Garmon v. Google LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

TRENTON ROGERS GARMON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:23-cv-1525-CLM

GOOGLE LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Trenton Rogers Garmon sues Google LLC (“Google”) and Alphabet

Inc. (“Alphabet”) (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging Defendants

subjected him to “systematic algorithm defamation” because searches on

Google News for Garmon’s name only return results with links to negative

articles critical of Garmon. (Doc. 19). Defendants ask the court to dismiss

Garmon’s First Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). (Doc. 25). As explained below, the court

GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss but will allow Garmon to amend

his Complaint on or before July 12, 2024.

BACKGROUND

The court takes these facts from Garmon’s First Amended

Complaint and assumes all alleged facts are true. FED. R. CIV.

P. 12(b)(6); see, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (at

the motion-to-dismiss stage, “the complaint is construed in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, and all facts alleged by the plaintiff are accepted

as true”).

Garmon is a divorced 44-year-old honorably discharged veteran

with three college degrees and 17 years of service as a pastor or

missionary. (See Doc. 19, ¶¶ 1-12). Garmon also practiced as an attorney,

with several wins in high-profile cases. (Doc. 19, ¶ 12).

Garmon says that if you search his name on engines like Bing,

Yahoo, and DuckDuckGo, you will find news articles about these positive

aspects of his life, along with some negative stories. (Doc. 19, ¶ 14). If you

search Garmon’s name on Google, however, all of the positive aspects of

his life and career are suppressed. Instead, Google News exclusively lists

bad news stories, an unflattering photo, and incorrect martial

information. (Doc. 19, ¶¶ 11, 13-14).

Garmon says the exclusivity of the negative coverages stems from

use of a Google algorithm that subjects white American Christian men to

“systematic algorithm defamation” when collecting third-party news

stories. (See Doc. 19, ¶ 6). Garmon thus sues Defendants in three counts:

• Count I: Defamation & Defamation Per Quod. Garmon

maintains that Defendants “have created, developed,

managed, and organically coded a ‘negative defaming

algorithm’ or a ‘destructive algorithm’ designed to target

Garmon and politically conservative Christian men, (doc. 19,

¶¶ 43-58). Specifically, Garmon asserts that Google’s

negative algorithm “intentionally suppress[es] positive

articles and search results,” (doc. 19, ¶ 49);

• Count II: Breach of Contract. Google allegedly breached

its “User Agreement” with Garmon by failing to eliminate

“Pure Spam” from its search results regarding Garmon, (doc.

19, ¶¶ 59-75); and,

• Count III: Petition and Claim for Injunctive Relief.

Garmon seeks an order requiring Google to (1) provide

balanced search results about Garmon and (2) list Garmon’s

marital status as “Divorced” and/or “Divorced, Annulment

Pending” on the Google Knowledge Panel1 regarding

Garmon, (doc. 19, ¶¶ 59-75).

1 “Knowledge panels are information boxes that appear on Google when you search for

entities (people, places, organizations, things) that are in the Knowledge Graph,” a

knowledge base from which Google serves relevant information in an infobox beside its

search results; knowledge panels are automatically generated, and information that

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Rule

8 does not require “detailed factual allegations,” but does demand more

than “an unadorned, ‘the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me’

accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Mere “labels and

conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”

are insufficient. Id.

Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). “To

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint states a facially plausible claim

for relief when the plaintiff pleads facts that permit a reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id.

DISCUSSION

Defendants ask the court to dismiss all three counts for failure to

state a claim. (Doc. 25). As a preliminary matter, Garmon’s First Amended

Complaint excludes Alphabet as a defendant, so the court finds that all

claims against Alphabet are dismissed. (Doc. 19). Accordingly, the court

will address each count against Google in turn.

Count I: Defamation and Defamation Per Quod

In Count I, Garmon alleges that Google defamed him, in violation

of Alabama law, by collecting and posting only negative articles about him

in Google News search results. (Doc. 19, ¶ 44).

appears in a knowledge panel comes from various sources across the web.” About

knowledge panels, GOOGLE,

https://support.google.com/knowledgepanel/answer/9163198?hl=en (last visited June

24, 2024).

As Garmon notes in Count I, (doc. 19, ¶ 47), to prove defamation

under Alabama law, Garmon must ultimately prove (1) “a false and

defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff”; (2) unprivileged

publication of the defamatory statement to a third party; (3) “fault

amounting to at least negligence”; and (4) in claims for defamation per

quod, special damages caused by the publication of the statement.

Dolgencorp, LLC v. Spence, 224 So.3d 173, 186 (Ala. 2016); see Byrdsong

v. A&E Television Networks, LLC, 4:21-cv-00607-CLM, 2021 WL 6050687,

at *3 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 21, 2021). If Garmon is deemed a “public figure, or

limited-purpose public figure,” the First Amendment also requires clear

and convincing evidence that Google acted with “‘actual malice’—that is,

with knowledge that [the statement] was false or with reckless disregard

of whether it was false or not.” Cottrell v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Ass’n, 975

So.2d 306, 333 (Ala. 2007) (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.

254, 280 (1964)).

The court needn’t decide whether Sullivan’s actual malice standard

applies because Garmon fails to plead sufficient facts to sustain a viable

defamation claim for private citizens. While Garmon sufficiently pleads

facts that would allow a reasonable juror to find that the articles collected

by Google News put Garmon in a negative light and hurt him emotionally

and financially, Garmon does not plead facts that would prove the articles

are false—a necessary element of defamation. Google links articles

written by other entities that report negative events in Garmon’s life that

actually happened. While Garmon says that certain statements within the

posted articles “are not true but presented as facts,” (doc. 19, ¶ 44), he

does not identify the false statements that Google re-posted in Count I.2

Without proving that Google published a particular false statement,

Garmon cannot prove defamation. See Byrdsong, 2021 WL 6050687, at *3-

2 In his Statement of the Facts, Garmon alleges that Google’s Knowledge Panel falsely

claims he is married, rather than divorced and seeking annulment.(Doc. 19, ¶¶ 15, 19).

But Count I, (doc. 19, ¶ 43), focuses solely on the algorithm that produces search results

in Google News, not the Knowledge Panel, so this false fact is not relevant to Count I.

Plus, the court questions whether being wrongly listed as married is defamatory under

Alabama law. Regardless, Garmon may re-plead this issue in his Second Amended

Complaint if it persists. (The court notes that, at the time of this opinion, Google

appears to have removed Garmon’s marital status from the Knowledge Panel.).

4 (“plaintiffs must allege (with specificity) that the defendants made a

particular statement or statements about a particular plaintiff”); Coral

Ridge Ministries Media, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 6 F.4th 1247, 1252-53

(11th Cir. 2021).

Count II: Breach of Contract

In Count II, Garmon alleges Google breached the terms of its User

Agreement with Garmon. (Doc. 19, ¶ 69). But the breach is hard to

determine, as Count II starts with a discussion of Google’s failure to

remove articles about Garmon’s use of marijuana, which Garmon says

was permitted because he has autism and chronic pain from his military

service. (Doc. 19, ¶ 59). Garmon says this violated Google’s agreement to

move certain articles to a “Pure Scam” category and, in his case, results

in discrimination against whites, persons with autism, and Irish-

Cherokee Catholics. (Doc. 19, ¶ 59).

Count II then shifts to a discussion of an Above the Law editorial

about Garmon’s appearance on MSNBC. The author of that editorial, as

Garmon puts it, called him a “white-ally bigot.” (Doc. 19, ¶ 62). Garmon

claims this article falsely labeled him a bigot and resulted in him being

the victim of police brutality. (Doc. 19, ¶¶ 66-68).

There are other tangents within Count II, including discussions

about former state Chief Justice Roy Moore and former Senator Doug

Jones. (See Doc. 19, ¶ 69). The court needn’t discuss those further to find

that Count II is a shotgun pleading. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); FED. R.

CIV. P. 10(b); Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1356 (11th Cir.

2018); Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313,

1321 (11th Cir. 2015).

If Garmon decides to re-plead a breach of contract claim, that Count

or Counts must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief,” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), and be

“limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” FED. R. CIV.

P. 10(b). To be viable, the single set of circumstances must ultimately

establish the elements of a state-law breach-of-contract claim: (1) the

existence of a valid contract binding the parties, (2) the plaintiff’s

performance under the contract; (3) the defendant’s nonperformance; and

(4) damages.’” Harp Law, LLC v. LexisNexis, 196 So. 3d 1219, 1224 (Ala.

Civ. App. 2015). That means, among other things, Garmon needs to

explicitly plead/include the terms of the contract between him and Google.

Count III: Petition and Claim for Injunctive Relief

Garmon’s request for injunctive relief is not an independent claim;

it rises and falls with the substantive counts. Fowler v. Goodman Mfg. Co.

L.P., 2014 WL 7048581, at *10 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 12, 2014). Because the court

dismisses Counts I and II, it must also dismiss Count III.

—

In sum, the court will dismiss all three counts as pleaded. The court

will do so without prejudice, giving Garmon one more chance to plead a

viable claim(s) and not a shotgun pleading. The court reminds Garmon

that under federal law, a shotgun pleading is any of these four things: (1)

a complaint that contains multiple counts where each adopts the

allegations of all preceding counts, (2) a complaint that is “replete with

conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any

particular cause of action, ” (3) a complaint that does not separate “into a

different count each cause of action or claim for relief, ” and (4) a complaint

that asserts “multiple claims against multiple defendants without

specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or

omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought

against.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321-23.

Garmon’s First Amended Complaint falls within some, if not all, of

these categories. If Garmon decides to file another complaint, the court

urges Garmon to, among other things:

• Write distinct counts that include only the facts and allegations

that apply to that count.

• Not start each count with an adoption of everything that came

before, as doing so violates the rule above.

• For defamation, specify what statements Google published that

were false;

• For breach of contract, specify the exact terms of a contract that

Google violated and how Google violated them.

The failure to address these and other issues in Garmon’s next complaint

will result in the dismissal of his case with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Garmon’s First Amended Complaint, (doc. 25). Garmon may file

a second amended complaint that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and Eleventh Circuit precedent by July 12, 2024. If Garmon

fails to amend the complaint by July 12th, or if he files another amended

complaint that does not comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

and Eleventh Circuit precedent, the court will dismiss this case with

prejudice.

If Garmon amends his operative Complaint, Google must respond

on or before August 2, 2024. If Google files a Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss,

the court will enter a briefing schedule. Pursuant to the court’s order

staying planning conference and related rules, (doc. 18), the court will not

order discovery until the court rules on any motion to dismiss.

The court will enter a separate order that carries out this ruling and

dismisses Garmon’s claims against Google without prejudice.

The court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to DISMISS Alphabet Inc.

as a defendant and send this Memorandum Opinion to Garmon at his

address of record.

DONE and ORDERED on June 24, 2024.

COREY L.MAZE ©

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE