Carson v. Brown

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HARRISON DIVISION

JOSHUA D. CARSON PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 3:24-cv-03014-TLB-MEF

SHERIFF JOHN MONTGOMERY,

Baxter County, Arkansas;

OFFICER ALENA BROWN (Badge #47);

NURSE SHERRY; and

LIEUTENANT DENICE LEE DEFENDANTS

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is a civil rights action filed by Joshua D. Carson (“Carson”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Carson proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. He maintains his constitutional rights were

violated when he was denied adequate medical care while detained at the Baxter County Detention

Center (“BCDC”).

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Timothy L.

Brooks, United States District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of

making a Report and Recommendation. The case is before the Court for preservice screening

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A, the Court is required to screen any complaint in

which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

I. BACKGROUND

Carson filed this case on February 21, 2024. (ECF No. 1). Because of deficiencies in his

original complaint, Carson was ordered to file an Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 3). Carson filed

his Amended Complaint on March 7, 2024. (ECF No. 6). It is this Amended Complaint that is

before the Court for screening.

Carson lists the dates of occurrences as between December 11, 2023, and January 9, 2024.

(ECF No. 6 at 6). Carson was in convicted status during his incarceration in the BCDC. Id. at 2.

In Claim One, Carson says that on December 17, 2023, he suffered numerous seizures,

vomited, defecated on himself, and was denied medical attention by Defendant Brown. (ECF No.

6 at 4-5). Defendant Brown believed he was faking the seizures. Id. at 4. Carson indicates he was

denied a shower for eight hours and forced to lay in his vomit and waste. Id. At the time, Carson

indicates he was being held in an isolation cell. Id. at 5.

In Claim Two, Carson alleges he was denied medical attention from a transport officer and

staff when they denied him the opportunity to travel to the medical center and the opportunity to

visit his neurologist at another hospital. (ECF No. 6 at 6).

For relief, Carson seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (ECF No. 6 at 9). He also

asks that Defendants be given proper training on how to handle inmates with seizures. Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under § 1915A, the Court is obliged to screen the case prior to service of process being

issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are

frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be false, or

it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather than to

vindicate a cognizable right. Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987); In re

Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we

hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded . . . to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). This means “that if the essence of an allegation is

discernable, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe

the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal

framework.” Jackson, 747 F.3d at 544 (cleaned up). However, the complaint must still allege

specific facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).

III. ANALYSIS

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of

a citizen’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United

States. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) each defendant

acted under color of state law, and (2) that he or she violated a right secured by the constitution.

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 1999).

As mentioned above, an Order was entered directing Carson to file an Amended Complaint

because of deficiencies in his original Complaint. (ECF No. 3). He was advised that liability

under § 1983 was personal; that is, an employee is liable only for his or her own acts of misconduct.

Id. Carson was advised that he must describe the actions taken by each Defendant. Id.

The Order explained in detail that the Amended Complaint must contain short, plain

statements telling the Court: (1) the constitutional right Plaintiff believes was violated; (2) the

name of the Defendant who violated the right; (3) exactly what the Defendant did or failed to do;

(4) how the action or inaction of that Defendant is connected to the violation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights; and, (5) what specific injury Plaintiff suffered because of that Defendant’s

conduct. (ECF No. 3). Carson was advised he must affirmatively link the conduct of each named

Defendant with the specific injury he suffered. Id. Carson was also advised that failure to do so

would result in the dismissal of the allegations for failure to state a claim. Id.

In his Amended Complaint, Carson fails to describe any actions taken by Defendants

Montgomery, Sherry, and Lee. (ECF No. 6). Liability under § 1983 requires personal involvement

in the constitutional violations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (a plaintiff “must plead

that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has

violated the Constitution”); Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Liability

under section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of

rights”). Carson has stated no plausible claim against Defendants Montgomery, Sherry, and Lee.

In Claim Two, Carson mentions an unidentified transport officer and “staff” denying him

access to medical care. He has not, however, listed a John Doe Transport Officer as a Defendant,

and he has been advised that he cannot simply name all jail staff as Defendants. Instead, he must

allege how each individual defendant violated his federal constitutional rights. Nor has he

indicated that anyone at the facility ordered his transport. In short, he has not alleged a plausible

claim. If Carson desires to add as a Defendant the individual who denied him transport for needed

medical care, he may file a motion to amend his complaint.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, I recommend the claims against Defendants Montgomery,

Sherry and Lee be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

By separate order the Amended Complaint will be served on Defendant Brown.

Status of Referral: This case should remain referred for all matters not

recommended for dismissal in this Report and Recommendation.

The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation

in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court.

RECOMMENDED this 4th day of April 2024.

/s/

HON. MARK E. FORD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE