LeClaire v. Dyer

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL LECLAIRE. PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 2:22-CV-02131-PKH-MEF

DEPUTY RICHARD DYER,

Crawford County Sheriff’s Department;

DEPUTY BRANDON CHANCEY,

Crawford County Sheriff’s Department DEFENDANTS

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Christopher Michael LeClaire, filed the above-captioned civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the Crawford

County Jail pending trial on state court charges and requested to proceed pro se. (ECF No. 2).

In a separate order, the Court granted Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application (“IFP”). (ECF No.

3). This matter is now before the Court for preservice review under the provisions of the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is required to screen

any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee

of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). For the reasons discussed below, it is

recommended that this case be stayed pursuant to the principle of abstention as outlined in Younger

v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff contends that on March 1, 2022, he was pulled over and arrested on Highway 162

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and Sunnyside in Kibler, Arkansas, then driven to 141 Arkansas Avenue in Kibler, Arkansas, and

charged with several felony criminal offenses. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff contends that Crawford

County Sheriff’s Deputy Richard Dyer and Investigator Brandon Chancey took advantage of the

fact that he is on parole to do a compliance check on his residence, even though he did not live

there nor was it his parole address. Id. Plaintiff claims he has been falsely imprisoned and

unlawfully charged, which has caused him to suffer mental anguish, anxiety, and PTSD. Id. He

is suing the defendants in their individual and official capacities and requests compensatory and

punitive damages. Id.

A review of the publicly accessible Arkansas state records system shows that Plaintiff was

arrested on March 1, 2022, and subsequently charged with three felonies in violation of Arkansas

state law: (1) second degree forgery; (2) possession of drug paraphernalia; and (3) felon in

possession of a firearm. State v. Christopher LeClaire, Case No. 17CR-22-205 (Arkansas Court

Connect, last accessed August 23, 2022). See also Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n.2

(8th Cir. 2005) (court may take judicial notice of judicial opinions and public records). That

criminal case currently remains open, and trial is scheduled for November 1, 2022.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the PLRA, the Court is obliged to screen the case prior to service of process being

issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are

frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seek monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

In reviewing whether a complaint (or portion thereof) states a claim for which relief may

be granted, this Court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and draw all

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reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Varga v. U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n, 764 F.3d 833, 838

(8th Cir. 2014). The factual allegations need not be detailed, but they must be sufficient “to raise

a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007). The complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. Pro

se complaints are to be construed liberally, but they must still allege enough facts to support the

claims advanced. Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing cases).

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

Pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), federal courts are required to abstain

from hearing cases when “(1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding which (2) implicates

important state interests, and when (3) that proceeding affords an adequate opportunity to raise the

federal questions presented.” Norwood v. Dickey, 409 F.3d 901, 903 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Fuller

v. Ulland, 76 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir. 1996)). “If all three questions are answered affirmatively, a

federal court should abstain unless it detects ‘bad faith, harassment, or some extraordinary

circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate.’” Night Clubs, Inc. v. City of Ft. Smith,

Ark., 163 F.3d 475, 479 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State

Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 435 (1982)). Where, as here, the plaintiff is requesting damages in the

federal suit, a “stay” is the appropriate mode of abstention. Night Clubs, Inc., 163 F.3d at 481

(citing Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 730 (1996) (“[W]e have permitted federal

courts applying abstention principles in damages actions to enter a stay, but we have not permitted

them to dismiss the action altogether.”)).

This case satisfies the Younger factors. First, Plaintiff’s claim that he has been unlawfully

charged with a crime and thus falsely imprisoned is intertwined with his pending state criminal

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case, Case No. 17CR-22-205. Second, it is clearly established that ongoing state criminal

proceedings implicate the important state interest of enforcing state criminal laws. See, e.g.,

Meador v. Paulson, 385 F. App’x 613 (8th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 action based

on Younger abstention principles where there was an ongoing state criminal case). Finally, to the

extent that Plaintiff claims that evidence being used against him in the state criminal proceedings

was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, such claims can be raised in those

proceedings. See generally Clingmon v. State, 620 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Ark. Ct. App. 2021)

(discussing the scope of a parolee’s expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment).

Plaintiff, moreover, does not contend that he cannot raise his claims in the state criminal case, and

he has not identified any extraordinary circumstances warranting this Court to interfere with that

case. Accordingly, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s federal § 1983 action be stayed pursuant to

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) pending the resolution of his state criminal case.1

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, having reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the

undersigned recommends that this action be STAYED AND ADMINISTRATIVELY

TERMINATED pending the resolution of Plaintiff’s state criminal case. Plaintiff will have thirty

(30) days after the final resolution of his pending criminal case to file a Motion to Reopen this

case. Failure to file the Motion to Reopen within this deadline will result in the summary

dismissal of this case.

The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation

1 Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that should he be convicted of the pending state criminal charges, a claim for relief

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is generally not cognizable if it implies the invalidity of his conviction or confinement pursuant

to the “favorable termination rule” established in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).

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in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file

timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties

are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by

the district court.

DATED this 24th day of August 2022.

/s/

HON. MARK E. FORD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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