Opinion

Sanford v. Robinson

Court
District Court, W.D. Arkansas
Filed
Apr 12, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.2%

sheriff’s department is not a legal entity subject to suit

How later courts described this case

  • sheriff’s department is not a legal entity subject to suit
  • police department not a juridical entity suable as such

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

DAMON CHARLES SANFORD PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 5:24-cv-05057

OFFICER ELI HOBBS;

OFFICER BRAD ROBINSON;

WASHINGTON COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT DEFENDANTS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a civil rights action filed by Damon Charles Sanford pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff, who is not incarcerated, proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. Pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, United States

District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned who now examines Sanford’s Complaint for

preservice screening under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b). Pursuant to §

1915(e)(2)(b), the Court has an obligation to dismiss a case at any time if the Court determines

that the action or appeal is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from relief.

I. BACKGROUND

Sanford brings claims against Defendant Eli Hobbs and Defendant Brad Robinson in their

individual capacities and against the Washington County Sheriff’s Department in its official

capacity alleging he was falsely prosecuted by Defendants and seeking $5,250.00 in compensatory

damages, punitive damages, and other relief to which he is entitled. (ECF No. 1).

The arrest in question arose from a domestic incident on March 12, 2021. Defendant Hobbs

was dispatched to Plaintiff’s residence following a domestic altercation; when Hobbs arrived,

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Sanford had already left the residence, and had walked to his parents’ home. (ECF No. 1 p. 8).

Charges filed against him were nolle prossed1 on March 11, 2022, but Sanford says he only

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became aware of the Sheriff’s 2021 report and potential charges when he retained an attorney to

assist him. Id.

While convoluted, the undersigned ascertains the following background: Sanford says one

week after the March 12, 2021, incident, two law enforcement officers arrived at Sanford’s

parent’s home, ostensibly to speak with Sanford. Officer Grindstaff (not a party here) rang the

doorbell three times, allegedly hiding at the sides of the house after ringing the bell; these instances

disturbed Sanford’s mother. Id. Sanford says Officer Grindstaff was verbally hostile toward

Plaintiff’s mother when asking to speak to Sanford. Officer Grindstaff was advised that Sanford

was away with his father. Id. Officer Grindstaff asked for Sanford’s father’s cell phone number,

and Sanford’s mother asked if the officers had a warrant and businesses cards. Id. Officer

Grindstaff replied in the negative; the officers left and waited at the end of the street for Sanford’s

return. Id. An attorney subsequently reached out to the Sheriff’s Department, inquiring why they

went to Sanford’s parents’ residence looking for Sanford and a Sheriff’s Department supervisor

allegedly threatened to arrest Sanford’s mother for obstruction of justice. Id.

Sanford complains that the Sheriff’s Department then sent several officers to Sanford’s

cousin’s residence in Goshen that same week, alleging officers entered the property and looked

around without consent or a warrant before being confronted and informed that Sanford went to

his parents’ residence after the incident. (ECF No. 1, p. 9).

Sanford says his attorney sent photos of Sanford’s injuries from the March 2021 incident

1 The Court has been unable to find a record of any criminal case filed against Sanford in 2021 or 2022.

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and discussed them with a Sheriff’s Department supervisor; they discussed the facts of the incident

and arguable probable cause, and the attorney was informed that charges would not be filed. (ECF

No. 1, p. 9). Sanford’s attorney also spoke with prosecutors about whether a warrant for Sanford

was being sought and learned there was no warrant. Id. The attorney inquired about a request by

Defendant Hobbs that Sanford “turn himself in” and was informed this would not work in the

absence of a valid warrant. Id. Following these conversations, Sanford says his attorney advised

Sanford and his family that the matter was resolved, and Sanford could retrieve his belongings

from his former residence. Id.

Sanford alleges that two months later, Defendant Hobbs returned to his parents’ home at

1:57 am and rang the doorbell, knocked multiple times on the door, and took pictures of vehicles

at the residence. Id. An attorney was retained who contacted Hobbs; Hobbs advised via email

there was felony probable cause for Sanford’s arrest and that Sanford needed to turn himself in,

advising that if Sanford was caught while driving, he would be arrested, and his vehicle would be

towed. Id. Sanford says Hobbs attempted to blackmail Sanford in this email by stating that if he

turned himself in, Hobbs would make it easy by booking him in and out quickly, but the matter

would be worse if Sanford did not do so. Id.

Approximately four months following this email exchange with Hobbs, Sanford filed an

order of protection against his former partner because of injuries he had sustained during the March

12, 2021, incident. Id. Sanford says he arrived at the Washington County Courthouse and there

was no confrontation with any officer. Id. Nearly a year later, Sanford went to the Washington

County Sheriff’s Department to file a fraud report and was met by Defendant Robinson. Robinson

allegedly followed Sanford to his car when he went to retrieve his ID; Sanford alleges Robinson

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reached into the door and unlocked it without Plaintiff’s consent, pulled Sanford out of the car by

the arm, and threatened Sanford about being physically dragged back inside if he did not sign

paperwork for charges related to the incident of March 12, 2021. (ECF No. 1, p. 10). Sanford

alleges Robinson told him to talk to an attorney and the charges would just go away “magically.”

Sanford says he was violently thrown into Defendant Robinson’s SUV while handcuffed. (ECF

No. 1, pp. 10, 11).

At some point, Sanford’s attorney requested discovery concerning the March 12th incident

and received a motor vehicle recording and Defendant Hobbs’ written report. (ECF No. 1, p. 10).

After watching the video, Sanford’s attorney advised him that Defendant Hobbs’ report did not

align with the recording, and that Hobbs must be aware that the alleged victim was the only

aggressor although she was never charged. Id. Sanford says the alleged victim told Defendant

Hobbs she just wanted Sanford to leave but she did not wish to press charges. Id.

Sanford says no warrant was ever issued for his arrest, and that even after the case against

him was dismissed, Sanford’s complaints to the supervisors at the Washington County Sheriff’s

Department were not taken seriously. (ECF No. 1, p. 11).

Sanford’s complaint seeks to allege the following: Malicious prosecution on the parts of

Defendants Hobbs and Robinson; false imprisonment by Defendant Robinson when he detained

and arrested Sanford on March 12, 2021; defamation by Defendant Hobbs in the incident report;

perjury on the part of Defendant Hobbs by fabricating statements in the incident report, and by

swearing a probable cause warrant which was denied; and false arrest by Defendant Robinson.

(ECF No. 1, pp. 12-13).

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II. APPLICABLE LAW

Under § 1915(e)(2)(b), the Court is obligated dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it

contains claims that: (1) are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(b). A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action is malicious when the allegations are known to

be false, or it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather

than to vindicate a cognizable right. Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987);

In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988). A claim fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we

hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded . . . to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). This means “that if the essence of an allegation is

discernable, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe

the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal

framework.” Id. at 544. However, the complaint must still allege specific facts sufficient to

support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).

III. DISCUSSION

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of

a citizen’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United

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States. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) each defendant

acted under color of state law, and (2) that he or she violated a right secured by the constitution.

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 1999).

A. Claims Against the Washington County Sheriff’s Department

Sanford has named the Washington County Sheriff’s Department as a defendant. The

Sheriff’s Department, however, is not considered a person or legal entity subject to suit. See e.g

Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992) (police department not a

juridical entity suable as such); In re Scott County Master Docket, 672 F. Supp. 1152, 1163 n. 1

(D. Minn. 1987) (sheriff’s department is not a legal entity subject to suit), aff’d, Myers v. Scott

County, 868 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir. 1989). Sanford’s claim against the Washington County Sheriff’s

Department is subject to dismissal.

B. Claims Against Hobbs and Robinson in their Individual Capacities

"Liability under Section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the

deprivation of rights." Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370 (1976)). To state a cognizable Section 1983 claim, a complaint must set

forth specific factual allegations showing what each named defendant allegedly did, or failed to

do, that allegedly violated the plaintiff's federal constitutional rights. Sanford makes factual

allegations showing what each Defendant Hobbs and Defendant Robinson allegedly did which

violated his constitutional rights, and the undersigned turns in attention to whether or not those

allegations state any claim.

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Malicious Prosecution Claims

For a malicious prosecution claim – sometimes referred to as an unlawful seizure pursuant

to legal process claim – to establish a constitutional violation, it must arise under the Fourth

Amendment. Harrington v. City of Council Bluffs, 678 F.3d 676, 679 (8th Cir. 2012). “[T]he

gravamen of the tort of malicious prosecution” is “the wrongful initiation of charges without

probable cause.” Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 44 (2022). The elements of a malicious

prosecution claim are: (1) the charge was instituted without probable cause; (2) the motive for

instituting the suit was malicious – that is, for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice;

and (3) the prosecution ended with a favorable termination. Id. In Thompson, the Court determined

that to establish a favorable termination a plaintiff “need only show his prosecution ended without

a conviction.” Id. at 39.

Here, it is questionable whether probable cause existed at the time of the warrantless arrest

of Sanford. Sanford alleges Defendant Hobbs and Defendant Robinson acted out of ill will or in a

spirit of revenge but does not allege specific malicious motive. Plaintiff’s charges ended with a

favorable termination. Therefore, the claim is cognizable and should be allowed to proceed.

False Imprisonment/False Arrest Claim

An officer is entitled to “qualified immunity for a warrantless arrest if the arrest was

supported by at least ‘arguable probable cause.’” Joseph, 712 F.3d at 1226. “Arguable probable

cause exists even where an officer mistakenly arrests a suspect believing it is based on probable

cause if the mistake is objectively reasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). The existence of probable cause is a question of law. Id. at 1227.

“Under the Fourth Amendment, a person has a right to be secure in his person and warrants

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may not issue but upon probable cause.” Ross v. City of Jackson, Mo., 897 F.3d 916, 920 (8th Cir.

2018). “It is well established that a warrantless arrest without probable cause violates an

individual’s constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Joseph v. Allen,

712 F.3d 1222, 1226 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, a

false arrest claim under § 1983 “fails as a matter of law where the officer had probable cause to

make the arrest.” Kurtz v. City of Shrewsbury, 245 F.3d 753, 758 (8th Cir. 2001).

“[P]robable cause is a fluid concept – turning on the assessment of probabilities in

particular factual contexts – not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). The Eighth Circuit advises that “An officer has

probable cause to make warrantless arrest when the totality of the circumstances at the time of the

arrest ‘are sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that the defendant has committed or is

committing an offense.’” Borgman v. Kedley, 646 F.3d 518, 523 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Fisher

v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 619 F.3d 811, 816 (8th Cir. 2010))“The substance of all the definitions

of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596

F.3d 465, 474 (8th Cir. 2010).

“We must give law enforcement officers ‘substantial latitude in interpreting and drawing

inferences from factual circumstances,’ ... but such latitude is not without limits.” Kuehl v. Burtis,

173 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Washington, 109 F.3d 459, 465 (8th

Cir. 1997)). First, evidence tending to “negate the possibility that a suspect committed a crime is

relevant” to whether probable cause exists. Id. “In this sense, the Fourth Amendment requires

that we analyze the weight of all the evidence – not merely the sufficiency of the incriminating

evidence.” Id. Second, “law enforcement officers have a duty to conduct a reasonably thorough

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investigation prior to arresting a suspect, at least in the absence of exigent circumstances and so

long as law enforcement would not be unduly hampered if the agents wait to obtain more facts

before seeking arrest.” Id. (internal punctuation marks and citations omitted).

An officer is entitled to “qualified immunity for a warrantless arrest if the arrest was

supported by at least ‘arguable probable cause.’” Joseph, 712 F.3d at 1226. “Arguable probable

cause exists even where an officer mistakenly arrests a suspect believing it is based on probable

cause if the mistake is objectively reasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The existence of probable cause is a question of law. Id. at 1227.

In this case, the incident related to this arrest occurred a year prior to Sanford’s arrest.

Sanford says that Defendant Hobbs had applied for and been denied a warrant which would render

it difficult for Defendant Robinson to mistakenly believe there was probable cause for this arrest.

Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to raise the question of whether probable cause existed at the time

of his arrest, and this claim should be allowed to proceed against Defendant Robinson.

Defamation Claim

Defamation of character does not state a constitutional violation. “[D]efamation, per se, is

not actionable under section 1983.” Underwood v. Pritchard, 638 F.2d 60, 62 (8th Cir. 1981).

The Supreme Court has held that a person’s interest in his reputation is not considered liberty or

property protected by the due process clause. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976). In

other words, the “Supreme Court has made clear that federal courts are not to view defamatory

acts as constitutional violations.” Boyanowski v. Capital Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396,

400 (3d Cir. 2000). No cognizable claim for defamation is stated, and therefore this claim should

not be allowed to proceed.

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Perjury

Sanford alleges Defendant Hobbs knowingly made false statements in his police report,

and sought a warrant based upon those false statements. A warrant based upon an affidavit

containing “deliberate falsehood” or “reckless disregard for the truth” violates the Fourth

Amendment. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S.Ct. at 2684. An official who causes such a deprivation

is subject to § 1983 liability. See Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 494 (8th Cir.1991). Bagby v.

Brondhaver, 98 F.3d 1096, 1098 (8th Cir. 1996). If Officer Hobbs had obtained a warrant by

submitting an affidavit containing deliberate falsehoods, Sanford might have had a Fourth

Amendment claim. No warrant, however, was granted, and therefore, Plaintiff has not pled

sufficient facts to state a cognizable claim for a Fourth Amendment violation and this claim should

not be allowed to proceed.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court recommends the claims against the Washington

County Sheriff’s Department be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim.

The Court recommends that the claims against Defendant Robinson for malicious

prosecution and false imprisonment/arrest in his individual capacity be allowed to proceed.

The Court recommends that the claim against Defendant Hobbs for malicious prosecution

in his individual capacity be allowed to proceed but recommends dismissal of the false

imprisonment/arrest claim against Defendant Hobbs.

Finally, the Court recommends that the perjury and defamation claims against any

Defendant be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim.

By separate order, the remaining claims will be served on Defendants Robinson and Hobbs.

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The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation

in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court.

RECOMMENDED this 12th day of April 2024.

isi Assit _Comatack

HON. CHRASTY COMSTOCK

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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