Williams v. Pineda

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

TYRECE WILLIAMS PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 5:22-cv-05047

SERGEANT PINEDA, Washington

County Detention Center (WCDC);

CORPORAL MYATT, WCDC; and

CORPORAL SENA, WCDC DEFENDANTS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, Tyrece Williams (“Williams”), currently an inmate of the Washington County

Detention Center (“WCDC”), filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, proceeding pro

se and in forma pauperis. Williams maintains his constitutional rights were violated when

Defendants, acting with malicious intent, denied him a blanket for a twenty-two-hour period.

Defendants seek summary judgment. (ECF No. 12). The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks,

United States District Judge, referred the motion to the undersigned for the purpose of making a

Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1) and (3). Plaintiff has responded and the

motion ripe for decision. (ECF No. 18).

I. BACKGROUND

Williams is a pretrial detainee (ECF No. 1 at 2) who was booked into the WCDC on January

19, 2022. (ECF No. 14-2 at 1). On February 9, 2022, at approximately 5:30 pm, Sergeant Pineda

and Officer Bilberry picked up towels and blankets from the inmates. (ECF No. 14-3 at 3).

Williams was housed in N-block on the bottom tier. (ECF No. 14-7 at 22).1 He was housed with

1 Williams’ deposition.

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two other inmates and slept on a rack on the back wall of the cell. Id. at 24 & 33. When towels

and blankets were passed out at approximately 9:30 pm, Williams did not get a towel or a blanket.

(ECF No. 14-3 at 1); (ECF No. 14-7 at 27 & 30). He believed “something happened” and “they

didn’t have enough” but recalls his cellmates received their blankets and towels. Id. at 29-30. At

an unspecified time, Williams was given a towel so he could shower. Id. at 30, 32. Williams

describes that the day shift officers typically retrieve the towels and blankets, and then clean ones

are distributed within a couple of hours and during the same shift. Id. at 36-37.

Williams told Sergeant Pineda and several officers during the day shift (6:00 am to 6:00

pm) that he did not receive a blanket and was told: “It’s in the works. We’re going to bring it.”

(ECF No. 14-7 at 34-35). Williams testified he kept getting “pushed off and told he was going to

get” a blanket. Id. at 35. During second shift (6:00 pm to 6:00 am), Williams repeatedly asked

Corporals Myatt and Sena and every officer he talked to for his blanket. (ECF No. 14-3 at 3); (ECF

No. 14-7 at 36). At the time, Williams was wearing his uniform and a pair of socks but no

underclothes, (ECF No. 14-7 at 32), and he had a towel and a mat. Id. at 37.

While Williams could not say what the temperature was in the cell, he said “[t]hey had the

air blowing top notch” and the “room was freezing.” (ECF No. 14-7 at 37). Williams understood

that the air needed to be circulating to “make sure people don’t get COVID or colds . . . but I just

want – I want a blanket like everyone else.” Id. at 38. The wall his rack was against was cold.

Id. at 33. He says he tucked his hands in his shirt and curled up to stay warm. (ECF No. 14-7 at

38). His lips and teeth were “moving.” Id. When officers performed cell checks, every thirty

minutes or so, Williams would tell them he still did not have a blanket. Id. at 39-41. Williams felt

he was being “pushed off.” Id. at 35. He did not receive a blanket until approximately 3:00 pm

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the following day, February 10, 2022, when Sergeant Pineda brought it to him. (ECF No. 14-3 at

3 & 6). Williams testified that as a result of the cold temperature he had the “sniffles a little bit”

and a runny nose. (ECF No. 14-7 at 44-45).

Williams believed he was being “discriminated against because everybody – how is

everybody else getting th[eir] stuff, you know, and I’m not getting mine.” (ECF No. 14-7 at 48).

The other inmates in his cell were also sex offenders. Id. at 52. To Williams, his cellmates

“looked white.” Id. There were other African Americans housed in N-block, but Williams has

“absolutely no idea” if they were also denied a blanket. Id. at 53. Williams believed someone

who was Marshallese and an inmate named Donovan did not get their blankets. Id. at 54. While

Williams testified Donovan shared a cell with Moses who was African American, Donovan’s race

was not provided. Id.

When asked what Williams meant by his assertion in the Complaint that Defendants acted

with malicious intent, he testified they were “being rude” to him and “brushing [him] off and

telling [him],” “Oh, it’s in the works, and then you catch an attitude about [him] stead[ily] asking,

that’s wrong.” (ECF No. 14-7 at 56). Williams testified he repeatedly was told: “Oh, it’s in the

works. Get off the door. It’s going to get done.” Id. at 57. Although Williams initially testified

he “never one time said they were trying to punish” him, he later testified that the Defendants

being rude to him, brushing him off, and their attitude led him to believe they were punishing him.

Id. at 56.

When Williams filed a grievance regarding the issue, Corporal Mulvaney responded that

“Sergeant Pineda told me he told that next shift that some blankets/towels still needed to be passed

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out.” (ECF No. 14-3 at 4). Williams filed no request for medical services following this incident.

Id. at 8-19.

During his deposition, Williams testified that when he was young, he was punished by

being placed in a very cold closet for long periods of time, (ECF No. 14-7 at 15), causing him to

suffer from PTSD.2 Id. at 13. As a result, Williams testified he gets cold easier and faster than

others. Id. at 41-42. The cold on February 9th-10th made him have flashbacks about “getting

put in that closet” which took a mental toll on him. Id. at 45, 58. Williams asked to speak with

the mental health counselor, Ms. Shelia, who counseled and advised him to write “stuff down

about my childhood.” Id.

By affidavit, Corporal Sena avers he was working the night shift from 6:00 pm to 6:00 am

in February of 2022, indicating that throughout the night on February 9, they “replaced blankets

and towels that were missing.” (ECF No. 14-8 at 1). Corporal Sena says he “was not made aware

that Tyrece Williams did not have a blanket.” Id. Further, Corporal Sena asserts that “[a]t no

point on February 9, 2022, did Williams mention to me that he did not have a blanket. Williams

did not [a]sk me for a blanket – either verbally or in writing.” Id. at 2. Corporal Sena says he did

not intentionally deny or refuse Williams a blanket on either February 9 or 10. Id. When

Corporal Sena returned to work the evening of February 10, the day shift informed him that

“Williams said he had not had a blanket the night before.” Id. Corporal Sena understood that

Williams had been given a blanket earlier that day. Id.

2 Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.

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Similarly, the affidavit of Corporal Myatt sates Myatt was not “made aware that Williams

did not have a blanket on the night” of February 9. (ECF No. 16-1 at 1). Corporal Myatt further

asserts he did not intentionally deny or refuse Williams a blanket on February 9-10. Id.

In opposition, Williams states the nightshift Defendants, Corporals Sena and Myatt, “did

refuse me my blanket and I have 2 witness[es] who were my cell mates and are willing to testify

against all 3 Defendants.3” (ECF No. 18 at 1). Williams further asserts that “[a]ll 3 Defendants did

knowingly and unequivocally not give me my blanket back and made me suffer a form of inmate

behavior correction.” Id. Williams maintains he was not causing any type of disciplinary issues

and did not have any on record of such during this time frame. Id. at 2.

II. APPLICABLE STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the record “shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

“Once a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with

the non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a

genuine issue of material fact exists.” Nat’l Bank of Comm. v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602,

607 (8th Cir. 1999). A fact is “material” if it may “affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

3 Williams’ response is made under penalty of perjury and therefore meets the requirements of 28 U.S.C. §

1746.

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The non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. “They must show there is sufficient

evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor.” Nat’l Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). “A case founded on speculation or suspicion

is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d

621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is

blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not

adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott

v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) no

constitutional violation exists; (2) Williams suffered no physical injury; (3) they are entitled to

qualified immunity on the individual capacity claims; and (4) there is no basis for official capacity

liability to exist.

In general, § 1983 claims involve two essential elements. First, the Defendants must act

under color of state law. Second, the alleged wrongful conduct must have deprived plaintiff of a

federally protected right. Schmidt v. City of Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564, 571 (8th Cir. 2009).

Here, there is no issue as to whether the Defendants acted under color of law. Instead, the inquiry

focuses on whether Defendants violated Williams’ constitutionally protected rights. Williams has

sued the Defendants in both their individual and official capacities.

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A. Individual Capacity Claims

The Court turns first to the individual capacity claims Williams asserts against the

Defendants. An individual capacity suit seeks to impose personal liability on a governmental

actor for actions taken under color of state law. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991).

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “pretrial detainees . . . may

[not] be punished . . . . [T]his prohibition against punishment encompasses conditions of

confinement.” Karsjen v. Lourey, 988 F.3d 1047, 1052 (8th Cir. 2021)(citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441

U.S. 520, 535 (1979)); see also Stearns v. Inmate Servs. Corp., 957 F.3d 902 (8th Cir.

2020)(rejecting application of deliberate indifference standard to claims of pretrial detainees).4 In

Bell, the Court stated that “the proper inquiry is whether [the] conditions amount to punishment

of the detainee.” Id., 441 U.S. at 535. The Eighth Circuit in Stearns stated:

In Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court articulated the standard governing pretrial

detainees’ claims related to conditions of confinement. The Court held that the

government may detain defendants pretrial and “may subject [them] to the

restrictions and conditions of [a] detention facility so long as those conditions and

restrictions do not amount to punishment, or otherwise violate the

Constitution.” Id. at 536-37. The Court articulated two ways to determine

whether conditions rise to the level of punishment. A plaintiff could show that the

conditions were intentionally punitive. Id. at 538. Alternatively, if there is no

expressly demonstrated intent to punish, the plaintiff could also show that the

conditions were not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose or

were excessive in relation to that purpose. Id. at 538-39. If conditions are found

to be arbitrary or excessive, it is permissible to “infer that the purpose of the

governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon

detainees qua detainees.” Id. at 539.

Stearns, 957 F.3d at 907 (alterations in original).

4 Prior to Stearns, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, while recognizing the Fourteenth Amendment

Due Process Clause applied to pretrial detainees, nevertheless applied the same Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference standard to detainees and convicted inmates. See e.g., Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir.

1996). In Stearns, the Eighth Circuit referred to these cases as involving isolated dicta. Stearns, 957 F.3d at 908.

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Pretrial detainees “are entitled to reasonably adequate sanitation, personal hygiene, and

laundry privileges, particularly over a lengthy course of time.” Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d

1017, 1045 (8th Cir. 2012)(cleaned up). “In considering whether the conditions of pretrial

detention are unconstitutionally punitive, we review the totality of the circumstances of a pretrial

detainee’s confinement.” Morris v. Zefferi, 601 F.3d 805, 810 (8th Cir. 2010); see also Stearns,

957 F.3d at 909 (“Importantly, we are concerned with the totality of circumstances of Stearns’s

confinement and not any particular condition in isolation”). “There is . . . a de minimus level of

imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 n.21 (quoting

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977)).

It is undisputed that Williams did not have a blanket during the evening hours of February

9th and the morning of February 10th – a period of less than twenty-four hours. He also maintains

he was subjected to cold temperatures.5 Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 269 (8th Cir. 1996)

(“[T]he length of time a prisoner is subjected to harsh conditions is a critical factor in our

analysis”). Williams alleges no other deprivations; Williams had adequate clothing and had been

given a towel to shower. Williams could not provide an estimate of the temperature in the cell

and did not complain he was cold on nights when he had a blanket. While he maintains he has

witnesses, including his former cellmates, who will testify he did not have a blanket during this

time, he makes no mention of their being willing to testify as to how cold it was in the cell.6 There

is no suggestion in the record that other inmates complained of the cold temperature. This type

5 WCDC policy provides for detainees to be issued one blanket. (ECF No. 14-6 at 1). Further, WCDC

policy provides that “the detention center to be kept at a reasonable temperature and properly ventilated at all times.”

(ECF No. 14-1 at 2 (Affidavit of Corporal Mulvaney)); (ECF No. 14-6 at 4 (Policy)).

6 No affidavits were submitted with Williams’ response.

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of short term or temporary deprivation does not constitute punishment in violation of the

constitution. See e.g., O’Leary v. Iowa State Men’s Reformatory, 79 F.3d 82, 83-85 (8th Cir.

1996)(three days confinement without underwear, blankets, mattress, exercise, and visits did not

rise to the level of a constitutional violation); Seltzer-Bey v. Delo, 66 F.3d 961, 964 (8th Cir.

1995)(detainee, who was placed in a strip cell for two days without clothing, bedding, or running

water, failed to show that named prison officials had knowledge of the his conditions of

confinement or knew of an excessive risk to his health or safety); Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442,

444-47 (8th Cir. 1995) (inmate’s deprivation of clothes, running water, hygiene supplies, blanket

and mattress for four days did not violate the constitution).7

As proof of malicious intent, Williams maintains the Defendants were rude, dismissive,

and short with him when he repeatedly requested a blanket. Williams admits that he knew other

inmates did not receive their blankets when linens were distributed. This conduct – assumed to

be true for the purpose of analysis – does not constitute the type of arbitrary or excessive conduct

from which an inference may be drawn that Defendants acted with intent to punish Williams when

they failed to provide him when linens were distributed to other N-block inmates. Stearns, 957

F.3d at 905. Furthermore, Williams essentially asserts Defendants were negligent in failing to

provide him a blanket for the night of February 9th which is insufficient under § 1983. See e.g.,

Patterson v. Kelley, 902 F.3d 845, 852 (8th Cir. 2018) (mere negligence, even gross negligence,

is insufficient to sustain a § 1983 claim).

As proof of discrimination, Williams testified that other inmates in his cell, who he

believed to be Caucasian, received their blankets. (ECF No. 14-7 at 39 & 52). All inmates in

7 These cases were all decided before Stearns.

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Williams’ cell were sex offenders as were many individuals in N-block. Id. at 53. As noted

above Williams did not know if the other African American inmates in the cell were denied their

blankets. Id. See Lewis v. Jacks, 486 F.3d 1025, 1028 (8th Cir. 2007) (unequal treatment of

inmates on one occasion did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, even if inmates of another

race were not treated the same). Construing these allegations as an Equal Protection claim, there

are simply no facts from which an inference can be made that Williams was treated differently

from other inmates because he belonged to a protected class. Seltzer-Bey, 66 F.3d at 964; Lewis,

486 F.3d at 1028 (“unequal treatment of persons who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial

of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful

discrimination”) (cleaned up). No genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Defendants

violated Williams’ constitutional rights.

B. Physical Injury Requirement

“Because a § 1983 action is a type of tort claim, general principles of tort law require that

a plaintiff suffer some actual injury before he can receive compensation.” Irving v. Dormire, 519

F.3d 441, 448 (8th Cir. 2008); see also Bell, 441 U.S. 539 n.21). The PLRA8 engrafted this

principle and provides that “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a

jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody

without a prior showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) & (e)(h)(including pretrial

detainees in the definition of the term prisoner).

The Eighth Circuit has interpreted § 1997e(e) “as limiting recovery for mental or emotional

damages in all federal actions brought by prisoners.” Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir.

8 Prison Litigation Reform Act.

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2004). The Court has construed “the PLRA to require more than a de minimis physical injury.”

McAdoo v. Martin, 899 F.3d 521, 525 (8th Cir. 2018). Thus, to recover compensatory damages,

Williams must show he suffered a physical injury that is more than de minimis. Id. As an

example, the appellate court has found headaches, cramps, nosebleeds, and dizziness to be de

minimis. Munn v. Toney, 433 F.3d 1087, 1089 (8th Cir. 2006).

Here, Williams testified he had the sniffles and a runny nose. Assuming for analysis that

Williams had these ailments, they are not more serious than those found to be de minimis in Munn.

Even had the Court found a constitutional violation exists, Section 1997e(e) would preclude

Williams from recovering compensatory damages. Royal, supra.

C. Qualified Immunity

“Government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “The qualified immunity standard ‘gives ample room for mistaken

judgments’ by protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.’” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341-

43 (1986)).

“[T]o withstand a motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, a civil

rights plaintiff must (1) assert a violation of a constitutional right; [and] (2) demonstrate that the

alleged right is clearly established. ” Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d 289, 295 (8th Cir. 1996);

see also Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 915 (1997). The Court is free to address the questions

in any order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). A government official is entitled

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to qualified immunity unless the answer to both questions is “yes.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 812 (1982).

Here, the Court has found that Williams has failed to allege a violation of a constitutional

right. Therefore, the Court’s qualified immunity inquiry ends here. See e.g., Krout v. Goemmer,

583 F.3d 557, 564 (8th Cir. 2009) (unless the facts make out a violation of a constitutional right

the Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity). Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

D. Official Capacity Claims

An official capacity claim is considered a claim against the employing governmental entity,

here, Washington County. Crawford v. Van Buren Cnty., 678 F.3d 666, 669 (8th Cir. 2012).

“Section 1983 liability for a constitutional violation may attach to a municipality if the violation

resulted from (1) an ‘official municipal policy,’ (2) an unofficial ‘custom,’ or (3) a deliberately

indifferent failure to train or supervise.” Corwin v. City of Independence, Mo., 829 F.3d 695, 699

(8th Cir. 2016)(citations omitted).

Williams does not allege that Washington County’s policies or customs were intentionally

punitive. Stearns, 957 F.3d at 907. “To succeed on his conditions-of-confinement claim, he

must show that [Washington County’s] policies or customs caused conditions that were not

reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose or were excessive in relation to that

purpose.” Id. Williams merely contends the Defendants did not adhere to policy – simply that

they did not properly do their jobs. This is insufficient to state an official policy claim. See e.g.,

Kennedy v. Blankenship, 100 F.3d 640, 643 (8th Cir. 1996) (failure to follow policy does not state

a claim for relief under § 1983). Furthermore, where no individual defendant has violated the

constitution, the governmental employer may not be held liable. See Ivey v. Audrain Cnty., Mo.,

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968 F.3d 845, 851 (8th Cir. 2020) (if the individual officers are entitled to qualified immunity

under the first prong of the analysis, 1.e., no evidence of a constitutional violation, then the county

cannot be held liable); Schoelch v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 1041, 1048 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that

there was no need to consider a pretrial detainee's failure to protect claim against the city when

there was no evidence that any of the individual officers committed a constitutional violation).

For these reasons, the Court finds no basis for an official policy claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

It is therefore recommended that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.

12) be GRANTED, and this case be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation

in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file

timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties

are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by

the district court.

DATED this 14" day of December 2022.

CHRISTY COMSTOCK

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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