Davis v. Dorman

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

GERRY LYNN DAVIS, JR. PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 4:19-cv-04014

DEPUTY GARY DORMAN, Hempstead County

Sheriff; JUSTIN HUGHES, Jail Administrator,

Nevada County Detention Facility; OFFICER

DREW RATHER, Jailer Nevada County

Detention Facility; TOMI HASH; REYN BROWN;

And CODY FERGERSON DEFENDANTS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is a civil rights action filed pro se by Plaintiff, Gerry Lynn Davis, Jr., under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Gary Dorman

and Reyn Brown. (ECF No. 65). Plaintiff filed a Response (ECF No. 79) and Defendants filed a

Reply. (ECF No. 81). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3)(2011), the

Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief United States District Judge, referred this case to the

undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and Recommendation.

I. FACTUAL BACKROUND

Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated and is currently living in Emmett, Arkansas. His claims

in this action against Defendants Dorman and Brown arise from searches and seizures of his

residence, a controlled buy of drugs, and his subsequent arrests in 2018. (ECF No. 11).

On August 30, 2018, agents with the Eighth North Task Force (“DTF”) visited Plaintiff’s

residence in search of two wanted individuals with felony arrest warrants. The agents requested

and obtained Plaintiff’s permission to search his residence. The individuals were not located at

the residence. During the search for the individuals, agents observed evidence of illegal controlled

substances at the residence, including a live marijuana plant in a bucket outside near the front door.

(ECF No. 66-1, p. 1 and 66-2, p.1).

According to Plaintiff, the DTF agents requested his permission to search his residence on

August 30, 2018, for one individual – Gage Dillard – and Plaintiff granted permission to the agents

to search for Mr. Dillard. (ECF No. 66-3, p. 21).

After returning from Plaintiff’s residence on August 30, 2018, DTF Agent Jeremy

McBride1 executed an Affidavit for Search and Seizure Warrant testifying at a residence

“described as a red, two story, metal residence with the front door of the residence facing East”

and “further described as the first house on the left travelling South on Nevada 275 approximately

.5 miles from Highway 73,” there was at that time “being concealed controlled substance, drug

paraphernalia, United States currency, electronics, and documents for the sale of drugs[.]” (ECF

No. 66-1, pp. 4-5). A search warrant was obtained, and DTF agents performed a second search of

Plaintiff’s residence on August 30, 2018. (ECF No. 66-1, p. 6). Plaintiff was arrested that day for

manufacturing marijuana and transported to the Nevada County Jail (“NCJ”).

During the search of Plaintiff’s residence on August 30, 2018, Defendant Dorman

remained “primarily” outside. However, Defendant Dorman conducted the search of Plaintiff’s

person incident to his arrest, finding a set of digital scales and methamphetamine in Plaintiff’s

pants. (ECF No. 66-1, pp. 1-2).

According to Plaintiff, although the Affidavit and search warrant incorrectly listed the

address of his residence as 234 Nevada 275 when his correct address was 294 Nevada 275, the

description of his residence in the Affidavit was correct except that it should have said the first

1 Jeremy McBride is not a named Defendant in this lawsuit.

house on the “right” instead of the first house on the “left”. (ECF No. 66-3, pp. 15-16, 19).

A search warrant return was executed on August 31, 2018, providing an inventory of the

items seized during the August 30, 2018 search of Plaintiff’s residence. The items seized included

two plastic baggies containing a substance believed to be methamphetamine, digital scales, two

baggies containing a substance believed to be marijuana, multiple glass pipes and cell phones, the

live marijuana plant under the air conditioner, and two additional live marijuana plants in the back

yard of the residence. (ECF No. 66-1, p. 7).

On October 3, 2018, Defendant Brown and Defendant Cody Ferguson conducted a

controlled purchase of methamphetamine from Plaintiff at his residence. A confidential informant

advised he could purchase methamphetamine at the residence. Defendants Brown and Ferguson

equipped the informant with a video camera and one-hundred forty dollars ($140) in U. S.

currency, and the informant purchased methamphetamine from Plaintiff at Plaintiff’s residence on

October 3, 2018. (ECF No. 66-2, pp. 9-10).

On October 10, 2018, based on the events surrounding the controlled substance purchase

that occurred on October 3, 2018, Defendant Brown executed an Affidavit for Plaintiff’s arrest for

committing the offense of Delivery of Methamphetamine. (ECF No. 66-2, pp. 13-14). That same

day based on Defendant Brown’s Affidavit, state court Judge Wright found there were reasonable

grounds for believing Plaintiff committed the offense of Delivery of Methamphetamine and issued

an arrest warrant for Plaintiff. (ECF No. 66-2, p. 15).

In addition, based on multiple controlled substance purchases, including the October 3,

2018 purchase involving Plaintiff, Defendant Brown executed an Affidavit for a Search and

Seizure Warrant on October 10, 2018, for Plaintiff’s “known residence” described in part as “234

Nevada 275…a red, two story, metal residence with the front door of the residence facing

east…first building on the left traveling South on Nevada 275 approximately.5 miles from

Highway 73….” (ECF No. 66-2 pp. 16-20). Based on this affidavit, Judge Wright also issued a

Search and Seizure Warrant for Plaintiff’s residence. (ECF No. 66-2, p. 21).

On October 10, 2018, the Arrest Warrant and Search and Seizure Warrant were executed,

and Plaintiff was arrested at the residence described in the warrants by Deputy Morris.2 (ECF No.

66-2, pp. 22-23). Upon Plaintiff’s arrest and execution of the search warrant, agents found

controlled substances and paraphernalia, resulting in additional criminal charges against Plaintiff.

(ECF Nos. 66-2, pp. 22-27). Defendant Dorman was present during the search of Plaintiff’s

residence on October 10, 2018, acting in a supervisory role, but he was not directly involved in the

search. (ECF No. 66-1, p. 2).

On October 12, 2018, Defendant Brown executed an affidavit for warrant of arrest of

Plaintiff for possession of drug paraphernalia and possession of a controlled substance, based on

the evidence seized during the search conducted on October 10, 2018. (ECF No. 66-2, pp. 25-27).

Plaintiff was charged with eight (8) crimes stemming from his arrest and the subsequent

search of his residence pursuant to a search warrant on August 30, 2018, in State v. Davis, Nevada

County Circuit Court No. 50CR-18-140. Plaintiff was charged with possession of

methamphetamine with intent to deliver (class A felony), use or possession of paraphernalia to

manufacture methamphetamine or cocaine (class B felony), maintaining a drug premises (class C

felony), manufacture of a Schedule IV controlled substance (class D felony), possession of drug

paraphernalia (class D felony), and possession of a controlled substance (class A misdemeanor).

2 Deputy Morris is not a named Defendant in this lawsuit.

(ECF No. 66-4, pp. 1-4).3

Plaintiff was charged with delivery of methamphetamine (class B felony) stemming from

the controlled buy on October 3, 2018, in State v. Davis, Nevada County Circuit Court No. 50CR-

18-167. (ECF No. 66-4, p. 12). Plaintiff was charged with four crimes stemming from the search

of his residence pursuant to a warrant on October 10, 2018, in State v. Davis, Nevada County

circuit Court No. 50CR-186. (ECF No. 66-4, pp. 14-15).

On March 11, 2019, Plaintiff signed a Plea and Waiver in Nevada County Circuit Court

Case Nos. 50CV-18-140, 50CR-18-167, and 50CR-18-186. In the Plea and Waiver, Plaintiff

acknowledged he understood he entered a plea of no contest and “the court treats the plea of no

contest as a plea of guilty.” Plaintiff also indicated in the Plea and Waiver that “no promises,

representations or threats have been made to or against him by anyone to induce or cause him to

enter a plea of not contest to the charges herein.” In addition, Plaintiff attested by entering the plea

he waived “any and all objections to the proceedings herein against him.” (ECF No. 66-4, p. 13).

Defendant Dorman states he did not seize any U.S. currency from Plaintiff’s person or

residence on August 30, 3018, October 3, 2018, October 10, 2018 or any other date. (ECF No.

66-1, p. 2). Defendant Brown also states did not seize any U.S. currency from Plaintiff’s person

or residence on August 30, 2018, October 3, 2018, October 10, 2018, or any other date. (ECF No.

66-2, p. 3).

Defendant Dorman states he did not have any involvement in the criminal proceedings

initiated against Plaintiff in Nevada County Circuit Court Case Nos. 50CF-18-140, 50CR-18-167,

3 The referenced exhibits are a collection of file-marked public records from Plaintiff’s state court criminal and civil

cases – Nevada County Circuit Court Case Nos. 50CV-18-140, 50CR-18-167, and 50CR-18-186. The Court will

take judicial notice of these public records. Fed. R. Evid. 201; See, e.g., Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir.

2007) (noting the district court correctly took judicial notice of public state-court records and stating “court records

are public records” in all states).

or 50CR-18-186 other than his presence at Plaintiff residence on August 30, 2018 and October 10,

2018. (ECF No. 66-1, p.3). Defendant Dorman also states he did not force, coerce, or encourage

Plaintiff to plead guilty to the crimes he was charged with in these cases. Id.

Defendant Brown states he did not have any involvement in the criminal proceedings

initiated against Plaintiff in Nevada County Circuit Court Case Nos. 50CV-18-140, 50CR-18-167,

and 50CR-18-186, other than the controlled buy and searches described above which formed the

basis of some of the charges in those cases. (ECF NO. 66-2, p. 4). Defendant Brown also states

he did not force, coerce, or encourage Plaintiff to plead guilty to the crimes he was charged with

in these cases. Id.

On December 28, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit in the Eastern District of

Arkansas. (ECF No. 1). On February 4, 2019, the case was transferred to the Western District of

Arkansas, Texarkana Division. (ECF No. 3). In response to this Court’s orders, Plaintiff filed an

Amended Complaint on March 6, 2019, (ECF No. 6), and a Second Amended Complaint on March

20, 2019. (ECF No. 11). Plaintiff named the following individuals as Defendants in the Second

Amended Complaint: Deputy Gary Dorman, Jail Administrator Justin Hughes, Officer Drew

Rather, Tomi Hash, Reyn Brown, and Cody Ferguson.4 Id. Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee at the

time he filed this lawsuit. Id. at p. 3

Plaintiff describes his individual capacity claim against Defendants Dorman and Brown5

as “Trespassing”. (ECF No. 11, p. 4.) Specially Plaintiff alleges on August 30, 2018:

4 On April 30, 2020, I entered two Report and Recommendations recommending Defendants Ferguson, Rather, Hash,

and Hughes summary judgment motions be granted. (ECF Nos. 88, 89). On May 4, 2020, I entered an Amended

Report and Recommendation replacing (ECF No. 88) recommending dismissal of all individual capacity claims as the

official capacity claims against Defendant Ferguson were previously dismissed. (ECF No. 90).

5 Plaintiff also alleged Defendant Ferguson was involved in the “trespassing” claim.

I was awoke by my son with two DTF agents standing in our hallway between us

and the back door exit, ordering us out in the yard. They were looking for someone

my son knew. They took $1490.00 out of my wallet, took us to jail, I paid $5000.00

to bond out they came back Oct 10th claiming; I sold meth to a confidential source,

took me back to jail, forced me to take a plea-deal without producing the

confidential source, threatening a long Prison sentence if I took it to trial.

(ECF No. 11, pp. 4-5). Plaintiff also asserts an official capacity claim against Defendants

Dorman and Brown and describes it as follows: “coming in my house while I was sleeping, looking

for someone I hardly even knew.” Id. at p. 6. Plaintiff is seeking compensatory and punitive

damages. Id. at p. 8.

During Plaintiff’s deposition taken on January 8, 2020, Plaintiff testified he is also suing

Defendants Dorman and Brown for unlawful arrest arising from the controlled buy on October 3,

2018 because “they claim I had a controlled buy video of selling meth to a confidential

informant…but they never would show it to me…and the arrest warrant he come back with had

the wrong address on it.” (ECF No. 66-3, p. 7).

On February 19, 2020, Defendants Dorman and Brown filed the instant motion arguing

they are entitled to summary judgment because: 1) the search warrants did not violate the Fourth

Amendment; 2) Defendants Dorman and Brown did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; 3)

Defendants Dorman and Brown are entitled to qualified immunity; and 4) Plaintiff has not

identified any custom or policy of Hempstead County or the DTF which caused a violation of

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights to establish official capacity liability. (ECF No. 65).

On April 13, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Response in opposition to Defendants’ motion stating:

The DTF never produced Search Warrant on Aug 30, 2018, they would not let any

of my family in house as they searched, the warrant they produced after I filed suit

is identical to the one they had on oct. 10, the only difference is the time and Date.

They had no reason to believe there was drug’s there Aug 30 2018, They were there

looking for Gage Dillard. Mapp vs. Ohio says they cannot come to my house

looking for someone and gather evidence against me without getting warrant

first.6…

My correct address was 294 Nev 275, when they have 234 Nev 275 on all

documents. If they would have went to 234 Nev 275 looking for Gage Dillard they

would have never woke me that morning. 234 from 294 is 60 Boxholder’s not just

one digit. Gerry and Marilyn Davis live at the first house on the left traveling South

on Nev 275, My house is on the right when traveling South…

Dorman et al did take $1490.00 and it is true it was not listed among the items

seized in the search warrant return. A black hand-gun was also not listed. There

was not black hand-gun…

(ECF No. 79, pp. 2, 8, 10). On April 15, 2020, Defendants Dorman and Brown filed a Reply (ECF

No. 81) reasserting their arguments in support of the summary judgment motion and pointing out

Plaintiff included state court pleadings with his Response including a court order directing the

return of $1490.00 to him. (ECF No. 79, p. 11). It is not clear from the record whether Plaintiff

has received the funds.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the record "shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). "Once

a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the

non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine

issue of material fact exists.” Nat’l Bank of Comm. v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir.

1999).

6 In addition to his own affidavit, Plaintiff submitted affidavits from Marilyn Davis and Gerry Davis Jr. stating “on

August 30, 2018, the DTF never produced a Search and Seizure Warrant for 294 Nevada 275 Emmet, Arkansas.”

The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "They must show there is sufficient

evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor." Nat’l Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). "A case founded on speculation or suspicion is

insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment." Id. (citing, Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d

621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is

blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not

adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott

v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Failure to Produce Controlled Buy Video

As an initial matter, the Court notes Plaintiff alleges for the first time mentions in his

deposition and again in his Response that Defendant Brown and Cody Ferguson failed to provide

video of the controlled as ordered in the Court’s Initial Scheduling Order. (ECF No. 79). The

Court finds this claim is not properly before the Court for decision because Plaintiff did not make

any allegations relating to the failure to produce the video in his Second Amended Complaint.

Moreover, the proper place for the Court to have considered a failure of a party to turn over a video

or other evidence would have been during the discovery phase in this case. Although Plaintiff

filed a Motion to Subpoena Body Cam Footage and Control Buy Footage on December 3, 2019,

(ECF No. 59), the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion because Plaintiff did not identify “where the

video footage was recorded, who recorded the video footage, and which Defendant(s) has

possession of the video footage so that a subpoena can be issued.” (ECF No. 60). Plaintiff did not

file any additional motion requesting production of these videos. Accordingly, I recommend the

Court not address Plaintiff’s claim set forth in the Response.

B. Heck v. Humphrey

Plaintiff alleges in the Second Amended Complaint that Defendants Dorman and Brown

were involved in unlawful searches and seizures of his residence on August 30, 2018 and October

10, 2019. (ECF No. 6). He also alleges these Defendants were involved in a controlled buy of

drugs on October 3, 2018 which led to his unlawful arrest on October 10, 2018.

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held a claim for damages

for "allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid" is not cognizable until “the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared

invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a

federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck, 512 U.S. 486-87. The Court noted if a

successful claim would not demonstrate the invalidity of an outstanding criminal judgment, it

should be allowed to proceed. The Heck doctrine has been applied to bar claims for injunctive or

declaratory relief and damages. See Smith v. Norris, 40 Fed. Appx. 305 (8th Cir. 2002)

(unpublished); Rosendahl v. Norman, 242 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 2000).

Here, all of Plaintiff’s claims are based on an underlying arrest and prosecution for which

he was convicted and sentenced. As previously stated, on March 26, 2019, Plaintiff voluntarily

pled nolo contendere on the charge of Delivery of Methamphetamine resulting from the October

3, 2018 controlled substance purchase. That same day, Plaintiff also pled nolo contendere to: 1)

Possession of Drug Paraphernalia to Ingest, Inhale, etc.; 2) Use or Possession of Paraphernalia to

Conceal, etc.; 3) Possession of Marijuana; and 4) Possession of Paraphernalia. The record reflects

Plaintiff was represented by counsel during these proceedings.

Plaintiff has not alleged his convictions have been invalidated by the highest state court or

in federal habeas proceeding. His claims concerning his conviction are therefore barred by Heck.

Plaintiff’s illegal search claims are also Heck-barred. While a § 1983 action for illegal search is

not categorically barred by Heck,7 in this case, Plaintiff pled guilty to possessing drugs that were

recovered in the search. Therefore, a determination that the search was invalid would undermine

the validity of his conviction, in contravention of Heck.

Plaintiff may not use the civil rights statutes as a substitute for habeas corpus relief. In

other words, he cannot seek relief pursuant to § 1983 relating to his arrest and his subsequent

confinement. See e.g., Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997); Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411

U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (habeas corpus is the sole federal remedy for prisoners attacking the validity

of their conviction or confinement). Accordingly, I recommend Defendants Dorman and Brown

be granted summary judgment as Plaintiff’s claims against them are barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

7Error! Main Document Only.In footnote seven, the Supreme Court in Heck explained a damages action for an

illegal search does not necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n. 7. Specifically, the

Court said: “a suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search may lie even if the challenged search

produced evidence that was introduced in a state criminal trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiff's still-outstanding

conviction. Because of doctrines like independent source and inevitable discovery, and especially harmless error,

such a § 1983 action, even if successful, would not necessarily imply that the plaintiff's conviction was unlawful. In

order to recover compensatory damages, however, the § 1983 plaintiff must prove not only that the search was

unlawful, but that it caused him actual, compensable injury, which, we hold today, does not encompass the "injury"

of being convicted and imprisoned (until his conviction has been overturned).” Id. The Eighth Circuit has interpreted

this footnote to create a general exception from Heck for Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claims.

See, Simmons v. O'Brien, 77 F.3d 1093, 1095 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Because harmless error analysis is applicable to the

admission at trial of coerced confessions, judgment in favor of Simmons on this § 1983 action will not necessarily

demonstrate the invalidity of his conviction.").

C. Seizure of Property

Plaintiff claims Defendants Dorman and Brown violated his constitutional rights when they

took $1490 in cash from his residence and failed to return it. First, there is no question the

government can seize property as evidence of a crime. See Jackson v. United States, 526 F.3d

394, 397 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that a Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) motion for return of evidence is

properly denied if, inter alia, “the government’s need for the property as evidence continues”).

Second, Defendants Dorman and Brown deny they took any money from Plaintiff or his residence

and Plaintiff has provided with the Court with a state court order which orders the return of the

money.

Even if the Court assumes for purposes of the summary judgment motion that Defendants

Dorman and Brown did unlawfully take and retain cash belonging to Plaintiff, the Supreme Court

has held that an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state or county employee

does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirement of the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment so long as a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss is available.

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). Arkansas law provides a post-deprivation remedy for a

loss of property in the form of an action for the tort of conversion. See Brown v. Blake, 86 Ark.

App. 107, 161 S.W. 3d 298 (2004). Because there exists a meaningful post-deprivation remedy

for Plaintiff’s alleged loss, Plaintiff does not have a valid federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for the seizure of $1490 in cash fails as a matter of law.

D. Official Capacity Claims

Plaintiff also sues Defendants Dorman and Brown in their official capacities. Under §

1983, a defendant may be sued in either his individual capacity, or in his official capacity, or claims

may be stated against a defendant in both his individual and his official capacities. Gorman v.

Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 1998). Official capacity claims are “functionally equivalent

to a suit against the employing governmental entity.” Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d

1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010). In other words, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Defendants

Dorman and Brown are treated as claims against their employer – Hempstead County and/or the

DTF. See Murray v. Lene, 595 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2010).

“[I]t is well established that a municipality [or county] cannot be held liable on a

respondeat superior theory, that is, solely because it employs a tortfeasor.” Atkinson v. City of

Mountain View, Mo., 709 F.3d 1201, 1214 (8th Cir. 2013). To establish liability on the part of

Hempstead County or the DTF under section 1983, “plaintiff must show that a constitutional

violation was committed pursuant to an official custom, policy, or practice of the governmental

entity.” Moyle v. Anderson, 571 F.3d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any policy, practice, or custom of Hempstead County or the

DTF contributed to the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Defendants fail as a matter of law. Id. 8

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, I recommend Defendants Dorman and Brown’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (ECF No. 65) be GRANTED and all individual and official capacity claims

against them be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

All other claims in this matter were previously dismissed (ECF No. 48) or are

recommended for dismissal (ECF Nos. 89, 90), I therefore recommend this entire case be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

8 Because the Court has found Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights it is not necessary to

address the issue of qualified immunity.

The parties have fourteen days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation in

which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court.

DATED this 11th day of May 2020.

/s/ Barry A. Bryant

HON. BARRY A. BRYANT

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE