Meraz v. Doe Dispatch Officer

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

JEROME M. MERAZ PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 5:24-cv-05029-TLB-MEF

JOHN OR JANE DOE DISPATCH OFFICER,

Fayetteville Police Department (FPD);

PATROL OFFICER Z. TALLON, FPD; and

JOHN DOE, District Prosecuting Attorney DEFENDANTS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, Jerome M. Meraz (“Meraz”), currently an inmate of the Delta Regional Unit of

the Arkansas Division of Correction, filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Meraz

proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”).

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Timothy L.

Brooks, United States District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of

making a Report and Recommendation. The case is before the Court for preservice screening of

the Complaint (ECF No. 1) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Pursuant to § 1915A, the Court has the

obligation to screen any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity

or officer or employee of a governmental entity.

I. BACKGROUND

According to the allegations of the Complaint, on April 2, 2022, Defendant Tallon, an

officer with the Fayetteville Police Department (“FPD”), initially advised Meraz that he was being

detained only to be served with an order of protection. (ECF No. 1 at 5-6). However, after

Defendant Dispatcher advised Defendant Tallon that Meraz had been previously charged with

having trespassed at 775 W. Sycamore Street, apartment 49, Meraz states he was arrested, charged

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with trespassing, and taken to jail. Id. at 4-6. Meraz asserts the information provided was

incorrect. Id. He indicates he had been charged with trespassing at apartment 47, not apartment

49. Id. Meraz indicates he was incapacitated at the time due to an October 2021 suicide attempt.

Id. at 4-5. Defendant Tallon took possession of a house key and a CRT pocket knife. Id. at 6.

Meraz states he was never provided with a receipt for these items, has not received the items back,

and has been denied his belongings. Id. at 6-7.

Except for 45 days when he was out on bond, Meraz states he was incarcerated from April

2, 2022, until December 13, 2023. (ECF No. 1 at 10). Meraz indicates his arrest triggered a

parole revocation charge and his bond was revoked. Id. Meraz contends if Defendant Dispatcher

had been competent and read the prior charge correctly, he would not have been arrested, charged

with trespassing, and a parole violation charge filed. Id.

In paragraph three of Defendant Tallon’s narrative report, he is alleged to have indicated

that Meraz had a previous stalking and kidnapping conviction out of Oklahoma from 2011, and a

felony stalking conviction the same year in Arkansas. (ECF No. 1 at 6). Meraz contends these

statements were false and resulted from Defendant Tallon not understanding what he read. Id. at

7, 10. Meraz regards these false statements as an attack on his character. Id. at 10.

Next, Meraz alleges he has been maliciously prosecuted. (ECF No. 1 at 7-8).

Specifically, Meraz alleges that the Defendant Prosecutor refused to look at the facts, went solely

based on the victim’s statement, and exhibited bias in favor of the victim. Id. at 8, 10. Meraz

maintains the Defendant Prosecutor did not conduct a proper investigation or have one performed.

Id. Meraz indicates he made a report on his own in the City Prosecutor’s Office and to Officer C.

Crafton of the FPD. Id. Despite this, Meraz alleges the Defendant Prosecutor continued to try

to get him to plead guilty to the charge. Id. Eventually, on December 13, 2023, the charges were

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nolle prosed. Id.

For relief, Meraz seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (ECF No. 1 at 9).

Additionally, Meraz asks that the arrest be “taken out of the data bank to be erased from [his]

record.” Finally, Meraz asks that his filing fee be paid in full.

II. APPLICABLE STANDARD

The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are

frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seek monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff

has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully

pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jackson v.

Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).

However, even a pro se Plaintiff must allege specific facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin

v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).

III. DISCUSSION

Several of Meraz’s claims are subject to dismissal. His claims are each addressed in turn.

A. Prosecutorial Immunity

The United States Supreme Court in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976),

established the absolute immunity of a prosecutor from a civil suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case.” This immunity extends to all

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acts that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Id. at 430.

Meraz has failed to allege that the Defendant Prosecutor engaged in any conduct other than

prosecutorial functions. “Whatever [Defendant Prosecutor’s] motives may have been ... his

conduct in filing [and pursuing] the charges is protected by absolute immunity.” Sample v. City

of Woodbury, 836 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, Defendant Prosecutor is entitled

to absolute immunity on the individual capacity claims against him. See also Brodnicki v. City of

Omaha, 75 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 1996) (County prosecutors were entitled to absolute immunity from

suit).

B. Sovereign Immunity

To the extent that an official capacity claim is asserted against the Defendant Prosecutor,

the claim is barred by sovereign immunity. In Arkansas, prosecuting attorneys are officers of the

state. Ark. Const. amend. 80, § 20. “[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity

is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. As such, it is no

different from a suit against the state itself.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,

71 (1989) (citation omitted).

The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not

be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against any one of

the United States.” U.S. Const. amend XI. It confirms “the structural understanding that States

entered the Union with their sovereign immunity intact.” VA. Off. For Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart,

563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011). “Absent a waiver of state sovereign immunity or a valid abrogation of

sovereign immunity by Congress, federal courts may not entertain a private party’s suit against a

State.” EEE Minerals, LLC v. State of N. Dakota, 81 F.4th 809, 815 (8th Cir. 2023).

The State of Arkansas has not waived its sovereign immunity. See e.g., Hadley v. N. Ark.

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Cmty. Tech. Coll., 76 F.3d 1437, 1438 (8th Cir. 1996). Nor did Congress abrogate sovereign

immunity when enacting § 1983. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979). Meraz’s official

capacity claims against the Defendant Prosecutor are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

C. Deprivation of Property

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “‘[n]o state shall . . .

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’” Walters v. Wolf,

660 F.3d 307, 311 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1). “Procedural due

process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of liberty or

property interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the ... Fourteenth Amendment.”

Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In some

circumstances ... the Court has held that a statutory provision for a postdeprivation hearing, or a

common-law tort remedy for erroneous deprivation, satisfies due process.” Zinermon v. Burch,

494 U.S. 113, 128 (1990). Specifically, when the deprivation is the result of a random and

unauthorized act and not pursuant to some established governmental procedure, the Court has held

that “adequate postdeprivation remedies satisfy the requirements of due process.” Walters, 660

F.3d at 312 (citations omitted). “The loss of property ... is in almost all cases beyond the control

of the [government], in most cases it is not only impracticable, but impossible, to provide a

meaningful hearing before the deprivation.” Id.

Meraz contends Defendant Tallon has deprived him of a house key and a pocket-knife.

Meraz points to no established procedure that resulted in the deprivation. Even if Defendant

Tallon intentionally deprived Meraz of his property, a post-deprivation remedy is all the process

Meraz is due. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (intentional deprivation of property

does not violate due process when meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available). Arkansas

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law provides such a post-deprivation remedy through an action for conversion. See e.g., Elliott

v. Hurst, 817 S.W.2d 877, 880 (Ark. 1991) (cause of action for conversion lies where distinct act

of dominion is exerted over property in denial of owner’s right). No cognizable constitutional

claim for deprivation of personal property is stated.

D. Defamation

Defamation of character does not state a constitutional violation. “[D]efamation, per se,

is not actionable under section 1983.” Underwood v. Pritchard, 638 F.2d 60, 62 (8th Cir. 1981).

The Supreme Court has held that a person’s interest in his reputation is not considered liberty or

property protected by the due process clause. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976). In

other words, the “Supreme Court has made clear that federal courts are not to view defamatory

acts as constitutional violations.” Boyanowski v. Capital Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396,

400 (3d Cir. 2000). No cognizable constitutional claim for defamation is stated.

E. False Arrest

“Under the Fourth Amendment, a person has a right to be secure in his person and warrants

may not issue but upon probable cause.” Ross v. City of Jackson, Mo., 897 F.3d 916, 920 (8th

Cir. 2018). “It is well established that a warrantless arrest without probable cause violates an

individual’s constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Joseph v. Allen,

712 F.3d 1222, 1226 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, a

false arrest claim under § 1983 “fails as a matter of law where the officer had probable cause to

make the arrest.” Kurtz v. City of Shrewsbury, 245 F.3d 753, 758 (8th Cir. 2001).

“[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in

particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). The Eighth Circuit has provided a fluid definition to

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provide some guidance in evaluating the existence of probable cause. Specifically, the Eighth

Circuit has stated that “[p]robable cause exists when “the totality of the circumstances at the time

of the arrest ‘[is] sufficient to lead a reasonable officer to believe that the defendant has committed

or is committing an offense.” Borgman v. Kedley, 646 F.3d 518, 523 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting

Fisher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 619 F.3d 811, 816 (8th Cir. 2010)). “The substance of all the

definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” Baribeau v. City of

Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 474 (8th Cir. 2010).

“We must give law enforcement officers ‘substantial latitude in interpreting and drawing

inferences from factual circumstances,’ ... but such latitude is not without limits.” Kuehl v. Burtis,

173 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Washington, 109 F.3d 459, 465 (8th

Cir. 1997)). First, evidence tending to “negate the possibility that a suspect committed a crime is

relevant” to whether probable cause exists. Id. “In this sense, the Fourth Amendment requires

that we analyze the weight of all the evidence—not merely the sufficiency of the incriminating

evidence.” Id. Second, “law enforcement officers have a duty to conduct a reasonably thorough

investigation prior to arresting a suspect, at least in the absence of exigent circumstances and so

long as law enforcement would not be unduly hampered if the agents wait to obtain more facts

before seeking arrest.” Id. (internal punctuation marks and citations omitted).

An officer is entitled to “qualified immunity for a warrantless arrest if the arrest was

supported by at least ‘arguable probable cause.’” Joseph, 712 F.3d at 1226. “Arguable probable

cause exists even where an officer mistakenly arrests a suspect believing it is based on probable

cause if the mistake is objectively reasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). The existence of probable cause is a question of law. Id. at 1227.

While Meraz’s factual allegations may be insufficient to survive a motion on the merits,

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the Court believes they are sufficient to allege a plausible false arrest claim against Officer Tallon.

F. Malicious Prosecution

While the Complaint appears to assert a malicious prosecution claim only against the

Defendant Prosecutor, even if we liberally construe it to be asserting such a claim against the other

two defendants, the claim still fails. For a malicious prosecution claim, sometimes referred to as

an unlawful seizure pursuant to legal process claim, to state a constitutional violation it must arise

under the Fourth Amendment. Harrington v. City of Council Bluffs, 678 F.3d 676, 679 (8th Cir.

2012). “[T]he gravamen of the tort of malicious prosecution” is “the wrongful initiation of

charges without probable cause.” Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 44 (2022). The elements of

a malicious prosecution claim are: (1) the charge was instituted without probable cause; (2) the

motive for instituting the suit was malicious—that is, for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff

to justice; and (3) the prosecution ended with a favorable termination. Id. In Thompson, the

Court determined that to establish a favorable termination a plaintiff “need only show his

prosecution ended without a conviction.” Id. at 39.

Meraz’s allegations are insufficient to state a plausible malicious prosecution claim against

either Defendant Tallon or Defendant Dispatcher. While he alleges that they either misread or

failed to properly comprehend the information available to them, Meraz has not alleged that either

acted maliciously or for an improper motive. At most, Meraz’s allegations speak of negligent

conduct. Negligence does not support a § 1983 claim. See e.g., Kulkay v. Roy, 847 F.3d 637,

643 (8th Cir. 2017) (a culpable state of mind of more than negligence or even gross negligence is

required to state a claim under § 1983).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the following is recommended:

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• All claims against the John Doe Prosecutor be dismissed.

• The deprivation of property claims against Defendant Tallon be dismissed.

• The defamation claims against Defendant Tallon and Defendant John or Jane Doe

Dispatcher be dismissed. And,

• The malicious prosecution claims against Defendant Tallon and Defendant John or

Jane Doe Dispatcher be dismissed.

Adoption of this Report and Recommendation would terminate all claims against

Defendant John Doe Prosecutor and Defendant John or Jane Doe Dispatcher. Additionally, all

claims against Defendant Tallon would be dismissed, except for the false arrest claim against him.

By separate Order the Complaint will be served upon him.

Status of the Referral: This case should remain referred for all matters not

recommended for dismissal in this Report and Recommendation.

The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation

in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file

timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties

are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by

the district court.

DATED this 7th day of February 2024.

/s/

HON. MARK E. FORD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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