The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
EL DORADO DIVISION
ESTATE OF EUSEBIO CASTILLO
RODRIGUEZ, DECEASED, by its Special
Co-Administrators, Amanda Castillo and Cary
Rios, on behalf of the Estate and its Wrongful
Death Beneficiaries PLAINTIFFS
v. Case No. 1:23-cv-1006
UNION COUNTY, ARKANSAS;
ASSOCIATION OF ARKANSAS COUNTIES
RISK MANAGEMENT FUND; SHERIFF
RICKY ROBERTS; CAPTAIN RICHARD
MITCHAM; SGT. JOSEPH WALKA; SGT.
JEDEDIAH COTTON; CORRECTIONAL
OFFICER DEMARIO FREEMAN; SGT. JOHN
WARD; TURN KEY HEALTH CLINICS LLC;
TURN KEY HEALTH MEDICAL ARKANSAS,
PLLC; HARLEY WEST, LPN; KASIE SANFORD,
LPN; and DEANNA HOPSON, M.D. DEFENDANTS
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Association of Arkansas Counties Risk Management Fund’s
(“AACRMF”) Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 91. Plaintiffs responded. ECF No. 96. AACRMF
replied. ECF No. 106. Plaintiffs filed a sur-reply. ECF No. 109. The Court finds the matter ripe
for consideration.
I. BACKGROUND1
0F
On April 27, 2022, Eusebio Castillo Rodriguez (“Decedent”) was arrested for driving while
intoxicated, driving with a suspended license, and having an open container of alcohol in his
vehicle. Decedent was released that same day from the Union County Detention Center (“UCDC”)
and later appeared in the Union County, Arkansas District Court on June 8, 2022, for a sentencing
1 The factual background is taken from the allegations within Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint. ECF No. 73.
hearing. Though the sentencing judge initially suspended the two separate sentences against
Decedent, an interpreter aiding that court through speakerphone mistranslated Decedent’s
comments which resulted in the judge reinstating the ten-day jail sentence for driving without a
license. Decedent was immediately taken into custody after the sentencing hearing and then
detained in the UCDC to serve his sentence.
Decedent’s daughter, Plaintiff Amanda Castillo, informed the UCDC of Decedent’s
various health conditions, such as diabetes and hypertension, and dropped off his medications.
The UCDC did not conduct an intake medical screening until roughly 26 hours after Decedent’s
initial intake on June 8, 2022. During the screening, Decedent was experiencing noticeable alcohol
withdrawal symptoms which were documented by the medical personnel conducting the screening.
Treating personnel did not provide or recommend any treatment for the alcohol withdrawal. After
initially being placed into a group booking cell, Decedent was moved into one of the general
population cell blocks in the UCDC at around 2:40 p.m. on June 10, 2022. That same day,
Decedent’s family communicated with him via video-call. The family noticed Decedent’s alcohol
withdrawal symptoms during the call, such as shaking and disorientation, and informed the UCDC
of their concerns. Decedent made attempts to communicate his condition with UCDC personnel
but no action was taken to provide medical assistance at that time.
Around midnight on June 12, 2022, UCDC personnel removed Decedent from his cell
block because his painful moaning was disrupting other inmates’ sleep. They then placed
Decedent in a booking cell meant for solitary confinement. No efforts were initially made to
provide further medical care or evaluation to Decedent, even though one guard witnessed Decedent
“hunched over in pain” in the booking cell at around 8:30 p.m. on June 12, 2022. UCDC personnel
then found Decedent “incoherent, and trembling severely while lying face down on the floor of his
solitary cell” at around 5:15 a.m. on June 13, 2022. No personnel attempted to provide Decedent
with medical care until one of the medical personnel, Nurse Kasey Sanford, arrived for her shift at
7:56 a.m. that day. UCDC personnel then moved Decedent off the floor and into a wheelchair to
transport him to the nurse’s station.
UCDC personnel secured authorization from Judge Jack Barker to release Decedent from
custody due to his medical condition. They initially placed Decedent into a law enforcement
vehicle for transportation to the Medical Center of South Arkansas (“MCSA”), but eventually
called an ambulance to transport Decedent. The ambulance arrived at the UCDC at roughly 9:00
a.m. UCDC personnel did not inform Decedent’s family of the ongoing medical emergency. Upon
calling the UCDC at 11:15 a.m. that morning, UCDC personnel informed family members that
Decedent had been released from custody and left the detention center under his own power.
Plaintiff Cary Rios, Decedent’s domestic partner, then visited the UCDC in person at around 11:30
a.m. and was again informed that Decedent was released and left the UCDC under his own power.
Decedent’s family subsequently spent several hours searching for Decedent. They then
called the UCDC once more regarding Decedent and were finally informed that he was transported
to the MCSA via ambulance. Decedent’s family arrived at the MCSA around 1:00 p.m. and shortly
thereafter witnessed Decedent unresponsive and being prepared for helicopter transport to UAMS
in Little Rock, Arkansas. Decedent arrived at UAMS in critical condition and remained in
intensive case from June 13, 2022, until his death on June 22, 2022.
Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint in this Court on January 1, 2023. ECF No. 2. After
multiple subsequent amendments, Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint on June 3, 2024,
which is the operative complaint in this matter. ECF No. 73. Plaintiffs brings claims pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, as well as state tort claims of negligence,
outrage, and wrongful death, against Defendants Union County, Arkansas, the AACRMF, Sheriff
Ricky Roberts, Captain Richard Mitcham, Sgt. Joseph Walka, Sgt. Jedediah Cotton, Correctional
Officer Demario Freeman, and Sgt. John Ward (“Municipal Defendants”). Plaintiffs also bring
claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, as well as state tort claims
of medical malpractice, outrage, and wrongful death against Defendants Turn Key Health Clinics
LLC, Turn Key Health Medical Arkansas, PLLC, Harley West, LPN, Kasie Sanford, LPN, and
Deanna Hopson, M.D. (“Medical Defendants”). Plaintiffs assert that this Court has original
jurisdiction over their § 1983 claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction
over their state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).2
1F
On June 17, 2024, Separate Defendant AACRMF filed the instant motion to dismiss
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and a brief in support, generally arguing that
Plaintiffs failed to state a claim against it because it is not subject to the Arkansas direct action
statute cited by Plaintiffs and there is no other theory of liability against it. ECF Nos. 91 & 92.
Plaintiffs responded in opposition, arguing that Defendant Union County, Arkansas (“Union
County”) is a medical provider and that the AACRMF is correspondingly subject to direct action.
ECF Nos. 96 & 97. AACRMF replied, arguing that Union County cannot be viewed as a medical
provider under the plain language of the statute. ECF No. 106. Plaintiff filed a sur-reply, arguing
that Union County’s constitutional duty to provide medical treatment for detainees makes it a
medical provider under the applicable direct-action statute. ECF No. 109.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A pleading must “contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This standard “does not require ‘detailed factual
2 The Court is satisfied that the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint confer subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a).
allegations,’ but it demands more that an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation omitted). While factual
allegations in a complaint are presumed true, unsupported legal conclusions presented as facts are
not sufficient to show a pleader is entitled to relief. See id. (citations omitted). There must be
factual allegations underlying a complaint such that the claim of misconduct is sufficiently
plausible on its face and not merely a possibility. See id. at 678-79 (citations omitted). Upon
motion, a party against whom a claim for relief is sought may assert the defense that the claim is
not one upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In evaluating a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court evaluates the complaint in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. Carton v. Gen. Motor Acceptance Corp., 611 F.3d 451, 454 (8th Cir. 2010)
(citations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs do not make factual allegations against AACRMF asserting direct involvement
in Decedent’s lack of medical care in the UCDC. Rather, Plaintiffs assert that AACRMF “is a
multi-county, self-funded insurance trust of Arkansas counties formed for legal services, including
defense and financial protection when its participating counties have been sued, including
defendant Union County.” ECF No. 73, p. 7-8.3 Plaintiffs continue:
2F
To the extent defendant Union County claims and is entitled to immunity,
AACRMF, who at all relevant times was a liability insurance carrier, self-insurance
fund, pooled liability fund, or similar fund maintained by defendant Union County
doing business in Union County, Arkansas, and who insures/indemnifies defendant
Union County for claims such as those made in the lawsuit is named as a party and
liable for the actions of defendant Union County pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 23-
79-210.
Id. at p. 8.
3 The Court is citing to the page number of the ECF document and not to the page numbers as they are labeled in
Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint.
The statute that Plaintiffs state makes AACRMF liable for Union County’s actions,
Arkansas Code § 23-79-210, reads in relevant part:
(a)(1) When liability insurance is carried by any cooperative nonprofit corporation,
association, or organization, or by any municipality, agency, or subdivision of a
municipality, or of the state, or by any improvement district or school district, or
by any other organization or association of any kind or character and not subject to
suit for tort, and if any person, firm, or corporation suffers injury or damage to
person or property on account of the negligence or wrongful conduct of the
organization, association, municipality, or subdivision, its servants, agents, or
employees acting within the scope of their employment or agency, then the person,
firm, or corporation so injured or damaged shall have a direct cause of action
against the insurer with which the liability insurance is carried to the extent of the
amounts provided for in the insurance policy as would ordinarily be paid under the
terms of the policy.
(2) Any self-insurance fund, pooled liability fund, or similar fund maintained by a
medical care provider for the payment or indemnification of the medical care
provider’s liabilities for medical injuries under § 16-114-201 et seq. shall be
deemed to be liability insurance susceptible to direct action under this section.
Arkansas Code § 23-79-210(a)(1)-(2).
AACRMF argues that Plaintiffs’ claims against it fail because it is not an “insurer” of
Union County as described in § 23-79-210(a). ECF No. 92, p. 2-4. AACRMF contends that it
does not function as an insurance carrier for counties and cites to this Court’s finding in
Hearnsberger v. Bradley County, No. 06-CV-1081, 2007 WL 2350287 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 16, 2007)
and an Arkansas Circuit Court’s recent determination (ECF No. 93-1) that the AACRMF is not an
insurer under § 23-79-210(a)(1). AACRMF emphasizes the clear distinction made between the
phrase “insurer” in paragraph § 23-79-210(a)(1) and the phrases “self-insurance fund” and “pooled
liability fund” within paragraph (a)(2), and then asserts that Arkansas courts have recognized that
distinction more generally. AACRMF then contends that there are no allegations to support a
claim against it under paragraph § 23-79-210(a)(2), which only applies to medical providers.
In response, Plaintiffs argue that AACRMF is subject to suit under § 23-79-210(a)(2)
because Union County is a medical provider. ECF No. 97, p. 2-3. Plaintiffs emphasize that Union
County has a non-delegable constitutional duty under the Eighth Amendment to provide medical
care to those in its custody. Thus, Plaintiffs contend that AACRMF’s status as a self-insurance
fund for Union County makes it subject to direct suit under paragraph § 23-79-210(a)(2) for the
torts related to Union County’s failure to provide Decedent with appropriate medical treatment
while in custody.
In reply, AACRMF argues that Union County cannot be considered a medical provider
under the plain language of § 23-79-210(a)(2). ECF No. 106, p. 2-4. AACRMF notes § 23-79-
210(a)(2)’s reference to Arkansas Code § 16-114-201 and how that section provides a statutory
definition of “medical providers” relevant to paragraph (a)(2). Section § 16-114-201(2) reads:
“Medical care provider” means a physician, certified registered nurse anesthetist,
physician's assistant, nurse, optometrist, chiropractor, physical therapist, dentist,
podiatrist, pharmacist, veterinarian, hospital, nursing home, community mental
health center, psychologist, clinic, or not-for-profit home healthcare agency
licensed by the state or otherwise lawfully providing professional medical care or
services, or an officer, employee, or agent thereof acting in the course and scope of
employment in the providing of such medical care or medical services[.]
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-201(2). AACRMF then contends that Union County cannot be
considered a medical provider under that statutory language and that Plaintiffs consequently have
no viable claims against it.
Plaintiffs’ sur-reply contends that § 16-114-201(2)’s language regarding “otherwise
lawfully providing professional medical care or services, or an officer, employee, or agent thereof
acting in the course and scope of employment” applies to Union County through the Medical
Defendants as its agents for contracted medical services. ECF No. 109, p. 2-3. Plaintiffs also
reassert their argument that Union County must be considered a medical provider because of its
constitutional duty to give necessary medical care to detainees.
The crux of the parties’ arguments revolves around their differing readings of the statutory
language within Arkansas Code §§ 23-79-210 and 16-114-201(2). The Supreme Court of
Arkansas summarized its “clear and well established” approach for statutory construction with:
The basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the
legislature. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we
determine legislative intent from the ordinary meaning of the language used. In
considering the meaning of a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the words
their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. We construe
the statute so that no word is left void, superfluous or insignificant, and we give
meaning and effect to every word in the statute, if possible. If the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, it is
unnecessary to resort to the rules of statutory interpretation.
Smith v. ConAga Foods, Inc., 2013 Ark. 502, 4, 431 S.W.3d 200, 202 (internal citations omitted).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against AACRMF. As an initial
matter, Defendant Union County has statutory immunity from tort actions. See Ark. Code Ann. §
21-9-301 (noting that counties have immunity from liability and suit from tort claims). The
language within Arkansas Code § 23-79-210(a)(1) regarding entities that are “not subject to suit
for tort” applies to Union County. See Downing v. Lawrence Hall Nursing Ctr., 2010 Ark. 175,
15, 369 S.W.3d 8, 17 (noting that “not subject to suit for tort” means immune from suit). While
Plaintiffs assert that AACRMF is an “insurer” subject to direct suit under § 23-79-210(a)(1) in
their complaint, the Court views that as a legal conclusion that is not entitled to the presumption
of truth like a factual allegation. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Moreover, this Court has previously
determined that AACRMF is not an “insurer” of immune counties under § 23-79-210(a)(1) and
consequently not subject to direct action under paragraph (a)(1). See Hearnsberger, 2007 WL
2350287 at *2 (citing Kauffman v. Bd. of Tr. Of the Ass’n of Ark. Counties Risk. Mgmt. Fund, No.
87-2076 (W.D.Ark.1988)). Therefore, there is no viable action against AACRMF under § 23-79-
210(a)(1). See id.
Further, Union County is not a “medical provider” under § 23-79-210(a)(2) that would
allow AACRMF to be treated as an “insurer” under paragraph (a)(1). Though § 23-79-210(a)(2)
does not define “medical provider”, the statute it references regarding indemnification for certain
suits against medical providers, “§ 16-114-201 et seq.”, does provide a definition. Under the
“ordinary and usually accepted meaning” of the language within § 16-114-201(2), Union County
cannot be viewed as a medical provider. ConAga Foods, 2013 Ark. 502, 4, 431 S.W.3d 200, 202.
That language clearly applies to professions and entities whose purpose is to directly provide
medical treatment, such as a physician, nursing home, or pharmacist. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-
201(2). There is no reasonable reading of that language that would allow it to apply to a county.
Consequently, Plaintiffs’ emphasis on the language in § 16-114-201(2) making it applicable to an
“officer, employee, or agent” of a medical provider is immaterial because Union County cannot
be considered a medical provider from the start. Plaintiff’s arguments regarding Union County’s
duties under the Eighth Amendment are similarly unpersuasive. The Court will not entertain an
assertion that a county’s broader constitutional duty to provide medical care to detainees creates a
philosophical override of the plain language defining medical provider in § 16-114-201(2) for state
tort claims.
Plaintiffs’ claims and theories of liability against AACRMF rely entirely on Arkansas Code
§§ 23-79-210(a)(1) or (a)(2) and fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims against
AACRMF must be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Defendant AACRMF’s Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 91) should be and hereby is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ claims against AACRMF
are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 26th day of July, 2024.
/s/ Susan O. Hickey
Susan O. Hickey
Chief United States District Judge