Wilson v. Arkansas Department of Human Services

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CENTRAL DIVISION

LAKEYSIA WILSON PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 4:22-cv-00775-LPR

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF

HUMAN SERVICES, Division of

Youth Services DEFENDANT

ORDER

In this case, Plaintiff alleges race and sex discrimination as well as a violation of the Equal

Pay Act.1 Defendant has moved to strike the Amended Complaint.2 Defendant has also moved to

dismiss the entire case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.3 For

efficiency’s sake, the Court will address the requests in reverse order.

First up is the 12(b)(6) dismissal request. A significant portion of that request should be

granted—regardless of which version of the Complaint counts as the operative version. For the

reasons asserted on pages 7–8 of Defendant’s Brief, Defendant is immune from a § 1983 suit.4 For

the reasons asserted on pages 6–7 of that same Brief, a declaratory judgment would not be legally

appropriate in the circumstances presented by this case.5 The remaining claims require a little

more discussion.

1 See Am. Compl. (Doc. 18). The Amended Complaint makes one oblique reference to a retaliation claim in its

opening paragraph. See id. at 1 (alleging Plaintiff was subjected to unlawful employment practices “on the account

of having opposed discriminatory practices due to her race, sex, and equal pay act”). But the Amended Complaint

never alleges anything that could remotely qualify as a retaliation claim. Indeed, it appears the oblique reference to

such a claim is more of a drafting error than anything else.

2 Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 19).

3 Id.

4 See Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 20) at 7–8.

5 See id. at 6–7.

With respect to Plaintiff’s Title VII race discrimination claim, it is obvious from the face

of her operative Complaint that she failed to properly exhaust. The EEOC Charge—which Plaintiff

attached to her initial Complaint and her Amended Complaint—asserts that: (1) in 2016, a Black

man (a Mr. Messer) was hired into a similar position as her at a higher pay grade making more in

compensation, and (2) in 2018, a Black man (a Mr. Gaston) was rehired at his previous C19 grade

and salary even though Plaintiff had been told in 2015 that her rehire could not be at her old C19

grade and salary.6 Like these two men, Plaintiff is Black.7 Accordingly, nothing in her EEOC

Charge properly complains of, and thereby exhausts, a race discrimination claim.8 Because she

did not properly exhaust such a claim, she may not bring it in this lawsuit.9

With respect to Plaintiff’s Title VII sex discrimination claim and Equal Pay Act claim,

Defendant does not make exhaustion/limitations arguments. Instead, Defendant solely argues that

the operative Complaint defeats itself by “alleg[ing] that [a] male employee, Eug[ene] Lamb,

6 Compl. (Doc. 2) at 4; Am. Compl. (Doc. 18) at 7.

7 See Am. Compl. (Doc. 18) at 2, 7.

8 See id. at 7 (“I was not given substantive reasons for the difference in my pay and the males[’] pay.”)

9 See Stuart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 630–31 (8th Cir. 2000); see also Graham v. Bryce Corp., 348 F. Supp.

2d 1038, 1041 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 15, 2004) (“Exhaustion of administrative remedies under Title VII requires a claimant

to give notice of all claims of discrimination in the initial administrative charge.”). It is true that Plaintiff’s EEOC

Charge noted her belief that her employer “has not carried out [its] pay policies equitably,” and that she “was and

continue[s] to be denied equal wages and equal pay[] due to my race (black)[] and my sex (female) . . . .” Am. Compl.

(Doc. 18) at 7. But, with no specifics to support her conclusory race discrimination allegation, the EEOC Charge did

not sufficiently place her employer on notice of her race discrimination allegations. Cf. Faibisch v. Univ. of Minn.,

304 F.3d 797, 803 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that checking the “sex discrimination” box on the EEOC charge form and

making a conclusory allegation did not establish a reasonable relationship between the facts alleged in the EEOC

charge and a sex discrimination claim), overruled in part on other grounds by Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.,

541 U.S. 369 (2004).

Although not provided by or discussed in the Amended Complaint, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s original Complaint

included a document that discusses race discrimination. See Compl. (Doc. 2) at 7–11. The document is undated. And

Plaintiff never says whether or when this document was submitted to the EEOC. Indeed, a reference to the document

on page 3 of the original Complaint suggests the document is merely “additional explanation” of the claims she is

bringing in the instant lawsuit. Id. at 3. The document lends itself to opposing inferences as to whether it was given

to the EEOC. But, again, even if it was given to the EEOC at some point, there is no indication as to when it was

given to the EEOC (except the document makes clear that it was drafted sometime after the EEOC Charge was filed

and after the Defendant’s responsive Position Statement was submitted). See generally id. at 7–11.

performed substantially identical duties as [Plaintiff] and received equal pay.”10 But the Amended

Complaint does not actually identify Eugene Lamb’s sex. Moreover, as the Defendant

acknowledges, the operative Complaint also alleges that two male employees—specifically

Mr. Gaston and Mr. Messer—were similarly situated to Plaintiff but treated more favorably than

her in terms of the pay.11 The existence of one similarly situated male being paid the same as

Plaintiff may well make things very tough for Plaintiff at the summary judgment stage. But it does

not, on its own, automatically render either the Title VII sex discrimination claim or Equal Pay Act

claim implausible under the Iqbal/Twombly standard.12 At the very least, Defendant has not

developed the legal argument enough to convince the Court otherwise at this stage.13

Now on to the Motion to Strike. The Court will not strike the Amended Complaint.

Defendant is right that Plaintiff did not completely comply with the Order granting Defendant’s

Motion for a More Definite Statement.14 But Plaintiff obviously tried to do what the Court

ordered.15 Perhaps more importantly, now that the § 1983 claim, the declaratory judgment claim,

and the Title VII race discrimination claim are out of the case, the need for fact-to-claim

organization and clarity is greatly reduced. Any facts in the Complaint concerning unequal pay

between men and women go to the two remaining claims: Title VII wage-related sex discrimination

and violation of the Equal Pay Act.

10 Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 20) at 5; see also Am. Compl. Doc. 18) at 3.

11 See Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 20) at 5; Am. Compl. (Doc. 18) at 3–5.

12 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))).

13 The Court has confined itself to addressing the specific argument made by Defendant. The Court is not saying

affirmatively that Plaintiff has stated a viable Title VII sex discrimination claim or Equal Pay Act claim. All the Court

is saying is that Defendant’s specific challenge to the claims lacks merit—at least at this stage of the proceedings.

14 See Order Granting Mot. for More Definite Statement (Doc. 11); Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 20) at 1–2.

15 See generally Am. Compl. (Doc. 18).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, her declaratory judgment claim, and her

Title VII race discrimination claim are dismissed without prejudice. Her Title VII sex

discrimination claim and Equal Pay Act claim remain. The Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to

Strike.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 11th day of July 2024.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE