Williams v. Birmingham Water Works Board

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TOMMY D. WILLIAMS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No.: 2:22-cv-1149-ACA

)

BIRMINGHAM WATER )

WORKS BOARD, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Tommy D. Williams worked for Defendant Birmingham Water

Works Board as a utility worker. Due to his degenerative disc disease, Mr. Williams

found that job physically demanding and self-demoted to a less physically

demanding position. The Board then promoted Mr. Williams to a dump truck driver

position. As part of the promotion, the Board reassigned Mr. Williams to a new

department where he reported to Milton Carpenter.

Almost immediately, problems developed. Mr. Carpenter told Mr. Williams

that he did not want Mr. Williams in his department. Mr. Carpenter directed

Mr. Williams to perform manual labor that aggravated his back, and when

Mr. Williams filed a complaint about his treatment, members of his department

“recruited” employees to file complaints about Mr. Williams to get back at him.

The Board investigated Mr. Williams’s complaint against Mr. Carpenter and

the coworkers’ complaints against Mr. Williams. The Board issued a verbal warning

to Mr. Carpenter and placed Mr. Williams on administrative leave “for making

threats toward other employees.” Although Mr. Williams vehemently disputes

making these threats, the Board ultimately terminated Mr. Williams for them.

Mr. Williams then filed suit, alleging that the Board discriminated against him

because of his disability (Count One) and retaliated against him for making his

internal complaint (Count Two) in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act

of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.

§ 701, et seq. (Doc. 1). The Board has moved for summary judgment as to both

claims. (Doc. 24).

The court WILL GRANT the Board’s motion and WILL ENTER

SUMMARY JUDGMENT in its favor as to both claims. Regarding Count One,

even assuming Mr. Williams can establish a prima facie case of discrimination, he

has failed to identify a triable issue of fact regarding pretext. And for Count Two,

Mr. Williams has failed to identity a triable issue of fact on causation, an essential

element of his prima facie case of retaliation.

I. BACKGROUND

When approaching a motion for summary judgment, the court “view[s] the

evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party, and resolve[s] all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the

non-movant.” Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 897 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation

marks omitted). Where the parties have presented evidence creating a dispute of fact,

the court’s description of the facts adopts the version most favorable to the

nonmovant. See id.; see also Cantu v. City of Dothan, 974 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th

Cir. 2020) (“The ‘facts’ at the summary judgment stage are not necessarily the true,

historical facts; they may not be what a jury at trial would, or will, determine to be

the facts.”).

Mr. Williams began his employment with the Board as a utility worker. (Doc.

43-14 at 9). But after about a year in that position, Mr. Williams told his supervisor

he was having back pain and requested a demotion to being a dump truck helper.

(Doc. 43-3 at 1; doc. 43-6; doc. 43-14 at 17, 21). About a year later, the Board

promoted Mr. Williams to a dump truck driver position with Mr. Carpenter as his

new manager. (Doc. 43-14 at 19–20; see also doc. 43-6).

Problems developed immediately. (See, e.g., doc. 43-14 at 16, 23). On

Mr. Williams’s first day, Mr. Carpenter told Mr. Williams “that he didn’t want

[Mr. Williams] in his department” and assigned him equipment used by utility

workers. (Id. at 23). Mr. Williams testified that Mr. Carpenter and members of his

department made him feel like they did not respect his decision to take the initial

voluntary demotion “because [he] had health problems.” (Id. at 16; see also id. at

42).

Mr. Carpenter also “continuously” tried to have Mr. Williams perform utility

worker duties. (Doc. 43-14 at 23). Mr. Williams refused to do so, telling

Mr. Carpenter that he had “back problems.” (Id.). Mr. Carpenter directed

Mr. Williams to produce supporting paperwork of his back problems. (Id.).

Mr. Williams provided Mr. Carpenter with medical documentation which

demonstrated Mr. Williams’s history of back problems. (Id. at 25–26).

In August 2020, Mr. Williams verbally complained to a member of the human

resources department about his treatment and filed a written complaint. (See doc.

43-14 at 29–30; see also doc. 43-6). In the written complaint, Mr. Williams states

that Mr. Carpenter and others were harassing and bullying him “due to [his] decision

to self demote” even though Mr. Williams “made the decision to take the lesser

position for the benefit of [his] personal health.” (Doc. 43-6). As an example of this

harassment and bullying, Mr. Williams stated that Mr. Carpenter assigned him to

work on a leak truck to do a utility worker’s work. (See id.). Mr. Williams testified

that when he made this written complaint, he told a human resources representative

about his back problems and accompanying physical limitations. (Doc. 43-14 at 31).

The Board investigated Mr. Williams’s complaint and issued a verbal warning

to Mr. Carpenter for his conduct. (Doc. 43-7). Although the Board disciplined

Mr. Carpenter in September 2020 (see id.), the Board did not notify Mr. Williams of

that decision until December 18, 2020 (see doc. 43-8). And that same day (December

18), the Board notified Mr. Williams that he was “being placed on administrative

leave effective” immediately “for making threats toward other employees.” (Doc.

43-9).

According to Mr. Williams’s coworkers, Mr. Williams threatened his

coworkers with physical violence, called his coworkers racial slurs, and used other

vulgarity at the workplace. (See docs. 43-22 to 43-25; see also doc. 43-15 at 14; doc.

43-16 at 18–24; doc. 43-17 at 8–9). These coworkers reported these comments to

various members of the Board’s human resources department. (See, e.g., doc. 43-19

at 37–39). And those employees collected these complaints and gave them to

Matthew Pritchett, the Board’s distribution manager. (See, e.g., doc. 43-19 at 38;

doc. 43-10 (indicating Mr. Pritchett’s title)).

Mr. Williams contends that the reported threats were “all made up.” (Doc. 43-

14 at 39; see also id. at 41, 43, 45–46). According to Mr. Williams, a coworker in

his Department “recruited a lot of people” to go into Mr. Carpenter’s office and

complain about him. (Id. at 48). And the reason his coworkers made these statements

was to get Mr. Williams “out of the department” because he made “a complaint about

[Mr.] Carpenter” and could not do a utility worker’s duties. (Id. at 46). In January

2021, the Board notified Mr. Williams that it had decided to terminate his

employment (doc. 43-10), and Mr. Williams’s appeal of that decision was

unsuccessful (doc. 43-11).

II. DISCUSSION

Mr. Williams asserts that he was discriminated against and retaliated against

in violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act when the Board terminated his

employment. (See doc. 12 ¶¶ 35–55). The Board moves for summary judgment as to

all claims against it. (Doc. 24). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

For each claim, the Board and Mr. Williams discuss the sufficiency of

Mr. Williams’s circumstantial evidence under only the McDonnell-Douglas burden

shifting framework. (See doc. 44 at 18, 31–32; doc. 45 at 34–35). Under that

framework, Mr. Williams bears the initial burden of establishing his prima facie

case. See Todd v. Fayette Cnty. Sch. Dist., 998 F.3d 1203, 1215–16, 1219 (11th Cir.

2021). “Once the employee sets forth a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the

employer to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment

decision.” Id. at 1219. “And if the [Board] satisfies that requirement, the burden

shifts back to [Mr. Williams] to show that the reasons the [Board] articulated are

merely a pretext” for discrimination or retaliation. Id. at 1216, 1219.

1. Count One

In Count One, Mr. Williams alleges that the Board “terminated [him] based

on his disability, history of a disability, and/or its perception of him as disabled.”

(Doc. 12 ¶ 40). Although the Board contends that Mr. Williams cannot carry his

initial burden of establishing a prima facie case (doc. 44 at 19–27), the court need

not decide that issue because even if Mr. Williams can carry that burden, he has

failed to show that the Board’s reason for its action was pretextual, see Akridge v.

Alfa Ins. Co., 93 F.4th 1181, 1195 (11th Cir. 2024) (declining to decide whether a

plaintiff had established a prima facie case because the plaintiff’s evidence “still

fail[ed] to show that [her employer’s] legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for her

termination were pretextual”). So the court’s analysis proceeds directly to steps two

and three of the McDonnell-Douglas burden shifting framework.

a. Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reasons

“[A]n employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a

reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not

for a discriminatory reason.” Id. The Board contends that it placed Mr. Williams on

administrative leave and ultimately terminated him for making threats toward other

employees. (Doc. 44 at 27–29; see also docs. 43-9 to 43-11). Although Mr. Williams

vehemently disputes making any threats (see doc. 43-16 at 39, 43, 45–46, 48), the

Board has articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for his termination, see

Baker v. Upson Reg’l Med. Ctr., 94 F.4th 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2024) (observing

that the burden on employers to identity a nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct

“is exceedingly light”) (quotation marks omitted).

b. Pretext

Because the Board has carried its burden to identify a legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct, Mr. Williams must “show that the reason[]

the [Board] articulated [is] merely a pretext for discrimination.” Todd, 998 F.3d at

1216. An employee attempting to rebut an employer’s legitimate, non-

discriminatory reasons for an employment action “must demonstrate such

weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the

employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder

could find them unworthy of credence.” Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga., Inc., 967

F.3d 1121, 1136 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). “A reason is

not pretext for [discrimination] unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and

that [discrimination] was the real reason.” Id. (cleaned up).

Mr. Williams testified that he did not threaten his coworkers. (See doc. 43-16

at 39, 43, 45–46, 48). But “the pretext inquiry centers on the employer’s beliefs, not

the employee’s beliefs and, to be blunt about it, not on reality as it exists outside of

the decision maker’s head.” Todd, 998 F.3d at 1218 (quotation marks omitted).

Mr. Williams has not presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could

conclude that Mr. Pritchett, the decisionmaker, did not believe that Mr. Williams

threatened other employees and therefore cannot show that unlawful discrimination

was the true reason for his termination.

Mr. Williams contends the investigation into these threats was shoddy and its

timing was suspicious (see doc. 45 at 35–36), but “Title VII does not allow federal

courts to second-guess nondiscriminatory business judgments, nor does it replace

employers’ notions about fair dealing in the workplace with that of judges,” Flowers

v. Troup Cnty., Ga., Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 1327, 1338 (11th Cir. 2015) (rejecting an

argument based on an employee’s contention that his employer conducted a “ham-

handed investigation and . . . singl[ed] [the employee] out”). Accordingly, the court

WILL GRANT the Board’s motion and WILL ENTER SUMMARY

JUDGMENT in its favor as to Count One.

2. Count Two

In Count Two, Mr. Williams contends that his termination was in retaliation

for “making complaints of disability harassment and discrimination against”

Mr. Carpenter. (Doc. 12 ¶ 46). “To establish a prima face case of retaliation,

[Mr. Williams] must show (1) [he] participated in conduct that the statute protects;

(2) [he] suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the protected conduct and

the adverse employment action are causally related.” Todd, 998 F.3d at 1219. The

Board challenges Mr. Williams’s ability to establish the first and third elements. (See

doc. 44 at 33–35). Because the court agrees with the Board that Mr. Williams has

not identified a triable issue of fact on causation, the court does not decide whether

Mr. Williams participated in conduct that the statute protects. See Frazier-White v.

Gee, 818 F.3d 1249, 1258 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that a district court “properly

granted summary judgment on [the employee’s] retaliation claim” where “there

[was] no evidence to support causation”).

The Board argues that Mr. Williams’s complaint was not causally connected

to his termination because more than five months elapsed between the complaint and

Mr. Williams’s termination. (Doc. 44 at 34). In response, Mr. Williams highlights

that only three months elapsed between his complaint and his placement on

administrative leave and that the Board notified him of the outcome from his internal

complaint on the same date that the Board placed him on administrative leave. (Doc.

45 at 33–34).

Under controlling precedent, “mere temporal proximity, without more, must

be very close” to establish the requisite causal connection. Thomas v. Cooper

Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). And

“[a] three to four month disparity between the statutorily protected expression and

the adverse employment action is not enough.” Id. Here, Mr. Williams complained

about his treatment on August 28, 2020. (See doc. 43-6). He was placed on

administrative leave on December 18, 2020 (doc. 43-9) and terminated in January

2021 (doc. 43-10). The temporal proximality between Mr. Williams’s complaint and

the adverse employment actions is not close enough, standing alone, to establish

causation. See Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364.

Mr. Williams tries to get around this precedent by highlighting the suspect

nature of the investigation into his coworker’s false complaints about him. (See doc.

45 at 36). But as described above, Mr. Williams has not identified any evidence from

which a reasonable jury could find that the relevant decisionmaker, i.e.,

Mr. Pritchett, had any knowledge that his coworker’s complaints were false,

participated in the fabrication of these statements, or was otherwise motivated to

retaliate against Mr. Williams for his internal complaint. See Todd, 998 F.3d at 1219;

Frazier-White, 818 F.3d at 1258. Accordingly, the court WILL GRANT the

Board’s motion and WILL ENTER SUMMARY JUDGMENT in its favor as to

Count Two.

Hl. CONCLUSION

The court WILL GRANT the Board’s motion and WILL ENTER

SUMMARY JUDGMENT in its favor as to all claims asserted against it.

DONE and ORDERED this August 5, 2024.

fo

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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