Floyd v. Trinity Central Home Health, LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

ALAN FLOYD PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 6:22-cv-06117

TRINITY CENTRAL HOME HEALTH, LLC DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 18. Plaintiff

responded in opposition. ECF No. 21. Defendant replied. ECF No. 23. The Court finds the

matter ripe for consideration. For the following reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2017, Plaintiff Alan Floyd, a registered nurse, began employment with Defendant

Trinity Central Home Health, LLC. Defendant is a “Medicare-certified home health care agency”

that “provides health care and health related social services in the comfort of the patient’s home.”

ECF No. 20, p. 1; ECF No. 22, p. 1. Plaintiff had been a registered nurse for over eighteen (18)

years. Defendant hired Plaintiff as a pro re nata (PRN) nurse, meaning he worked on an as needed

basis. Plaintiff was interested in this position with Defendant because he could set his “schedule

around [his] kids and [his] family.” ECF No. 22-1, pp. 21-22.

While working for Defendant, Plaintiff’s primary responsibilities included conducting

assessments of patients in their homes, advising on appropriate medical care, and being an

advocate for his patients. Plaintiff’s at-home assessments included “head to toe” assessments,

including heart and lung checks. ECF No. 22-1, p. 30. Plaintiff’s primary patient population

included pediatric patients who were receiving home health care due to medical conditions and

their potential to become so sick that they need inpatient hospital care.

In addition to providing direct patient home health care, Plaintiff was required to attend

weekly staff meetings at Defendant’s facilities. Plaintiff was “in and out” of Defendant’s facilities

around four times per week. Id. at 25. The only part of Plaintiff’s job that he could perform

without having direct contact with people would be making phone calls. Jennifer Rogers was

Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor who was responsible for evaluating Plaintiff’s work performance.

In September 2021, Defendant developed a mandatory Covid-19 vaccination policy in

response to the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) mandatory vaccine mandate

for Medicaid and Medicare health providers. Pursuant to the policy, all of Defendant’s employees

were required to receive the Covid-19 vaccination. On September 15, 2021, Rick Still,

Defendant’s Executive Operations Director sent the following email communicating the

mandatory vaccine policy to Defendant’s employees:

Subject: Mandatory Vaccination Policy

Dear Valued Trinity Employee,

Trinity Home Health of Arkansas has implemented a mandatory vaccination policy

effective 10/31/21 requiring a Covid-19 vaccination for all employees. In

accordance with Trinity’s duty to provide and maintain a workplace that is free of

known hazards, we are adopting this policy to safeguard the health of our

employees and their families, our customers and visitors, and the community at

large from infectious diseases that may be reduced by vaccinations.

All employees must begin the vaccination process no later than 10/31/21. All

employees must be fully vaccinated by 11/30/21. Individuals seeking an exemption

from this requirement for medical or religious reasons should complete a request

for accommodation form and submit the form to the human resources department

immediately.

Should you have any question regarding this new policy, please contact you local

HR director.

Sincerely,

Rick Still

Executive Operations Director

ECF No. 18-2.

When Plaintiff received notice of the mandatory vaccine policy he got “angry.” ECF No.

22-1, p. 33. On October 14, 2021, Plaintiff sent the following reply all response to Defendant’s

employees:

Subject: Re: Covid Vaccine

Follow Up Flag: Follow up

Flag Status: Flagged

This about the safety to our employees and others or about being forced by Biden’s

admin because you are scared? It seems like this is a Trinity ruling by the wording.

What are the chances of breakthrough infection for those with the engineered spike

proteins vs the breakthrough infections for those already that’s recovered from

Covid like myself. That’s right I have better immunity than anyone that just has

the leaky Covid vaccines or show me the science if I’m wrong. I’ll challenge my

natural immunity and overall health against anyone that works for any of David’s

corporations. Anyone with a soul or courage shouldn’t allow themselves to be

overruled by political and medical tyranny. Trinity Home Health will be losing the

only pediatric home health nurse in this community along with the longest

employee remaining here at Trinity with this vaccine mandates. David, it’s time to

have some courage. Be like the founders of this country and resist. Now’s the time

to show your fortitude. Rick, send this to your upper management bc I know this

ruling isn’t yours.

Sincerely,

Alan Floyd

ECF No. 18-3.1 Plaintiff subsequently2 submitted a religious exemption request to Human

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Resources where he stated that he objects to vaccines because he believes in and follows “God and

the principles laid out in His Word” and he has a “deeply held belief that this Covid-19 vaccine

violates them.” ECF No. 18-4. Plaintiff further elaborated on reasons for his objection to the

vaccine. See id.

1 At his deposition, Plaintiff stated that David is the owner of Defendant’s corporation, however, Plaintiff could not

remember his last name. ECF No. 22-1, p. 37.

2 It is unclear to the Court exactly when Plaintiff made this request.

On October 19, 2021, Plaintiff’s supervisor, Rogers, informed Plaintiff that his request for

a permanent exemption from the vaccination was denied. The notice provided as follows:

Describe the requested accommodation:

Permanent exemption from COVID-19 vaccination.

Evaluation of impact (if any): Mr. Floyd is a registered nurse working in a PRN

capacity, which involves direct contact with other employees and home health

patients. Due to his job description, there is a significant risk of substantial harm

to the health and safety of the employee, other employees, and the patients of the

agency that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation. The

work environment is indoors, with direct and daily contact with others that cannot

be eliminated.

ECF No. 18-8. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was terminated from his position with Defendant.3

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On November 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed this case pursuant to Title VII and the Arkansas

Civil Rights Act (ACRA) alleging religious discrimination. ECF No. 2. Plaintiff seeks

compensatory and punitive damages. Id.

On December 12, 2023, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 18.

On December 22, 2023, Plaintiff responded in opposition. ECF No. 21. On December 29, 2023,

Defendant replied to Plaintiff’s response. ECF No. 23.

II. STANDARD

The standard for summary judgment is well established. A party may seek summary

judgment on a claim, a defense, or “part of [a] claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When a

party moves for summary judgment, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Krenik v. Cnty. of LeSueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957

(8th Cir. 1995). This is a “threshold inquiry of . . . whether there is a need for trial—whether, in

3 Plaintiff was “terminated in October or November of 2021.” ECF No. 22-1, p. 74.

other words, there are genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact

because they reasonably may be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A fact is material only when its resolution affects the outcome of

the case. Id. at 248. A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable

jury to return a verdict for either party. Id. at 252.

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must consider all the evidence and

all reasonable inferences that arise from the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. Nitsche v. CEO of Osage Valley Elec. Co-Op, 446 F.3d 841, 845 (8th Cir. 2006). The

moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that

it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank, 92 F.3d 743, 747

(8th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving party “may not rest upon mere allegations or denials . . . but must

set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.

“A party that fails to respond to any basis of a motion for summary judgment effectively waives

any argument in opposition to that aspect of a motion for summary judgment.” See Department

of Labor v. EJ’s Cleaning Services, Inc., 2020 WL 1432048, at *1 (E.D. Ark. March 19, 2020)

(citing Satcher v. Univ. of Ark. at Pine Bluff Bd. of Trs., 558 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 2009)).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brings claims of adverse employment actions resulting from religious

discrimination under Title VII and the ACRA. Title VII prohibits an employer from “discharg[ing]

any individual, or otherwise [ ] discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . .

religion[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). The ACRA similarly prohibits employment

discrimination on the basis of religion, among other grounds. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-107.

“ACRA claims are analyzed in the same manner as federal Title VII claims.” Pearson v. Tyson

Foods, Inc., No. 4:23-CV-01080-BSM, 2024 WL 1311420, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 26, 2024) (citing

Bell v. Baptist Health, 60 F.4th 1198, 1203 (8th Cir. 2023)); see also Orr v. City of Rogers, 232 F.

Supp. 3d 1052, 1061 n.2 (W.D. Ark. 2017) (“Title VII and ACRA claims ‘are governed by the

same standards.’” (quoting McCullough v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Scis., 559 F.3d 855, 860 (8th Cir.

2009))).

To establish a prima facie case for religious discrimination under Title VII, Plaintiff must

show that he: (1) has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement;

(2) informed Defendant of that conflict; and (3) suffered an adverse employment action. Jones v.

TEK Indus., Inc., 319 F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 2003). Once Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case

under this three-pronged test, the burden shifts to Defendant to show that accommodating the

plaintiff’s religious beliefs would result in undue hardship. Seaworth v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 1056,

1057 (8th Cir. 2000). The Court will first discuss Plaintiff’s prima facie case before shifting its

focus to Defendant’s burden to show that undue hardship would result from accommodating

Plaintiff’s permanent vaccine exemption request.

A. Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case

Focusing only on the first factor of the three-prong test set out in Jones, Defendant argues

that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case because Plaintiff fails to show that he has a bona

fide religious belief that conflicts with Defendant’s vaccination requirement. ECF No. 19, p. 9-

11. Only “beliefs rooted in religion, as opposed to purely secular beliefs or personal preferences”

are protected. Love v. Reed, 216 F.3d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 2000). “To determine whether a belief is

religious, factors to consider include whether it addresses ‘fundamental and ultimate questions

having to do with deep and imponderable matters,’ if the teachings are ‘comprehensive in nature,’

and if ‘certain formal and external signs’ are present.” Pearson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 4:23-

CV-01080-BSM, 2024 WL 1311420, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 26, 2024) (quoting Love, 216 F.3d at

687). The “difficult and delicate” determination of whether a belief is indeed religious may not

“turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in question.” Thomas v. Rev.

Bd. of Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981). “[R]eligious beliefs need not be

acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit” protection. Id. “It

is, thus, not a question of whether a plaintiff’s religious beliefs are reasonable, ethical, or well-

founded—but only whether those beliefs are indeed religious.” Jackson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No.

5:23-CV-5102, 2023 WL 9097854, at *3 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 27, 2023) (internal quotations omitted).

Defendant asserts that “[n]otwithstanding [Plaintiff’s] use of religious terminology, the

overarching theme of his communications, exemption requests, and testimony demonstrate that

[Plaintiff’s] objections are political in nature and personal autonomy driven.” ECF No. 19, p. 10.

Thus, Defendant argues because Plaintiff’s “objections to the mandatory Covid-19 vaccine are

individual preferences, indicating a medical, political, safety, and personal objection, rather than

one rooted in religion, [Plaintiff] cannot make out a prime [sic] facie case of religious

discrimination.” Id. at 11. To support its argument, Defendant relies on Petermann v. Aspirus,

Inc., No. 22-332, 2023 WL 2662899 (W.D. Wis. March 28, 2023), Bube v. Aspirus Hosp., Inc.,

No. 22-CV-745-JDP, 2023 WL 6037655 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 15, 2023), rev’d and remanded, No.

23-2892, 2024 WL 3562972 (7th Cir. July 29, 2024), and Kiel v. Mayo Clinic Health Sys. Se.

Minnesota, 685 F. Supp. 3d 770 (D. Minn. 2023), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Ringhofer v. Mayo

Clinic, Ambulance, 102 F.4th 894 (8th Cir. 2024).

In the present case, Plaintiff asserted in his religious exemption request to Defendant that

he is a “Christian who believes in the Bible, including the teaching in the New Testament”; he has

“a Christian worldview”; and that “this perspective recognizes that faith and conscience compel

an individual to submit to the proper jurisdiction within the rule of law, in this case Divine law.”

ECF No. 18-4. Further, Plaintiff stated that he objects to vaccines because he believes in and

follows “God and the principles laid out in His Word” and he has a “deeply held belief that this

Covid-19 vaccine violates them.” Id. Plaintiff believes his “body is a temple for the Holy Spirit”

and provides the following convictions that he holds:

• If God intended for me to get the vaccine, then in July 2020 I would have never

caught Covid-19 and obtained antibodies to it. I have proof of antibodies that I

will provide. For all the data that has been produced, Gods natural immunity

does best to defeat this virus.

• In the Book of Revelations, it speaks of “Mark of the beast.” I currently don’t

believe this engineered spike proteins are the mark of the beast but it’s the

introduction to it by world government agencies and now private businesses

making it mandatory. It is also backed by Big Pharmaceuticals and in

Revelations it mentions pharmakia and it being the downfall of Babylon.

Revelation 18:23 “And the light of a candle shall shine no more at all in thee;

and the voice of the bridegroom and of the bride shall be heard no more at all

in thee; for thy merchants were the great men of the earth; for by thy pharmakia

were all nations deceived.” Revelation 21:8 “But the cowardly, the

unbelieving, the vile, the murderers, the sexually immoral, those who practice

magic arts pharmakia, the idolaters and all liars—they will be consigned to the

fiery lake of burning sulfur. This is the second death.”

• God teaches to treat your body as a temple for the Holy Spirit. I do my best to

do that. I workout 4+ times a week, eat healthy, take vitamins, and have around

15% body fat. I have researched this vaccine and the companies still fail to

release all of their ingredients and side effects of this vaccine. I have followed

the VAERS report and many lives have been lost by taking these spike proteins

or been permanently wounded by the spike proteins. Will the engineered spike

proteins lead to ADE?

• Early in the development of mRNA vaccine technology, fetal cells were used

for “proof of concept” (to demonstrate how a cell could take up mRNA and

produce the SARS-CoV-2 spike protein) or to characterize the SARS-CoV-2

spike protein. I have convictions about aborted fetal cells and lives lost for the

creation of this and other vaccines.

ECF No. 18-4.

In Kiel, as Defendant points out, a plaintiff similarly objected to a mandatory Covid-19

vaccine mandate and asserted a religious belief that her body was a “Temple to the Holy Spirit”

and that she, therefore, could not “put into it substances which are impure or dangerous.” Kiel,

685 F. Supp. 3d at 783. She additionally objected to the vaccine because she alleged that

“receiving the COVID vaccine is against her anti-abortion beliefs.” Id. The district court in Kiel

concluded that because the plaintiff did not allege a religious belief to explain why she believed

the vaccine was “impure or dangerous,” but instead based that view on medical and safety

determinations, she did not satisfy the first prong of the standard set out in Jones. The court

explained:

The important question isn’t whether an employee has a religious belief not to

mistreat her body; the question is whether the employee’s belief that the vaccine

qualifies as a mistreatment is itself based in religion. If [plaintiff] believed that the

vaccine defiled her body because it was unhealthy or unsafe, that would be a

medical objection, not a religious objection . . . But if her objection to the vaccine

was rooted in her belief ‘that she must remain as God made her,’ that would be

sufficient to show a religious conflict at the pleading stage.

Id. (quoting Petermann, 2023 WL 2662899 at *2). The district court additionally concluded that

the plaintiff did “not actually tie her anti-abortion beliefs to any formal or external signs of

religion,” and because a “religious opposition to abortion is different from an opposition to

vaccines that were potentially developed using a fetal cell line,” she “fail[ed] to tie her opposition

to the vaccine to any particularized religious belief.” Kiel, 685 F. Supp. 3d at 783-84 (emphasis

in original) (internal quotations omitted). The court consequently dismissed the plaintiff’s Title

VII claims at the pleadings stage and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Defendant argues

that the Court should similarly reject Plaintiff’s “(1) Body as a temple of the holy spirit

justification; and (2) Fetal line cell/abortion objection” and determine that Plaintiff “failed to

present any ‘religious beliefs’ to support his request for a permanent vaccine exemption and

dismiss [Plaintiff’s] claims with prejudice.” ECF No. 19, p. 9; ECF No. 23, p. 9.

However, in May of this year, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of

the plaintiffs’ Title VII claims in Kiel concluding that “[b]y connecting their objection to testing

to specific religious principles,” the plaintiffs satisfied their burden at the pleadings stage.

Ringhofer v. Mayo Clinic, Ambulance, 102 F.4th 894, 902 (8th Cir. 2024).4 “[Religious] beliefs,”

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the court emphasized, “do not have to be uniform across all members of a religion or ‘acceptable,

logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others.’” Id. (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714, 101 S.

Ct. 1425). The Court finds that Plaintiff adequately identifies religious views that he believes

conflicts with taking the Covid-19 vaccine.

Although Defendant states otherwise,5 the Court views Defendant’s arguments as ones

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challenging the credibility of Plaintiff’s asserted beliefs regarding the vaccine. As previously

noted, Defendant argues that, “[n]otwithstanding [Plaintiff’s] use of religious terminology, the

overarching theme of his communications, exemptions requests, and testimony demonstrate that

[Plaintiff’s] objections are political in nature and personal autonomy driven,” not religious. ECF

No. 19, p. 10. Defendant points to Plaintiff’s October 14, 2020 email as the “best example of

[Plaintiff’s] true motive.” Id. Plaintiff’s email, reproduced in its entirety above, makes references

to “Biden’s admin” and “political and medical tyranny” in regard to Defendant’s vaccine policy.

ECF No. 18-3. Defendant points out that “[o]ther than the single use of the word ‘soul,’ nothing

in [Plaintiff’s] email is rooted in religion.” ECF No. 19, p. 11. Further, Defendant points to

4 The Seventh Circuit recently reversed the district court’s decision in Bube, 2023 WL 6037655, granting the

defendant’s motion to dismiss and dismissing the plaintiffs’ Title VII claims on similar grounds opining that they

“have recognized—in the Title VII context no less—that courts should avoid putting themselves in the impossible

position of trying to define religious legitimacy and view-point sufficiency.” Bube v. Aspirus Hosp., Inc., No. 23-

2892, 2024 WL 3562972 at *3 (7th Cir. July 29, 2024); and see Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 900–01 (7th

Cir. 1978) (explaining that Title VII protects “conduct which is ‘religiously motivated,’ i.e., all forms and aspects of

religion, however eccentric”); see also Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 452 (7th Cir. 2013)

(emphasizing Title VII’s “broad and intentionally hands-off definition of religion”).

5 See ECF No. 23, p. 1.

Plaintiff’s deposition where he testified that he got “angry” after receiving Defendant’s email

announcing the vaccine policy. ECF No. 22-1, p. 33. Defendant states that “[t]he reason for his

anger was not a religious objection, rather it was political.” ECF No. 19, p. 11.

Defendant’s arguments clearly challenge the motive and sincerity behind Plaintiff’s

objections to the Covid-19 vaccine, of which is a challenge to Plaintiff’s credibility. The issue of

credibility is one that should be left to the factfinder. See Murphy v. Missouri Dep’t of Corr., 372

F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that whether something “is a sincerely held religious

belief is a factual determination”); see also Vetter v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 120 F.3d 749, 752–53

(8th Cir. 1997) (noting that “[t]he jury had the duty to determine whether [the defendant’s]

residence requirement interfered with the observance or practice of [the plaintiff’s] religion or

whether he chose to live elsewhere because of a purely personal preference”); E.E.O.C. v. Union

Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados de Puerto Rico, 279 F.3d 49, 56

(1st Cir. 2002) (“Credibility issues such as the sincerity of an employee’s religious belief are

quintessential fact questions”); Bethea v. Access Bank, No. 8:17CV135, 2018 WL 1954246, at *2

(D. Neb. Apr. 19, 2018) (“Establishing that a religious belief is ‘sincerely held’ requires a

determination of Plaintiff’s credibility. And credibility issues such as the sincerity of an

employee’s religious belief are quintessential fact questions best left to a jury.”) (cleaned up).

Consequently, the Court finds that a fact question remains as to the credibility of Plaintiff’s beliefs.

B. Undue Burden

Assuming, arguendo, Plaintiff’s religious beliefs are sincerely held, and he establishes a

prima facie case for religious discrimination, the Court turns to Defendant’s burden to show that

accommodating Plaintiff’s religious beliefs would result in undue hardship. Seaworth, 203 F.3d

at 1057.

“The reasonable accommodation provision under Title VII provides that while employers

must make reasonable accommodations for employees’ bona-fide religious practices, employers

need not suffer ‘undue hardship.’” Brokken v. Hennepin Cnty., No. CV 23-1469 (JRT/DJF), 2024

WL 1382150, at *5 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2024) (quoting Harrell v. Donahue, 638 F.3d 975, 979

(8th Cir. 2011)). The Supreme Court recently held that to establish “undue hardship,” an employer

“must show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in substantial increased

costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business.” Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447, 470, 143

S. Ct. 2279, 216 L.Ed.2d 1041 (2023). “[W]hether a given accommodation would cause undue

hardship is a fact-intensive inquiry. Lee v. Seasons Hospice, 696 F. Supp. 3d 572, 580 (D. Minn.

2023) (internal quotations omitted). “Determinations of what constitutes an ‘undue hardship’ must

be made on a case-by-case basis.” Harrell, 638 F.3d at 979. “[C]ourts must apply the test in a

manner that takes into account all relevant factors in the case at hand, including the particular

accommodations at issue and their practical impact in light of the nature, size and operating cost

of an employer.” Groff, 600 U.S. at 470–71, 143 S. Ct. 2279 (cleaned-up).

Defendant argues that “[t]here can be no question that permitting [Plaintiff] to work with

critical pediatric patients without the required Covid-19 vaccination presented an undue burden.”

ECF No. 19, p. 13. Defendant states that “[b]ecause of the substantial risk [Plaintiff] presented to

his patients, families, coworkers, and their families, his requested accommodation presented an

undue burden on [Defendant]’s business—safe home health treatment—that could not be

eliminated,” thus “Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed.” Id. at 18.

In response, Plaintiff argues “that there would have been no undue hardship with

substantial cost to let Plaintiff be tested and quarantined if exposed” to Covid-19 and that “there

simply is no record evidence of a substantial cost to Defendant for allowing Plaintiff . . . to mask,

test, and quarantine for a period of time.” ECF No. 21, p. 12-13.

The Court finds that the record is devoid of evidence showing that granting an

accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in relation to Defendant’s business.

While the Court is aware of the nature of Defendant’s business, the Court is unaware of the “size

and operating cost” of the business and the potential impact an accommodation such as the

masking, testing, and quarantining of one employee, would have on those factors. Groff, 600 U.S.

at 471, 143 S. Ct. 2279. Further, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant made no attempt and “failed to

engage in any process to attempt to accommodate Plaintiff,” 6 and “terminated Plaintiff simply

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because he did not want to get the Covid-19 vaccine due to his religious beliefs.” ECF No. 21, p.

14. In fact, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant did not engage in any sort of communication with him

at all to discuss his request. Id. However, Defendant states in its notice to Plaintiff informing him

of the denial of his request that the permanent exemption request was “discussed with [Plaintiff

on] 10/19/2021.” ECF No. 19-8. As such there are questions of fact that remain in this case

regarding the issue of undue hardship. Accordingly, the Court finds that summary judgment is

inappropriate, and Defendant’s motion should be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 18)

is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 5th day of August, 2024.

/s/ Susan O. Hickey

Susan O. Hickey

Chief United States District Judge

6 Plaintiff also asserts that the CMS mandate allowed for religious exemptions. See ECF No. 22-1, p. 94.