Prosecutor acting as an advocate for the state in a criminal prosecution is entitled to absolute immunity while a prosecutor acting in an investigatory or administrative capacity is only entitled to qualified immunity
How later courts described this case
- Prosecutor acting as an advocate for the state in a criminal prosecution is entitled to absolute immunity while a prosecutor acting in an investigatory or administrative capacity is only entitled to qualified immunity
- neither public defenders nor privately retained defense counsel act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in criminal proceedings.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
DONALD STEVEN BRYAN PLAINTIFF
v. Civil No. 5:23-cv-05239-TLB-CDC
ANGELINE BACON, Public Defender;
NANCY ALDRIDGE, Prosecuting Attorney;
and JOHN DOE, First Helping Public Defender DEFENDANTS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This is a civil rights action filed by Plaintiff, Donald S. Bryan (“Bryan”), pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Bryan proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis.
Bryan has named as Defendants his former public defender, Angeline Bacon, the assistant
public defender, John Doe, and prosecuting attorney, Nancy Aldridge. All Defendants were
involved with criminal charges that were pending against Bryan in August or September of 2022.
Bryan has sued the Defendants in both their individual and official capacities.
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Timothy L.
Brooks, United States District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of
making a Report and Recommendation. The case is before the Court for preservice screening
under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Pursuant to § 1915A(a), the Court has the obligation
to screen any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity.
I. BACKGROUND
According to the Complaint, in August or September of 2022, a week before Bryan was
set for trial, the Defendants attempted to coerce him into taking a plea agreement with a prison
sentence. (ECF No. 1 at 4). Defendant Bacon first came to Bryan with a plea offer that would
result in three years of prison time. Id. at 5. Bryan rejected the offer saying he would rather go to
trial. Id. Defendant Bacon responded that if Bryan refused the offer, Defendant Aldridge would
drop the charges and proceed to “charge [him] with pills” that Defendant Aldridge had not filed
charges on for nine months. Id. Bryan said he had been told if he went to trial for possession of
methamphetamine, he could be sentenced for thirty to forty years as a habitual offender despite
this being his “first drug charge ever.” Id.
Bryan asked to be allowed to think about it overnight. (ECF No. 6). He says Defendants
Bacon and Doe continued to assert pressure on him to take the plea offer. Id. When he went back
to his cell, Bryan states he wrote a letter to Judge Green telling her how he was being threatened
and coerced. Id. Bryan did not hear from the judge. Id. Bryan says he also filed a complaint with
the Public Defender Board. Id.
Two days later, Defendant Bacon brought him a plea agreement for time served, six months
in rehabilitation, and six years’ probation. (ECF No. 1 at 6). Bryan signed it. Id. Two days after
he signed the first agreement, Bryan says Defendant Bacon brought him a second agreement saying
he would plead guilty to failure to appear which carried a twenty-two-year sentence, but it would
be suspended. Id. Bryan said he signed this agreement under duress. Id. After his signature
Bryan wrote “v.c. . . ..” Id. Bryan explains this is short for the Latin term “vi coactis” which
means under duress. Id.
In the relief section of the Complaint, Bryan asserts he is an “American State National and
the courts cannot change [his] Jus soli status and threaten and [coerce him].” (ECF No. 1 at 7).
He seeks compensatory and punitive damages, all charges “discharged,” $1500 per day of
incarceration or in a program, all his property returned, and loss of wages. Id.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
Under § 1915A, the Court is obligated to screen the case prior to service of process being
issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be false, or
it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather than to
vindicate a cognizable right. Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987); In re
Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we
hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded . . . to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). This means “that if the essence of an allegation is
discernable, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe
the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal
framework.” Id. at 544. However, the complaint must still allege specific facts sufficient to
support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
III. DISCUSSION
Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of
a citizen’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United
States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) each
defendant acted under color of state law, and (2) that he or she violated a right secured by the
constitution. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th
Cir. 1999).
A. Public Defenders
Public defenders do not act under color of state law while representing criminal
defendants. Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324 (1981) (neither public defenders nor privately
retained defense counsel act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional
functions as counsel to a defendant in criminal proceedings.”). The only allegations Bryan has
made against Defendants Bacon and Doe are in connection with their representation of him in his
criminal case. Bryan’s claims against Defendants Bacon and Doe are therefore subject to
dismissal.
B. Prosecutorial Immunity
The United States Supreme Court in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976),
established the absolute immunity of a prosecutor from a civil suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case.” Id. at 427. This immunity
extends to all acts that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process.” Id. at 430; see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (Prosecutor acting as
an advocate for the state in a criminal prosecution is entitled to absolute immunity while a
prosecutor acting in an investigatory or administrative capacity is only entitled to qualified
immunity).
Bryan has failed to allege Defendant Aldridge engaged in any conduct other than
prosecutorial functions. “Whatever [Defendant Aldridge’s] motives may have been . . . [her]
conduct in filing [and pursuing] the charges is protected by absolute immunity.” Sample v. City
of Woodbury, 836 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, Defendant Aldridge is entitled to
absolute immunity on the individual capacity claims against her. See also Brodnicki v. City of
Omaha, 75 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 1996) (County prosecutors were entitled to absolute immunity from
suit).
C. Sovereign Immunity
In Arkansas, prosecuting attorneys are officers of the state. Ark. Const. amend. 80, §20.
“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but
rather is a suit against the official’s office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the state
itself.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citation omitted).
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against any one of
the United States.” U.S. Const. amend XI. “The Eleventh Amendment confirms the sovereign
status of the States by shielding them from suits by individuals absent their consent.” Frew ex re.
Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004). “Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is well-settled:
‘a suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the
state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.’” Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 492 (8th Cir.
1991) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974)).
This bar exists whether the relief sought is legal or equitable. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.
265, 276 (1986). Furthermore, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are
‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71.
Exceptions to the reach of the Eleventh Amendment exist only when the state has
unequivocally waived its immunity or Congress has abrogated the immunity. Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678, 693 (1978). The State of Arkansas has not waived its sovereign immunity. See e.g.,
Hadley v. North Ark. Cmty. Tech. Coll., 76 F.3d 1437, 1438 (8th Cir. 1996). Nor did Congress
abrogate sovereign immunity when enacting § 1983. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979).
The official capacity claims against Defendant Aldridge are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
D. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
To the extent the Complaint (ECF No. 1) can be read to be seeking declaratory relief, the
request is barred by sovereign immunity. The exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity
created by the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908), which allows a party to
seek prospective injunctive relief in federal court against state officials in their official capacities,
does not apply to requests for declaratory relief establishing past violations of federal law. Verizon
Maryland, Inc., v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 646 (2002). Bryan’s claims
for declaratory relief are also barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine which provides that, except
for habeas corpus petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges
to state court judgments and state proceedings. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,
476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923); see also Mosby v. Ligon, 418
F.3d 927, 931 (2005).
Finally, the Supreme Court has held that a state prisoner may not use §1983 to challenge
“the fact or duration of his confinement.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973). A
prisoner seeking either immediate release from prison or a shortening of his term of confinement
must seek habeas relief instead. Id. Bryan is therefore entitled to neither declaratory nor injunctive
relief in this case.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I recommend this case be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
Status of the Referral: The Referral is terminated.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
DATED this 26th day of January 2024.
s/ Christy Comstock
CHRISTY COMSTOCK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE