Opinion

Herndon v. Byers

Court
District Court, W.D. Arkansas
Filed
Mar 22, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.2%

mere timing of events alone does not establish the requisite causal link

How later courts described this case

  • mere timing of events alone does not establish the requisite causal link
  • not every response to a prisoner’s exercise of a constitutional right is actionable
  • “[W]hen retaliatory conduct is involved, there is no independent injury requirement.”
  • The Ex parte Young exception only applies when a state official has threatened to, and is about to, commence proceedings

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

JOHN ELWAIN HERNDON PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 6:22-CV-06031-SOH-MEF

WARDEN BYERS, AMBER COLSON and DEFENDANTS

JOHN OR JANE DOES PUBLICATIONS

REVIEW COMMITTEE (All of the Arkansas

Division of Correction)

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief United States District Judge,

referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and Recommendation.

Currently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 18).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint on March 22, 2022. (ECF No. 1). Defendants filed

their Answer on June 24, 2022. (ECF No. 10). Plaintiff filed a Motion to Supplement his

Complaint on July 5, 2022. (ECF No. 12). Because it was incorrectly labelled as a Motion to

Supplement instead of a Motion to Amend, the Motion was denied on August 22, 2022. (ECF No.

13). The Court then entered an Order granting Plaintiff the opportunity to Amend his Complaint

in accordance with the Federal and Local Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 14). Plaintiff did

so on September 29, 2022. (ECF No. 17).

Plaintiff’s claims center on his order for eight books, which he alleges were “confiscated”

by the Arkansas Division of Correction. (ECF No. 17 at 2). For his first claim, Plaintiff alleges

that from December 16, 2021, to the time he filed his complaint, Defendants violated his First

Amendment rights with “flagrant due process dismissals.” (Id. at 4). More specifically, Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Colson confiscated the books for containing “nudity” on December 16,

2021. (Id. at 5). Defendant Byers and the Review Committee then agreed with Defendant Colson.

(Id.). Plaintiff argues that the book was a “world-class book of magnificant (sic) art & not

censorable, and they know that, so why did they do it?” Plaintiff states that his “injury” is that he

is still trying to gain possession of his eight books, which he says are worth $128.00. (Id.). Plaintiff

proceeds against Defendants on this claim in both their individual and official capacities. (Id.).

To support his official capacity claim, Plaintiff alleges that the ADC has book censoring policies

and guidelines and is not following them.1 (Id. at 6). He further alleges Defendants have forged,

0F

backdated, and changed the reason for the censorship three times. (Id.).

For his second claim, Plaintiff alleges that from December 16, 2021, to the time he filed

his complaint, Defendants violated is First Amendment rights when they failed to follow the ADC

policy AD 20-04 “Publications” guidelines for book censorship. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff proceeds

against Defendants for this claim in both their individual and official capacities. (Id. at 7). He

repeats his allegation that the ADC is not following its policy on book censoring to support his

official capacity claim. (Id.).

For his Third Claim, Plaintiff alleges that from December 16, 2021, to the time he filed his

complaint, Defendants violated his First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they

seized his books without due process and failed to compensate him for the loss. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff

alleges Defendant “are bending over backwards to block good books.” He asks: “Could it be

1 It is well settled that prisoners do not have a constitutional right to enforce compliance with

internal prison rules or regulations. See Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 2003)

(“there is no federal constitutional liberty interest in having . . . prison officials follow prison

regulations”); Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1997) (“there is no § 1983 liability

for violating prison policy”).

federal suit DOJ No. 204-10-41 which includes the loss of 17 pieces of legal mail, including 8

registered letters to federal attorneys . . .? Retaliation?” (Id.). Plaintiff identifies his injury as one

of property and monetary loss. (Id.). He states he suffered no physical injury. (Id.). Plaintiff

proceeds against Defendants for this claim in both their individual and official capacities. (Id.).

For his official capacity claim, Plaintiff repeats his allegation that the ADC is not following its

policy on book censoring, and he states this is a “widespread practice.” (Id.).

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 9). Plaintiff asks that his books

be brought to the Court for review, that his books be given to him, and that he not be required to

defend his book purchases in the future. (Id. at 9). He further asks that the ADC policy AD 20-

04 be “abolished as unconstitutional,” and that his costs for this lawsuit be paid by the ADC. (Id.

at 10).

In the section of the Complaint where he is asked to identify his other state or federal

lawsuits, Plaintiff indicates he has filed a small claims case in state court regarding missing art

supplies, which was dismissed due to his “PLRA error.” (Id. at 11). He provides an incomplete

citation for a case in this District as being one for medical indifference. (Id.). Finally, he indicates

he has an active Department of Justice case “204-10-41.” (Id.). At the end of this section, Plaintiff

states: “Note: My 8 books were brought to me 09-22-22 so are no longer an issue.” (Id. at 12).

Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on October 13, 2022. (ECF Nos. 18, 19). They

argue dismissal is appropriate because: (1) Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims concerning his

eight confiscated books are now moot because he has received them; (2) Plaintiff’s official

capacity claims for monetary relief are barred by sovereign immunity; (3) Defendants are entitled

to qualified immunity because Plaintiff failed to allege a plausible retaliation claim and failed to

allege any actual physical injury. (ECF No. 11).

Plaintiff filed his Response on November 2, 2022. (ECF No. 21). Plaintiff argues that his

case is not mooted by the return of the books because his case concerns the books, the

constitutionality of AD 20-04, and his damages. (ECF No. 21 at 3). He argues he is not barred

from suing state employees in their official capacity for injunctive or declaratory relief. (Id. at 4).

Plaintiff argues retaliation claims must be proved by cumulative external evidence.2 (Id. at 8).

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Plaintiff argues that “my ‘protected activity’ was the activity of buying books, not writing

complaints about the violations.” (Id. at 9, 11). Plaintiff alleges he has been “chilled” from buying

books. (Id. at 9). Plaintiff argues it took “9 long tedious months” to receive his books, and the

ADC would have disposed of them if he had not challenged them in court with this lawsuit. (Id.

at 2). Plaintiff further argues Defendant should not be shielded by qualified immunity, because

the failure to follow ADC procedure, “contrived” responses, backdating, and changing reasons for

rejection of his books is evidence that they violated clearly established rights. (Id. at 5-6).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 8(a) contains the general pleading rules and requires a complaint to present “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2). “In order to meet this standard, and survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), ‘a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Braden v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While the Court will

2 Plaintiff attempts to introduce an example of retaliation unrelated to the confiscation of his book

order, which will not be considered.

liberally construe a pro se plaintiff’s complaint, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support

his claims. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Confiscated Books

Because Plaintiff alleges in his Amended Complaint that the eight books in his order were

returned to him, he no longer has a plausible claim concerning the confiscation of those books. A

case that no longer presents a live case or controversy is moot, and a federal court lacks jurisdiction

to hear the action. See Minnesota Humane Socy. v. Clark, 184 F.3d 795, 797 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing

Hickman v. Missouri, 144 F.3d 1141, 1142 (8th Cir.1998). Plaintiff’s individual capacity and

retrospective official capacity claims concerning his confiscated books are now moot because he

has received the books in question.

Plaintiff’s claim for official capacity prospective injunctive relief concerning the

application of the ADC censorship policy should also be dismissed. The doctrine of Ex parte

Young only applies where the suit seeks prospective injunctive relief to end a continuing federal

law violation. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996). “[A] plaintiff's speculation that

a future injury may occur is not sufficient to warrant injunctive relief.” Guggenberger v.

Minnesota, 198 F. Supp. 3d 973, 991 (D. Minn. 2016) (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,

111 (1983)). Here, Plaintiff has alleged only a single, retrospective incident in his Amended

Complaint. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim for official capacity prospective injunctive relief should be

dismissed. See, e.g., 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 797 (8th Cir. 2014) (The Ex parte

Young exception only applies when a state official has threatened to, and is about to, commence

proceedings); Richards v. Dayton, CIV. 13-3029 JRT/JSM, 2015 WL 1522199, at *6 (D. Minn.

Jan. 30, 2015), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Richards v. Ritchie, CIV. 13-3029

JRT/JSM, 2015 WL 1522237 (D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2015) (single retrospective incident is not a

continuing violation, is clearly barred from the Ex parte Young exception, and must be dismissed.).

B. Retaliation

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim should be dismissed for two reasons. First, Plaintiff’s initial

pleading concerning retaliation fails to meet the pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Rule

8(a) requires a “short and plain” statement of fact showing the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule

8(d) requires allegations to be “simple, concise, and direct.” Plaintiff’s sole reference to retaliation

in his Amended Complaint is phrased as a rhetorical question about an alleged Department of

Justice case. A rhetorical question is not a short, plain, and direct factual allegation. Thus, Plaintiff

fails to plead sufficient factual allegations to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See,

e.g., Holtsclaw v. Sanders, 2:16-CV-02020, 2016 WL 3951213, at *1 (W.D. Ark. July 20, 2016),

aff'd, 676 Fed. App’x. 622 (8th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (To the extent a narrative full of rhetorical

questions can be considered factual allegations, “they are neither quantitatively nor qualitatively

sufficient to meet the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.”).

Second, Plaintiff also failed to state a plausible retaliation claim in his Response to the

Motion to Dismiss. In his Response, Plaintiff denies that his retaliation claim was triggered by a

Department of Justice case. Instead, he states “my ‘protected activity’ was the activity of buying

books, not writing complaints about the violations.” Thus, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is now that

he ordered books, they underwent the required ADC publication review, he was told different

reasons for why the books were denied to him, and he did not receive his books until he filed this

case, nine months after they arrived.

“To prevail on a § 1983 claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, [a

Plaintiff] must demonstrate (1) that he engaged in a protected activity; (2) that the government

official took adverse action against him that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from

continuing in the activity; and (3) that the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the

exercise of the protected activity.” Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984, 991 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing

Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th Cir.2004)).

In general, “[c]onduct that retaliates against the exercise of a constitutionally protected

right is actionable, even if the conduct would have been proper if motivated by a different reason.”

Cody v. Weber, 256 F.3d 764, 771 (8th Cir.2001) (citation omitted); Madewell v. Roberts, 909

F.2d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1990) (same). “Indeed, the retaliatory conduct does not itself need to be

a constitutional violation in order to be actionable.” Id. See also Dixon v. Brown, 38 F.3d 379,

380 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[W]hen retaliatory conduct is involved, there is no independent injury

requirement.”). “Yet, there are some injuries so de minimis that they do not rise to the level of

constitutional violation. ‘It would trivialize the First Amendment to hold that harassment for

exercising the right of free speech was always actionable no matter how unlikely to deter a person

of ordinary firmness from that exercise.’” Evenstad v. Herberg, 994 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1001 (D.

Minn. 2014) (quoting Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982)). “The ordinary-firmness

test is . . . designed to weed out trivial matters from those deserving the time of the courts as real

and substantial violations of the First Amendment.” Santiago, 707 F.3d at 992 (citing Garcia v.

City of Trenton, 348 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir.2003).

Because nearly every otherwise routine administrative decision may potentially be viewed

as a retaliatory act, it has been recognized that “[r]etaliation claims by prisoners are prone to abuse

since prisoners can claim retaliation for every decision they dislike.” Graham v. Henderson, 89

F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir.1996). Further, the courts have recognized that prison officials must have

broad administrative authority. Id. For this reason, it has been said that “courts must approach

prisoner claims of retaliation with skepticism and particular care.” Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d

489, 491 (2d Cir. 2001) (not every response to a prisoner’s exercise of a constitutional right is

actionable). See also Turner v. Mull, 784 F.3d 485 (8th Cir. 2015) (mere timing of events alone

does not establish the requisite causal link); Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir.1996)

(per curiam) (Speculative and conclusory allegations cannot support a retaliation claim).

Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to support his retaliation claim. It is well-established

that “officials may lawfully censor prison mail that is detrimental to the security, good order and

discipline of the institution.” Kaden v. Slykhuis, 651 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing

Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404, (1989)). Plaintiff alleges only that his books underwent

publication review, he experienced a nine-month delay in receiving his books, the delay violated

ADC policy, and during that time he was told multiple reasons for why the books were denied.

This is not an adverse reaction which would chill a person of ordinary firmness from pursuing a

protected activity. See, e.g., Gordon v. Bertsch, 1:15-CV-026, 2015 WL 10319307, at *9 (D.N.D.

Oct. 30, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 1:15-CV-026, 2016 WL 676365 (D.N.D.

Feb. 18, 2016) (false disciplinary charges, threats of bodily harm, denials of favorable prison work,

and subjecting a prisoner to harsh living conditions are items that the courts have held to constitute

sufficiently adverse actions.) Instead, Plaintiff merely describes a routine administrative process

with a resulting de minimis injury. That he was unhappy with the delay in receiving his books

does not convert that delay into First Amendment retaliation. Further, Plaintiff cannot provide

facts to show retaliatory intent because he cannot make up his mind as to what protected activity

triggered the alleged retaliation. As such, Plaintiff’s allegations are inconsistent, speculative and

conclusory, and they do not support a plausible claim for retaliation.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 18) be

GRANTED and Plaintiff’s case be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation

in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court.

DATED this 22nd day of March 2023.

/s/

HON. MARK E. FORD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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