Woodruff v. Cargle (INMATE 4)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOHN MICHAEL WOODRUFF, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:23-cv-00033-MHH-NAD

)

JOSEPH HEADLEY, Warden, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On June 3, 2024, the magistrate judge filed a report in which he recommended

that the Court dismiss John Michael Woodruff’s § 2254 habeas petition because Mr.

Woodruff has not fully exhausted his constitutional challenges to his state court

criminal conviction. (Doc. 37). Mr. Woodruff has filed objections to the report and

recommendation. (Doc. 40).1

A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings

or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A

district judge must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the

[magistrate judge’s] report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to

1 The magistrate judge gave Mr. Woodruff an extension until June 26, 2024 to file objections.

(Doc. 39). Mr. Woodruff appears to have signed his objections on June 26, 2024. (Doc. 40, p.

11). The Court received Mr. Woodruff’s objections on June 27, 2024. (Doc. 40, p. 1). Mr.

Woodruff is not in custody, so the prison mailbox rule does not apply to his objections. The Court

will consider the merits of Mr. Woodruff’s objections even though the Court received them one

day late.

which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3)

(“The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s

disposition that has been properly objected to.”). A district court’s obligation to

“‘make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed

findings or recommendations to which objection is made,’” 447 U.S. at 673 (quoting

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)), requires a district judge to “‘give fresh consideration to those

issues to which specific objection has been made by a party,’” 447 U.S. at 675

(quoting House Report No. 94-1609, p. 3 (1976)). United States v. Raddatz, 447

U.S. 667 (1980) (italics in Raddatz).

Mr. Woodruff objects to the magistrate judge’s summary of the state criminal

charges and proceedings. (Doc. 40, pp. 2-7). The Court has reviewed the documents

from Mr. Woodruff’s state court proceedings and finds no error in the facts in the

magistrate judge’s summary.

Mr. Woodruff objects to the magistrate judge’s finding that he (Mr. Woodruff)

has not fully exhausted his first ground for federal habeas relief in state court. (Doc.

40, p. 7). As the magistrate judge discussed in his report, for his first ground for

federal habeas relief, Mr. Woodruff asserts that his “constitutionally-defective”

municipal court conviction for indecent exposure could not serve as a “valid factual

predicate” for his subsequent ASORCNA charge and conviction because the

underlying indecent exposure judgment is void. Mr. Woodruff reasons that the

indecent exposure conviction is void because the municipal court that entered that

judgment lacked jurisdiction to impose judgment for a Class A misdemeanor. A

Class A misdemeanor is punishable by up to 12 months of imprisonment, an offense

punishable by a sentence of more than six months must be accompanied by the right

to a jury trial, and jury trials are not available in state municipal courts, hence Mr.

Woodruff’s jurisdictional challenge. (Doc. 1, p. 5; Doc. 2, pp. 6-14).2

Mr. Woodruff acknowledges that he must exhaust in state court his federal

constitutional challenges to his state court conviction before he may present those

challenges in a federal habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1)(A); O’Sullivan v.

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999) (“Before a federal court may grant habeas relief

to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court.”). Mr.

Woodruff argues that his jurisdictional argument is exhausted as a practical matter

and that the State is procedurally barred from arguing that he did not exhaust this

2 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 159 (1968) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment guarantees

a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which—were they to be tried in a federal court—would

come within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee,” but “petty offenses” may be tried without a jury);

Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (“[N]o offense can be deemed a ‘petty offense’ for

purposes of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized.”).

On April 4, 2018, Mr. Woodruff was convicted in Alabaster Municipal Court on a misdemeanor

charge of indecent exposure. (Doc. 17-1, pp. 26, 28). He appealed that conviction to the Circuit

Court of Shelby County for a trial de novo. (Doc. 17-1, pp. 24-25). Under Alabama law, Mr.

Woodruff had to register as a convicted sex offender while awaiting his trial de novo. Alabama

Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act (ASORCNA), § 15-20A-10(a), Code

of Alabama 1975, as amended. On April 20, 2018, while his appeal was pending, Mr. Woodruff

was arrested for failing to register under ASORCNA. (Doc. 17-1, pp. 11, 22).

claim. He also argues that the State has refused to allow him to exhaust his

constitutional argument for relief from his ASORCNA conviction. (Doc. 40, pp. 7-

9).

With respect to practical exhaustion, Mr. Woodruff argues that his

jurisdictional argument in his pre-ASORCNA-conviction mandamus petition, which

he filed after the Shelby County trial court denied his motion to dismiss the

ASORCNA indictment, sufficed for habeas exhaustion because the trial judge

indicated that he had read Mr. Woodruff’s mandamus petition and would have

vacated his rulings if he had found Mr. Woodruff’s mandamus arguments

persuasive. (Doc. 40, pp. 8-9). The Court understands Mr. Woodruff’s thought that,

as a practical matter, the remark from the state trial judge indicates that he considered

Mr. Woodruff’s constitutional argument and rejected it, but the exhaustion

requirement demands more. Mr. Woodruff must present his constitutional challenge

to the ASORCNA charge and conviction clearly and directly to the trial judge. See

e.g., Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (requiring that a petitioner “fairly

present his constitutional claim in each appropriate state court ... for the claim to be

exhausted.”). “It is not sufficient merely that the federal habeas petitioner has been

through the state courts, nor is it sufficient that all the facts necessary to support the

claim were before the state courts or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was

made.” Kelley v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1343–44 (11th Cir. 2004)

(citations omitted).

In any event, “to properly exhaust a claim, the petitioner must ‘fairly present’

every issue raised in his federal petition to the state’s highest court, either on direct

appeal or on collateral review.” Mason v. Allen, 605 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir.

2010) (citing Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989)) (alterations omitted);

see also Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 845 (requiring “one complete round of the state’s

appellate review process.”); Johnson v. Florida, 32 F.4th 1092, 1096 (11th Cir.

2022) (“[A] prisoner must take his claim to the state’s highest court, either on direct

appeal or on collateral review.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

The Court has not found authority that indicates that a request for interlocutory

appellate review of an order denying a motion to dismiss a criminal charge is an

adequate substitute for post-conviction exhaustion. Therefore, Mr. Woodruff’s pre-

conviction mandamus petition does not suffice to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.

Mr. Woodruff contends that the State’s failure to rebut his practical

exhaustion argument serves as an admission that he has adequately exhausted his

first ground for habeas relief, (Doc. 40, pp. 9-10). General rules regarding waiver

and admissions do not operate when a federal statute states that a defendant must

exhaust his constitutional challenges in state court before pursuing those challenges

in federal court. (Doc. 37, pp. 8-11) (discussing statutory exhaustion requirement).

In other words, the State cannot waive the exhaustion requirement. See e.g., Brown

v. Warden of Minn. Corr. Facility - Faribault, No. 22-cv-01122(ECT/BRT), 2022

WL 2974117, at *2 (D. Minn. July 27, 2022) (“Pleading practice in habeas

proceedings is ... specified in federal statutes and the Habeas Rules, making Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 8 inapplicable .... Unlike Rule 8(b)(6) of the civil rules,

neither Rule 5 of the Habeas Rules nor any federal statute provides that an allegation

in a § 2254 petition is deemed admitted if not specifically denied.”) (citations

omitted); Dellinger v. Mays, No. 3:09-CV-104-TAV-DCP, 2018 WL 4102241, at *6

(E.D. Tenn. Aug. 28, 2018) (holding that unlike Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6), habeas rule

5(b) requires that an “answer must address the allegations in the petition” and “must

state whether any claim in the petition is barred by a failure to exhaust state remedies,

a procedural bar, non-retroactivity, or a statute of limitations”).3

Mr. Woodruff’s alternative assertion that the State refuses to allow him to

exhaust his constitutional challenge to the ASORCNA conviction in a Rule 32

petition, (Doc. 40, pp. 7-8), fairs no better under Eleventh Circuit precedent. Mr.

Woodruff has not demonstrated “an absence of available State corrective process[ ]

3 In its initial answer in this matter, the State asserted that Mr. Woodruff had raised his first ground

for habeas relief in his pending Rule 32 petition, but the ground was not exhausted because the

Rule 32 petition still was pending. (Doc. 17, p. 4; Doc. 27, p. 3). After the magistrate judge sought

clarification regarding Mr. Woodruff’s exhaustion of ground one, in its supplemental answer, the

State argued that “[Mr.] Woodruff did not raise his first ground for relief in his currently pending

Rule 32 petition.” (Doc. 28, p. 5). Therefore, the State argued, the first ground is untimely and

has not been properly exhausted. (Doc. 28, pp. 5, 7-8).

or ... circumstances [] that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the

applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i), (ii). Mr. Woodruff has not explained why

he cannot now raise his first ground for habeas relief in his pending Rule 32 petition.4

For these reasons, the Court overrules Mr. Woodruff’s objections, adopts the

magistrate judge’s report, and accepts the magistrate judge’s recommendation.

Consistent with the recommendation, by separate order the court will dismiss Mr.

Woodruff’s petition for writ of habeas corpus without prejudice to allow him to

completely exhaust in state court his constitutional challenges to his state conviction.

Because the petition does not present issues that are debatable among jurists of

reason, a certificate of appealability is denied. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000); Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254

Proceedings.

The Clerk of Court shall please term Doc. 37.

4 Mr. Woodruff filed a declaratory judgment action in the Montgomery County Circuit Court in

which he asserted that the municipal court indecent exposure conviction was unconstitutional.

That state circuit court converted the action to a Rule 32 petition and transferred the matter to the

Circuit Court of Shelby County. (Doc. 33-1). In earlier filings, Mr. Woodruff has asserted that

the transferred declaratory judgment action, though “wrongly converted and transferred,” should

be “viewed as a consensual relating-back amendment of the pre-existing Rule 32 petition.” (Doc.

33, pp. 8-9 & n.5). Mr. Woodruff stated that because of the merger of his civil complaint with his

Rule 32 proceeding, “Ground One was indeed raised in a state Rule-32 proceeding . . . .” (Doc.

33, pp. 8-9).

DONE and ORDERED this July 16, 2024.

J DELINE HUGHES HAIKALA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE