“Rule 14(c) permits a defendant to implead a third-party defendant for two purposes: (1) to seek contribution or indemnification from the third-party defendant, and (2) to tender the third-party defendant to the plaintiff.”
How later courts described this case
- “Rule 14(c) permits a defendant to implead a third-party defendant for two purposes: (1) to seek contribution or indemnification from the third-party defendant, and (2) to tender the third-party defendant to the plaintiff.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
GERALD PAULK, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Case No. 5:22-cv-15-CLM
TENNESSEE VALLEY
AUTHORITY,
Defendant.
________________________________
JOSEPH MILES, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
TENNESSEE VALLEY Case No. 5:22-cv-105-CLM
AUTHORITY,
Defendant.
__________________________________
TOMMY JONES, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Case No. 5:22-cv-114-CLM
TENNESSEE VALLEY
AUTHORITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Tim Parker moves to dismiss the Electric Power Board of the City
of Scottsboro (“SEPB”) and the City of Scottsboro’s “Fourth Party
Complaints.” (Doc. 151); (doc. 159)..1 Because Parker filed two almost
identical motions asking the court to dismiss two similar claims, the court
1 The court cites the record as it appears in Paulk, et al. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., et al. (5:22-
cv-15-CLM).
resolves the motions together in one opinion. The court DENIES both of
Parker’s pending motions to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
Because this case has an extensive filing history, the record already
contains ample factual summaries. So the court’s factual recitation is
minimal here. The parties involvement is as follows:
• Tim Parker owned the Dixie Delight—a liveaboard houseboat that
caught fire in January 2020.
• The Dixie Delight was berthed at Dock B that Jackson County owns
and maintains.
• SEPB owned and operated the electrical system powering Dock B.
• The City of Scottsboro—through its fire department—inspected and
maintained the electrical system.
• Jackson County built Dock B on land the United States granted by
easement.
• The Tennessee Valley Authority issued the permit authorizing
Jackson County to construct the dock.
The fire started in the Dixie Delight’s inner walls near an electrical
panel. The fire engulfed the houseboat and spread to neighboring vessels.
Because the Dixie Delight was docked closest to the shore, it prevented
occupants of other vessels from escaping the fire. The fire resulted in
deaths, personal injuries, and property destruction.
Shortly after the fire, Plaintiffs filed three state court lawsuits
against Scottsboro and SEPB. A year later, Plaintiffs filed three federal
lawsuits against TVA.2 TVA filed a Third-Party Complaint against
Scottsboro, Jackson County, SEPB, and Parker. (Doc. 118). But TVA
voluntarily dismissed all pending claims against Parker. (Doc. 149).
Scottsboro and SEPB answered TVA’s amended complaint and included
2 The lead case, Paulk, et al. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., et al. (5:22-cv-15-CLM), is consolidated
with Miles v. Tennessee Valley Auth., et al. (5:22-cv-105) and Jones, et al. v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., et al. (5:22-cv-114-CLM).
“Fourth Party Complaints” against Parker. (Doc. 151); (doc. 159). Their
only claim is a right to contribution from Parker for his share of the
liability.
Parker moves to dismiss both Scottsboro and SEPB’s contribution
claims under Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 168); (doc. 169). Parker argues that any
claim Scottsboro or SEPB has against him should have been brought as a
compulsory counterclaim in state court. Parker also claims that
contribution isn’t a standalone cause of action. SEPB and Scottsboro
oppose Parker’s counterclaim theory since TVA wasn’t a party in state
court. They also argue that contribution is a standalone claim under
maritime law.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead
enough facts to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). A claim is plausible on
its face when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. When considering the motion, the court accepts
all factual allegations of the complaint as true and construes them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282,
1284 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
Parker raises two arguments, neither of which compels dismissal.
1. Parker argues that the compulsory counterclaim doctrine bars
SEPB and Scottsboro from bringing a contribution claim in federal court.
(Doc. 168, p. 5); (doc. 169, p. 5); Fed. R. Civ. P. 13. But the court disagrees.
SEPB and Scottsboro couldn’t assert contribution in state court because
TVA wasn’t a party in those actions. And SEPB and Scottsboro request
contribution from Parker only if the court finds them liable on TVA’s
third-party complaint. (Doc. 151, p. 24); (doc.159, p. 18–19). SEPB and
Scottsboro couldn’t have been compelled to assert contribution in state
court because, at that time, they didn’t need to: the need only arose after
TVA asserted claims against them in federal court.
2. Parker also argues that contribution is not a standalone claim.
(Doc. 168, p. 12); (doc. 169, p. 12). But here too Parker is mistaken.
Contribution is a standalone claim in admiralty law. 1 Admiralty & Mar.
Law. § 5:16 (Contribution is a cause of action that arises when a tortfeasor
pays more than his pro rata share of a judgment.”); Ambraco, Inc. v.
Bossclip B.V., 570 F.3d 233, 242 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Rule 14(c) permits a
defendant to implead a third-party defendant for two purposes: (1) to seek
contribution or indemnification from the third-party defendant, and (2) to
tender the third-party defendant to the plaintiff.”). In a case like this
pleaded under Rule 9(h), Rule 14(c)’s plain language allows a defendant
to bring in a third-party defendant for contribution. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(c)(1)
(“If a plaintiff asserts an admiralty or maritime claim under Rule 9(h), the
defendant . . . may, as a third-party plaintiff, bring in a third-party
defendant who may be wholly or partly liable—either to the plaintiff or to
the third-party plaintiff— for remedy over, contribution, or otherwise . . .
.”). The court can use a claim for contribution as the means to evaluate
and assign liability—even without an accompanying tort claim.
The court construes both SEPB and Scottsboro’s contribution claims
as if they were properly pleaded under Rule 14(c). The court treats SEPB
and Scottsboro as defendants turned third-party plaintiffs and Parker as
a third-party defendant. By the plain language of Rule 14(c), SEPB and
Scottsboro are free to use the impleader rules to bring a contribution claim
against Parker. Because SEPB and Scottsboro don’t need to bring
separate tort claims with their contribution claims, Parker’s concerns
about the statute of limitations are also resolved. (Doc. 168, p. 11); (doc.
169, p. 11).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the court DENIES Parker’s
Motions to Dismiss. (Doc. 168); (doc. 169).
DONE and ORDERED on September 30, 2024.
Cony MAZE :
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE