Opinion

Bryan v. Bacon

Court
District Court, W.D. Arkansas
Filed
Jan 26, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.2%

Prosecutor acting as an advocate for the state in a criminal prosecution is entitled to absolute immunity while a prosecutor acting in an investigatory or administrative capacity is only entitled to qualified immunity

How later courts described this case

  • Prosecutor acting as an advocate for the state in a criminal prosecution is entitled to absolute immunity while a prosecutor acting in an investigatory or administrative capacity is only entitled to qualified immunity
  • neither public defenders nor privately retained defense counsel act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in criminal proceedings.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

DONALD STEVEN BRYAN PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 5:23-cv-05239-TLB-CDC

ANGELINE BACON, Public Defender;

NANCY ALDRIDGE, Prosecuting Attorney;

and JOHN DOE, First Helping Public Defender DEFENDANTS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a civil rights action filed by Plaintiff, Donald S. Bryan (“Bryan”), pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Bryan proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis.

Bryan has named as Defendants his former public defender, Angeline Bacon, the assistant

public defender, John Doe, and prosecuting attorney, Nancy Aldridge. All Defendants were

involved with criminal charges that were pending against Bryan in August or September of 2022.

Bryan has sued the Defendants in both their individual and official capacities.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Timothy L.

Brooks, United States District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of

making a Report and Recommendation. The case is before the Court for preservice screening

under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Pursuant to § 1915A(a), the Court has the obligation

to screen any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or

employee of a governmental entity.

I. BACKGROUND

According to the Complaint, in August or September of 2022, a week before Bryan was

set for trial, the Defendants attempted to coerce him into taking a plea agreement with a prison

sentence. (ECF No. 1 at 4). Defendant Bacon first came to Bryan with a plea offer that would

result in three years of prison time. Id. at 5. Bryan rejected the offer saying he would rather go to

trial. Id. Defendant Bacon responded that if Bryan refused the offer, Defendant Aldridge would

drop the charges and proceed to “charge [him] with pills” that Defendant Aldridge had not filed

charges on for nine months. Id. Bryan said he had been told if he went to trial for possession of

methamphetamine, he could be sentenced for thirty to forty years as a habitual offender despite

this being his “first drug charge ever.” Id.

Bryan asked to be allowed to think about it overnight. (ECF No. 6). He says Defendants

Bacon and Doe continued to assert pressure on him to take the plea offer. Id. When he went back

to his cell, Bryan states he wrote a letter to Judge Green telling her how he was being threatened

and coerced. Id. Bryan did not hear from the judge. Id. Bryan says he also filed a complaint with

the Public Defender Board. Id.

Two days later, Defendant Bacon brought him a plea agreement for time served, six months

in rehabilitation, and six years’ probation. (ECF No. 1 at 6). Bryan signed it. Id. Two days after

he signed the first agreement, Bryan says Defendant Bacon brought him a second agreement saying

he would plead guilty to failure to appear which carried a twenty-two-year sentence, but it would

be suspended. Id. Bryan said he signed this agreement under duress. Id. After his signature

Bryan wrote “v.c. . . ..” Id. Bryan explains this is short for the Latin term “vi coactis” which

means under duress. Id.

In the relief section of the Complaint, Bryan asserts he is an “American State National and

the courts cannot change [his] Jus soli status and threaten and [coerce him].” (ECF No. 1 at 7).

He seeks compensatory and punitive damages, all charges “discharged,” $1500 per day of

incarceration or in a program, all his property returned, and loss of wages. Id.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

Under § 1915A, the Court is obligated to screen the case prior to service of process being

issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are

frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be false, or

it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather than to

vindicate a cognizable right. Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987); In re

Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we

hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded . . . to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). This means “that if the essence of an allegation is

discernable, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe

the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal

framework.” Id. at 544. However, the complaint must still allege specific facts sufficient to

support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).

III. DISCUSSION

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of

a citizen’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United

States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) each

defendant acted under color of state law, and (2) that he or she violated a right secured by the

constitution. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th

Cir. 1999).

A. Public Defenders

Public defenders do not act under color of state law while representing criminal

defendants. Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324 (1981) (neither public defenders nor privately

retained defense counsel act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional

functions as counsel to a defendant in criminal proceedings.”). The only allegations Bryan has

made against Defendants Bacon and Doe are in connection with their representation of him in his

criminal case. Bryan’s claims against Defendants Bacon and Doe are therefore subject to

dismissal.

B. Prosecutorial Immunity

The United States Supreme Court in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976),

established the absolute immunity of a prosecutor from a civil suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case.” Id. at 427. This immunity

extends to all acts that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal

process.” Id. at 430; see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (Prosecutor acting as

an advocate for the state in a criminal prosecution is entitled to absolute immunity while a

prosecutor acting in an investigatory or administrative capacity is only entitled to qualified

immunity).

Bryan has failed to allege Defendant Aldridge engaged in any conduct other than

prosecutorial functions. “Whatever [Defendant Aldridge’s] motives may have been . . . [her]

conduct in filing [and pursuing] the charges is protected by absolute immunity.” Sample v. City

of Woodbury, 836 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, Defendant Aldridge is entitled to

absolute immunity on the individual capacity claims against her. See also Brodnicki v. City of

Omaha, 75 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 1996) (County prosecutors were entitled to absolute immunity from

suit).

C. Sovereign Immunity

In Arkansas, prosecuting attorneys are officers of the state. Ark. Const. amend. 80, §20.

“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but

rather is a suit against the official’s office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the state

itself.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citation omitted).

The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not

be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against any one of

the United States.” U.S. Const. amend XI. “The Eleventh Amendment confirms the sovereign

status of the States by shielding them from suits by individuals absent their consent.” Frew ex re.

Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004). “Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is well-settled:

‘a suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the

state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.’” Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 492 (8th Cir.

1991) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974)).

This bar exists whether the relief sought is legal or equitable. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.

265, 276 (1986). Furthermore, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are

‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71.

Exceptions to the reach of the Eleventh Amendment exist only when the state has

unequivocally waived its immunity or Congress has abrogated the immunity. Hutto v. Finney, 437

U.S. 678, 693 (1978). The State of Arkansas has not waived its sovereign immunity. See e.g.,

Hadley v. North Ark. Cmty. Tech. Coll., 76 F.3d 1437, 1438 (8th Cir. 1996). Nor did Congress

abrogate sovereign immunity when enacting § 1983. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979).

The official capacity claims against Defendant Aldridge are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

D. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

To the extent the Complaint (ECF No. 1) can be read to be seeking declaratory relief, the

request is barred by sovereign immunity. The exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity

created by the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908), which allows a party to

seek prospective injunctive relief in federal court against state officials in their official capacities,

does not apply to requests for declaratory relief establishing past violations of federal law. Verizon

Maryland, Inc., v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 646 (2002). Bryan’s claims

for declaratory relief are also barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine which provides that, except

for habeas corpus petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges

to state court judgments and state proceedings. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,

476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923); see also Mosby v. Ligon, 418

F.3d 927, 931 (2005).

Finally, the Supreme Court has held that a state prisoner may not use §1983 to challenge

“the fact or duration of his confinement.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973). A

prisoner seeking either immediate release from prison or a shortening of his term of confinement

must seek habeas relief instead. Id. Bryan is therefore entitled to neither declaratory nor injunctive

relief in this case.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, I recommend this case be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

Status of the Referral: The Referral is terminated.

The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation

in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court.

DATED this 26th day of January 2024.

s/ Christy Comstock

CHRISTY COMSTOCK

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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