Adams v. HGC Riverchase LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ELAINE ADAMS, }

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Plaintiff, }

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v. } Case No.: 2:23-cv-1540-RDP

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HGC RIVERCHASE, LLC, }

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Defendant. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Elaine Adams’s Amended Motion for

Reconsideration. (Doc. # 26). The Motion has been fully briefed. (Docs. # 26, 27, 30). For the

reasons discussed below, the Motion (Doc. # 26) is DENIED.

I. Background

Tragically, on August 22, 2023, eighteen-year-old Reginald D. Adams drowned at the

Riverchase Country Club after going down a slide connected to the pool into twelve feet of

water. (Doc. # 1 ¶ 5). On November 13, 2023, his mother, Plaintiff Elaine Adams, filed this

action against Defendant HGC Riverchase, LLC, the company that owned, operated, and

controlled the premises and pool at the Riverchase Country Club. (Doc. # 1). The original

Complaint asserted five causes of action against Defendant: (1) Count I – Negligence; (2) Count

II – Wantonness; (3) Count III – Negligent Hiring, Training, and Supervision; (4) Count IV –

Wanton Hiring, Training, and Supervision; and (5) Count V – Negligence Per Se. (Id.).

On January 4, 2024, Defendant responded to the Complaint by filing a Motion to

Dismiss. (Doc. # 4). The Motion sought dismissal of Counts I and II in part and Count V in its

entirety for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Id. at 2-3). In

addition, the Motion sought to dismiss the entire Complaint without prejudice under Rules

8(a)(2) and 10(b) as a shotgun pleading. (Id. at 4-11).

On May 23, 2024, the court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting in part

and denying in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (Docs. # 22; 23). The court denied

Defendant’s request to partially dismiss Counts I and II. (Docs. # 22 at 10; 23). However, the

court dismissed Plaintiff’s negligence per se claim without prejudice because Plaintiff had not

pled that Defendant violated a statute that was enacted to protect a specific class of people to

which the deceased belong. (Docs. # 22 at 7-8; 23). In addition, the court dismissed the

Complaint in its entirety without prejudice as a shotgun pleading but granted Plaintiff the

opportunity to file an amended complaint to remedy the pleading deficiencies. (Docs. # 22 at 13-

14; 23).

On June 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amended Motion for Reconsideration. (Doc. # 26).1

The Amended Motion for Reconsideration requests the court to reconsider only its decision to

dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence per se claim.

II. Legal Standard

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically authorize motions for

reconsideration, but they are common enough in practice. However, “[i]n the interests of finality

and conservation of scarce judicial resources, reconsideration of an order is an extraordinary

remedy and is employed sparingly.” Gougler v. Sirius Products, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1185,

1189 (S.D. Ala. 2005); see also Spellman v. Haley, 2004 WL 866837, *2 (M.D. Ala. 2002).

1 Plaintiff inadvertently filed a draft version of her Motion for Reconsideration on June 6, 2024. (Doc. #

24). However, the next day, Plaintiff filed an Amended Motion for Reconsideration that substituted the draft version

of the motion with the final version. (Doc. # 26).

Although this court has discretion to reconsider its orders, motions for reconsideration are

disfavored. See, e.g., Iberiabank v. Case Constr., LLC, 2015 WL 5457889, *2 (S.D. Ala. 2015).

Courts have made clear that a motion to reconsider is not a vehicle to relitigate old

matters, assert novel arguments, or present evidence that could have been raised previously:

Far too often, litigants operate under the flawed assumption that any adverse

ruling … confers upon them license to move for reconsideration, vacatur,

alteration or amendment as a matter of course, and to utilize that motion as a

platform to criticize the judge’s reasoning, to litigate issues that have already been

decided, to champion new arguments that could have been made before, and

otherwise to attempt a “do-over” to erase a disappointing outcome. This is

improper.

Garrett v. Stanton, 2010 WL 320492, *2 (S.D. Ala. 2010); see also Michael Linet, Inc. v. Vill. of

Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding that a motion to reconsider may not

be used to “relitigate old matters, raise argument[s] or present evidence that could have been

raised prior to the entry of judgment.”); Hughes v. Stryker Sales Corp., 2010 WL 2608957, *2

(S.D. Ala. 2010) (rejecting notion that motions to reconsider “are appropriate whenever the

losing part thinks the [d]istrict [c]ourt got it wrong.”).

Motions to reconsider “cannot be brought solely to relitigate issues already raised.”

Harris v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 433 F. App’x 824, 825 (11th Cir. 2011). Instead, as a general rule,

“[a] motion to reconsider is only available when a party presents the court with evidence of an

intervening change in controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct

clear error or manifest injustice.” Busby v. JRHBW Realty, Inc., 2006 WL 8446617, at *1 (N.D.

Ala. 2006); see also Harris, 433 F. App’x at 825.

III. Discussion

Plaintiff’s Motion urges the court to reconsider the dismissal of her negligence per se

claim without prejudice. Because this request centers around a prior ruling, the court briefly

summarizes the applicable caselaw and the inquiry relevant to its prior decision before

evaluating Plaintiff’s arguments for reconsideration.

“The doctrine of negligence per se or negligence as a matter of law arises from the

premise that the legislature may enact a statute that replaces the common-law standard of the

reasonably prudent person with an absolute, required standard of care.” Parker Bldg. Servs. Co.,

Inc. v. Lightsey ex rel. Lightsey, 925 So. 2d 927, 930-31 (Ala. 2005). “When the legislature

adopts such a statute, anyone who violates it and causes an injury to a person whom the statute

was intended to protect is liable for negligence per se.” Id. at 931. However, to succeed on a

claim of negligence per se, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the statute the defendant is charged

with violating was enacted to protect a class of persons to which the plaintiff belonged; (2) the

plaintiff’s injury was the kind of injury contemplated by the statute; (3) the defendant violated

the statute; and (4) the defendant’s violation of the statute proximately caused the plaintiff’s

injury. Dickinson v. Land Devs. Constr. Co., Inc., 882 So. 2d 291, 302 (Ala. 2003) (citing Elder

v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 479 So. 2d 1243, 1248 (Ala. 1985)).

Count V of Plaintiff’s original Complaint asserted a claim for negligence per se on the

basis that Defendant violated applicable rules and regulations for a public pool of the size

involved in this case by failing to have a lifeguard chair staffed by a certified lifeguard. (Doc. #

1). However, as noted in the court’s opinion, Plaintiff failed to cite to a single rule or regulation

to support this particular contention in the Complaint. (Doc. # 22 at 5). Instead, it was not until

she filed her response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiff alleged -- for the first time

-- that Defendant violated a Shelby County, Alabama regulation for swimming pools.

(h) Lifeguard Chair

1. All Class A and B swimming pools having a water surface area of

more than 2,250 square feet shall be provided with at least one

elevated lifeguard platform or chair. …

2. The elevated lifeguard platforms or chairs shall be so located as to

provide a clear, unobstructed view of the bottom of the swimming pool

in the area under surveillance. All chairs must be manned during hours

of operation with a certified person trained in lifesaving by the

American Red Cross or equivalent program.

(Doc. # 12 at 4-5, citing Rules Governing the Construction, Maintenance and Operation of

Public Swimming Pools and Spas for Shelby County, Alabama, Chapter 5, Section 8(h) (2019)

(hereinafter “Shelby County Rules”)).

After evaluating the Shelby County Rules, the court held that Plaintiff’s claim was due to

be dismissed because she failed to satisfy the first prong of the negligence per se analysis: that is,

she could not show that the Shelby County Rules were enacted to protect a class of people to

which Reginald Adams belonged. (Doc. # 22). The court noted that the stated purpose of the

Shelby County Rules was to protect the general public:

(1) Purpose. It is the intent of the Shelby County Board of Health that these rules,

in the interest of the public’s public health and safety, shall define the terms

used herein; require written approval before construction or repair of pools

and spas; require permits for operation of pools and spas; establish health and

sanitation standards for pools and spas; regulate the operation thereof; and

provide for the enforcement of these regulations.

Shelby County Rules, Chapter 1, Section 1 (2019) (emphasis added). And, because the class of

persons must be narrower than the general public for the first prong of the negligence per se

analysis to be satisfied, the court found that dismissal of the claim was warranted. (Doc. # 22);

Lightsey, 925 So. 2d at 931 (citing Thomas Learning Ctr., Inc. v. McGuirk, 766 So. 2d 161, 171

(Ala. Civ. App. 1998)). However, the court made clear that Count V was dismissed without

prejudice in the event Plaintiff was able to locate a different statute upon which to base her

negligence per se claim. (Doc. # 22 at 8).

Plaintiff now urges the court to reconsider its finding that the Shelby County Rules do not

apply to a specific class of persons but instead to the public at large. As noted above, it is

generally improper for a plaintiff to use a motion to reconsider to relitigate old matters or bring

forward new arguments or evidence that could have been raised earlier. See Michael Linet, Inc.,

408 F.3d at 763. Instead, as a general rule, “[a] motion to reconsider is only available when a

party presents the court with evidence of an intervening change in controlling law, the

availability of new evidence, or the need to correct clear error or manifest injustice.” Busby, 2006

WL 8446617, at *1. Here, Plaintiff does not allege that the Shelby County Rules have been

modified since the court’s ruling or that new evidence has emerged that was previously

unavailable; instead, Plaintiff argues that the court erred in interpreting the Shelby County Rules

and finding that they did not apply to a limited subclass of individuals to which the deceased

belonged. She believes this to be true for three reasons. The court considers each of those, in

turn.

First, Plaintiff argues that the Shelby County Rules are analogous to motor vehicle laws

in the state of Alabama that apply to a limited subset of individuals. In making this argument,

Plaintiff points to the Supreme Court of Alabama’s decision in Lightsey. 925 So. 2d at 927.

There, the court noted that, although traffic laws are applicable to the general public at large,

“the rules of the road were passed for the benefit of a particular class of people who use the

public streets and highways for travel.” Id. at 932 (internal quotations omitted). Therefore, the

Lightsey court made clear that the purpose of the rules of the road in Alabama were to protect a

class of persons distinguishable from the general public, and that, as a result, a negligence per se

claim may be brought under them. Id. Plaintiff argues the court should find the same to be true

here.

But, this argument has been repeatedly rejected by other courts within the state. In the

Lightsey decision, the Alabama Supreme Court noted that, unlike the rules of the road, building

codes are not enacted to protect a class of persons that is distinguishable from the general public.

Id. This point was echoed in Benefield v. International Paper Co., when the court made clear

that traffic laws are in their own distinct category and are therefore not comparable to statutes

regulating other industries in the state:

As the Defendant points out, in Parker Building Servs. Inc., the court expressly

acknowledged that violation of certain rules of the road designed to protect users

of the road is considered negligence per se, but stated that the “rules of the road

were passed for ‘the benefit of a particular class of people who use the public

streets and highway for travel.’” Parker Building Servs., 925 So. 2d at 932

(quoting Simpson v. Glenn, 264 Ala. 519, 88 So. 2d 326, 327 (Ala. 1956)). The

laws governing road ways in Alabama have, therefore, been placed in a special

category by the Alabama Supreme Court which does not include the laws

regulating the paper mill at issue in this case. The law in Alabama is that

negligence per se is inapplicable when the purpose of a law allegedly violated

was to protect the general public. Id. at 931.

2009 WL 2601425, at *6 (M.D. Ala. 2009); see also Brantley v. Int’l Paper Co., 2009 WL

2601390, at *4-5 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (finding the same). Therefore, because laws governing the

roadways have been expressly placed in a special category different from any other type of law

in the state of Alabama, Plaintiff’s argument that swimming pool regulations should be evaluated

in the same manner is unpersuasive.

Second, Plaintiff argues that the court should find persuasive the findings of a report and

recommendation in Smith v. Triad of Alabama, LLC, Case No. 1:14-cv-00324-WKW-GMB

(Sept. 2, 2015) (Doc. # 39). There, the plaintiffs brought numerous claims against a hospital in

relation to a breach of their confidential information, including a negligence per se claim for

violating The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). (Doc. # 39 at 3-

4). The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s negligence per se claim on the basis that

HIPAA was not enacted to protect a particular class of citizens, but instead the public at large.

(Id. at 27). The magistrate judge issued a report recommending denial of the motion to dismiss

because the defendant did not cite to any controlling precedent holding that HIPAA was not

intended to protect a particular class of citizens. (Id.). Instead, the magistrate judge, quite

sensibly, concluded that HIPAA was enacted to protect patients who entrust their confidential

information to healthcare providers. (Id. at n.26). Plaintiff argues that the court should apply that

same logic here.

As an initial matter, this is an argument that Plaintiff could have raised in its response to

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and failed to do so; as a result, it is an inappropriate ground for a

motion for reconsideration. See Rossi v. Troy State Univ., 330 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1249 (M.D Ala.

2002) (“Additional facts and arguments that should have been raised in the first instance are not

appropriate grounds for a motion for reconsideration.”). But the court’s ruling does not stand on

that point alone because, in any event, the analysis in Smith is irrelevant to this case. Notably,

HIPAA does not have an enumerated purpose of protecting the general public like the Shelby

County Rules; instead, the enumerated purpose for the statute simply states, “The requirements

of this subchapter implement sections 1171-1180 of the Social Security Act (the Act), sections

262 and 264 of Public Law 104-191, section 105 of Public Law 110-233, sections 13400-13424

of Public Law 111-5, and section 1104 of Public Law 111-148.” See 45 C.F.R. § 160.101

“Statutory Basis and Purpose.” In contrast, the purpose section of the Shelby County Rules

unambiguously states that the rules were created “in the interest of the public’s public health and

safety.” Shelby County Rules, Chapter 1, Section 1 (2019). Alabama law is clear that in

determining a statute’s purpose, courts must give the words used in the statute their plain,

ordinary, and commonly understood meaning and “interpret the language to mean what it says.”

Lightsey, 925 So. 2d at 931. Therefore, because the plain language of the purpose section

expressly states that the Shelby County Rules were enacted in the interest of the general public,

this matter differs from Smith and the holding there is unpersuasive.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that, even if the stated purpose of the Shelby County Rules

appears to apply to the public at large, the court should find that the defined “scope” of the Rules

expressly limits them to a specific class of individuals. In making this argument, Plaintiff directs

the court to Chapter 1, Section 5 of the Shelby County Rules, which states:

(5) Scope.

(a) These regulations govern Public Swimming Pools and Spas in Shelby

County as they may affect the public’s health and safety.

(b) These rules do not apply to:

1. Residential Swimming Pools

2. Therapeutic chambers drained, cleaned, and refilled after each

individual use; or

3. Natural bodies of water used for swimming.

Shelby County Rules, Chapter 1, Section 5 (2019). Plaintiff argues that this language clearly

limits the Shelby County Rules to a specific class of people: “swimmers” or “persons in

swimming pools.” (Doc. # 26 at 4). The court disagrees, for at least two reasons.

First, as made clear in Lightsey and discussed above, for a violation of a statute or

ordinance to constitute negligence per se, that statute or ordinance must have been enacted to

protect a specific class of persons distinguishable from the general public. 925 So. 2d at 931. In

this case, the Shelby County Rules unambiguously state that they are created “in the interest of

the public’s public health and safety.” Shelby County Rules, Chapter 1, Section 1 (2019).

Therefore, under Alabama law, this stated purpose alone renders a negligence per se claim filed

relying on the Shelby County Rules a non-starter. See Lightsey, 925 So. 2d at 932 (finding that

the stated purpose of the building code that it is enacted for the “public safety, health, and

general welfare” refers to the public generally and bars a negligence per se claim); Thomas

Learning Center, Inc., 766 So. 2d at 171 (holding that the language “in order to safeguard life,

health, and property, and to promote the general public welfare” refers to the general public).

Any other analysis is unnecessary. But, there is more.

Even considering the language related to the “scope” of the Rules, in addition to their

stated purpose, the court reaches the same conclusion. The scope clearly states, “[t]hese

regulations govern Public Swimming Pools and Spas in Shelby County as they may affect the

public’s health and safety.” Shelby County Rules, Chapter 1, Section 5 (2019) (emphasis added).

This language is nearly identical to the language above that was found too broad to apply to a

specific subclass of individuals in Lightsey. 925 So. 2d at 932; see also Thomas Learning Center,

Inc., 766 So. 2d at 171. Although Plaintiff argues that this language limits the Rules to swimmers

and persons in swimming pools (Doc. # 26 at 4), both the law and logic say otherwise. In

Lightsey, the court made clear that a building code does not protect only those who are in a

building, but the public at large, including people who may never enter the building at all.

Lightsey, 766 So. 2d at 932. The same is true for lifeguards and rules at a swimming pool.

Indeed, a lifeguard’s duties often involve monitoring individuals who are out of the pool just as

much as those in it, whether it be through instructions to refrain from running, ensuring sanitary

conditions on the pool deck, or administering first aid. Therefore, despite Plaintiff’s assertions

otherwise, the language of the Rules’ “scope” simply does not suggest that they only apply to

“swimmers.” Instead, the language reiterates that the Rules are enacted for the health and safety

of the public. Shelby County Rules, Chapter 1, Section 5 (2019). After all, it is the public who

would end up swimming in the county’s many pools.

“In the interests of finality and conservation of scare judicial resources, reconsideration

of an order is an extraordinary remedy and is employed sparingly.” Ball v. Brown, 2019 WL

5727438, at *8 (N.D. Ala. 2019) (quoting Gougler, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 1189). Instead, as a

general rule, “[a] motion to reconsider is only available when a party presents the court with

evidence of an intervening change in controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the

need to correct clear error or manifest injustice.” Busby, 2006 WL 8446617, at *1. The court has

employed a more generous standard here. Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s motion is due to be denied.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. # 26) is

DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED this July 10, 2024.

CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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