumstances

when the plaintiff satisfies the following three conditions: “(1) defendant

must have had timely notice of the claim; (2) defendant must not be

prejudiced by being required to defend the otherwise barred claim; and (3)

plaintiff's conduct must have been reasonable and in good faith.” Fink v.

Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation and citation

omitted), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1117 (2000). Here, the FAC provides no

apparent basis for equitable tolling sufficient to overcome the time bar.

III. Order

Accordingly, Plaintiff is Ordered to Show Cause by November 8, 2024,

why this action should not be dismissed as time barred. Plaintiff's response

should address whether he properly qualifies for tolling or other grounds

sufficient to overcome the applicable statute of limitations.

Alternatively, if Plaintiff does not wish to proceed with this federal

action, he may instead date, sign and return the attached dismissal notice by

the foregoing deadline.

Plaintiff is cautioned that the failure to comply with this Order to Show

Cause and/or to show good cause may result in the dismissal of this action as

time-barred, for lack of prosecution and/or for failure to comply with a Court

Order.

Finally, the Clerk is directed to provide a Central District of

California Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Form, CV-09, to Plaintiff.

Attachment:

--Notice of Voluntary Dismissal (CV-09)