noting that domicile typically requires physical presence in a location and an intention to remain there indefinitely
How later courts described this case
- noting that domicile typically requires physical presence in a location and an intention to remain there indefinitely
- “A person’s domicile is her permanent home, where she resides with the intention to remain or to which she intends to return.”’
- “Our precedent directs us to consider only the American citizenship of a dual citizen for purposes of determining diversity”
- “a party who corresponds to none of § 1332(a)’s categories destroys original jurisdiction over a diversity case”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 24-7576 PA (BFMx) Date September 17, 2024
Title Reuven Levitt, et al. v. FCA US, LLC
Present: The Honorable PERCY ANDERSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Kamilla Sali-Suleyman Not Reported N/A
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter Tape No.
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants:
None None
Proceedings: IN CHAMBERS - COURT ORDER
On September 12, 2024, the Court issued an order dismissing the Complaint filed by
plaintiffs Reuven Levitt, Meredith Levitt, individually and on behalf of their two minor children,
E.L. and N.L. (“Plaintiffs”) against defendant FCA US, LLC (“Defendant”). (Docket No. 10.)
Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleged that the Court possessed diversity jurisdiction over this action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), but the Court concluded that the Complaint failed to
adequately allege that the parties were completely diverse.
Section 1332(a)(2) provides for diversity jurisdiction of a civil action where the amount
in controversy exceeds $75,000 and is between “citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a
foreign state... □□ The Complaint alleged that Plaintiffs were residents of Portugal and that
Defendant was a citizen of the United States. However, because “a resident of a foreign country
is not necessarily a citizen thereof,” Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 248 (Sth Cir. 1996), the Court
found that Plaintiffs’ allegations were insufficient to plausibly allege diversity jurisdiction under
section 1332(a)(2). The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Complaint with leave to amend to allege a
basis for the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on September 14, 2024. (Docket
No. 11.) Plaintiffs again rely on 28 U.S.C. §1332(a)(2) as the basis for the Court’s subject
matter jurisdiction. (“FAC” 14.) Plaintiffs now allege that Plaintiffs are all “resident
citizen[s]” of Portugal and that plaintiffs Reuven and Meredith Levitt are also United States
citizens. (FAC {ff 8, 9.)
Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction only over matters authorized by the
Constitution and Congress. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106
S. Ct. 1326, 1331, 89 L. Ed. 2d 501 (1986). In seeking to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction,
Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists. Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925,
927 (9th Cir. 1986). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that “[a] pleading that states a
claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 24-7576 PA (BFMx) Date September 17, 2024
Title Reuven Levitt, et al. v. FCA US, LLC
jurisdiction....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). This District’s Local Rules further provide that “[t]he
statutory or other basis for the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court shall be plainly stated in...
any document invoking this Court’s jurisdiction.” Local Civil Rule 8-1.
To establish citizenship for diversity purposes, a natural person must be a citizen of the
United States and be domiciled in a particular state. Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd., 704
F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1983). Persons are domiciled in the places they reside with the intent
to remain or to which they intend to return. See Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853,
857 (9th Cir. 2001). The FAC alleges that Plaintiffs are currently “resident citizens” of Portugal,
that they moved to Portugal and have lived there since 2019, had traveled to the United States in
July 2023 for business and to visit family, and had intended to return to Portugal after their
vacation. (FAC 7¥ 8, 18.) The FAC also alleges that after the August 7, 2023 accident at issue
in this case that resulted in the loss of their personal belongings, Plaintiffs had to purchase basic
necessities for the family “until they could return home to Portugal’, and that they “finally flew
home to Lagos, Portugal” on August 23, 2023. (FAC § 38.)
Based on these allegations, the Court concludes that the FAC fails to plausibly allege
diversity jurisdiction. First, although the FAC attempts to allege Plaintiffs’ Portugese citizenship
to comply with the requirements for alienage jurisdiction as set forth in section 1332(a)(2), only
Plaintiffs’ United States’ citizenship is considered for purposes of establishing diversity
jurisdiction. Matao Yokeno v. Sawako Sekiguchi, 754 F.3d 649, 655 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Our
precedent directs us to consider only the American citizenship of a dual citizen for purposes of
determining diversity”) (citing Mutuelles Unies v. Kroll & Linstrom, 957 F.2d 707, 711 (9th
Cir.1992)); see also Frett-Smith v. Vanterpool, 511 F.3d 396, 400 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We agree
with the courts that have already decided this issue and hold that for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction, only the American nationality of a dual national is recognized. Because Smith is a
United States citizen, her initial reliance on alienage jurisdiction was in error.”). Simply stated,
“an American living abroad is not by virtue of that domicile a citizen or subject of the foreign
state in which he resides so as to permit invocation of the alienage jurisdiction prescribed in 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) of the Judicial Code.” Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 250 (Sth Cir. 1996)
(citing 13B Wright—Miller—Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3621 (1984)).
Nor can an American national, living abroad, sue in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332
unless that party is domiciled in a particular state of the United States. Coury, 85 F.3d at 248
(citing | J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 0.74[4] (1996)). Plaintiffs’ own allegations
establish that they were domiciled in Portugal — and not in the United States — at the time they
filed this action. (FAC ff 8, 18, 38.) See Coury, 85 F.3d at 250 (noting that domicile typically
requires physical presence in a location and an intention to remain there indefinitely); Kanter,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 24-7576 PA (BFMx) Date September 17, 2024
Title Reuven Levitt, et al. v. FCA US, LLC
265 F.3d at 857 (“A person’s domicile is her permanent home, where she resides with the
intention to remain or to which she intends to return.”’).
When a party is a “is ‘a United States citizen, but has no domicile in any State,’” they are
stateless for purposes of diversity jurisdiction under§ 1332(a). La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys.
v. Wynn, 829 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Newman-Green Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain,
490 U.S. 826, 828 (1989)).” Thus, Plaintiffs are considered “stateless” for diversity purposes,
and their presence in this action “destroy[s] complete diversity required for federal jurisdiction.”
Id.; see also Lee v. American National Ins. Co, 260 F.3d 997, 1005 (9th Cir. 2001) (“a party who
corresponds to none of § 1332(a)’s categories destroys original jurisdiction over a diversity
case”); Brady v. Brown, 51 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1995) (because a party was a United States
citizen living in Mexico, he was neither a citizen or an alien under § 1332(a)(2) or (3), and his
presence thus destroyed the complete diversity required for federal jurisdiction). Plaintiffs raise
no other basis for jurisdiction other than diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).
Accordingly, the Court dismisses this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
A district court may grant leave to amend when it appears that subject matter jurisdiction
may exist — even though the complaint inadequately alleges jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1653;
Trentacosta v. Frontier Pac. Aircraft Indus., Inc., 813 F.2d 1553, 1561 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Leave to
amend a complaint should be freely given in the absence of a showing of bad faith or undue
delay by the moving party or prejudice to the nonmoving party.”). Here, however, it would be
futile to grant Plaintiffs leave to amend because based on their own allegations of domicile and
citizenship, Plaintiffs are “stateless” and thus unable to establish diversity jurisdiction in this
matter. See Newman-Green Inc., 490 U.S. at 828-29 (concluding that the combination of a
party’s “stateless status” and “United States citizenship” destroyed diversity jurisdiction under
section 1332(a)). Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ Complaint without prejudice and
without leave to amend.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
u In La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys, the court of appeals considered whether a “‘stateless”
defendant destroyed diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3) (providing for diversity
jurisdiction among citizens of different States and parties who are citizens or subjects of a
foreign state). This same reasoning applies to cases alleging jurisdiction under §1332(a)(2)
(providing for diversity jurisdiction for citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign
state). Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 829.