Jones v. Arkansas Division of Correction

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

KEITHES MONTEL JONES PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 6:22-cv-06063-SOH-BAB

ARKANSAS DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS, DEFENDANTS

DOCTOR DANIELS, DOCTOR FORREST,

and MACKLARAE

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is a civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to the provisions

of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief United States District

Judge, referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and

Recommendation.

The case is before the Court for preservice screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.1

Under § 1915A, the Court is required to screen any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress

from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(a).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the Eastern District of Arkansas on June 3, 2022. (ECF

No. 1). It was transferred to this District on June 6, 2022. (ECF No. 3). Plaintiff is currently

incarcerated in the Arkansas Division of Correction (“ADC”) Ouachita River RPU Unit. (ECF

No. 1 at 1, 4). Plaintiff alleges that on June 14, 2022, Defendants violated his constitutional

rights. (Id. at 4). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he is mentally ill and allergic to the drug

Haldol, but Dr. Forrest threatens to prescribe it for him. (Id.). He further alleges Dr. Forrest

1 Enacted as part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).

refuses to put him on Seroquel for schizophrenia or on any medication for bipolar and anxiety.

(Id.). He alleges one medication Dr. Forrest gave him, “geodon,” made his “voices” worse and

gave him headaches and other side effects. (Id. at 4-5). Plaintiff does not describe any actions or

inactions by Dr. Daniels or Defendant Macklarae. Plaintiff proceeds against Defendants in their

official capacities only. (Id. at 5). In the section of the form where he is to describe an official

capacity claim, Plaintiff alleges “the State of Arkansas doesn’t have the right amount of funds to

afford real psychic [sic] medication.” (Id. at 5). He further alleges he has been locked down in

RPU for eight months and no one monitors him to see if he is stable. He alleges there are only

guards that do walk-ins. (Id. at 6).

Plaintiff asks the Court to have him transferred to Riverdale in Little Rock so he can be in

a proper environment, receive the psychiatric medications Seroquel and “calatipine,” and get

“mentally stable.” (Id. at 10).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under § 1915A, the Court is obliged to screen the case prior to service of process being

issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1)

are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action is malicious when the allegations are known to

be false, or it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants

rather than to vindicate a cognizable right. Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C.

1987); In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988). A claim fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we

hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded . . . to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). This means “that if the essence of an allegation is

discernable, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should

construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the

proper legal framework.” Jackson, 747 F.3d at 544 (cleaned up). However, the complaint must

still allege specific facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337

(8th Cir. 1985).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Arkansas Division of Correction

The Arkansas Division of Correction is not a person or a legal entity subject to suit under

§ 1983.  See Owens v. Scott Cty. Jail, 328 F.3d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (jails are not legal

entities amenable to suit); see also Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th

Cir. 1992) (stating that “departments or subdivisions” of local government are not “juridical

entities suable as such”); De La Garza v. Kandiyohi Cty. Jail, 18 F. App’x 436, 437 (8th Cir.

2001) (affirming district court dismissal of county jail and sheriff’s department as parties

because they are not suable entities). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against the Arkansas

Division of Correction should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

B. Dr. Daniels and Defendant Macklarae

Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants are subject to dismissal. To state a cognizable

§ 1983 claim, a complaint must set forth specific factual allegations showing what each named

defendant allegedly did, or failed to do, that allegedly violated the plaintiff's federal

constitutional rights. Plaintiff has alleged no facts indicating a causal link between either Dr.

Daniels or Defendant Macklarae and his claims in this case. See Martin, 780 F.2d 1337. (Even a

pro se Plaintiff must allege specific facts sufficient to state a claim).

C. Dr. Forrest

Under Section 1983, a defendant may be sued in either his individual capacity, or in his

official capacity, or in both. In Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1998), the Eighth

Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the distinction between individual and official capacity suits.

As explained by the Court in Gorman:

“Claims against government actors in their individual capacities differ from those

in their official capacities as to the type of conduct that is actionable and as to the

type of defense that is available. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 112 S.Ct. 358,

116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991). Claims against individuals in their official capacities are

equivalent to claims against the entity for which they work; they require proof

that a policy or custom of the entity violated the plaintiff’s rights, and the only

type of immunity available is one belonging to the entity itself. Id. 502 U.S. at

24-27, 112 S. Ct. at 361-62 (1991). Personal capacity claims, on the other hand,

are those which allege personal liability for individual actions by officials in the

course of their duties; these claims do not require proof of any policy and

qualified immunity may be raised as a defense. Id. 502 U.S. at 25-27, 112 S. Ct.

at 362.”

Gorman, 152 F.3d at 914. Plaintiff identified no ADC custom or policy which violated his

constitutional rights. Instead, he states only that the State of Arkansas does not have sufficient

funding to provide “real” psychiatric medication. Such vague and conclusory allegations cannot

support an official capacity claim. See Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 433 (8th Cir. 1989). (“To

establish liability in an official-capacity suit under section 1983, a plaintiff must show either that

the official named in the suit took an action pursuant to an unconstitutional governmental policy

or custom . . .or that he or she possessed final authority over the subject matter at issue and used

that authority in an unconstitutional manner.”); Arnold v. Corizon, Inc, No. 1:15CV62, 2015 WL

4206307, at *2 (E.D. Mo. July 10, 2015) (conclusory claims that defendants acted according to

some unspecified policies or customs are not enough to state official capacity claims).

Here, Plaintiff proceeds against Dr. Forrest in his official capacity alone but wholly fails to

allege any official capacity claim. Plaintiff’s claims against Dr. Forrest should be dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, it is recommended that: (1) the case be dismissed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; (2) Plaintiff

is warned that, in the future, this dismissal may be counted as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. §

1915(g) and thus, the Clerk is directed to place a § 1915(g) strike flag on the case for future

judicial consideration; and (3) the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any

appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in good faith.

The parties have fourteen days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation in

which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court.

DATED this 13th day of September 2022.

/s/ Barry A. Bryant

HON. BARRY A. BRYANT

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE